Blitzkrieg - How's that work?

[pgwenthold]

OK, the German army in WW2 was infamous for its Blitzkrieg ability, the ability to move fast and conquer.

We hear about it all the time, but my question is, what's the key to making it work? I mean, why didn't anyone else do that before? What was Germany's key to making it work?

I could envision a few possible things, but these are merely guesses

1) Overwhelming fire power, so they basically can steamroll over everything in their way
2) Similar to 1, fast tanks that could provide that fire power and cover a lot of ground?
3) Again with 1, sufficiently mobile artillery that can be brought along fast enough to keep up with the convoy?
4) An infrastructure that is able to supply the fast moving army? IIRC, that was largely done by horses.

As I said, I could very well be clueless here, so am interested in learning more about it.

 

[theprestige]

It works like this:

1. The defender must spread their forces along the entire front.

2. The attacker may concentrate their attack anywhere along the front

3. As long as they don't concentrate directly on a strongpoint, the attacker can thus achieve temporary but overwhelming superiority at a single point of the front.

4. This superiority can be used to achieve a breakthrough in the front line.

5. Fast-moving, heavily-armed forces can exploit this breakthrough to:
- flank defending units nearby
- capture or destroy supply depots behind the front
- disrupt or sever communications between defenders along the front
- intercept and defeat reinforcements while they are still on the march, before they get into position

6. This explosion of violence in the supposedly safe area behind the defender's defenses creates a vicious cycle of weakness begetting weakness, opening up the entire defensive line to the development of further attacks, disruption, and ultimately defeat.

7. Ultimately, the blitz slows down as the breakthrough troops outpace their own supply lines and have to stop to consolidate and recover.

8. Meanwhile, the strongpoints they've been bypassing have been surrounded and cut off by the attacker's follow-on troops, and can be reduced at the attacker's convenience.

---

The Soviets made a distinction between blitzkrieg and what they called "deep battle".

In blitzkrieg, you pick the breakthrough point first, and concentrate your forces there.

In deep battle, you push hard along the entire front. Whichever of your forces encounter the least resistance, you declare the spearhead of the breakthrough and shift your reserves to that point to reinforce and carry it forward.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Blitzkrieg relied on momentum. It didn't 'steamroller'.
It relied on exploiting a fast advance bypassing concentrations of enemy forces and strong points to keep the attack moving and not allow the defenders time to organise any coordinated counter attack.
Two parallel lines of advance were used dispersing through country roads and tracks but able to concentrate together when needed and then move apart to continue an advance.
This allowed the main effort of the attack to switch it's line depending on resistance and terrain.
To this end it exploited mechanised forces led by strong for the time numbers of tanks supported by armoured infantry.
In place of slow moving artillery the Germans relied on air attacks in the form of dive bombers to act as tactical artillery.
To an extent the advance was faster than they expected and they outran their supply column.

It's all in Guderian's book.

 

[Childlike Empress]

Opel Blitz^WP. Mass-produced by the Opel car company then and until very recently owned by General Motors.

 

[Childlike Empress]

It's a bit similar to modern day "Toyota War" between Chad and Libya in the late 80s where they used Ratmobiles like ISIS did when they conquered a good bit of Iraq and Syria in 2013/14.

 

[HansMustermann]

Germany never had a "blitzkrieg" doctrine, or not called as such. That was actually the name the allies gave it.

What Germany had was a "bewegungskrieg" doctrine, i.e., basically "mobile warfare." After WW1 basically they looked at what worked and what didn't work. And yes, there was none of the later "backstab legend"; the army was honestly all, "ok, so what did we do wrong?" The conclusion was that basically the whole trench warfare in the west sucked hairy ass, while the mobile warfare in the east ruled.

Hence all doctrines were made to favour breakthrough and keeping it moving. It did have components like the armoured spearhead to create a breakthrough, and some other components. But basically it was all subordinated to: don't get bogged in a siege (yeah, tell that to Army Group North at Leningrad), don't get bogged in trench warfare, keep it moving.

 

[kayle]

worked like a charm. up to some moment.

