Transporter has been debunked - but wait a second...

[Dorian Gray]

The transporter/teleporter as seen on Star Trek and other shows has been generally debunked, or at least deconstructed into a philosophical issue and a technological one. However, something occurred to me while I was thinking about it. Nearly all the cells in the human body are replaced on the average about every 4 years.

The technological question is whether it is even possible to do. Scientists have teleported material at the quantum level, and however likely it is now, I think it's at least plausible that with enough time and money this can be expanded into our level of existence (multicellular, etc.). That leaves the philosophical question: When your body is deconstructed and reassembled later, that new body essentially being a copy, is it still 'you', or just an extremely good copy of you?

That's where the thought comes in. Our bodies are replaced every 4 years, and we still consider that as 'us'. (I could bring up that even if we aren't teleported, we're not exactly the same as before anyway). So all the transporter does is accelerate that replacement - thus, the end result is still 'you'. The relationship between natural and transporter replacement is like the difference between walking and taking a plane - the same result, only one is much much faster.

Comments?

 

[pvt1863]

If I'm not mistaken, some nerve cells never get replaced. So the transporters would do more than simply accelerate a natural process.

A bigger issue is parts and wholes. Yes, almost all of your cells get replaced over time, but that never happens all at once. Replacing small parts doesn't affect the whole, even if the entire whole is replaced as the end product of numerous small replacements. This is different from taking everything apart at once and then rebuilding it with new parts. The whole in that case ceases to be and is then replaced with a duplicate. At least that's my take.

It is a bit philosophical, and unfortunately it is impossible to discuss this without devolving into semantics over what a part is, what a whole is, and what object/concept an 'identity' is attached to.

As a side note, it has always been my hypothesis that people who use transporters like in Star Trek die and are then replaced by a perfect clone with a complete memory of the departed.

 

[Buckaroo]

Greg Egan's Permutation City is a great hard sci-fi novel that deals with essentially this very issue. Cracking read -- if you can find it, it might even affect your thinking on the subject. The science is pretty darn good.

 

[athon]

This is very much a philosophical debate rather than a scientific one. The concept of 'self' is a complicated thing and requires precise definition. For instance, I refer to my historical 'self' primarily because I possess a string of memories to which I personally relate. If a construct was to be given my memories and felt related to them, then how would it distinguish its own history as unique, in relation to mine? That cognitive model of historical self, arguably an illusion created by a perspective of sequential memories, is how we define our 'self'.

As to say whether something is the same object if all of its particles are replaced perfectly by identical substitutes, it is a pointless question. Rather than particles, think 'if a house is torn down and all of its materials are replaced by identical substitutes, and it is rebuilt, is it the same house?'...what meaning does 'same' have? It will respond to the environment in the same way as before, given the rules of determinism, so the terms 'same' or 'not same' has no real meaning.

Of course, if you're dualist, then you'd have a completely different opinion to that when it came to something that possessed a mind.

Athon
(hm, this place is almost too quiet without Hammy around now. I feel like making a smug comment and putting in a winkie)

 

[athon]

Greg Egan's Permutation City is a great hard sci-fi novel that deals with essentially this very issue. Cracking read -- if you can find it, it might even affect your thinking on the subject. The science is pretty darn good.

Egan is a legend of a science fiction writer. If anybody gets an opportunity to read any of his stuff....do!

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

As to say whether something is the same object if all of its particles are replaced perfectly by identical substitutes, it is a pointless question. Rather than particles, think 'if a house is torn down and all of its materials are replaced by identical substitutes, and it is rebuilt, is it the same house?'...what meaning does 'same' have? It will respond to the environment in the same way as before, given the rules of determinism, so the terms 'same' or 'not same' has no real meaning.

Didn't you just provide a meaning to "same" i.e. that a thing is the same if it responds to the enviroment in the same was as before, given the rules of determinism.

 

[athon]

Didn't you just provide a meaning to "same" i.e. that a thing is the same if it responds to the enviroment in the same was as before, given the rules of determinism.

I defined what I meant by 'same', but does it really mean anything? By that, I mean if I said it was different because the atoms had been swapped with identical replacements, does this change anything? How is defining it as the same useful at all if different in this case?

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

I defined what I meant by 'same', but does it really mean anything? By that, I mean if I said it was different because the atoms had been swapped with identical replacements, does this change anything? How is defining it as the same useful at all if different in this case?

