Transporter Philosophy

[quixotecoyote]

Yes, I get all that and I agree. The problem I have is that the two conclusions seem to be a contradiction to me. In one, I wake up in a different brain. In the other, I stay in the same brain. Why should it matter if the original is still around or not? And, in the final example, of many clones and a destroyed original, who's brain do I wake up in? Sure I've been "split" but it doesn't seem like that should matter, since it is just plain impossible for me to ever "experience" being split. I'll either experience one side of the split or the other, but not both. From the outside, it doesn't matter. Without conciousness, it doesn't matter whether you consider a copied file the original or not. When you introduce it, suddenly it matters. Maybe I'm overthinking this, and really I don't think there's anything that magical about conciousness, except one thing. I've got to be SOMEONE, or I've got to be NO one.

The 'you' doesn't actually move around at all. What I meant my 'waking up in a different brain' is this; if conciousness is an emergent property rather than an independant entity, then if a second brain produces the identical consciousness, that is 'you' as well. Thus for an instant after our theortical cloning (memory intact and all that), you exist in two brains so you could kill one of yourself and still exist. That window of opportunity passes instantly however, as as soon as you start experiencing things -anything-, the two consciousnesses diverge. They develop the concept of 'me' and 'the other clone', and that is a fundamental alteration of the original consciousness phenomenon. So for a quick breakdown of your questions:

In one, I wake up in a different brain. In the other, I stay in the same brain. Why should it matter if the original is still around or not?

It doesn't. Unless you are talking about it being ok to kill one of them off. In that case if the orignal is left in palce after the cloning, they very quickly diverge into unique people, causing the death of 'you' if you were to kill yourself.

And, in the final example, of many clones and a destroyed original, who's brain do I wake up in?

You wake up in all of them, and then the identity diverges into many people.

By the way, to whoever said they think making a clone is like eternal life, why do you think that? There's nothing in common between you and the genetic copy except DNA. It'll grow up to be it's own person. If you think you will be "reincarnated" into that new form, why not any OTHER mind out there?

That was me. I qualified that as an imperfect immortality. But, since I see consciousness (me) as something my brain does, if I copy my brain-I copy me. Problem is, in the curent situation it's impossible to get the exact same brain copied, as in reality you can't transfer memories. So the closest we can come is something similar to the divergent identifty discussed above.

That leads me to a final quandry. Imperfect copies. How imperfect does your copy have to be before it isn't "you"? Clearly, a mother dying during birth isn't going to suddenly experience the world out of the baby's eyes. What about the father that died during conception? (There's a though...) Aside from the genetics, the brain of that newborn clone has nothing in common with your fully formed brain, and there's no reason to think of that brain as in any way "specialer" than the brain of a child or a twin.

And when it comes right down to it, the ability of our species to make imperfect clones leads me to believe that making a perfect one isn't going to make me wake up a new brain at childhood. But how "perfect" does a total brain copy have to be? What if during the copy a single neural connection is changed, just a single one? Would that be enough to make that new person "not me", considering we are constantly altering our mind anyway? What about two? What about three? How different does that new brain have to be during the process before I no longer wake up in a new brain?

As for how similar the brains would have to be, if you made that difference in my brain right now, and you'd still consider me the same person, then it should work in the clone.

As for the twin thing, and waking up with a new brain at childhood:

The twins are an excellent example of divergent personality. Theoretically they start off exactly the same, but rapdily become different people, and killing one is killing a unqiue mental phenomena which in not replicated in the other.

The difference is cloning oneself is that you're starting over. It's still not perfect immortality, but it's close enough to reincarnation for me. I say you do 'wake up in a new brain at childhood' because the consciousness that was you originally should be the same as what your clone exhibits during its process of creation.

Picture it like a computer rpg game. You start with the same character, and devlop him over the course of the game. He dies. You restart/reload an earlier game. He's lost everthing that's happens to him since the save point, but it's still the same person.

It's an imperfect analogy for a couple reasons, including that there's a pre-established self-identify that your real-world clone would lack. But apart from that I think it illustrates what I'm trying to say.

 

[jmercer]

If the replicant is a perfect copy (practically speaking, if not truly perfect because of displacement in N-space), then what difference does it make? His memories will be indistinguishable from the original's memories. He will believe them just as earnestly as the original believes them.

