The relationship between science and materialism

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Hold on! when did I accept that P1 is not P2???

They are the same. The experience of chair and the experience (thinking) about the chair. Without thinking involved (recognizing patterns for example) there would be no chair.

To express it in another way. There is no isolated "chair". The "chair" is a thinking process; It involves "a constant" (whatever is a chair without language, perception and imagination) and "us" (meaning language, perception, imagination).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hold on! when did I accept that P1 is not P2???

They are the same. The experience of chair and the experience (thinking) about the chair. Without thinking involved (recognizing patterns for example) there would be no chair.

You aren't even claiming to be defending physicalism, BDZ, so what is the problem?

P1 is not P2. That is the essence of the mistake made by physicalists. The experience of a chair is P1. P2 is something we postulate the existence by "thinking about it". We reason that it must exist. Which is fair enough. But it is not fair enough to claim that thing we have reasoned to exist is the same as the experience we started reasoning from.

Read this page, and I think you'll stop wanting to argue with me:

http://naturyl.humanists.net/diamon.html

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Nope, Im not "defending" physicalism. Still, what I dont agree is in the assumption that "materialists are wrong".

If anything, they are confused, as we both are.

BTW, that link makes me think that you could be an Advaitin too (you might be ready!). Note that this would imply to cease to reason and understand before language... difficult task... and rewarding!!

 

[chriswl]

But you seem to think this has demonstrated something. All it has demonstrated is that you don't understand the relationship between science and materialism, as per the title of the thread. You are calling things "materialistic" when what you should be saying is "scientific".

You'd agree that science is naturalistic and I've already said that I see no difference between naturalism and materialism. Note, I am not saying that science proves materialism or naturalism. Just that science is essentially materialistic because it only deals in material things (only a strawman version of materialism cannot accomodate things like QM).

Not quite. You've put words into my mouth. What I actually said was that it includes things we are minimally aware of.

OK, but in my example, the person sitting in the room with the ticking clock was not even minimally aware of the ticking. That is certainly how the experience seems to us - we are not aware of the clock until we "hear" it stop. It is often the case that we are not aware (even minimally) of many of the audible sounds around us or all the objects in our visual field.

We are basically talking about subliminal awareness here. Which is not conscious awareness at all, or it would no longer be subliminal. See here for a discussion and some examples:

http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~pmerikle/papers/SubliminalPerception.html

I'll say again: there can be no "what it is like" to be only subliminally aware of something (i.e. not consciously aware) and then to realise that the something (which you were not consciously aware of) has stopped happening. But we believe we experience this quite frequently. It shows that there is something fundamentally wrong with the idea that there must always be something that it is like to be conscious.

You say, the literature of cognitive science is full of things like this. Which surely means your worldview is full of holes that you are ignoring.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Nope, Im not "defending" physicalism. Still, what I dont agree is in the assumption that "materialists are wrong".

If anything, they are confused, as we both are.

Confused...yep, they are confused. They think P1 is P2.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK, but in my example, the person sitting in the room with the ticking clock was not even minimally aware of the ticking.

Yeah, that's what you claimed. But it's wrong.

That is certainly how the experience seems to us - we are not aware of the clock until we "hear" it stop. It is often the case that we are not aware (even minimally) of many of the audible sounds around us or all the objects in our visual field.

No, this isn't true. They are there all along, providing the backdrop to consciusness.

We are basically talking about subliminal awareness here. Which is not conscious awareness at all, or it would no longer be subliminal.

Neither is it non-awareness. It's subliminal awareness, just like you said.

See here for a discussion and some examples:

You say, the literature of cognitive science is full of things like this. Which surely means your worldview is full of holes that you are ignoring.

No. It demonstrates nothing about ontology. All it demonstrates is that there are many levels of consciousness and different types of awareness.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

P1) Your experiences of objects (like chairs) ("subjective experiences")
P2) The external things which cause you to have experiences of objects ("external stimuli")

Agreed Premise (A): P1 and P2 are not the same thing and should not be confused.
Premise (B) : P1 and P2 account for everything which exists

(E) Physical is both (P1 and P2):

This is just plain incoherent. We’ve already agreed that this isn’t a valid option.

