The Theory of Relativity will begin to fall apart in 2016/2017

[Bjarne]

That's not often enough.

If General Relativity had the flaws you claim then GPS satellites would be too far out of sync to be useful within a few minutes.

http://www.astronomy.ohio-state.edu/~pogge/Ast162/Unit5/gps.html

.

No you claim that.
I say automatically -sync happens all the time, - most of the time without always asking what was causing the anomalies..

GPS runs most of all on auto-pilot.
Off course you can go in and read data, and see now this and this satellites is perturbed so and so much so we fire a rocket in 23 seconds to bring it back where we want it etc ..

And off course you can list all details for a specific satellite and for a specific period, and try to separate all the contribution there are, and thereby end up to check if all is according to different theories and measurements . (space weather, crust anomalies, perturbation SR / GR )

It will require more equipment and none interrupted data, - this is not a GPS mission
Because enough equipment and good enough data is not available, - (at a none scientific GPS control center) - who cares , whether it all is according to the holy book ?

 

[halleyscomet]

No you claim that.

No, I did the math. In this case debunking your theory required a little light multiplication and division. My eldest son learned how to do this level of math in first grade.

The rest of your post is just supposition. You are so desperate that you're defending your ******** "theory" with raw supposition, assuming the logs of the GPS system are never scrutinized.

A competent scientist would see the problem posed by functional GPS and do serious research into it, finding out what corrections the GPS system really DOES on its own and if the logs of said corrections could be used to confirm the hypothesis. If your theory is right and the GPS system really IS run with oversight as shoddy as you claim it is, then PROOF OF YOUR THEORY WILL BE IN THE LOGS OF GPS CORRECTIONS.

If your theory is right, then the hard data to prove it ALREADY exists. You just need to research the proper channels needed to request copies of it. Once you have the data you just need to analyze it to see if the corrections performed match your predictions of the corrections that would be necessary. Once you have that, you can produce charts of the corrections you expect to see in the future. If your predictions match the corrections made, you have a firm footing for publication and getting some serious attention from physicists.

Oh, right, you brag about being too lazy to do any work to actually support your theory.

Never mind.

 

[Bjarne]

No, I did the math. In this case debunking your theory required a little light multiplication and division. My eldest son learned how to do this level of math in first grade.

The rest of your post is just supposition. You are so desperate that you're defending your ******** "theory" with raw supposition, assuming the logs of the GPS system are never scrutinized.

A competent scientist would see the problem posed by functional GPS and do serious research into it, finding out what corrections the GPS system really DOES on its own and if the logs of said corrections could be used to confirm the hypothesis. If your theory is right and the GPS system really IS run with oversight as shoddy as you claim it is, then PROOF OF YOUR THEORY WILL BE IN THE LOGS OF GPS CORRECTIONS.

If your theory is right, then the hard data to prove it ALREADY exists. You just need to research the proper channels needed to request copies of it. Once you have the data you just need to analyze it to see if the corrections performed match your predictions of the corrections that would be necessary. Once you have that, you can produce charts of the corrections you expect to see in the future. If your predictions match the corrections made, you have a firm footing for publication and getting some serious attention from physicists.

Oh, right, you brag about being too lazy to do any work to actually support your theory.

Never mind.

I just have to wait for the ISS and Galileo 5 & 6 test i finish, its much easier

 

[dasmiller]

No you claim that.
I say automatically -sync happens all the time, - most of the time without always asking what was causing the anomalies..

No. No. No. No. No. This is not at all how it works. Why do you keep saying these things?

GPS runs most of all on auto-pilot.

Again, in this context, that's simply wrong.

Off course you can go in and read data, and see now this and this satellites is perturbed so and so much so we fire a rocket in 23 seconds to bring it back where we want it etc ..

This is fractally wrong. GPS maneuvers (rocket firings) are very rare, and whenever they fire a thruster on a GPS spacecraft, they have to take that spacecraft offline for days until they're confident that they know exactly how the thruster firing affected the orbit. Firing a thruster to get back to a predicted orbit would be like hitting your hand with a hammer to fix a broken finger.

And off course you can list all details for a specific satellite and for a specific period, and try to separate all the contribution there are, and thereby end up to check if all is according to different theories and measurements . (space weather, crust anomalies, perturbation SR / GR )

Yes, people do exactly that.

It will require more equipment and none interrupted data,

something like this?

Because enough equipment and good enough data is not available, - (at a none scientific GPS control center) -

(hilighting mine). You keep harping on GPS' lack of science focus, but if you go to the GPS Planning Document, you will find things like

NASA’s national policy positions on the use of GPS and its augmentations for PNT and science are developed and coordinated with the NASA Centers and Science Mission Directorate by the Space Communications and Navigation (SCaN) Program within the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) at NASA Headquarters.

and

4.2.1.2 Science Mission Support
GPS science mission support typically consists of analysis of data in a post-processing mode to accurately locate instrument position in space when measurements are taken. Typical science mission accuracy requirements are to determine 3-dimensional position within 5 cm and maintain time transfer stability at 0.15 ns. Some missions may require much higher accuracy levels, such as 0.3 cm accuracy in altitude measurements for altimetry missions.