Objectively, from the perspective of a third party observer, the two jmercers are different, but from the two 1st person perspectives (the two jmercers with identical memories and thought patterns), they are the same, at least at the moment of duplication.

The third party - which is an objective perspective - I agree with completely. The first person perspective is really where the trouble exists.

From a subjective first-person viewpoint, you're quite correct; the two jmercer's are almost the same person in terms of memories and physical characteristics (other than location and duration). However, one of the jmercer's is experiencing an almost perfect illusion of having experienced the events of the past, while the other one is recalling events that he was physically present at. (For a further explanation of my use of "almost" in this paragraph, please see below this section. )

From the position of asking either jmercer to recall events, this is no problem - they'll both have the same memories. (Although a verbal recitation of those memories will likely be different, based on the mood of the individual queried and the words chosen.) However, both having the same memories doesn't change the objective reality that only one of them was actually present during those events.

I agree with this, but this means the replicant is not a perfect copy. Practically speaking, it could be in theory. I say "practically" because on a human scale of perception, we wouldn't be able to tell them apart. They wouldn't be able to tell themselves apart either. They would each truly believe they were the original.

That would only be true if the replicant didn't appear in a location that demonstrated to him that he was the replicant. In example, if I went into a blue chamber knowing that my replicant would arrive in a red chamber, then the replicant would instantly recognize that his sudden awareness of the chamber becoming red would indicate that he was the copy. This would then render both the objective third-person and subjective first-person perceptions as unified; the observers would know who the replicant was, and so would the replicant.

(Of course, that doesn't address the replicant's emotional/mental reaction to this knowledge, etc. The replicant could easily go into denial or even become psychotic from the realization that he's not the original, for example. He could also simply lie about if for personal gain.)

Setting aside the blatant red/blue chambers, the same recognition would happen if the replicant appeared 100 miles away from the starting point; the location would give away the truth to the replicant.

In order for both to believe that they are the originals, a significant effort would have to be made to prevent the replicant from getting any indication of his status. Again, that doesn't alter the objective reality - it simply prevents the subjective perception from matching the objective truth. Further - unless the two are put together at the same moment of replication - the original will be able to recite verifiable events post-transportation that the replicant cannot, permitting objective identification.

So barring some bizarre situation, the issue of "who is who" should be resolvable.

Well, yeah, in the sense that theoretically we could take all the atoms in the universe and assign each one a serial number. We could then theoretically track each atom and see where it goes over the course of the evolution of the universe, including the ones that eventually become jmercer as an infant, and then leave his body eventually, only to be replaced over time with other atoms which constitute the body of jmercer.

Because atoms are hairless, however, i.e., they are fungible commodities, it doesn't make any practical difference which serial numbers one uses to construct a jmercer. You just have to put them into the exact configuration that spells "jmercer" and you have a jmercer. Not THE jmercer, but a jmercer. Jmercer is now a fungible commodity as well. Well, at least jmercer at any given time t is fungible.

Maybe... maybe not. That's what we're debating.

OK, forget the temporal characteristics idea. Perhaps it was ill-conceived. Forget the actual history of the atoms themselves which constitute the original jmercer. After all, their individual histories don't really matter because they're fungible. Their configuration doesn't confer upon them some mystical special quality of history in the aggregate. If it did, then again we would be conjuring up some dualistic property not found in the material world.

I think that given all that (and you may disagree with me here) we keep coming back to the idea that the original jmercer and the replicant are indistinguishable (except for the trivial matter, from a human perceptible perspective, of their not occupying the same N-space co-ordinates).

I agree that the temporal transfer idea doesn't work; but I don't think that either the temporal or spacial issues are trivial. I think they're definitive, especially since they are the only way to objectively determine the identities of the original versus the copy.

We can only differentiate them due to their occupying different configurations of atoms, or occupying different co-ordinates in N-space. Remove those variables, and you have identical entities, indistinguishable from each other.

Yeah, there's no scientific test we can use (other than my fictional history viewer) that can be done to physically differentiate between the two. That doesn't make them the same; it just makes us incapable of identifying who is who using a scientific process. However, that doesn't mean it's impossible to distinguish them in ways other than scientific. Third party observations can still be considered valid, as would be truthful testimony from both the replicant and the original concerning their identities.