Athon

The different definitions of "same" will provide different answers to the question of the OP.

 

[athon]

The different definitions of "same" will provide different answers to the question of the OP.

Indeed. But for all intents and purposes, what does it matter? If I have two rubber balls that are absolutely identical in all respects, does it matter which one I choose for an experiment? You could say they are two different balls, or you could say they are the same balls...it really doesn't have any meaning when it comes to how they will behave in the real world.

The debate becomes one of semantics rather than any real world meaning.

Athon

 

[Mangafranga]

Indeed. But for all intents and purposes, what does it matter? If I have two rubber balls that are absolutely identical in all respects, does it matter which one I choose for an experiment? You could say they are two different balls, or you could say they are the same balls...it really doesn't have any meaning when it comes to how they will behave in the real world.

The debate becomes one of semantics rather than any real world meaning.

Athon

Of course after the experiment is complete you would have to look at the ball you actually used, rather than the other one which is the same. By identical in all respects I assume you really mean identical in all respects except location.

The two philosophical issues I am aware of are 1- when you have a case whereby you reasonably end up with two objects that are the same object. This happens when you replace the bits of the object peice by peice, and then someone comes along and uses the bits from the original to reconstruct the original.
2- whether or not you should choose to take the transporter.

I consider the second case to be more interesting than the first since understanding the second case may lead us to understand what our identity lies in.

ETA- the stanford entry on this issue is "Identity Over Time", I would post the link but I am without mouse and there is only so much Tabbing one can take.

 

[dakotajudo]

Nearly all the cells in the human body are replaced on the average about every 4 years.

...

Our bodies are replaced every 4 years, and we still consider that as 'us'.

You can't make this jump.

Some cells are turnover relatively quickly (for example, red blood cells, on the order of months), so you can assume some cells remain around for many times 4 years.

From a physiological perspective, it's those cells that don't turnover that define 'us'.

y). So all the transporter does is accelerate that replacement - thus, the end result is still 'you'.

Does this logically follow?

I have books on my shelf from twenty years ago. Same molecular structure as twenty years ago (plus or minus an insignificant wear and tear). But that person from twenty years ago?

I share memories and DNA but not all the body mass.

Does this postulated transporter cause a discontinuity in memory and thought? Is memory fixed, in cell structure, or does it depend on the constant interaction between cells?

What happens, in this transporter, if a nerve is in mid-action potential? Will the action potential be resumed at the same point along the nerve? Would this be analogous to how a defibrillator works?

 

[Diamond]

I think Stimpson J Cat has covered this in some detail since his work is on modelling the brain as a noisy neural network. Is the self a "ghost in the noise"?

 

[Mangafranga]

From a physiological perspective, it's those cells that don't turnover that define 'us'.

Can you explain why it is that the cells that don't turn over define 'us'. Can you tell me which cells they are?

 

[alfaniner]

I have this one hammer that I've had for 30 years.

I've replaced four handles and three heads in that time, but it's still the same old hammer!

 

[Jimbo07]

The debate becomes one of semantics rather than any real world meaning.

That's how I've started to come to view a lot of these discussions where there seems to be a split between technology and philosophy (for example, AI).

It seems that technologists (scientists, engineers, doctors, med techs, etc.) will do what they do. If they can build something that creates an identical 'copy' with no gap in memory, will there be a real-world difference?

The technologists will do a task and leave it to the philosophers to sit around noodle-caboodling about the 'self' and TRUTH^TM.

 

[Dorian Gray]

If 'self' is a 'string of memories' as Athon put it, that self can be stored as information, moved, and reconstructed without necessarily losing that 'self'. All I'm saying is that I don't think teleportation of a human necessarily requires the death of that human and a reproduction at the other end.

What if every electron in your body was replaced with duplicates? Would you be the same person? How about if every neutron and proton was replaced? Would you be the same person then? What if each particle is converted to a wave(or light), beamed to the new location, and converted back to a particle?

Also, I see your Egan's Permutation City and raise you one Terry Pratchett's The Fifth Elephant (Scone of Stone).

 

[athon]

If 'self' is a 'string of memories' as Athon put it, that self can be stored as information, moved, and reconstructed without necessarily losing that 'self'. All I'm saying is that I don't think teleportation of a human necessarily requires the death of that human and a reproduction at the other end.