This is where the fast one is pulled.

We haven't agreed that it isn't a valid option at all. We agreed P1 and P2 were different, we never agreed that together they could not account for all that is physical.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

We haven't agreed that it isn't a valid option at all. We agreed P1 and P2 were different, we never agreed that together they could not account for all that is physical.

So define "physical" in terms of P1 and P2, please. Paul tried, and couldn't do it. Can you do better?

 

[chriswl]

No, this isn't true. They are there all along, providing the backdrop to consciusness.

Consciousness != backdrop to consciousness. I don't know what more to say

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Consciousness != backdrop to consciousness. I don't know what more to say

Your argument depends on claiming that everything available to conciousness is available at the same level as whatever it is you happen to be focused on. It's simply not true. There's nothing more to say.

And anyway - in terms of my proof, eliminativism isn't going to be supported by your argument. Eliminativism is a claim that there is no such thing as P1, which isn't what you are claiming.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wow, what progress we made while I was managing my money. We're using reality, physical, physical reality, physicalism, and exists without agreeing on definitions. I wonder if that might have something to do with our not agreeing on the proof?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wow, what progress we made while I was managing my money. We're using reality, physical, physical reality, physicalism, and exists without agreeing on definitions. I wonder if that might have something to do with our not agreeing on the proof?

~~ Paul

What is your actual objection, Paul?

I knew beforehand you were going to find some way of not admitting this is a proof. But you're going to actually have to specify what is wrong with the proof this time. If you want to object to any of my terms, then object to them. But be very clear what your objection is, and make sure it isn't critically dependent on an assumption that physicalism is true.

 

[chriswl]

Your argument depends on claiming that everything available to conciousness is available at the same level as whatever it is you happen to be focused on. It's simply not true.

You are confusing "availability to consciousness" with actual consciousness. Things available to consciousness are potential candidates for conscious awareness. They may not actually get experienced consciously. They may not lead to conscious experiences.

 

[LW]

Physicalism: The claim that the only reality is physical reality. (YEP, that's what it means!)
P1) Your experiences of objects (like chairs) ("subjective experiences")
P2) The external things which cause you to have experiences of objects ("external stimuli")

Agreed Premise (A): P1 and P2 are not the same thing and should not be confused.

Hold on, now we have to be careful.

Let's suppose for a moment that the physical reality is all that is.

Let's consider the small four-legged chair that I right now see in front of me. Let's call the chair A₁ and my observation of it O(A₁). These two things are patently different. True. It would be extremely non-physicalist to claim that they were the same.

But if there is nothing that is not physical, then that observation O(A₁) is another physical thing, let's call that A₂. Or more precisely, it would be a physical process caused by my physical brain (object A₃) changing its state as a response to stimulation of optical nerves (A₄) that in turn was caused by reflected light entering my eyes (A₅).

This is a case that you didn't take in accord in your analysis: the possibility that the experience of an object may be a physical thing that is different from the object itself.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hold on, now we have to be careful.

Let's suppose for a moment that the physical reality is all that is.

We can suppose that. That would be a supposition that physicalism is true. The trouble is that so far, Paul hasn't been able to define "physical", so we aren't sure what "physicalism" even means.

But we certainly have to be careful.

Let's consider the small four-legged chair that I right now see in front of me. Let's call the chair A₁ and my observation of it O(A₁). These two things are patently different. True. It would be extremely non-physicalist to claim that they were the same.

So what we have called "P1", you have called O(A₁, and what we have called "P2", you have called A₁. That is fair enough. You are implying that the "real chair" is P2 - the cause of the experience rather than the experience. And you have accepted that these things aren't the same. All sounds good so far.

But if there is nothing that is not physical, then that observation O(A₁) is another physical thing, let's call that A₂.

A reminder of my note in red at the top of the proof:

NOTE: If you want to challenge this proof then you must challenge either the premises, the definitions or the reasoning. What you must not do is make some other sort of statement, which depends on an assumption that physicalism is true (thus assuming the proof fails before examining it), and claim that this means the proof is false. Any responses to this proof which take this form will be rejected on the grounds they they have nothing to do with the proof.