As you've made obvious to everyone but yourself, you have no idea about how GPS actually operates.

 

[The Man]

Have you hear about the many time dilation synchronization every day

Have you heard about your claim that those "many time dilation synchronization every day" should be inaccurate for some orbits? Apparently not. Not just inaccurate by the way, you claim in some cases actually reversed. By all means please get back to us when you do actually just read what you have asserted.

ETA: Again muons is where you should be looking for your projections. That is if you actually intended to try to find them.

 

[halleyscomet]

I just have to wait for the ISS and Galileo 5 & 6 test i finish, its much easier

How will it be easier? You'd have the same number crunching ahead of you to use that data to prove your claims?

Besides, as dasmiller has pointed out, it looks like there's already a fairly easy way to get the data you need to use the GPS system to prove your hypothesis:

http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/control/

 

[MRC_Hans]

How will it be easier? You'd have the same number crunching ahead of you to use that data to prove your claims?

Besides, as dasmiller has pointed out, it looks like there's already a fairly easy way to get the data you need to use the GPS system to prove your hypothesis:

http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/control/

And when you have studied that site, Bjarne, you should realize that any systematic anomalies will not go unnoticed or un-actioned.

Hans

 

[halleyscomet]

And when you have studied that site, Bjarne, you should realize that any systematic anomalies will not go unnoticed or un-actioned.



Hans

You'd think he'd be excited about a ready data repository that he could use to support, possibly prove, the hypothesis he's been promoting for close to a decade.

Maybe he's not responding because he's busy getting the raw data. Maybe.

 

[Bjarne]

And when you have studied that site, Bjarne, you should realize that any systematic anomalies will not go unnoticed or un-actioned.

Hans

Many satellites encounter anomalous events detrimental to mission
performance at some point during their operational lifetimes.
These “satellite anomalies” may be as minimal as a temporary error in
a noncritical subsystem, or as devastating as a complete mission failure.
Hardware damage and software malfunctions, the typical manifestations
of these anomalies, may occur because of a variety of causes,
including faulty equipment, the hazardous natural space environment,
impact with orbital debris, operator error, hostile actions by a malicious
actor, or even unintentional interference from another satellite transmitter.
The cause of the anomaly is typically not obvious to the satellite
operators at the time of the event.
While individual satellite operators may investigate and catalog
their anomalies, few databases are available to the broader satellite
community.

Those that are broadly available and openly shared are
mostly limited to historical anomalies encountered by a small number
of scientific satellites whose operators and sponsoring agencies had the
resources and willingness to share the information openly. These data
are highly valuable for mission design purposes, as they provide an
empirical record of which hardware and software designs are most
robust, and which regions of space are most hazardous under varying
solar-terrestrial conditions.
However, the absence of a centralized, accurate, and up-to-date
anomaly database available to the broader community means that
satellite operators do not typically have access to information about
anomalies other satellites may be experiencing, at similar times, in similar orbits, and under similar conditions. Such information would be
useful in diagnosing causes of anomalies.
Despite these potential benefits, a comprehensive, up-to-date, and
broadly accessible database of anomalies from a large number of satellites
does not exist. There are political, economic, and operational
obstacles to the development and maintenance of such a database. For
one, there are distinct disincentives for some satellite operators to disclose
anomaly information to a wider community. Satellite operators
in DoD often have strict national security requirements prohibiting
them from sharing satellite information specific enough to be useful
in anomaly investigations. Commercial satellite owners may not wish
to reveal to their competitors or investors that their on-orbit assets are
experiencing unsolved technical problems. Also, there are logistical
efforts required to organize and manage a community service like an
anomaly database, with little funding or resources typically available
for such a task
Source
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR560/RAND_RR560.pdf

 

[dasmiller]

Many satellites encounter anomalous events detrimental to mission
performance at some point during their operational lifetimes.
These “satellite anomalies” may be as minimal as a temporary error in
a noncritical subsystem, or as devastating as a complete mission failure.
Hardware damage and software malfunctions, the typical manifestations
of these anomalies, may occur because of a variety of causes,
including faulty equipment, the hazardous natural space environment,
impact with orbital debris, operator error, hostile actions by a malicious
actor, or even unintentional interference from another satellite transmitter.
The cause of the anomaly is typically not obvious to the satellite
operators at the time of the event.
While individual satellite operators may investigate and catalog
their anomalies, few databases are available to the broader satellite
community.

