Transporter has been debunked - but wait a second...

[Dorian Gray]

Right. And I'm claiming that the original person does not necessarily cease to exist simply because of the transporter process, and for scientific reasons as well as philosophical ones.

 

[athon]

Right. And I'm claiming that the original person does not necessarily cease to exist simply because of the transporter process, and for scientific reasons as well as philosophical ones.

Huh? I hope you don't think I'm intentionally being daft, because I'm not. But...

Are you saying that if an object's complete structural information is copied and transferred across a distance, and this information is used to recreate the object perfectly, that if the original object is destroyed, it still exists?

I keep saying, this view is a matter of semantics. 'Same' is only relative to the object at the time of creation. We use the term in a rather flexible manner; I say I am the 'same' person as I was a day ago, which is used in a manner of reference to self. However, if that self was copied and the copy continued into an existance of its own, could you say both it and I were the same being? No, you could not.

Hence this is more a limitation of definitions than one of any real philosophy or mechanics. Without clear meanings, the question asking whether they are the same is essentially meaningless.

Athon

 

[~enigma~]

Scientists have teleported material at the quantum level

Dorian,

you are not understanding the term teleportation correctly in regards to Quantum teleportation^WP as done by Gisin et al.

 

[Mangafranga]

Are you saying that if an object's complete structural information is copied and transferred across a distance, and this information is used to recreate the object perfectly, that if the original object is destroyed, it still exists?

I think the question is "if the original is destroyed, would you step into the transporter?"

I keep saying, this view is a matter of semantics. 'Same' is only relative to the object at the time of creation. We use the term in a rather flexible manner; I say I am the 'same' person as I was a day ago, which is used in a manner of reference to self.

I do not understand what this means.

However, if that self was copied and the copy continued into an existence of its own, could you say both it and I were the same being? No, you could not.

I do not see why it is necessary for you to say that it is only if there is continued existence that they can be said to be different. You have already differentiated between the copy and the original. If you had not then you might be able to say that on their continued existence there becomes two different individuals, but I do not see how you could say of these individuals that one is the "I".

Hence this is more a limitation of definitions than one of any real philosophy or mechanics. Without clear meanings, the question asking whether they are the same is essentially meaningless.

In the respect of these bodies being the thing which athon thinks is athon, are they the same?

ETA- that last question was confusingly put by me. I think what you might by saying when you say that the question is meaningless is that the bodies in question have their identity in respect of them being certain things. So in respect of these bodies being human, they are both the same. The issue here is to do with the respect in which a body has its personal identity.

 

[athon]

I think the question is "if the original is destroyed, would you step into the transporter?"

Ok. If that's the question, then why not? Your sequence of memories is the same. Nobody has found evidence of a single unit called 'self' in the mind. It's an illusion produced by the sequence of memories formed up until a certain point. Therefore, the object with those memories would be standing on the other side, recalling the apprehension it felt before stepping in, and would be glad that it did so as it is now existing in another place (as intended) with a retained sense of self.

I do not understand what this means.

Sorry. I was trying to describe what I meant by it being a matter of definition.

The word same has slightly different denotations, depending on the context. If you walk into a shop and see a man buy a newspaper, and you approach the shop keeper and say 'I'll have the same paper, thanks', he's not going to run after the other guy and snatch the paper off him to sell to you. Likewise, if you hired a squash racket one week, and ask the counter assistant for a racket the following week and say 'I'll have the same one I used last week', they'll most likely give you the exact same racket, understand that you don't want one that is the same make and brand, but want that actual same racket.

The term can be blurred when one asks if a person who is replicated is the same person. The definition needs to be very precise.

I do not see why it is necessary for you to say that it is only if there is continued existence that they can be said to be different. You have already differentiated between the copy and the original. If you had not then you might be able to say that on their continued existence there becomes two different individuals, but I do not see how you could say of these individuals that one is the "I".

I'm not. I'm saying it depends on the definitions.

In the respect of these bodies being the thing which athon thinks is athon, are they the same?

Again, it depends on the definition of same. Each will identify with the self called Athon, but it depends on what the term same means as to whether the copy is the same as the original.

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

Ok. If that's the question, then why not? Your sequence of memories is the same. Nobody has found evidence of a single unit called 'self' in the mind. It's an illusion produced by the sequence of memories formed up until a certain point. Therefore, the object with those memories would be standing on the other side, recalling the apprehension it felt before stepping in, and would be glad that it did so as it is now existing in another place (as intended) with a retained sense of self.

I think I understand your position now. You consider that there is no fact of the matter as regards personal identity. I would say that your position is something like this- "athon" =df features x,y,z but we can just as well say that "athon" =df features a,b,c and be just as correct. The opposing position is something like this- "athon" has the intrinsic features ?,?,? and doing thought experiments like this one can help to understand what these features are.

