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There are no material objects


Because what I believe is, in essence, different to what most people believe. In this forum, for instance, full of naive materialists, people believe that supernatural stuff is ridiculous, that using empirical approaches, and letting the "facts talk" it is obvious that the only thing that exists is matter.

In contrast, I believe that we shouldn't go that far, it is not necessary. We don't need a magical "ultimate substance" of any sort. I believe that all we have is a set of systems of thought that matches, with various degrees of certainty, empirical facts. My own one only holds that phenomena is describable in terms of sets of relational rules. Here the implications are that matter (and every kind of stuff, like geometries, ideas or the value of a coin), are relational objects that (it can be said) follow sets of rules. If such rules allows us to predict phenomena, then they work as descriptions, but nothing can be said about their ontological status beyond our models. Our theories are, and will always be, just functional descriptions, out of this, nothing should be said.
 
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Because what I believe is, in essence, different to what most people believe. In this forum, for instance, full of naive materialists, people believe that supernatural stuff is ridiculous, that using empirical approaches, and letting the "facts talk" it is obvious that the only thing that exists is matter.

In contrast, I believe that we shouldn't go that far, it is not necessary. We don't need a magical "ultimate substance" of any sort. I believe that all we have is a set of systems of thought that matches, with various degrees of certainty, empirical facts. My own one only holds that phenomena is describable in terms of sets of relational rules. Here the implications are that matter (and every kind of stuff, like geometries, ideas or the value of a coin), are relational objects that (it can be said) follow sets of rules. If such rules allows us to predict phenomena, then they work as descriptions, but nothing can be said about their ontological status beyond our models. Our theories are, and will always be, just functional descriptions, out of this, nothing should be said.

Can I have some dressing for that word salad?
 
Seriously did Mad Libs release a "Bad First Year Philosophy Student on Weed" addition recently or something?
 
Ah yes, someone asks a person to explain themselves and then they ridicule their opinion.

If you do not care to understand then why do you ask?

I do not always agree with BDZ, as I am a utilitarian and they tend more to phenomenology,

"If such rules allows us to predict phenomena, then they work as descriptions, but nothing can be said about their ontological status beyond our models. Our theories are, and will always be, just functional descriptions"

This phrase is however exact in its terms and usage, and it is correct. If you think that theories are more than just approximate models then you are wrong, there is no way to determine ontology.

So perhaps some people should remember that we all have opinions, just like we all have...

And if you do not understand what BDZ said then perhaps you should think rather than ridicule.
 
Ah yes, someone asks a person to explain themselves and then they ridicule their opinion.

If you do not care to understand then why do you ask?

I do not always agree with BDZ, as I am a utilitarian and they tend more to phenomenology,

"If such rules allows us to predict phenomena, then they work as descriptions, but nothing can be said about their ontological status beyond our models. Our theories are, and will always be, just functional descriptions"

This phrase is however exact in its terms and usage, and it is correct. If you think that theories are more than just approximate models then you are wrong, there is no way to determine ontology.

So perhaps some people should remember that we all have opinions, just like we all have...

And if you do not understand what BDZ said then perhaps you should think rather than ridicule.

'I'm the same as you mate, I don't really know' would have been a more succinct statement by BZN. No need to break out the thesaurus.
 
This phrase is however exact in its terms and usage, and it is correct. If you think that theories are more than just approximate models then you are wrong, there is no way to determine ontology.

So perhaps some people should remember that we all have opinions, just like we all have...

And if you do not understand what BDZ said then perhaps you should think rather than ridicule.

Indeed. What is sad about this, is that the JREF is supposed to be full of critical thinkers and skeptics. On the other hand, it is interesting to see the results when they are confronted by something they can't trash like beliefs in supernatural stuff, and can't also tackle using reason. Oh well, at least this time the answers are hilarious :)
 
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Indeed. What is sad about this, is that the JREF is supposed to be full of critical thinkers and skeptics. On the other hand, it is interesting to see the results when they are confronted by something they can't trash like beliefs in supernatural stuff, and can't also tackle using reason. Oh well, at least this time the answers are hilarious :)

Goodbye. Enjoy your King's New Clothes, they suit you.
 
