when did we develop conciousness?

[Interesting Ian]

Merc,
Skinner talked about his toothache. How do we know?

We know through his behaviour -- particularly the fact he tells us he is experiencing toothache.

 

[Piggy]

I think there may be some real doubt in some way, though certainly not to the degree of "You feel pain? What's that?"
But rather, what does it mean to feel something? To experience something? We have an intuitive understanding of this, which is probably accurate to a certain degree, but intuition is often wrong, especially when we're talking about our own experiences.

Yes, I see that point. But I don't see the relevance. All I'm saying is that the question of whether another critter has "felt experience" is meaningful, even if there's no clear and sure method to provide an answer at the moment. It's worth investigating. And I think Dennett's model is one good way to proceed.

Intuition is certainly often wrong. But I wouldn't call it mere "intuition" that I have felt experience and rocks don't.

I think Mercutio is basically saying that introspection isn't a very good method for finding out about conciousness or the activities of the brain.

I agree.

As such he's looking for a more objective approach; find out how the word is acquired in order to understand what it refers to. I'm not sure that is the best approach, but it seems like it will probably be useful, anyway.

Doesn't seem useful to me, but I'm willing to wait and see if anything comes of it.

But it seems like just an attempt to look at the question from another angle, because he doesn't trust introspection.

Neither do I. Maybe that's the confusion here. I didn't intend to suggest any sort of peering into the quality and content of felt experience. What I am saying is that it is meaningful to pose the question of consciousness in animals in terms of the existence of "felt experience" of the sort we have, as opposed to mere chemical reaction which, I believe, is all that bacteria are capable of.

I don't think he's suggesting that you and he have qualitatively different "felt experiences", rather I think he's suggesting that the term itself is rather vague and possibly inaccurate if we're talking about what's actually going on. I think he may have a point.

It's certainly not a scientific term. But I seriously doubt that anyone doesn't know what I'm referring to. If so, maybe they'll ask.

Also, Merc and others are certainly correct in saying that observation of behavior will necessarily play a part in any study of consciousness in animals. But a purely behavioral definition coupled with a purely behavioral investigative method is, I believe, impossible. When talking about consciousness we can't get around the fact that we're talking about this sticky business of being aware, of having a sense of things that is not merely reaction, not merely behavior. Regardless of what that is (I think it's probably the result of a feedback loop) I don't think there's any doubt that it's real.

If we do relegate consciousness to mere reaction and behavior, then we've effectively dodged the issue.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

If we do relegate consciousness to mere reaction and behavior, then we've effectively dodged the issue.

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

 

[Jeff Corey]

I really don't see what it could be beside behavior.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

It's not a question of not liking the feel of it. We know with absolute certainty that the notion that consciousness is literally behaviour is false. Otherwise there would be no distinction between p-zombies and real people.

 

[Jeff Corey]

No. We don't know that with absolute certainty. You're spouting nonsense again.

 

[Piggy]

Or actually acknowledged what "it" is.

(I'm not saying that it is "mere reaction and behaviour" just pointing out that just because it's an answer we don't like the feel of it isn't really a reason to avoid the correct conclusion.)

I was probably unclear above.

As far as I can tell, the phenomenon of conscious experience appears to be entirely an emergent phenomenon arising from the physical activity of the brain.

But this emergent phenomenon is not entirely equivalent to this physical activity.

There exists in the universe the phenomenon of "felt experience". And while it arises from, is dependent on, and is never separate from brain activity (as far as we know), and therefore can be presumed to be explainable entirely in terms of brain activity, it is not necessarily always associated with the activity of any sort of brain.

It is worthwhile, therefore, to consider how this phenomenon may arise, what sorts of brains may produce it, and which animals may engage in it, and to what degrees.

And it is not only worthwhile for mere scientific curiosity, but also for ethical reasons. It matters whether a fetus has a felt experience of pain. It matters if a cat or dog does, and if a cricket doesn't.

That being the case, it is worthwhile to attempt to develop ways of determining whether other critters are subject to this phenomenon. If we can come to understand how this sense of experience is produced by the brain, then we may be able to answer some ethical questions regarding appropriate treatment of animals, for example.

If a cricket has no more experience of the world than a computer, then using it for bait cannot be said to be cruel. If there is no "felt experience" occurring at that point in the universe defined by the body of the cricket, then there is no suffering there either.

If a puppy "feels" pain (and doesn't just physically react to it) in much the same way that you and I do, then certainly it is cruel to burn its ears off. If whales feel emotional pain, then there are ethical implications to capturing them and penning them up to perform in theme parks.

If we do not make reference to this most salient feature of our own consciousness, then we do dodge the issue.

Perhaps I'm wrong, but at the moment I can't see how a purely behavioral approach can effectively address this issue. If it can, then this will be a good thing b/c it will make research much easier.

 

[Piggy]

Re the role of behaviorism and introspection in answering questions about consciousness....

It seems clear at this point that introspection is going to be a vital component in investigating the relationship between conscious ("felt") experience and brain activity.

For example, look at recent studies into the relationship between average differences in male v. female brain activity and the conscious experience of pain.

