The relationship between science and materialism

Geoff said:
I am glad to see you have abandoned all those silly non-eliminativist physicalist positions and have admitted the bald truth of coherent materialism: minds don't exist.
Ooh, it sounds so crazy, doesn't it? Those whacky old materialists, denying the existence of the mind. Whatever won't they think of next?

Tell us what you think "mind" is, Geoff. Start from the beginning, so we don't have any folk psychological baggage.

~~ Paul
 
"The mind is the bit of the brain that does all the stuff that can't be physical, as per my defintion."

Something like that I'd suspect.
 
The problem here is that nobody understands my system so when I try to define things for them they end up imposing their own meanings on words that I am using to mean what *I* mean. I can explain quite clearly what I mean in terms of neutral monism, but you woudn't be able to understand it

Please dont take Interesting Ian's route. You are doing a lot better than him so far.

Now, this DOES NOT IMPLY that everybody should agree with you... does it?
 
Ooh, it sounds so crazy, doesn't it? Those whacky old materialists, denying the existence of the mind. Whatever won't they think of next?

Tell us what you think "mind" is, Geoff. Start from the beginning, so we don't have any folk psychological baggage.

~~ Paul

OK. Start at the beginning. We need to try to find a system which, once constructed, allows us to explain what mind is coherently without denying it exists. In order to get to the point where you understand why that explanation works, and is better than those we have been discussing, it is neccesary that people actually try to understand the system. When I tried to explain it before this is not what happened. Instead, long before I had any change get the system off the ground, people looked at the very first component of this system and started attacking. They did this because even that first component contradicts the reductive physicalism they wish to defend. This may be an understandable reaction, but it prevents people from getting to the point where they understand the system well enough to be able to criticise it in an informed manner. So I am going to have to ask you, just for the purposes of getting to the point where you understand my description of mind, to resist the temptation to attack the first component of the system before you have had a chance to understand the rest of it. OK?

Observation 1 : "absolute nothingness" has no referent.

My system starts with the observation that we have no need for a concept of absolutely nothing, where "absolutely nothing" means "not even the potentional for anything" or "the total abscence of everything". This concept would be the concept of non-existence. But if it had ever existed, then nothing would exist. Since something obviously exists, it follows that there was never a state of absolute nothingness

Definition 1 : "Being"

We now have a word ("nothing") and a symbol ("0") which don't appear to have a referent. So there is no difficulty involved if I wish to give them a referent. The "thing" I am defining them to refer to also isn't really a "thing". Instead, it can be viewed in a variety of ways. It can be thought of as "Beingness itself" - the thing which all things which actually exist have in common but isn't specific to any of them. It can also be viewed as "Everything" - for the same reason. I shall refer to this entity as Zero or Being. An extended discussion of the relationship between Being and Nothing may well be required. Fortunately Sartre and Heidegger have already done this, so I don't have to.

If everyone is happy with those, I will continue. If people start furiously attacking these foundations before they have tried to understand what I build upon them, then this is a waste of time because I'll never actually get to the point where I can answer Paul's question.
 
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Geoff said:
Observation 1 : "absolute nothingness" has no referent.

My system starts with the observation that we have no need for a concept of absolutely nothing, where "absolutely nothing" means "not even the potentional for anything" or "the total abscence of everything". This concept would be the concept of non-existence. But if it had ever existed, then nothing would exist. Since something obviously exists, it follows that there was never a state of absolute nothingness
You do not know that absolute nothingness couldn't change into somethingness. For that matter, absolute nothingness might equal somethingness. But anyway.

Definition 1 : "Being"

We now have a word ("nothing") and a symbol ("0") which don't appear to have a referent. So there is no difficulty involved if I wish to give them a referent. The "thing" I am defining them to refer to also isn't really a "thing". Instead, it can be viewed in a variety of ways. It can be thought of as "Beingness itself" - the thing which all things which actually exist have in common but isn't specific to any of them. It can also be viewed as "Everything" - for the same reason. I shall refer to this entity as Zero or Being. An extended discussion of the relationship between Being and Nothing may well be required. Fortunately Sartre and Heidegger have already done this, so I don't have to.
I'm uncomfortable with the word entity, but carry on.

~~ Paul
 
As an aside, I just realized that, in this eliminativist statement:

minds don't exist

I do not know what the definition of mind is, so I don't know what it means.

Carry on.

~~ Paul
 
As an aside, I just realized that, in this eliminativist statement:

minds don't exist

I do not know what the definition of mind is, so I don't know what it means.

Carry on.

~~ Paul

From what I understand they mean "mind" as in its common useage e.g.:

OED said:
IV. Mental or psychic faculty.

19. a. (a) The seat of awareness, thought, volition, feeling, and memory; cognitive and emotional phenomena and powers considered as constituting a presiding influence; the mental faculty of a human being (esp. as regarded as being separate from the physical); (occas.) this whole system as constituting a person's character or individuality.

(b) Esp. in contexts where a definition, summary, or analysis of this faculty is provided.
 
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OK. Start at the beginning. We need to try to find a system which, once constructed, allows us to explain what mind is coherently without denying it exists.

