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Blitzkrieg - How's that work?

And when the Germans were unable to act inside the Russians decision flow they were soundly beaten (Kursk). Or like during the fighting of '41 and '42 winters, when the weather slowed the speed of combat down enough, that the Russians decision flow could manage it.
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Same in the Western Desert, there was a lot of Africa to fall back through.
 
erwinl said:
What Germany had going for it, in the beginning of the war, was the ability to act inside the enemies decision flow.
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I wasn't as good with words, but basically this. That's the definitive answer to the OP question of how and why did Blitzkrieg work.
 
Comms was key to the early German victories. The ability to call back and get either artillery or dive bomber support to put a hole in the enemy defences and to coordinate an attack at that point is key to success.

Early in the war the Allies 3C was not responsive and its radios were not well distributed down to allow for more nimble responses - as the war went on this changed quite dramatically. As an example, Commonwealth artillery communications and responses allowed practically any artillery observer to call down not only the guns of their own battery on targets, but with up to all available indirect fire resources within range within minutes for targets of sufficiently high importance.
 
Germany also just had more people than their neighbors, so they could afford to concentrate a high number in a specific place without decreasing their numbers too much elsewhere. It's a relatively large country for that area, with the highest population density around.
 
Border Reiver said:
Comms was key to the early German victories. The ability to call back and get either artillery or dive bomber support to put a hole in the enemy defences and to coordinate an attack at that point is key to success.

Early in the war the Allies 3C was not responsive and its radios were not well distributed down to allow for more nimble responses - as the war went on this changed quite dramatically. As an example, Commonwealth artillery communications and responses allowed practically any artillery observer to call down not only the guns of their own battery on targets, but with up to all available indirect fire resources within range within minutes for targets of sufficiently high importance.
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Don't forget the development of the VHF 'Radio Telephone' that allowed simultaneous two way communication was a big advance.
Certainly in Naval use it allowed close coordination of ships when attacking U-Boats and was used by RAF Forward Observers to talk to their 'Taxi Rank' of circling Typhoons.
My uncle Harold was a radio op attached to a FOO on D Day and through to Germany.
 
Early in World War II, the Germans often had surprise and initiative on their side, which vexed their enemies who were expecting a long, drawn out, slug-fest as in World War I.

However, the Allies eventually figured out how to use fast-paced, rapid troop movements with air coordination which the Germans never could match.
 
Crossbow said:
Early in World War II, the Germans often had surprise and initiative on their side, which vexed their enemies who were expecting a long, drawn out, slug-fest as in World War I.

However, the Allies eventually figured out how to use fast-paced, rapid troop movements with air coordination which the Germans never could match.
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Not true at all as far as the 'slug fest as in World War 1' is concerned.
For example the British Army was completely mechanized and trained in mobile warfare.
 
Border Reiver said:
Comms was key to the early German victories. The ability to call back and get either artillery or dive bomber support to put a hole in the enemy defences and to coordinate an attack at that point is key to success.

Early in the war the Allies 3C was not responsive and its radios were not well distributed down to allow for more nimble responses - as the war went on this changed quite dramatically. As an example, Commonwealth artillery communications and responses allowed practically any artillery observer to call down not only the guns of their own battery on targets, but with up to all available indirect fire resources within range within minutes for targets of sufficiently high importance.
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This.

The key problem in WW1 trench warfare wasn't breaking into the enemy trench line, it was taking advantage of any break in - they lacked reliable man portable radios and also a maneuver arm (WW1 tanks were very slow and very unreliable). By the time WW2 came around, you have good tanks and radios and therefore generals could respond to developments in a battle (as they had in civil war and earlier days) rather than sending in troops and artillery according to a rigid timetable that allowed no improvisation.
 
theprestige said:
I think a two tiered approach is maybe not a bad idea for many armies.

A more expensive, technologically advanced core of elite troops for the tough jobs. Spearheading offensives. Counter attacking. Etc.

And a large mass of follow-on forces, using numbers in place of equipment to hold territory, delay enemy advances, etc.
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France sure as hell had a two tiered force. Unfortunately they put their "Series B" grade troops on the section of the front adjacent to the Ardennes. That didn't work go so well for the French. They only had a small mobile force to counterattack. Then 4 years later the US Army had mainly green troops spread out over the same section of front. Didn't go so well for us... briefly. Then we exploited the overstretched German units, counterattacked and got around the Siegfried line.
 
Northern Africa was won by codebreakers and sinking all axis supply to ground troops possible. The ground troops there with superior weapons had no fuel or ammo in the end.

Nazi armour was limited early conquest, the Panzer 3 added about 1939 and large Stug units in 1940
Three Stug could be made on Panzer running gear for the price of one tank. Economy in getting units onto the field was important.

Early on those units were used in antitank roles as they proved effective and kept up to front lines easier than other types. Self contained pack up and go if all goes wrong.
 