To defeat this, a major effort would have to be made to hide the information from both third-party observers and the replicant as well. Another way would be if one or both of the subjects intentionally conceals the truth after creating a situation where third-party observation was no longer reliable.

If third party objective observers can state "This is the replica", then identification is done. Alternatively, if both subjects know who they are and are truthful - if one says "I'm the original", and the other says "I'm the replicant", then the two are distinguished by their acknowledgement.

Let me summarize - the assumption of indistinguishablity relies upon these factors:

1) Concealing the truth from the third-party objective observers
2) AND concealing the truth from the subjects

Or...

1) Creating a situation where third-party observations are no longer trustworthy
2) AND having one (or both) of the subjects lie about their identity.

Regardless of either set of assumptions, the objective reality remains unchanged; all that's lost is our ability to determine the truth.

I believe you that you aren't proposing a dualist paradigm on purpose. I think you are stumbling into it inadvertantly by ascribing a history to the original that the replicant doesn't share in a meaningful way. I don't think you can do that at the atomic level. You can get away with it on a systemic level, but that's not what we're able to observe once we start picking out different atoms to configure into a replicant jmercer. That's because the two systems will be identical except for their different co-ordinates in N-space and the theoretically different serial numbers of their respective atoms (which again are constantly changing anyway, even in the original jmercer).

I think the problem is that everyone's focusing on the atomic level, when what we are discussing is an organized system - a person. When you get right down to it, if you collected a pile of the exact same type atoms that make me up in the proper proportions, and them dumped them into a container... you'd be unable to distinguish between me and the contents of the container by examining them on an atomic level, without even introducing anything fancy like matter transportation.

Examining the two of us as a system would quickly reveal the reality of which was me, and which was the pile of atoms. In the case of our subjects, we've postulated a system which makes determining the reality that much harder by reducing our investigative options.

Does the difficulty lie only with the third party observer, or with the two jmercers? How about both?

****

Again, that means the replicant isn't a perfect copy, and we know that. I think for practical purposes, within the realm of our thought experiment, we can conceive of the imperfections being undetectible on a human scale and using ordinary human perceptions.

I think I addressed this above, so I won't repeat it here.

I can accept this, but it makes my head want to explode.

Yeah... me too. Which is why I won't go there unless I absolutely have to.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Here's the problem I'm having. Basically, after dividing so that there are two "me" at once, for that split moment before "divergence", my question is basically this, which one do I "diverge" into? What happens to my own awareness? Is it some random event, or what? Basically I'm wanting a step by step description of what I would experience in real time.

And no, I still don't think making a clone of yourself (in the traditional DNA copy and impregnating someone way) would keep your awareness going. It's just a new brain, completely devoid of anything that makes you "you". All you did was reproduce. Why would your awareness, even as a blank slate, keep going? That suggests some sort of reincarnation, and I fail to see why that couldn't happen anyway just by reproducing the old fasioned way and having the parent die.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Here's the problem I'm having. Basically, after dividing so that there are two "me" at once, for that split moment before "divergence", my question is basically this, which one do I "diverge" into? What happens to my own awareness? Is it some random event, or what? Basically I'm wanting a step by step description of what I would experience in real time.

And no, I still don't think making a clone of yourself (in the traditional DNA copy and impregnating someone way) would keep your awareness going. It's just a new brain, completely devoid of anything that makes you "you". All you did was reproduce. Why would your awareness, even as a blank slate, keep going? That suggests some sort of reincarnation, and I fail to see why that couldn't happen anyway just by reproducing the old fasioned way and having the parent die.

Isn't the "you" that you describe here some kind of soul? I thought most of us in this thread agreed that your consciousness, your awareness, is simply an emergent property of the 3 pounds of grey matter in your skull running some low electrical current and transmitting signals using electro-chemicals.

AS

 

[Dark Jaguar]

Agreed.

But I'm still stuck on who's brain I end up in if my "me-ness" ends up in a new brain. If it's an emergent property, I, me, my selfiness, has to be the one in there. Either I just end up not existing or I keep going. Even being "split" into two seperate identical copies that eventually diverge into their own persons (very quickly) makes sense to me. What doesn't make sense is this. Which one of the clones will I be when I wake up? Which one am I "continuing on" into? "Both" just doesn't make sense, because there's no intercommunication and clearly they are distinct from each other.