Ah yes, someone asks a person to explain themselves and then they ridicule their opinion.

If you do not care to understand then why do you ask?

I do not always agree with BDZ, as I am a utilitarian and they tend more to phenomenology,

"If such rules allows us to predict phenomena, then they work as descriptions, but nothing can be said about their ontological status beyond our models. Our theories are, and will always be, just functional descriptions"

This phrase is however exact in its terms and usage, and it is correct. If you think that theories are more than just approximate models then you are wrong, there is no way to determine ontology.

So perhaps some people should remember that we all have opinions, just like we all have...

And if you do not understand what BDZ said then perhaps you should think rather than ridicule.

Indeed. What is sad about this, is that the JREF is supposed to be full of critical thinkers and skeptics. On the other hand, it is interesting to see the results when they are confronted by something they can't trash like beliefs in supernatural stuff, and can't also tackle using reason. Oh well, at least this time the answers are hilarious :)

You are both ignoring the possibility that people understood the post perfectly well, but just think it's silly.
 
You really should not stop taking your meds jonesboy, all you do is embarrass yourself. :)
 
You are both ignoring the possibility that people understood the post perfectly well, but just think it's silly.

It's apparently impossible to say something so stupid that someone else won't think it's profound.
 
Theories of objective experience are nothing more than cultural constructs related to cognitive viability. Knowledge can be stripped of its metaphysics thus providing a framework for phenomena that have no counterpart in orthodox descriptions of reality. Intrinsic causuality incoprporates indwelling realities which appear as metaphorical templates,thus negating logical models of conciousness.
 
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Theories of objective experience are nothing more than cultural constructs related to cognitive viability. Knowledge can be stripped of its metaphysics thus providing a framework for phenomena that have no counterpart in orthodox descriptions of reality. Intrinsic causuality incoprporates indwelling realities which appear as metaphorical templates,thus negating logical models of conciousness.

How true... our a-posteriori concepts are a representation of the real phenomena, yet our judgements of them constitute the whole content for metaphysics; the unity of our apperception relies on the paralogisms of natural reason. However, metaphorical templates are only modalities of separated modes of consciousness. Consciousness becomes adjusted to noetic acts, and the predominant task of uncovering noetic acts by conscious conversion into the corresponding multiplicities of the whole of conscious life is ongoing.

I particularly like how its reflexive irony highlights the OP's unstated but fundamental similarity to random philosophy generation :p
 
How true... our a-posteriori concepts are a representation of the real phenomena, yet our judgements of them constitute the whole content for metaphysics; the unity of our apperception relies on the paralogisms of natural reason. However, metaphorical templates are only modalities of separated modes of consciousness. Consciousness becomes adjusted to noetic acts, and the predominant task of uncovering noetic acts by conscious conversion into the corresponding multiplicities of the whole of conscious life is ongoing.

You're darn tootin'! Yet how can a constructivist view of deconstructionism be maintained in an epiphenomenalistic universe? This is a fertile field of study, but paradoxically it is a sterile form of fertiltity, allowing non-cognitive, quasi-realistic reasoning.
 
Some Geese Oliver Hertford


Every child who has the use
Of his senses knows a goose.
See them underneath the tree
Gather round the goose-girl's knee,
While she reads them by the hour
From the works of Schopenhauer.

How patiently the geese attend!
But do they really comprehend
What Schopenhauer's driving at?
Oh, not at all; but what of that?
Neither do I; neither does she;
And, for that matter, nor does he.
 
Yet how can a constructivist view of deconstructionism be maintained in an epiphenomenalistic universe?
Ah, the eternal question... I hesitate to admit I don't know, for fear that admitting that lack of knowledge will be taken as evidence of a deeper wisdom.
 

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