 

[Elagabalus]

Blitzkrieg goes in, Blitzkrieg goes out?

 

[8enotto]

It also helped that Germany had the most capable armed forces in the world in land warfare in 1938-1940.
Everyone else was understaffed and using small numbers of interwar designs not fully battle tested.

It was the air superiority that allowed the ground forces to advance in many battles.

By 1943 the axis forces were facing a much better equipped enemy in far greater numbers and the technical advances were more important than the tactical advantage.

 

[abaddon]

Opel Blitz^WP. Mass-produced by the Opel car company then and until very recently owned by General Motors.

I am aware of the truck, it's origin and it's use. So what?

It's a lot overplayed. Nazi Germany relied on horses for the bulk of their front line logistics, including their artie.

The Stuka would never have happened if the Nazi's had not recognised those simple logistics.

 

[rjh01]

It worked in WW2 and not before because of two things
1. Aircraft.
2. Fast tanks.
The aircraft were used to soften up the front line. The tanks would then go in and capture their targets. Enemy reinforcements could not get close to the front as refugees blocked the roads.

 

[Andy_Ross]

It also helped that Germany had the most capable armed forces in the world in land warfare in 1938-1940.
Everyone else was understaffed and using small numbers of interwar designs not fully battle tested.

As was Germany, most of their tanks in 1940 were Mk1s and Mk2s, the former armed only with machine guns and the latter with a light cannon, they were training machines pressed in to service.
Most of the German army was still horse drawn, only Britain had completely mechanised forces, the Germans were using a large number of British horses sold out of service as they were replaced with lorries and gun tractors.

Don't fall for the hype.[/quote]

 

[Andy_Ross]

Opel Blitz^WP. Mass-produced by the Opel car company then and until very recently owned by General Motors.

[qimg]https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/LKW_Opel-Blitz.jpg[/qimg]

Most of the German army was still horse drawn in 1940 and was never fully mechanised even at the end of the war.

 

[theprestige]

I think a two tiered approach is maybe not a bad idea for many armies.

A more expensive, technologically advanced core of elite troops for the tough jobs. Spearheading offensives. Counter attacking. Etc.

And a large mass of follow-on forces, using numbers in place of equipment to hold territory, delay enemy advances, etc.

 

[8enotto]

As was Germany, most of their tanks in 1940 were Mk1s and Mk2s, the former armed only with machine guns and the latter with a light cannon, they were training machines pressed in to service.
Most of the German army was still horse drawn, only Britain had completely mechanised forces, the Germans were using a large number of British horses sold out of service as they were replaced with lorries and gun tractors.

Don't fall for the hype.

[/QUOTE]

Not just the tanks, everybody had tin cans with small guns in 1939. It was the technique and mass use of them plus elite troops for those times that made a difference. Everyone else was still debating tactics of the last war for all practical purposes.

Other thinking that worked was self-propelled artillery to be able to keep up with the spearhead. Not a lot at first but enough to show it was good.

Supply by horses was always a weaker point but it was good enough to get a major conquest done.

 

[smartcooky]

It also helped that Germany had the most capable armed forces in the world in land warfare in 1938-1940.
Everyone else was understaffed and using small numbers of interwar designs not fully battle tested.

It was the air superiority that allowed the ground forces to advance in many battles.

By 1943 the axis forces were facing a much better equipped enemy in far greater numbers and the technical advances were more important than the tactical advantage.

It also helped the Germans that they were able to "battle test" their new equipment and systems by helping Franco in the 1936 to 1939 Spanish Civil War

 

[8enotto]

During the Spanish civil war it was learned the Panzer Mk1 didn't do well against Uncle Joe's T26. The Mk2 was improved to better that.

The bigger stick with more and rustier nails race began there.

 

[HansMustermann]

I'd like to also point out that almost everyone else had come to similar ideas.

E.g., sure, Germany had the "schwerpunkt" idea (literally "centre of gravity") i.e., to concentrate the attack in one point and overwhelm the defenses. So did the French actually, and for some reason they still get accused of trench warfare mentality and whatnot. Those separate tank formations that could be attached in whatever point you needed? Yeah, that's why. The artillery being attached to higher levels? Yeah, so you could concentrate it on whatever point you needed to pulverize.