I'm very much willing to accept I'm making some grave error in logic here. If it's already been shown, maybe it just needs to be pointed out more clearly. What I need is some explanation from a first person perspective, a line by line history description of exactly what I would personally experience if this happened.

 

[quixotecoyote]

Agreed.

But I'm still stuck on who's brain I end up in if my "me-ness" ends up in a new brain. If it's an emergent property, I, me, my selfiness, has to be the one in there. Either I just end up not existing or I keep going. Even being "split" into two seperate identical copies that eventually diverge into their own persons (very quickly) makes sense to me. What doesn't make sense is this. Which one of the clones will I be when I wake up? Which one am I "continuing on" into? "Both" just doesn't make sense, because there's no intercommunication and clearly they are distinct from each other.

I'm very much willing to accept I'm making some grave error in logic here. If it's already been shown, maybe it just needs to be pointed out more clearly. What I need is some explanation from a first person perspective, a line by line history description of exactly what I would personally experience if this happened.

I see what you're saying now. I think we've created a needless confusion by overusing words like 'split' and 'diverge'. When you double yourself in th manner we're speaking of, you haven't split yourself, you've increased yourself. You're still you, and there's now another person that's also you. Imagine a single celled creature dividing. Again, not a perfect analogy, because there actually is a splitting involved that doesn't exist in our scenario, but it ends up with two selves which for an instant are still (barring mutation) identical. Maybe two instances of a program running is a better idea. Start two internet browsers at the same time. Before you go away from the homepage, they're the same yet seperate.

 

[Dilb]

Yeah, there's no scientific test we can use (other than my fictional history viewer) that can be done to physically differentiate between the two. That doesn't make them the same; it just makes us incapable of identifying who is who using a scientific process. However, that doesn't mean it's impossible to distinguish them in ways other than scientific. Third party observations can still be considered valid, as would be truthful testimony from both the replicant and the original concerning their identities.

You're got the right idea, but you're missing the point. What you're missing is the utilitarian "There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere". In a practical sense, I am only a material thing. For any actual property of me, any property that would cause me to not be myself in any meaningful way, the question of 'original' or 'copy' is irrelevant. It's a difference with no actual consequences anywhere in the testable universe. The difference is irrelevant. There is an actual, physical me, that is unaffected by the history of the atoms, so it makes no sense to differentiate between them.

 

[Vox Humana]

What doesn't make sense is this. Which one of the clones will I be when I wake up? Which one am I "continuing on" into? "Both" just doesn't make sense, because there's no intercommunication and clearly they are distinct from each other.

It seems to me that you are subtly assuming a soul here, DJ. If you were replicated, there would be two of you; both would wake up thinking 'I am Dark Jaguar' and would perceive the other as just another person, distinguished only by the fact that he looks identical. Both would think "I am me, this is my body. That body is someone else." And both would be right.

I think your mistake is that you are assuming the uniqueness of your 'me-ness'. This is accurate in real-life, but the hypothetical situation being discussed invalidates that assumption.

 

[jmercer]

You're got the right idea, but you're missing the point. What you're missing is the utilitarian "There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere". In a practical sense, I am only a material thing. For any actual property of me, any property that would cause me to not be myself in any meaningful way, the question of 'original' or 'copy' is irrelevant. It's a difference with no actual consequences anywhere in the testable universe. The difference is irrelevant. There is an actual, physical me, that is unaffected by the history of the atoms, so it makes no sense to differentiate between them.

That's a nice summary of the opposing argument I've been dealing with. And in a universe where the only thing that matters is the physical similarity between objects, that would be fine. I have no idea what universe that would be, but it's certainly not the one you and I live in.

I maintain that there is a difference, and a relevant one which matters in a significant way. In example, (one I've used here twice before to demonstrate this concept) - take the Mona Lisa. Replicate it.

Will the original Mona Lisa or the copy be more valuable to the art world? And if you mix the two up, what would happen to the relative values of both?

Regarding humans, a similar argument is as follows: if the original commits a crime, jumps into a transporter and then replicates himself... who gets punished for the crime? Both the original and the duplicate? Or just the original, the one who was actually physically present and committed the crime?

If you say the original gets punished, then the identity of the original is relevant. If you say both, I'd like you to please explain why the replicant - who didn't even exist at the time of the crime in any form, atoms included - should be held responsible for the actions of the original.