However it seems to me that the thought experiment is useful even if it is the case that there is no fact of the matter. If we are under the persistent illusion that there is a fact of the matter as regards personal identity, then by examining that illusion we can draw it out to have no basis in the real world.

 

[athon]

I think I understand your position now. You consider that there is no fact of the matter as regards personal identity. I would say that your position is something like this- "athon" =df features x,y,z but we can just as well say that "athon" =df features a,b,c and be just as correct. The opposing position is something like this- "athon" has the intrinsic features ?,?,? and doing thought experiments like this one can help to understand what these features are.

However it seems to me that the thought experiment is useful even if it is the case that there is no fact of the matter. If we are under the persistent illusion that there is a fact of the matter as regards personal identity, then by examining that illusion we can draw it out to have no basis in the real world.

I don't understand how this argument could make any sense in a materialistic philosophy. Sure, if you use some form of dualism, where the mind exists as a distinct set of rules separate from the physics of the body, then perhaps the sense of self is also distinct and you can discuss whether the person on the other side is the same or not. If that's the case, it becomes a debate on dualism.

If you want to keep this discuss on principles of the physical, material universe, then perfectly replicating something that is self-reflective will produce the same 'self-reflection' on the other side of the transporter. Once again, it would depend on what you mean by 'same', but I feel that entity would see no difference and would feel that it was the same self.

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

The main issue I have had with your comments is that you have made the claim that the question is meaningless. Now you might be right that the question has a bad assumption underpinning it, but I do not think that it is a meaningless question.

I don't understand how this argument could make any sense in a materialistic philosophy.

To make things clear, I think you are refering to this argument- that the self has instrinsic features that would be destroyed by a transportation device.

Sure, if you use some form of dualism, where the mind exists as a distinct set of rules separate from the physics of the body, then perhaps the sense of self is also distinct and you can discuss whether the person on the other side is the same or not. If that's the case, it becomes a debate on dualism.

If you want to keep this discuss on principles of the physical, material universe, then perfectly replicating something that is self-reflective will produce the same 'self-reflection' on the other side of the transporter. Once again, it would depend on what you mean by 'same', but I feel that entity would see no difference and would feel that it was the same self.

Athon

It seems to me that you are quite coherently making points about the question at hand. You have argued that the image of the self is not a fact of reality. You have argued that even if it was a fact of reality that only if we accepted a dualist position would there be a loss of self identity in this theoretical case.

I may be being a bit too pedantic in my pursual of saying that the question is meaningful, and you are just using "meaningless" in a different sense than I. Anyway my point has been that even if there is no self as such, or if some other bad assumption is motivating the question, it still may be a meaningful question. It is meaningful because we are able to discuss it. It is meaningful because you a proposition can be false but still meaningful (indeed doesn't saying something is false imply that it is meaningful?)

 

[athon]

I may be being a bit too pedantic in my pursual of saying that the question is meaningful, and you are just using "meaningless" in a different sense than I. Anyway my point has been that even if there is no self as such, or if some other bad assumption is motivating the question, it still may be a meaningful question. It is meaningful because we are able to discuss it. It is meaningful because you a proposition can be false but still meaningful (indeed doesn't saying something is false imply that it is meaningful?)

Perhaps. My statement of it being a meaningless question was directly related to the point of definition. Without explicitly defining what is meant by the word 'same', the question, and therefore any answer, has no real meaning, as the question produces no useful response.

One of the single biggest problems in discussing anything scientific is definitions. A word can have subtly different denotations and connotations, and unless we're using language in the same capacity, the discussion can - IMO - lose meaning.

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

Perhaps. My statement of it being a meaningless question was directly related to the point of definition. Without explicitly defining what is meant by the word 'same', the question, and therefore any answer, has no real meaning, as the question produces no useful response.

I thought the unclear word was "you".

One of the single biggest problems in discussing anything scientific is definitions. A word can have subtly different denotations and connotations, and unless we're using language in the same capacity, the discussion can - IMO - lose meaning.

But when we begin to talk about a thing in the world that we want to study we may not (and probably won't, hence the need for study) know all its properties, and thus won't be able to define it strictly.

 

[Dorian Gray]

Huh? I hope you don't think I'm intentionally being daft, because I'm not. But...

Are you saying that if an object's complete structural information is copied and transferred across a distance, and this information is used to recreate the object perfectly, that if the original object is destroyed, it still exists?

No. I'm saying that if an object's complete structural information is transferred across a distance, and this information is used to recreate the object perfectly, that it still exists. No copy.

