OK, here's a couple of points that I was trying to avoid in the FC thread. Note that I haven't actually read everyone's comment in this thread yet.
- The fall of the Roman Empire is the best-known of many historical examples of slow collapses.
- The fall of the Soviet Union is an example of a single "crisis" event. The population of Russia declined (due to mortality, low birth rates, and emigration), some regions broke away, and a new less complex government eventually patched things together.[/quote]
Firstly, neither of these historical situations appear to be in any way relevant. The Roman empire may have declined (although parts of it were still around by the Renaissance), but the rest of the world barely noticed. In particular, it's problems were not due to a lack of resources - the Romans did not run out of wood or forget how to make steel. Similarly, the Soviet Union may be gone, but Russia remains one of the richest and most advanced nations on the planet, and indeed is still one of the major sources of resources for the rest of the world. Importantly, in neither case did the rest of the world particularly care (in terms of civilisation rather than politics). The fall of Rome did nothing to the technological level or living conditions of those in, say, China, and the fall of the USSR arguably actually improved things for those living there.
From what I understand of the conference you went to, the hypothesis is that
modern industrial civilisation will collapse, not just that one or two countries will do so. As far as I am aware, no such event has ever occurred in all of human history. Appeals to "it happened before" are therefore entirely irrelevant, because it simply didn't.
- The collapse can also be understood in basic Malthusian terms: an organism that stumbled upon an accumulation of an exploitable resource, used it to overrun its normal environmental limits, and faces the inevitable consequences of that once the resource is depleted. The industrial and green revolutions were only temporary reprieves, because they depend on finite fossil fuel resources.
Getting to the more sciency end, this is again where the claims just don't hold up. The whole point of the "green revolution" (is there actually any solid definition for that?) is that it is absolutely not based on fossil fuels. Hydro power has actually been around for longer than we've been using fossil fuels, and all renewable energy sources can output more energy than they take to build. The fact that we largely use the power from fossil fuels to construct them currently is simply an artefact of our power based currently consisting mainly of fossil fuels. We would be entirely capable of building more renewables if we started off with a base consisting solely of renewables.
It's therefore simply not true to describe any collapse as inevitable. Resources depletion is only a big deal if you don't have anything to replace it with. See
here, for example. We didn't have a global collapse when we passed peak wood, we didn't have a global collapse when we passed peak coal, we've arguably already passed peak oil and haven't collapsed yet. Each time, we simply bring in new resources to replace the old. And in this case, importantly, many of the replacements are effectively unlimited, ensuring we will never have to face the same problem again.
Of course, it's a reasonable point that we might not actually build enough of them in time to prevent serious problems, but it's far from inevitable that this must be the case.
-- Debt crises in Europe, the U.S. working class turning into an underclass, chronic U.S. budget deficits and foreign debt, neglected infrastructure, and political focus on distractions are all symptoms of early stages of collapse (and are also seen in historical analogues).
-- Just as there's a tendency to see every local weather anomaly as a symptom of global climate change, there's a tendency to see every instance of declining quality or higher costs (of foods, education, manufactured goods, insurance, air travel, job benefits, medical care, etc.) as a symptom of early stages of collapse.
I think Soapy Sam made a good point here in the FC thread that a lot of this seems a lot more like the usual "it used to be better back in the day" of older people rather than an actual scientific analysis. Your account contains an awful lot of people giving anecdotal accounts of how they noticed how terrible things were, but is rather short on peer-reviewed studies.
-- The end of steady economic growth means that investment money seeking profit tends to be driven into speculative bubbles -- most recently the real estate bubble that popped in 2008 and the present ongoing fracking bubble.
The tulip bubble occurred in the 1600s, well before we had any reliance on fossil fuels, and well before any such trend of "steady economic growth" could have been established. Wiki has a
handy list of stock market crashes and bubble collapses. Far from economic bubbles being a new phenomenon, they've been the norm for as long as we've had economies big and connected enough.
- Resource depletion must be understood in terms of costs of extraction and use of the remaining deposits, not just how much of the resource exists. It doesn't matter how much oil is in a shale formation, for instance, if it takes more energy to get the oil out than you get from burning the oil.
- Slow collapse cannot be arrested or reversed given the current state of the world. Awareness of the process doesn't help. There is no "solution."
How much energy does it take to build a wind or water turbine? Resource depletion is only a problem if you use depletable resources. Or resources in which the the available deposits are so large compared to usage that any shortage is an extremely long term problem. Nuclear being the obvious example, but also more the case for
everything else than many people seem to think.
- Sufficiently massive build-outs of nuclear and/or alternative power sources cannot be funded in tight (let alone crisis) times, and cannot be operated at a net profit, and so cannot solve the problem. Such a build-out is more feasible sooner than later, and it's not being undertaken at anywhere near the necessary scale now, so it will not happen.
This, especially the bolded part, simply doesn't make sense. Claiming they can never be operated at a profit assumes that the cost can never fall and that other prices can never rise. In fact, some alternative power sources are already very competitive, and it would take much of a price rise in fossil fuels to make them extremely attractive. It's also worth noting that this is rather at odds with the earlier claim that no solution is possible. "It's not currently being done fast enough" is not at all the same as "it can't be done".
- Increased cost of resources drives efforts to increase efficiency. But increasing efficiency has a side effect: it tends to decrease resilience, leaving the more efficient system more vulnerable to shocks. For example, many "just in time" inventory systems were disrupted by the Tōhoku (Fukushima) tsunami in 2011.
Is there any evidence to support this claim? I can see no reason better efficiency must always equate to worse resilience.
Overall, there just doesn't seem to be much substance to the whole thing. Comparisons with history don't really fit, and everything about current events and the future is based on anecdote and personal feelings rather than science and objective evidence. In particular, there seems to be a very pessimistic "we can't do anything and it wouldn't work even if it we could" attitude that dismisses out of hand any suggestions for why things might not be so bad, especially when it comes to renewable and nuclear power, or any other new technology for that matter.