Take the reverse argument. Post-replication, the duplicate commits a crime. Who gets punished... and why?

What we are discussing is essentially whether or not the original and replicate are the same person - or if they are distinct and different individuals. I say they are different due to spacial location and history.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Will the original Mona Lisa or the copy be more valuable to the art world? And if you mix the two up, what would happen to the relative values of both?

The presumptive decrease in the perceived value of both in the marketplace might be due to the fact that the Mona Lisa would no longer be unique. You've just monkeyed with the scarcity of it.

I think that's the real reason. There is no functional or practical distinction between the "original" and the "copy." We are making an exact duplicate here.

Then again, I realize that the latter point is the bone of contention between us. Also, you've got the whole perceived value thing going on. It doesn't mean there's a real difference.

Regarding humans, a similar argument is as follows: if the original commits a crime, jumps into a transporter and then replicates himself... who gets punished for the crime? Both the original and the duplicate? Or just the original, the one who was actually physically present and committed the crime?

If you say the original gets punished, then the identity of the original is relevant. If you say both, I'd like you to please explain why the replicant - who didn't even exist at the time of the crime in any form, atoms included - should be held responsible for the actions of the original.

Take the reverse argument. Post-replication, the duplicate commits a crime. Who gets punished... and why?

Legally, this doesn't translate well simply because our laws never evolved to deal with this problem. Ethically or morally, I think others have already proposed ways to deal with this. I'm inclined to agree with the theory that says both should be punished.

What we are discussing is essentially whether or not the original and replicate are the same person - or if they are distinct and different individuals. I say they are different due to spacial location and history.

I think they are different too, but not in a practical or functional way. It still makes my head hurt.

AS

 

[Dilb]

That's a nice summary of the opposing argument I've been dealing with. And in a universe where the only thing that matters is the physical similarity between objects, that would be fine. I have no idea what universe that would be, but it's certainly not the one you and I live in.

It's certainly the universe I think I live in. Like I said, it's not an entirely attractive prospect, but I prefer it to the alternatives.

I maintain that there is a difference, and a relevant one which matters in a significant way. In example, (one I've used here twice before to demonstrate this concept) - take the Mona Lisa. Replicate it.

Will the original Mona Lisa or the copy be more valuable to the art world? And if you mix the two up, what would happen to the relative values of both?

The problem is that the value of things changes dramatically when you have things like replicators. If any rube can duplicate the Mona Lise, the actual painting loses it's value, just like posters or forgeries of it have little value. Some people, animists for example, or the Louvre (I expect, though maybe they'd take it amazingly well), would probably think there is a meaningful difference, but I would disagree.

Regarding humans, a similar argument is as follows: if the original commits a crime, jumps into a transporter and then replicates himself... who gets punished for the crime? Both the original and the duplicate? Or just the original, the one who was actually physically present and committed the crime?

As the meaningful "person" behind the meat-sack is an identity, I'd want to punish both. The fact that a person committed a crime in a different body is like not charging someone with murder because they used a gun to kill a person rather than using their own body to stab them with a knife.

If you say the original gets punished, then the identity of the original is relevant. If you say both, I'd like you to please explain why the replicant - who didn't even exist at the time of the crime in any form, atoms included - should be held responsible for the actions of the original.

Take the reverse argument. Post-replication, the duplicate commits a crime. Who gets punished... and why?

After duplication, they are meaningfully different people. That is, the people they are, are the same up to a point in their history, and then they split into different people.

This is similar what happens with identical twins, aside from the fact that they don't have a personality to copy. But if "life begins at conception" people are okay with punishing twins are separate people, or even just if you can accept that they are okay with it, then I don't see why duplicates would be a problem.

What we are discussing is essentially whether or not the original and replicate are the same person - or if they are distinct and different individuals. I say they are different due to spacial location and history.

And I say they are the same person, because to me, a person is a collection of thoughts and memories, not meat that happens to have taken a particular path through time. Even in distinguishable clones, like a copy in a robot body, I think they are both the same person.

 

[jmercer]

And at this point - for me, at least - I feel this thread has reached an impasse. What's interesting is that some of us seem to feel that identity is more-or-less an illusion based on the unique collection of physical attributes that make us up; others of us insist (including myself) that it's the individual history of each object that makes it "not-identical".