...snip...

Can I just clarify something? You seem to be saying that one of the basic assumptions (axioms) you start your worldview with is that "minds exist as something that isn't physical"?

In other words that minds exist is a given in your system?

(ETA I see you explain it below.)
 
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You do not know that absolute nothingness couldn't change into somethingness.

Ah, but I do. If it changed into somethingness then it was never absolute nothingness to begin with. Instead, it was nothingness with some sort of potential to become somethingness. It was like the Buddhist conception of "Sunyata" or "Pregnant Void".

For that matter, absolute nothingness might equal somethingness. But anyway.

No, that wouldn't work. It only works if it equals everythingness. Nothingness and Everythingness have no identity. All of the individual somethings which make up everything do have identity.

I'm uncomfortable with the word entity, but carry on.
~~ Paul

Well, perhaps my previous answer might help. Everythingness and nothingness are special sorts of "entities" because they have no individualised identity.

I hope you are now more comfortable with the bits I have explained so far, and I will continue to the next stage. At this point, I want to wipe clean the metaphysical slate and declare that neither mind nor matter are fundamental existents. You can think of this in terms of the example with the external cause of the experience of a chair and the actual experience of a chair. Physicalists want to put the label "physical" on both the experience and the external cause, leading to a great deal of confusion. What is particularly problematic is their claim that the external world is "physical" when in fact all they really know is that "there's something out there causing me to have experiences of objects". So in order to avoid this problematic definition of "physical" I am going to say that the external world is neither mental nor is it physical. Since that definition excludes everything we currently have words for, I am going to need to invent a new one. I am going to call it "neutral", in order to make clear that it is neither mind nor is it matter. My system is now complete. Everything which exists is accounted for in this system and all it consists of is Being/Zero and a neutral entity. There are no such thing as "minds". But, and it is very important "but", there is no such thing as "matter" either. I can hear you know wanting to say "But that's even worse than eliminativism! It's double eliminativism!" But it isn't. Instead, I am going to show that it is reductive without being eliminative. In my next post I will explain how the reduction works, i.e. what "minds" really are. But I will wait first for you to respond to this post. I also want you to see that what I have described is NOT ontological idealism.
 
Can I just clarify something? You seem to be saying that one of the basic assumptions (axioms) you start your worldview with is that "minds exist as something that isn't physical"?

In other words that minds exist is a given in your system?

No. See last post. I am asking you to dump BOTH your concept of mind AND your concept of matter.
 
I'm good so far. I presume you're going to tell me the relationship between Being and the neutral, and why both are required?

~~ Paul
 
Hello?
Nope - that's what you are doing. I will try once more. This time, don't assume you are talking to Ian or Lifegazer. You are talking to Geoff now.
I have not talked with LG much. I understand Ian, and understand hammy. I also understand you.
OK...in small sentences this time....

1) I didn't define any of those terms!!!
2) I gave people the option whether or not they wanted to define them!!!
Um...this is so obvious, it could not possibly have been what I was referring to by "the language you have chosen." I am, rather looking at the language you are using to frame the question and to frame your critiques. If you think that I am trying to pin other people's language on you, your misunderstanding runs deep.
How can I be constrained by my assumptions and my language if I haven't assumed anything and I am allowing people to provide THEIR OWN definitions?
Do you agree that the question you are asking is a coherent one?* That you are holding off on assumptions and letting others fill in their definitions?
And I gave them the option of not defining them at all!!!!
Indeed, or refusing to fill in their definitions?
Understand yet?
Understood long ago.

* because I do not agree. It is your question itself that demonstrates that you do not agree with me.
 
I'm good so far. I presume you're going to tell me the relationship between Being and the neutral, and why both are required?

~~ Paul

I'll answer the second question first. Why are both required?

The answer is that both are required if we are going to avoid getting re-embroiled in the ontological mess that we have been discussing in this thread. I hope that the arguments so far have shown you that the only way to coherently defend materialism is to defend eliminative materialism. But there is a problem with eliminativism: nearly everybody thinks it is absurd. The result, in terms of the history of ideas, is demonstrated by hammegk. It is hammegk's argument that this system is supposed to avoid. His position goes something like this:

A) The language we use to describe our experiences of reality is inherently dualistic
B) But we all agree dualism must be wrong
C) Therefore monism must be true
D) The only form of materialist monism which stands up is eliminativism
E) The only alternative is idealist monism
F) So we must choose between (D) and (E)
G) We can't choose (D) because denying the existence of minds is absurd
H) Therefore idealism must be true

My argument departs from hammegk's at step (E). The purpose is to block his claim that the only alternative to eliminative materialism is idealism. The reason I want to do this is because I do not believe idealism gives the correct account of the nature of the reality external to mind which I have claimed exists, which you presumably agree exists, but which hammegk claims does not exist.