 

[athon]

But when we begin to talk about a thing in the world that we want to study we may not (and probably won't, hence the need for study) know all its properties, and thus won't be able to define it strictly.

You're not understanding what I mean by definition. I mean in order to describe an observation, you need language, and the descriptors need to be used consistently and precisely in order to conserve meaning. Meaning is lost when the definition is imprecise. So, when the word 'same' is used, its meaning must be used precisely in each instance. See my earlier example for where the word's definition can be vague.

No. I'm saying that if an object's complete structural information is transferred across a distance, and this information is used to recreate the object perfectly, that it still exists. No copy.

So it's only a copy if the original remains? If the original is destroyed, you're calling it the original? Again, it's a discussion of semantics. Sure, if they're the definitions you want to use, then you've explicitly stated them and I would have to for the purposes of such a discussion accept them. But it would have no bearing on the material effects of such a situation, hence debating the definitions as if it is a scientific discussion is meaningless.

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

You're not understanding what I mean by definition. I mean in order to describe an observation, you need language, and the descriptors need to be used consistently and precisely in order to conserve meaning. Meaning is lost when the definition is imprecise. So, when the word 'same' is used, its meaning must be used precisely in each instance. See my earlier example for where the word's definition can be vague.

I'm still not clear on what you mean. I see three main options-

Same could mean either "having all the same properties (e.g. reacting the same when put in the same circumstances)" or "being numerically identical" or it could even mean something else.

Same, in this instance as respect to the transporter could mean "having all the atoms be in identical configuration as the original", it could mean "having configuration such as to have relevant features (i.e. at a higher level) be of identical configuration as the original", that is to say we haven't clearly said why the transported thing is the same as the original.

When you say the transporter creates something that is the same then it just must be the same in virtue of the fact that the transporter created something that was the same.

 

[Dorian Gray]

So it's only a copy if the original remains? If the original is destroyed, you're calling it the original? Again, it's a discussion of semantics. Sure, if they're the definitions you want to use, then you've explicitly stated them and I would have to for the purposes of such a discussion accept them. But it would have no bearing on the material effects of such a situation, hence debating the definitions as if it is a scientific discussion is meaningless.

Athon

It's NOT semantics. You're talking about teleportation that is like sending a fax, where there is an original and a copy. I'm talking about teleportation that is like sending a letter through regular mail, where there IS NO COPY. No copy. And a third time, no copy.

 

[Dorian Gray]

I'm seeing:

1. Original copied and destroyed, copy sent, copy 'created' at destination.
2. Original copied but retained, copy sent, copy 'created' at destination.
3. Original converted into a form that retains 'self' by any rational definition, original sent, original converted back into normal physical form at destination.

I'm suggesting that Star Trek engages in Number 3, and I'm asserting that this way causes no interruption to 'self'.

 

[Mangafranga]

It's NOT semantics. You're talking about teleportation that is like sending a fax, where there is an original and a copy. I'm talking about teleportation that is like sending a letter through regular mail, where there IS NO COPY. No copy. And a third time, no copy.

I understood you in the "like a fax" way. Thus I may have been a factor in the way in which athon understood you.

I'm seeing:

1. Original copied and destroyed, copy sent, copy 'created' at destination.
2. Original copied but retained, copy sent, copy 'created' at destination.
3. Original converted into a form that retains 'self' by any rational definition, original sent, original converted back into normal physical form at destination.

I'm suggesting that Star Trek engages in Number 3, and I'm asserting that this way causes no interruption to 'self'.

I had no idea this was what you were talking about. I think you need to justify that the original was "converted into a form that retains 'self' by any rational definition" to be able to make any sense of whether or not there would be any interruption to the self on reconstruction.

 

[athon]

It's NOT semantics. You're talking about teleportation that is like sending a fax, where there is an original and a copy. I'm talking about teleportation that is like sending a letter through regular mail, where there IS NO COPY. No copy. And a third time, no copy.

As in the original particles are sent physically? Then why complicate it by talking about a transporter?

There are two methods I'm assuming you're referring to here; one in which the information determining the position of every particle in the body is examined, and this 'map' as such is sent across time and space and used to assemble like particles into a copy of the original, yet in determining the map the original was destroyed. That is what I assumed you were referring to, so I apologise if I got confused. According to this, whether it is 'the same' individual is a matter of defining what you mean by 'same', and the argument is one of pure semantics, as I have argued.

If the particles themselves are transferred across time and space, where no mapping and information transfer is required, then I really don't understand your dilemma; it's not different to stepping from one side of the room to the other.

I'm feeling one of us is really confused by your statement. I'm not beyond admitting it is me.