Some people have conceded that point while citing it as irrelevant or trivial; others appear to have dismissed it entirely. So - from my perspective, anyway - this has boiled down to the point of basic worldviews. That makes it debatable, but it's unlikely that anyone will change their minds regardless of debate. Which is perfectly fine by me - I just enjoy exploring these things while constantly re-evaluating my POV.

Just a few more comments, then I'm going into lurk mode here unless something new crops up.

The Mona Lisa example I used is unfair in a couple of ways; I'm a bit surprised that nobody called me on it. Having said that, I'll self-expose those flaws.

Firstly, the Mona Lisa is an inamimate object being used in a debate over an animate subject; while not totally "apples and oranges", I was a bit surprised that no-one challenged me over that. In addition, the Mona Lisa has no identity other than the subjective one that third parties assign it - kind of a major flaw when debating identity.

That last flaw plays in quite well with a challenge to the monetary value of the painting should it be replicated. A perfect duplication of the Mona Lisa would probably result in a boost of value for both the replicant and the original if only one replicant was made; however, if hundreds - or thousands - of replications were made both the original and the duplicate would almost certainly drop in value.

The other interesting thing I noticed is that no-one brought up the thought that art is totally subjective, and that an individual might prize the replicant of the painting quite as strongly as a museum might view the original... simply because of the beauty of the painting.

In the same sense, a family might feel very strongly about the original versus the replicant... or feel very strongly toward the replicant if the original were dead.

In my opinion... while we can certainly arrive at an "objective" conclusion concerning this in an academic discussion, I doubt that we'd react the same way if faced with this in reality.

Personally, I hope we never find out until the ethical capabilities of humanity reach the point of being able to successfully address our technological abilities.

 

[AmateurScientist]

In addition, the Mona Lisa has no identity other than the subjective one that third parties assign it - kind of a major flaw when debating identity.
....

The other interesting thing I noticed is that no-one brought up the thought that art is totally subjective, and that an individual might prize the replicant of the painting quite as strongly as a museum might view the original... simply because of the beauty of the painting.

Hey, credit where credit is due. I did raise that issue just two posts above yours. See my use of "perceived value" twice.

I agree that there is an impasse regarding worldviews. All that is left is for you to concede that yours is totally wrong.

AS

 

[jmercer]

Heh - Sorry, AS... I didn't realize that's what you meant with percieved. I took it as perceived in the art world rather than all of humanity. I am therefore pleased to acknowledge and note that you were the only person in this thread to recognize that flaw.

Tell you what - I'll concede my worldview when you demonstrate that you're willing to step into a matter transmitter... knowing that your personal consciousness will cease forever, and another one will seamlessly continue elsewhere believing it's you.

 

[chriswl]

That's a nice summary of the opposing argument I've been dealing with. And in a universe where the only thing that matters is the physical similarity between objects, that would be fine. I have no idea what universe that would be, but it's certainly not the one you and I live in.

Well, you are departing from materialism in saying that (perhaps this is your intention).

Materialists believe that the mental depends on the physical. And that no difference in a mental state is possible without a corresponding difference in a physical state. So an exact physical duplicate is an exact duplicate in every way. This is pretty much a definition of materialism/physicalism.

Your arguments that people would feel differently about or behave differently towards a duplicate are not relevant. A materialist would simply say that they are not justified in feeling that way, that their dualist assumptions are leading them to misunderstand the true nature of the situation.

 

[jmercer]

Chriswl... I certainly don't have a problem with what you've described. My issue all along has been that there's a very limited set of what is considered to be a difference - I believe people are excluding at least two things that would affect the mentality - one directly and the other indirectly.

FWIW, spacial location upon replication is a physical change that would (IMO) have a direct impact on the mentality of one of the beings - the replicant. That would be followed by the realization that he (the replicant) didn't have a real personal history, merely someone else's memories of it.

But like I said, this is just my personal view on it. Thanks for the debate, everyone.

 

[BoogieWoogieWookie]

This brings to mind an episode of The Outer Limits. In this episode, aliens have transporter technology that they intend to give humans after they have shown they have the maturity to use it properly.

They have a human employed to perform one task during a teleportation and that is to push the button that will destroy the original. I believe they called it 'balancing the equation'. This was finalized after the message was received that the 'copy' had arrived at the other end.