What if every electron in your body was replaced with duplicates? Would you be the same person? How about if every neutron and proton was replaced? Would you be the same person then? What if each particle is converted to a wave(or light), beamed to the new location, and converted back to a particle?

Also, I see your Egan's Permutation City and raise you one Terry Pratchett's The Fifth Elephant (Scone of Stone).

When two 'selves' beging to have unique memories, they can no longer claim to be the same 'self'. I'll see your Fifth Elephant and raise you a Richard Morgan's 'Altered Carbon'. This novel is essentially about this very topic (downloading memories into a cortical memory drive for transfer through hyperspace).

Now, again I'll say that question 'would you be the same person' has no meaning in a scientific sense. Philosophically you could debate it until the cows came home, but two perfect copies of an entity will only claim unique status once they have different interactions occuring for each of them, thereby changing them in some way. Until then, the fact they are identical copies means that the universe will act upon each in the same way. Separating them by time and space will allow different interactions, thereby making each copy different. Until that happens, the term 'same' carries no explicit meaning.

Athon

 

[fuelair]

The transporter/teleporter as seen on Star Trek and other shows has been generally debunked, or at least deconstructed into a philosophical issue and a technological one. However, something occurred to me while I was thinking about it. Nearly all the cells in the human body are replaced on the average about every 4 years.

The technological question is whether it is even possible to do. Scientists have teleported material at the quantum level, and however likely it is now, I think it's at least plausible that with enough time and money this can be expanded into our level of existence (multicellular, etc.). That leaves the philosophical question: When your body is deconstructed and reassembled later, that new body essentially being a copy, is it still 'you', or just an extremely good copy of you?

That's where the thought comes in. Our bodies are replaced every 4 years, and we still consider that as 'us'. (I could bring up that even if we aren't teleported, we're not exactly the same as before anyway). So all the transporter does is accelerate that replacement - thus, the end result is still 'you'. The relationship between natural and transporter replacement is like the difference between walking and taking a plane - the same result, only one is much much faster.

Comments?

A number of SF authors looked at some of the issues of teleport devices that essentially created a new body in a new place in the 50' and 60s - including legal ramifications. It's late for me so I am not doing that well at IIRC stuff, but I am pretty sure Van Vogt was involve and the term Dellian robots and no-Dellian were involved (and between 57 and 60 - the period when I was the class order for Weekly Reader Book Club/equiv. (most books 25 or 35 cents each 1 free for every 3 ordered IIRC good on a stick!!)

 

[Dorian Gray]

When two 'selves' beging to have unique memories, they can no longer claim to be the same 'self'. I'll see your Fifth Elephant and raise you a Richard Morgan's 'Altered Carbon'. This novel is essentially about this very topic (downloading memories into a cortical memory drive for transfer through hyperspace).

Now, again I'll say that question 'would you be the same person' has no meaning in a scientific sense. Philosophically you could debate it until the cows came home, but two perfect copies of an entity will only claim unique status once they have different interactions occuring for each of them, thereby changing them in some way. Until then, the fact they are identical copies means that the universe will act upon each in the same way. Separating them by time and space will allow different interactions, thereby making each copy different. Until that happens, the term 'same' carries no explicit meaning.

Athon

If there were an original and a copy, they would be completely identical in every single way until the copy fully materialized, at which time the copy would be unique in location at first, and increasingly more unique as time went on.

But that implies that one steps into the transporter and a copy comes out on the planet's surface while the original person remains on the transporter. Instead, what if the original person is sent to the planet's surface and no 'copy' is ever made (you know, the way that has been shown on Star Trek about a thousand times)?

 

[athon]

If there were an original and a copy, they would be completely identical in every single way until the copy fully materialized, at which time the copy would be unique in location at first, and increasingly more unique as time went on.

Yep. Agreed.

But that implies that one steps into the transporter and a copy comes out on the planet's surface while the original person remains on the transporter. Instead, what if the original person is sent to the planet's surface and no 'copy' is ever made (you know, the way that has been shown on Star Trek about a thousand times)?

I'm not sure of what it is you're really wanting to know. If a duplicate is made, and the original remains, then as you said in the first paragraph, they would be considered to be identical, with this agreement between entities diminishing with time as each was to experience unique influences.

In the situation that the original ceased to exist, there would be only one entity; the one experiencing the influences of the 'planet'.

Athon