Those that are broadly available and openly shared are
mostly limited to historical anomalies encountered by a small number
of scientific satellites whose operators and sponsoring agencies had the
resources and willingness to share the information openly. These data
are highly valuable for mission design purposes, as they provide an
empirical record of which hardware and software designs are most
robust, and which regions of space are most hazardous under varying
solar-terrestrial conditions.
However, the absence of a centralized, accurate, and up-to-date
anomaly database available to the broader community means that
satellite operators do not typically have access to information about
anomalies other satellites may be experiencing, at similar times, in similar orbits, and under similar conditions. Such information would be
useful in diagnosing causes of anomalies.
Despite these potential benefits, a comprehensive, up-to-date, and
broadly accessible database of anomalies from a large number of satellites
does not exist. There are political, economic, and operational
obstacles to the development and maintenance of such a database. For
one, there are distinct disincentives for some satellite operators to disclose
anomaly information to a wider community. Satellite operators
in DoD often have strict national security requirements prohibiting
them from sharing satellite information specific enough to be useful
in anomaly investigations. Commercial satellite owners may not wish
to reveal to their competitors or investors that their on-orbit assets are
experiencing unsolved technical problems. Also, there are logistical
efforts required to organize and manage a community service like an
anomaly database, with little funding or resources typically available
for such a task
Source
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR560/RAND_RR560.pdf

None of that applies to GPS navigation.

 

[Bjarne]

None of that applies to GPS navigation.

Why do you think so ?

 

[Daylightstar]

I just have to wait for the ISS and Galileo 5 & 6 test i finish, its much easier

And what will the data which you think will support your notions, look like?

 

[Daylightstar]

You'd think he'd be excited about a ready data repository that he could use to support, possibly prove, the hypothesis he's been promoting for close to a decade.

Maybe he's not responding because he's busy getting the raw data. Maybe.

No he's not, he just doesn't know what to do with it.

 

[halleyscomet]

None of that applies to GPS navigation.

He grasping at straws.

 

[halleyscomet]

Why do you think so ?

GPS satellites are too heavily monitored for such variances to go unnoticed.

 

[dasmiller]

Why do you think so ?

In BjarnePhysics, a GPS 'anomaly' would be a discrepancy between a predicted GPS orbit and the measured GPS orbit. In that article, an 'anomaly' would mean anything that was surprising or undesirable. Typical spacecraft 'anomalies' include random unit failures, unexpected software glitches, and even the occasional spectacular explosion. I can assure you that the article you quoted was using the more general sense of 'anomaly,' and AFAIK they're correct that there's no decent central database of general spacecraft anomalies.

But GPS nav anomalies are different. First, any GPS nav anomaly would be immediately observable by literally millions of users.

Then, if a nav anomaly is detected, a notice ("NANU") is broadcast notifying all subscribers that there's been an anomaly. You can see the 2016-so-far list here, for example. Admittedly, the NANU often isn't terribly descriptive. But note that the list has about 60 NANUs for the whole constellation for all of 2016. If 'dark flow' was anomalies on every orbit, then we'd be seeing at least 4 NANUs per spacecraft per day, or about 30,000 NANUs just for the first 8 months of 2016.

If you look (and did you look, or just assume it wasn't there?) you can find lots of online documentation of GPS anomalies. The US Coast Guard (no, I'm not sure how the Coast Guard got this job) has a website that keeps everyone posted on the status of all the satellites in the GPS constellation.

And then there are GPS trade publications that regularly run stories about various GPS anomalies.

. . . okay, I'm going to stop there.

 

[Dancing David]

Why do you think so ?

Burden on you, show that it does apply

 

[slyjoe]

... snip

If you look (and did you look, or just assume it wasn't there?) you can find lots of online documentation of GPS anomalies. The US Coast Guard (no, I'm not sure how the Coast Guard got this job) has a website that keeps everyone posted on the status of all the satellites in the GPS constellation.

And then there are GPS trade publications that regularly run stories about various GPS anomalies.

. . . okay, I'm going to stop there.

Agree with the above.

The Coast Guard operates the nationwide DIfferential GPS system. I am going way back in the memory banks, but when GPS first started mariners were more interested than aviation folks. So, we needed a nationwide service that interacted with civilians. Coast Guard fit the bill, as they were at the time responsible for Omega (don't remember about LORAN) for maritime navigation.

 

[fuelair]

Possible
What worry me is only, is it all according to the holy book, or have something here too, to be modified.

Rrriiiggggghhhhhtttt!!!

 

[MRC_Hans]

Many satellites encounter anomalous events detrimental to mission
*snip*
Commercial satellite owners may not wish
to reveal to their competitors or investors that their on-orbit assets are
experiencing unsolved technical problems. Also, there are logistical
efforts required to organize and manage a community service like an
anomaly database, with little funding or resources typically available
for such a task

GPS is not a commercial system, it is a military system. It is also the worldwide navigation system of choice. It is a multi-billion dollar enterprise, and is expected to hold the lead in decades to come.

Of course they are monitoring anomalies. The aerospace business is more focused on documentation than even the medical industry (and that says a LOT, I can tell you from personal experience.). And of course they make all relevant analysis of that data. After all, it's just a question of feeding the data you already collected into a computer program.

Your idea, Bjarne, would cause systematic pertuberations, which are very easy to detect using statistical analysis.

Face it, man: They are NOT there.

Hans