Athon

 

[athon]

I'm seeing:

1. Original copied and destroyed, copy sent, copy 'created' at destination.
2. Original copied but retained, copy sent, copy 'created' at destination.
3. Original converted into a form that retains 'self' by any rational definition, original sent, original converted back into normal physical form at destination.

I'm suggesting that Star Trek engages in Number 3, and I'm asserting that this way causes no interruption to 'self'.

I really don't see how you are picturing this. The closest I can understand it is that particles are mapped and their relative positions are destroyed as this happens. It's the 'original converted into a form' I'm lost on. What form? Information is sent across distance, either in the form of the particles themselves in their original positions, or in the form of some alternative encoding where they are reinterpreted somewhere else.

Are you suggesting that 'self' is a metaphysical body of information that cannot be copied as physical information? If so, what are you suggesting 'self' is?

Sadly, I suspect that your statement is a dualist suggestion - that self has information-like properties beyond the scope of the material universe. If you're not meaning that, then please clarify what you mean by a rational definition of 'self'. Because you seemly to be vaguely suggesting some method that has no real description.

Athon

 

[Thabiguy]

Well, I can't speak for Dorian, but a lot of what he says bears some resemblance to quantum teleportation, as opposed to classical teleportation. Classical teleportation is a hypothetical process in which particles are measured and their complete whereabouts are encoded as information, which is then copied and/or sent as desired; the no-teleportation theorem of quantum information theory says this is impossible, that your encoded information will always be incomplete. Quantum teleportation is a different process which allows one to perfectly teleport the quantum state of a particle to a different location without measuring it. Transmission of some (incomplete) information is required to get around the no-communication theorem. The no-cloning theorem requires that the "original" is irreversibly destroyed by the process. (Of course, you could also ship the original by mail - but the advantages of sending the particle via radio transmission, instead of physically moving it, should be obvious.) Note: this is of course simplified and is not meant to be a primer in quantum information theory.

If Dorian were talking about teleporting an electron with a precious quantum state that you don't want to destroy by measuring, what he says is making sense. However, it seems highly debatable whether the same considerations apply to teleporting people. Once could argue that a person's "self" might be related to the exact quantum states of the particles that the person is composed of, but I haven't seen evidence for that. Indeed, it appears that we interact with our environment all the time, continuously changing our quantum state without experiencing discontinuation of self-identity.

From this point of view, classical teleportation of people might be possible. You wouldn't get a perfect copy of the original (the quantum states of the compositing particles will necessarily differ, by no-teleportation theorem), but you would get a person that would, even at a pretty close glance, look just like the original, and perhaps more importantly, who couldn't tell themselves from the original.

But who knows, maybe 1000 years from now, quantum-teleporting people will be easier than teleporting them classically. ("Are you tired with the old and clumsy classical teleporters? Are you plain sick of the hangover and headaches that disturbing your quantum states gives you? Do you feel bad for your original self who has to be electrocuted and fed to lions while you're enjoying your vacation at your destination? Do you just hate it when the sleazy teleport operators secretly copy your body information to reconstruct it later and have sex with your clones? Well look no further and try our new Tele-Qu 3000 (R) today! Equipped with the cutting-edge quantum teleportation technology and Planckguard (tm) quantum cryptography software for your security, experience what it means to arrive to your destination in the same state! So grant yourself a little comfort and let us bring some perfection in your travels. Tele-Qu. Feel perfect.")

 

[athon]

If Dorian were talking about teleporting an electron with a precious quantum state that you don't want to destroy by measuring, what he says is making sense. However, it seems highly debatable whether the same considerations apply to teleporting people. Once could argue that a person's "self" might be related to the exact quantum states of the particles that the person is composed of, but I haven't seen evidence for that. Indeed, it appears that we interact with our environment all the time, continuously changing our quantum state without experiencing discontinuation of self-identity.

Nice post, Thabiguy. Thanks.

It's the notion of 'same' which loses me in this discussion. I can understand that there are a whole manner of ways of transferring information from one place to another, and while I hadn't really thought of the quantum transfer, now that you've mentioned it I can see that as well.

I thought Dorian was asking essentially that if an entity with a sense of self was transferred in some manner where their information travelled in some altered state and returned to the same state as before, whether it would be the 'same' person. I've argued that the word 'same' needs to be defined precisely, but really it's a moot argument. If the information is exactly as it was previously, then all effects of that entity on the universe regardless of the transportation would be identical. Hence you could call it the same because it is the same arrangement of information, or different because the particles themselves are not the original particles...it doesn't matter.

So, either we talking semantics, dualism, or something even more complicated... Either way, I'm yet to see the value of the question.

Athon