Conversely, infantry needing support tanks? Sure, we know the Brits famously had those, but so did the French. Aaand... so did the Germans, really. Just the Germans used StuGs for that role, and technically they were part of the artillery arm, but same idea: infantry needs some tin cans to support them, if you don't want them to get bogged down.

Etc.

What Germany had early that the other guys didn't was mostly just good communications to make it work. E.g., for all the doctrines and organization that should have made similar "schwerpunkt" or armoured spearhead tactics possible, the French quickly discovered in 1940 that their communications and organization weren't up to snuff to actually make it work. Sure, they could theoretically throw in more tanks than anyone needs and attach it to any infantry divisions in one point, and throw UNHOLY amounts of artillery shells at that point, in practice they couldn't do it in anything even vaguely resembling real time. The extra levels between the guys needing the artillery, and the guys who could command it there, just added delays and missed opportunity.

Later in the war, when everyone else got battle experience and sorted their crap out, Germany's "blitzkrieg" stopped being much of a "blitzkrieg".

 

[zooterkin]

I am aware of the truck, it's origin and it's use. So what?

It was a joke?

 

[erwinl]

I'd like to also point out that almost everyone else had come to similar ideas.

E.g., sure, Germany had the "schwerpunkt" idea (literally "centre of gravity") i.e., to concentrate the attack in one point and overwhelm the defenses. So did the French actually, and for some reason they still get accused of trench warfare mentality and whatnot. Those separate tank formations that could be attached in whatever point you needed? Yeah, that's why. The artillery being attached to higher levels? Yeah, so you could concentrate it on whatever point you needed to pulverize.

Conversely, infantry needing support tanks? Sure, we know the Brits famously had those, but so did the French. Aaand... so did the Germans, really. Just the Germans used StuGs for that role, and technically they were part of the artillery arm, but same idea: infantry needs some tin cans to support them, if you don't want them to get bogged down.

Etc.

What Germany had early that the other guys didn't was mostly just good communications to make it work. E.g., for all the doctrines and organization that should have made similar "schwerpunkt" or armoured spearhead tactics possible, the French quickly discovered in 1940 that their communications and organization weren't up to snuff to actually make it work. Sure, they could theoretically throw in more tanks than anyone needs and attach it to any infantry divisions in one point, and throw UNHOLY amounts of artillery shells at that point, in practice they couldn't do it in anything even vaguely resembling real time. The extra levels between the guys needing the artillery, and the guys who could command it there, just added delays and missed opportunity.

Later in the war, when everyone else got battle experience and sorted their crap out, Germany's "blitzkrieg" stopped being much of a "blitzkrieg".

This ^

What Germany had going for it, in the beginning of the war, was the ability to act inside the enemies decision flow.

When the allies got a message that 'x units of Germans are at that place and going in that direction'.
By the time they decided to counter that by which units, which had to first concentrate in 'that' spot, to be able to attack/defend oriented in 'that' direction.
Not only would the Germans not be at the original spot anymore, but often already had passed the place where the units to counter them would concentrate, even before these were present or even on their way.
Picture this with a lot of these things going on at the same time and often contradicting each other (fog of war) and you have a command paralysation.

This concept was not new. It had been done in the past (Battle of Lake Trasimene by Hannibal for instance) and would be done in the future as well (Desert Storm).

What made it so lethal in 1940 was a combination of a new ability to advance much quicker than before, combined with a lack of strategic depth in France.

When there was strategic depth, like in Russia 1941 and 1942, the Germans stil were able to act inside the decision flow of the Russians but were unable te decisively finish the battles, because the Russians could always retreat far enough back, so that they could keep the Germans in front of them (as a whole. There were a lot of Russians cut off in pockets, of course) and wait untill they ran out of steam.

And when the Germans were unable to act inside the Russians decision flow they were soundly beaten (Kursk). Or like during the fighting of '41 and '42 winters, when the weather slowed the speed of combat down enough, that the Russians decision flow could manage it.