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rjh01 said:
It worked in WW2 and not before because of two things
1. Aircraft.
2. Fast tanks.
The aircraft were used to soften up the front line. The tanks would then go in and capture their targets. Enemy reinforcements could not get close to the front as refugees blocked the roads.
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Arguably there were 2 even more important factors. Radio communications, better maps and distribution of said maps to front line units. These allowed for coordination of forces that wasn’t possible for most of WW1. Tanks etc sped things up and doctrines improved, but the 100 days at the end of WW1 were still pretty fast moving.
 
8enotto said:
Northern Africa was won by codebreakers and sinking all axis supply to ground troops possible. The ground troops there with superior weapons had no fuel or ammo in the end.

Nazi armour was limited early conquest, the Panzer 3 added about 1939 and large Stug units in 1940
Three Stug could be made on Panzer running gear for the price of one tank. Economy in getting units onto the field was important.

Early on those units were used in antitank roles as they proved effective and kept up to front lines easier than other types. Self contained pack up and go if all goes wrong.
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No it wasn't 'won by codebreakers' although although it contributed as it did in all theatres.
Only a handful of Stug were sent to N Africa, all were combat losses.
 
I had to look up dates of development and numbers again as it has been a while. The German stuff in the battlefield, captured usually, really did help the allied forces hop up their equipment to higher standards.

The Lee/Grant could face view a P2, the Sherman a P3, way up to the Tiger 2 meeting it's match in a Pershing in 1944.
 
Well, not just the equipment. The attacks on Poland and especially France kinda gave away the plot too. It's when everyone finally paid attention and thought "so THAT's what we're going to contend with." So the Soviets went even more in depth with their in depth defense strategy. (At least until Stalin went into full retard mode in '41 and ordered everyone to only keep attacking westwards, instead of actually doing the in depth defense they had prepared to do.) The Americans came up with the TD arm, so they can stop an armoured spearhead before it goes too far. Etc.

As time went by, people looked at more and more of what the Germans were doing, and started figuring out how to counter it.
 
8enotto said:
I had to look up dates of development and numbers again as it has been a while. The German stuff in the battlefield, captured usually, really did help the allied forces hop up their equipment to higher standards.
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Except that the vehicles in question were mostly in development before German vehicles were captured. German equipment was not by and large superior to its Allied equivalents. You seem to be buying into a whole bunch of myths about the Wehrmacht. In fact in the battles of 1940 the Wehrmacht was heavily dependent on captured Czech tanks to fill out the Panzer divisions.
 
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No, I will downplay the hype. There is no secret that all involved worked overtime to try to keep a vehicle in the field with enough armour to resist enemy guns and a gun to defeat the enemy.

It's also no secret nobody had the one machine of any type that could do it all in any season or terrain.

Usually it came down to the skills of the men in the machines, and an ability to make quick decisions. That is what won or lost many battles. Getting those men in the right machine helped a lot.

I dislike after the fact of the battle stories of the heroic and valiant group A after a long and intense battle beat back the others with no mention of the detail that many died on both sides, especially when the objective was an ego trip or personal grudge between leaders. Wasting human lives like that is still a bit shocking.
 
Dude. Like, dude... The Pz.I's used in Poland and for that matter still in use in France had a whole 13mm armour thickness on the front. You could bloody put a hole in them with an infantry rifle at point blank range. By the time of Poland, duly noted, most had an extra 15mm thick plate welded onto the front, but the sides were still just as vulnerable as ever, and even the combined thickness on the front was still well within the ability of a 37mm gun to penetrate it.

And actually all the way through Barabarossa, the doctrine wasn't to send a bunch of heavies or even mediums as the main course. It was to have a bunch of light tanks, with something like a medium per platoon to "monitor" them and deal with stuff they couldn't deal with themselves.

Anyone who thinks that any tanks except the Tiger II and IS-3 actually had enough armour to resist enemy guns is... not very well informed.
 
I'd also add that during the heyady of "blitzkrieg", that is to say, up to and including France, Germany not only didn't have all that tough tanks, but didn't have that many either. All through the thirties, the percentage of military procurement budget that went into tanks was... homeopathic.

It was only after France that the propaganda machine caught onto the idea, and started broadcasting the myth of the vast armies of panzers rolling over everything.
 
HansMustermann said:
I'd also add that during the heyady of "blitzkrieg", that is to say, up to and including France, Germany not only didn't have all that tough tanks, but didn't have that many either. All through the thirties, the percentage of military procurement budget that went into tanks was... homeopathic.

It was only after France that the propaganda machine caught onto the idea, and started broadcasting the myth of the vast armies of panzers rolling over everything.
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And the Allies went along with it because it sounded a lot better to be beaten by superior firepower and tactics than their own ineptitude. Has to be remembered that the attack through the Ardennes was a huge gamble by the Germans. It could, and probably should, have failed in a dozen different ways. A little more initiative and energy on the part of the French High Command in 1940 and Germany is screwed.
 
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