The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

Proof by proclaiming utter bullcrap and emphasizing subjective experience.

You need to demonstrate that subjective experience isn't just precisely certain brain functions.

~~ Paul

Do I also need to demonstrate why saucepans aren't sheep?
Why passionate love isn't the starship enterprise?

Your "plausibiolimeter" should actually explode each time you try to make out two things which couldn't be more different are actually the same. There is your "crisis". You specialise in debunking claims from other people which are absurd and implausible, but you are quite happy to make absurd and implausible statement yourself, and then sit there making out that it's my job to prove they are absurd.

How would one go about demonstrating that saucepans aren't sheep?

One wouldn't. One would call the person asking the question a total idiot. You aren't an idiot, so why are you making a similar claim?

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Claiming that two things that couldn't be more different are exactly the same is an extraordinary claim. "Subjective experiences are brain processes" is no less a bizarre claim than "Zero = Infinity". There should be a clue in there.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I have no degree in philosophy (my undergraduate degree is in Liberal Arts), but I have read a bit. In my experience, such activities have always been considered "mental".

Not in the context of arguments about ontology and the mind-body problem they haven't. Sure, in the course of our common business we mix these things up and it doesn't matter, e.g.: "The coffee machine hates me" actually means "the machine is malfunctioning, and it's annoying me." We don't actually believe the coffee machine is experiencing hatred. So we must be careful when having these debates that we don't take a loosely-defined common usage of mental concepts and try to abuse this concept to conflate mental and physical things.

If we redefine "mental" to that which has not yet been explained by physical processes

This is bordering on dishonesty. It's certainly gross misrepresentation. I did NOT "redefine mental to mean that which has not been explained by physical processes". That is a counter-factual definition, based upon an assumption of physicalism. It was not my definition, and does not agree with my own position. I postulate the existence of things which are neither mental nor physical, remember?

So please stop putting words into my mouth. If you are going to challenge my definition of "mental" then challenge it. But don't claim I defined it as something else and then challenge that redefinition as if it was mine.

In other words, this is a straw man.

Since it does not rest on a priori proof, the whole question becomes empirical as you suggest. We have examples of "mental processes" explained by physical means.

Rubbish. All we have is an hypothesis. Your "explanation" isn't an explanation. It is an assertion of physicalism. Take away the assertion of physicalism and the so-called "explanation" disappears in a puff of materialist smoke.

We need a fuller description of the possible physical means of explaining subjective experiences. I suspect the subjectivity will be an emergent property that we can't precisely predict by the actions of neurons....

Do you think that if you repeat this enough times it is actually going to start being true?

.....but it should be theoretically possible.

Only if materialism is true.

Next time you reply, before you type each sentence think to yourself "Is this claim critically dependent on assuming materialism is true?" If the answer is "yes" then type something else.

 

[cyborg]

Do I also need to demonstrate why saucepans aren't sheep?
Why passionate love isn't the starship enterprise?

Do you need to demonstrate why that's not a strawman?

Your "plausibiolimeter" should actually explode each time you try to make out two things which couldn't be more different are actually the same. There is your "crisis".

Your crisis would be then that all you're doing is using a gap in knowledge as the foundation of your metaphysics.

Can fully describe a computer's calculation process: no mind.
Can't fully describe a person's calculation process: mind.

Yeah, I call bullcrap.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Claiming that two things that couldn't be more different are exactly the same is an extraordinary claim.

I claim by your reasoning computers might be said to have mental processes if we couldn't fully explain how they work. You tell me nobody seriously believes this. Then you say it's ludicrous to not believe as you do about our mental processes.

Bull. Crap.

"Subjective experiences are brain processes" is no less a bizarre claim than "Zero = Infinity". There should be a clue in there.

No, it's a perfectly reasonable claim given what we know about how brains work

Saying zero = infinite is just a fuxing stupid way to do maths. Do you not get tired of having your ass handed to you by people who understand mathematics? You really should either learn so you can put forward a cogent mathematical argument of your own or cease cribbing other people's mathematical crap because you think it's useful to you.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's why I choose anxiety. The whole point of anxiety is that it isn't directed at any abstractions of things in the external world. You can be very anxious, but completely unaware of why you feel anxious.

That means that part of what we call anxiety is nonconscious.

Do I also need to demonstrate why saucepans aren't sheep?

No, because saucepans aren't sheep by definition. If you proclaim that consciousness is not brain function by definition, then you are begging the question.

Your "plausibiolimeter" should actually explode each time you try to make out two things which couldn't be more different are actually the same.

Proof by claiming "couldn't be more different."

There is your "crisis". You specialise in debunking claims from other people which are absurd and implausible, but you are quite happy to make absurd and implausible statement yourself, and then sit there making out that it's my job to prove they are absurd.

Proof by declaration of absurdity and implausibility.

How would one go about demonstrating that saucepans aren't sheep?

By definition.

One wouldn't. One would call the person asking the question a total idiot. You aren't an idiot, so why are you making a similar claim?