During one transport they receive an alarm and cannot verify the success of the operation, so they stop the destruction of the original. In a short time they receive confirmation that the person did indeed arrive at their destination and thus it now becomes the task of the human to kill the original the old fashioned way.

This leads to a problem as the human that must do this is now faced with a task that has always been rather mechanical and impersonal. That the traveler is a very pretty young woman adds further consternation for him.

OK, now let's suppose that the transporter we are using has a monitoring device that detects when the duplicate has safely arrived at the other end. Let's further suppose that we must do the 'balancing of the equation' ourselves. There is a panel in front of us that has an indicator that turns green when the duplicate arrives safely. Next to it is a large push-button that is labeled 'destroy original'.

How many of you would use this transporter and have no problem with pushing that button?

If you believe that your conciousness is purely a physical property ot the brain then you should have no problem, right? You know that as soon as you push that button you will feel yourself appear at the other end, right?

Think I'll walk, though.

 

[Dilb]

How many of you would use this transporter and have no problem with pushing that button?

If you believe that your conciousness is purely a physical property ot the brain then you should have no problem, right? You know that as soon as you push that button you will feel yourself appear at the other end, right?

Think I'll walk, though.

No, that's been repeatedly brought up. Any time after duplication, you have two different, although very similar people. You do not "feel" yourself transferred once you push the kill button, either you are suddenly at your destination, and go on your way, or you are not at your destination and have to kill yourself. The prospect of actively killing myself in that situation isn't all that attractive. Even if I know the only unique parts of me are what I think about right up until I hit that button, it's still the 'real me' dying, while the 'other me' lives.

By any meaningful test both have equal claim to being the continuation of me from before the duplication, but afterwards each is locked into a unique person, and as a person I don't want to kill myself. Before the duplication, I know that I will come out of it, even if one version is destroyed, but that isn't true after the duplication.

 

[Rasmus]

How many of you would use this transporter and have no problem with pushing that button?

I agree with Dilb: I would have to kill myself, regardless of any copy that might exist of me. So I would not rid the world of anything, I would just have to commit suicide. No thanks.

 

[Dark Jaguar]

And THAT is about where I give up this notion of eternal life by replication. If my body going on means (as simply makes sense and I have no reason to think otherwise) that my experience is "here I am" consistantly with no break, then that's me. At no point during the process am I "sharing an awareness" with the clone. If they can "diverge" into their own person, what keeps me from, every single moment I'm awake and my brain makes the slightest change (which is every single moment I'm awake), diverging into a new me? It seems that being aware really is contingent on linked brain activity from past to present.

That said, I don't think destroying me the instant the new me is created will do anything more than create a new person. It seems, to me, no different than the scenario where my "original self" is still there, so it seems the only way to go about it is to be consistant and say that my own experience would "end" there and a new one with a built in template would go on.

(Note: Even if you open two instances of a program on a computer, they each occupy a unique space in memory, they are unique, at least unique enough for the computer to say "there's two of them". That's how unique a clone would be. If they were literally the same, you could only count 1 of them because there would only be 1 of them.)

That all said, I'm very much willing to change my mind. I mean, I already have right here. For the record, I wasn't saying I actually THOUGHT I'd "transfer" to another body, I'm saying that seems the only conclusion I can think of, and it would be transfering in the same way as moving a file in a computer (IE, copy and delete). As much as it makes sense for me to think of copying all my brain data and then after my death recreating it resulting in "me" (not in the legal sense, because I really don't care about any of that, I mean in the sense that instead of the void my experience in real time is straight away from moment of copy to new body, that's my experience), well, as much as that makes sense, there are too many odd paradoxes, the easiest of which is the "leave the copied person alive" scenario. In no way can I reasonably expect to be "aware" in that other mind for even an instant. Seems more likely I'd just keep on going and that would be my experience of it. I don't see myself keeping on going "into" that new mind, and that's partly because I don't think of myself having a soul.

The only paradox here then is, well, maybe someone who enters a coma and comes back really has died and a new existance starts from scratch? Maybe I do die every night, or more accuratly, a long precession of "me's" that came before? That's still a pretty big one, because that's not how I experienced it, to the best of my memories.

So in other words, I'm STILL as confused as ever. How do BOTH paradoxes get resolved?