Studies like these rely on personal reports by test subjects regarding their experience. These reports can then compared to scans of activity in various areas of the brain.

Similarly, introspection is a key component to studying certain brain pathologies, such as those present in people who show many physical signs of emotion, but who have short-circuits in critical feedback systems of the brain and so have no felt experience of these emotions.

From this type of methodology, combining introspection and neuroscience, we're likely to get insights into the nature of conscious experience that a purely behavioral approach is unlikely ever to produce.

As we learn more, we may be able to describe in greater detail exactly how the phenomenon of felt experience is created, and therefore to begin making informed conclusions regarding when conscious experience arose and which animals participate in it and to what degree.

 

[Interesting Ian]

No. We don't know that with absolute certainty. You're spouting nonsense again.

Consciousness is the felt experience, therefore it cannot be literally the same thing as behaviour. This is just so obvious. For example I could have toothache but give no sign of it whatsoever in my behaviour or facial expression.

 

[Jeff Corey]

More nonsense.

 

[Mercutio]

Consciousness is the felt experience, therefore it cannot be literally the same thing as behaviour. This is just so obvious. For example I could have toothache but give no sign of it whatsoever in my behaviour or facial expression.

Remember, Ian, that Radical Behaviorists define behavior differently than you do; your definition is more in tune with Methodological Behaviorism, which has not been Behaviorism in decades. Radical Behaviorism defines behavior simply as "what you do"; this includes private behavior as well as the public behavior you are speaking of.

(this is beyond the scope of the current thread question, though, and if I recall correctly, Ian, you were one who did read the behaviorism links a year or so ago, so I don't really need to go into it. If I recall, you understood the position, but did not agree with it. Which is fine; just recall that if "feeling pain" is something you do, then it is behavior. Would you agree that feeling pain is something you do?)

 

[Mercutio]

Piggy, I will address more of this later--I agree, though, we were talking at cross purposes, and agree far more than we disagree. I do still think my approach is useful to address some of the things said here, but real life will prevent me from elaborating for the moment.

 

[Darat]

...snip.. Otherwise there would be no distinction between p-zombies and real people.

And your point is?

 

[Piggy]

Piggy, I will address more of this later--I agree, though, we were talking at cross purposes, and agree far more than we disagree. I do still think my approach is useful to address some of the things said here, but real life will prevent me from elaborating for the moment.

Cool. I also think behaviorist approaches have something to contribute. And I'm not deying that other definitions of consciousness are worth considering and investigating also, of course. Looking forward to your later posts.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Remember, Ian, that Radical Behaviorists define behavior differently than you do;

I don't know what "radical behaviourism" is. If they mean something different by the word "behaviour" as it is commonly employed, then you must provide the definition.

your definition is more in tune with Methodological Behaviorism, which has not been Behaviorism in decades.

No.

Methodological Behaviorism is just the recognition that it is only behaviour which can be scientifically studied. It does not commit itself to any philosophical position on what consciousness actually is in itself. This is in contrast with analytical behaviourism which holds that consciousness just is behaviour.

Radical Behaviorism defines behaviour simply as "what you do"; this includes private behavior as well as the public behavior you are speaking of.

And I've told you before that private behaviour is an oxymoron. By definition behaviour is that which is potentially observable -- that which potentially can be determined from the 3rd person perspective.

just recall that if "feeling pain" is something you do, then it is behavior. Would you agree that feeling pain is something you do?)

Absolutely not. Not only do I not agree, but it is transparently false. Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.

 

[Interesting Ian]

And your point is?

The point is that some thing that looks exactly like a human being, and behaves indistinguishably from a human being, does not entail by definition that the thing in question is conscious.

No matter how incredibly implausible and unlikely you might feel it is, it is not the case that all other apparent people are by definition conscious. Another person's feelings, pains, thoughts etc, are not by definition constituted by your visual observations of their behaviour. It is conceivable (albeit arguably incredibly unlikely) that no one apart from you is actually conscious.

An analytical behaviourist, on the other hand, says that other people by definition are conscious. This is clearly utterly absurd.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Appropriate physical processes in the brain might elicit or cause or generate pain, but pain itself is numerically distinct from the physical processes which give rise to it.

How distinct? why "numerically" distinct? Physical processes in the brain are certainly behaviour, so, if you agree in that those processes are the cause of the pain, why do you object that when explaining such mechanism one could explain pain in purely physical terms?

Unless you can demonstrate that "pain" is different from "brain processes" you are expressing wishful thinking, not doing philosophy nor science.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

An analytical behaviourist, on the other hand, says that other people by definition are conscious. This is clearly utterly absurd.

Clearly utterly absurd... why exactly. I want to see the argument, not only the emotional part.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Clearly utterly absurd... why exactly. I want to see the argument, not only the emotional part.

You cannot logically maintain that your consciousness is utterly distinct from your behaviour, but that other peoples' consciousness are one and the very same thing as their behaviour.

 

[Interesting Ian]

How distinct? why "numerically" distinct? Physical processes in the brain are certainly behaviour, so, if you agree in that those processes are the cause of the pain, why do you object that when explaining such mechanism one could explain pain in purely physical terms?

This has absolutely nothing to do with behaviourism -- the topic iunder discussion.