Proof by ad hominem.

Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Claiming that two things that couldn't be more different are exactly the same is an extraordinary claim. "Subjective experiences are brain processes" is no less a bizarre claim than "Zero = Infinity". There should be a clue in there.

Proof by personal incredulity.

Let me ask you this: Why are you comfortable claiming that we can explain the complete workings of a computer by invoking electrons, QM, and so forth? How are you sure that there isn't "something that it is like" to be a computer, and that we are completely missing this facet of the explanation? Well, there may be, but all we can do is explain what we see.

Simililarly, all we can do is explain what we see of the brain and consciousness. This has to include everything people state about experiences we label "mind," "consciousness," "qualia," etc. If you are to claim that this is impossible, even in a trillion-word text, then you need a proof other than "only an idiot would think otherwise."

This same gambit is used in the Knowledge Argument: Mary couldn't possibly deduce the experience of color, even if she understands every single physical fact about color. Really? (Note that there are other problems with the KA, too.)

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Cyborg,

See my previous post to you. You do not have an identifiable position for me to debunk, so there is little point in me discussing this with you.

Geoff

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Next time you reply, before you type each sentence think to yourself "Is this claim critically dependent on assuming materialism is true?" If the answer is "yes" then type something else.

Why? Wasp is not saying "materialism is true, so therefore ..." You, on the other hand, appear to be defining consciousness as not possibly material in basis, and are therefore assuming nonmaterialism.

~~ Paul

 

[cyborg]

Cyborg,

See my previous post to you. You do not have an identifiable position for me to debunk, so there is little point in me discussing this with you.

Well I'm real sorry if I refuse to be pigeon holed by you but I couldn't care less if you are unable to actually respond to what people say without having to have some implied baggage that fits into your narrow concept that people must slot into certain catergories you know about.

You see your self-labelling means about dick to me. I couldn't care what you call yourself.

I think it's just about as transparant as it can get to everyone here that you would simply rather not respond to my fairly straightforward observations because you absolutely cannot answer them in a straightforward way. So after a whole you decided to play your little catergory game and now you're using this tactic as if it were some valid reason not to respond.

So just for you how about this?

I am a neutral bullcrapper. You'll have to wait for my book to understand just what one of those is.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That means that part of what we call anxiety is nonconscious.

Actually its non-intentional.

No, because saucepans aren't sheep by definition.

You mean because their definitions have nothing in common, yes?

If you proclaim that consciousness is not brain function by definition, then you are begging the question.

This is ridiculous Paul. You argument depends on it being perfectly reasonable, sensible, understandable and non-controversial to define mental things to be "physical processes". It's not me who has to provide bizarre, screwed-up and useless definitions of "mental" in order to get their argument to work. They are "useless" because they serve one purpose only: to try to get materialistic arguments to work. If it weren't for this, you'd accept my definition immediately, and so would everybody else. The cart is right in front of the horse.

Proof by claiming "couldn't be more different."

Yep, like saucepans are different to sheep. Am I supposed to feel like my argument is crumbling?

Proof by declaration of absurdity and implausibility.

Yep. Like claiming it is absurd and implausible to claim there is no difference between a sheep and a saucepan. I mean, what a weak argument! Sheep and saucepans might be the same thing when we have a "completed veterinary science" and a complete theory of kitchen utensils.

This is stupid.

Let me ask you this: Why are you comfortable claiming that we can explain the complete workings of a computer by invoking electrons, QM, and so forth?

Because we can! We don't have to postulate that we'll "do it one day". We designed the f****** things, so we know precisely what they are doing.

How are you sure that there isn't "something that it is like" to be a computer, and that we are completely missing this facet of the explanation?

I don't - although I strongly suspect this to be the case. What I do know is

a) If there was such a thing, we'd never know anything about it.
b) If there was such a thing, it wouldn't be physical.

Well, there may be, but all we can do is explain what we see.

EXACTLY! Ye Gods!

And with brain processes, we can explain what we see. We can't see other people's mental experiences though, can we?

WHY oh WHY oh WHY do materialists find this so hard to understand?

Everything I am saying is obvious.

Simililarly, all we can do is explain what we see of the brain and consciousness.

Yep. We can see brains and processes. We can't see minds.

This has to include everything people state about experiences we label "mind," "consciousness," "qualia," etc.

WHY? Since when could we see "qualia"?

 

[cyborg]

You mean because their definitions have nothing in common, yes?

Yes, because sheep and saucepans are both HUMAN WORDS THAT DON'T AFFECT REALITY AT ALL! They are patently not the same thing because people understand what saucepans and sheep are.

When you claim that minds are patently not material I agree. When you say that this means minds have some sort of fundamental existence that's more so than sheep or saucepans that's where you get absurd. Minds don't exist any more than sheep or saucepans do beyond what humans define them to be. And no, that doesn't mean I don't think that sheep and saucepans don't actually exist and that makes me an idealist. I'm just making the patently non-absurd counter to your claims that creating abstractions for things doesn't pull these things into existence! Calling something a saucepan didn't bring a new thing into existence, it just gave it a label.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yes, because sheep and saucepans are both HUMAN WORDS THAT DON'T AFFECT REALITY AT ALL!