Now - how does my system avoid the problems? Why do we need both the Zero and the neutral entity? The answer is that in the monist systems of both the eliminative materialist and the eliminative idealist there isn't enough theoretical space to account for the dualism we acknowedged right back at (A). That's why both those systems end up having to eliminate something. The materialists eliminate mind, the idealists eliminate matter. Both of them do it because their system of fundamental existents hasn't got enough bits in it to account for these apparently different thing. There is no space in the system for two sorts of stuff. So one of them has to go. The reason I need both Being/Zero and the neutral entity is to make enough theoretical space within the system to avoid having to eliminate anything at all, whilst at the same time avoiding being a dualist.

I'll wait for a response to this bit before continuing.
 
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Why is denying the existence of minds absurd? We haven't denied the existence of mental activity or of experiencing, only that there is a separate "thing" called mind. Mind is an abstraction used to refer to the working of a brain and the activity that goes on, which is "minding". All the mental stuff is just a verb, not a noun. The problem arises from the language itself. It is not the case that all languages support the distinctions that ours does. From what I understand, there are some African languages that do not even allow the formulation of the mind-body problem (this from John Searle).
 
Why is denying the existence of minds absurd?

Wasp, I just don't know how to answer this question. Fortunately, I don't have to, because I already know that 99 out of 100 people would never ask it. :)

I've already said that eliminativism is logically coherent. Therefore I cannot (empirically) refute the claim that minds don't exist.
 
Wasp, I'm hoping to learn the answer to your question as we continue. I don't understand the problem either. Seems like we've dumped a fundamentally dualistic notion of mind, yet people still want something called mind. So they laugh at the notion that we're denying mind, even as they have no idea what their own definition of mind is.

I'm good so far, Geoff. I presume that something coming up will convince me that Being and Neutral aren't two fundamental types of existents, resulting in neutral dualism.

~~ Paul
 
Why is denying the existence of minds absurd? We haven't denied the existence of mental activity or of experiencing, only that there is a separate "thing" called mind. Mind is an abstraction used to refer to the working of a brain and the activity that goes on, which is "minding". All the mental stuff is just a verb, not a noun. The problem arises from the language itself. It is not the case that all languages support the distinctions that ours does. From what I understand, there are some African languages that do not even allow the formulation of the mind-body problem (this from John Searle).

Geoff, I have to agree here. Zen would also support the view that what we call "mind" (a separated individual) is a false notion.
 
I don't understand the problem either.

Then we need to rewind. What don't you understand?

Seems like we've dumped a fundamentally dualistic notion of mind, yet people still want something called mind.

No, Paul. They need it. Not as a pychological crutch but as the only way they can actually talk sensibly about the way the world appears to them. The reason our language is inherently dualistic is because our experience of the world is itself inherently dualistic. Physicalists want to deny both of these things. All of your definitional difficulties resulted from your wish to redefine an inherently dualistic set of terms so that they no longer appeared dualistic. But if you do that then you end up having to eliminate "folk psychology" and to claim that minds don't exist, or give some meaningless waffle about how "minds are just brain processes" without ever explaining what on earth this is supposed to mean or providing any sort of convincing explanations as to how it happens. Sure, explanations are given. But they don't make sense. They try to eliminate subjectivity but never explain how this can work. They just redefine the subjective things to be objective/physical things and expect people to accept this as a convincing explanation for the existence of subjectivity. The whole position revolves around an abuse of the word IS. "Minds ARE brain processes". This word IS doesn't mean anything. It's the "little bit of magic" that makes the system work:

********************************************************
The entire explanation (wasp's is a good example) - the CRITICAL piece of the explanation - the piece of the explanation which is supposed to be the key to understanding how subjective things could arise from physical/objective ones is one word which doesn't mean anything : IS.
********************************************************

So it isn't an explanation. None of the actual content of the non-eliminativists theories being touted here make any difference to the key problem of how you bridge the gap between subjective and objective. There is lots of hypothetical waffle, but the KEY part of the explanation is never forthcoming. All we get is an entirely meaningless "IS".

The problem:

Now, if at this point you are feeling like you want to reject the previous paragraph then think about why you (and everybody else) ended up having to defend eliminativism. It was to get rid of the entirely meaningless IS!!! So please do not say you don't see the problem. The problem is the meaningless "IS" which forces the truly logical materialists to be eliminativists.

Why my system is better:

I can provide a meaning for the meaningless "IS". It is still going to be "IS", in a sort of way, but this time the "IS" is going to mean something instead of being a fig leaf covering up the embarrassing hole in materialist theories of mind.


I'm good so far, Geoff. I presume that something coming up will convince me that Being and Neutral aren't two fundamental types of existents, resulting in neutral dualism.

That's easy. As already explained Being/Nothing/Zero/Everything isn't a thing. It has no identity. It lacks the defining characteristics of a "something". Therefore there are not two fundamental types of existent. There is the neutral entity, and there is existence itself. This can be restated more simply as:

A neutral entity exists.

Do you see why that is monism and not dualism?
 
Geoff, I have to agree here. Zen would also support the view that what we call "mind" (a separated individual) is a false notion.

BDZ

You have misunderstood the position I am defending, as have 99% of the other people here. Maybe if you followed my posts to Paul, it might help.

Geoff
 
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