Asserting that physicalism is true and then claiming that this is sufficient to refute a proof against physicalism which makes no assumptions about whether physicalism is true simply doesn't work. Here is your line of reasoning:

1) Assume physicalism is true
2) Therefore, even though we've already agreed that P1 and P2 aren't the same, they both must be physical.

This is a proof against physicalism by contradition. You are correct. If physicalism is true then P1 and P2 must be the same (or one of them simply doesn't exist). But P1 and P2 aren't the same, therefore physicalism is false.

You can't defend physicalism by assuming it is true anymore than you can do the same thing with the Bible:

1) Assume the bible is true
2) Therefore, even though we've already agreed that we are evolved from worms, this cannot possibliy correct.
3) conclusion : We didn't evolve from worms

Doesn't work, does it?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

While we're at it, let's define physicalism. Let's just see what Google comes up with:

physicalism: the theory that human beings can be explained completely and adequately in terms of their physical or material components

physicalism ((philosophy) the philosophical theory that matter is the only reality) [patently absurd]

Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense.

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical.

There is a lot of confusion in the philosophy of mind literature stemming from a tendency to take physicalism and materialism to be interchangeable. [interesting]

Physicalism is the thesis that, in some sense, everything (beliefs, thunderstorms, people, sounds, etc.) is physical.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

OK. So we have established that you [Paul] don't want to label either P1 or P2 physical. Can you tell me why, instead of just refusing to do so?
...
(E) Physical is both (P1 and P2):

This is just plain incoherent. We’ve already agreed that this isn’t a valid option.

Clearly we didn't.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Clearly we didn't.

~~ Paul

Oh dear. Are you now going to backtrack on the claim that P1 isn't P2?

After all we said about not going back and arguing about terms after the proof had been delivered?

After I told you that the proof depended on this distinction?

After you admitted the distinction is real?

Tut tut. Somebody is cheating.

 

[LW]

NOTE: If you want to challenge this proof then you must challenge either the premises, the definitions or the reasoning.

I am attacking your reasoning. To put it more precisely, your statement:

(D) Physical is (P2):

If “physical” is defined as (P2) then there is a reality which isn’t physical – the world of experiences – the world of P1 – otherwise known as the mental realm.

You have not ruled out the possibility that P1 is physical but different from P2.

What you must not do is make some other sort of statement, which depends on an assumption that physicalism is true (thus assuming the proof fails before examining it)

But what you are doing in the above is assuming that physicalism is false and then proving it false based on that assumption. You assume that if an object and an experience of an object are different, then they are so completely different that have to belong to completely separate realities.

That is like saying that because an apple is different from an orange, they may not be both made of matter.

Here is your line of reasoning:

1) Assume physicalism is true
2) Therefore, even though we've already agreed that P1 and P2 aren't the same, they both must be physical.

No. What I did was to show that there was one line of reasoning that you didn't address in your proof. If you want your proof to be waterproof, you have to address it. Unfortunately, I can't see any way to do it except that by assuming that P1 and P2 must necessarily be different, but feel free to prove me wrong by doing it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

While we're at it, let's define physicalism. Let's just see what Google comes up with:

physicalism ((philosophy) the philosophical theory that matter is the only reality) [patently absurd]

Paul, This is what physicalism is. You are DEAD RIGHT. It's patently absurd.

Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense.

Which is also patently absurd. How are you going to defend it from my proof? By assuming physicalism is true, as LW did? Doesn't work, Paul.

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical.

Is this the definition you are going to go for? How are you going to defend it from my proof?

There is a lot of confusion in the philosophy of mind literature stemming from a tendency to take physicalism and materialism to be interchangeable. [interesting]

Makes no difference to my proof. Don't care whether you call if physicalism or materialism. The proof works against both of them.

Physicalism is the thesis that, in some sense, everything (beliefs, thunderstorms, people, sounds, etc.) is physical.

Is this the definition you are going to go for? How are you going to defend it from my proof?

None of that makes a blind bit of difference. I am waiting for an actual objection to the proof. One that doesn't depend on you backtracking on something you already agreed NOT to backtrack on.