Erm....sorry, but what has the fact that the definition of "sheep" bears no resemblance to the definition of "saucepan" got to do with the fact that sheep aren't saucepans? Nothing, cyborg. So this is a case of special pleading. Because the brain processes and subjective experiences have implications for the nature of reality, you want me to grant you that in this very special case it is OK to equate things with completely different definitions. This amounts to "Absurd statements are OK if they are the only way to defend materialism, because materialism is true."

They are patently not the same thing because people understand what saucepans and sheep are.

Yep, just like almost all normal people understand what brain processes are and what subjective experiences are. The only people who don't seem to be able to recognise the difference are materialists.

When you claim that minds are patently not material I agree.

Good. Then you're not an eliminative materialist.

Wibble....

Minds don't exist any more than sheep or saucepans do beyond what humans define them to be.

OOPS! Now you're an eliminative materialist.

Wobble...

And no, that doesn't mean I don't think that sheep and saucepans don't actually exist and that makes me an idealist. I'm just making the patently non-absurd counter to your claims that creating abstractions for things doesn't pull these things into existence! Calling something a saucepan didn't bring a new thing into existence, it just gave it a label.

Cyborg, what do you think the labels refer to?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This is ridiculous Paul. You argument depends on it being perfectly reasonable, sensible, understandable and non-controversial to define mental things to be "physical processes". It's not me who has to provide bizarre, screwed-up and useless definitions of "mental" in order to get their argument to work. They are "useless" because they serve one purpose only: to try to get materialistic arguments to work. If it weren't for this, you'd accept my definition immediately, and so would everybody else. The cart is right in front of the horse.

No, my argument does not depend on that. I am making no argument for materialism, physicalism, or anything else. I am simply saying that if you define consciousness in a way that disallows it from being the result of brain processes, you are begging the question. Don't foist your question begging on me.

Because we can! We don't have to postulate that we'll "do it one day". We designed the f****** things, so we know precisely what they are doing.

Yet you have absolutely no idea whether there is something it is like to be a computer.

I don't - although I strongly suspect this to be the case. What I do know is

a) If there was such a thing, we'd never know anything about it.
b) If there was such a thing, it wouldn't be physical.

We might know something about it one day, if we design a computer that can tell us about it. If you say it wouldn't be physical, then you just opened up Pandora's Box again. You need to explain how the physical suddenly got in bed with the nonphysical.

If I slowly replace my brain modules with hardware, will there come a point when suddenly I've got no consciousness anymore?

EXACTLY! Ye Gods!

And with brain processes, we can explain what we see. We can't see other people's mental experiences though, can we?

We can see them to some degree, because people can explain them.

WHY oh WHY oh WHY do materialists find this so hard to understand?

Everything I am saying is obvious.

Who is having trouble understanding that we can't experience other people's experiences? The problem we're having, that is getting you so worked up, is that we won't jump from this to "therefore we cannot explain other people's experiences."

Proof by claim of obviousness.

WHY? Since when could we see "qualia"?

I didn't say we could see them. I said we might be able to explain them. We can't see the operation of a computer, either.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

There is nothing about either calculation or word processing which cannot be fully describe in terms of the entities of physics.

Yes. That's the whole point. It was considered mental and now has a physical explanation. Are you suggesting that in the history of ideas calucation was never considered a mental predicate, never considered a property of a mind? What was it considered, thsn? I've not read every philosophy text out there, so perhaps you could point me to the Greeks who thought this way.

THe whole point is that which was considered mental may have a physical explanation. You are pushed into the corner now of saying the subjective cannot be explained because it is the mental -- but here it becomes very apparent that you are using circular reasoning. You seem to be defining the mental as that which does not have a physical explanation. Since calculation now has a physical explanation you must jettison either the little homily you quoted up above, or you must re-define what mental is. You have obviously chosen to re-define mental to "What mental means now". But since we explained other things that were considered to be mental in the past by physical means, on what grounds do you claim that it is impossible to explain those things that you have now re-defined as mental in the future by physical means?

Since always.

Really? OK, that is an empirical claim. Show me where calculation has always been considered to be a physical process in the history of ideas. I'd like to see it. If not, return to the objections above.

It a process occuring in something we can see (a computer). It's physical in exactly the same way that a chemical reaction is physical.

And so, every time our brains calculate, detect features, manipulate words in syntactic structures, spell, etc. they are only performing physical and not mental tasks, correct?

What was under discusion was mental predicates.

I'm not a philosopher, so I suppose that there is some new or jargon definition of mental or predicate or mental predicate other than what is meant by a proposition about the mind such as calculation abilitiy is a property of the mind. I would appreciate your full explanation.

I have told you what MY definitions of them are. They are in the opening post of my thread on neutral monism.

And those definitions are of no help whatsoever in this discussion. I am not the one making the claim -- you are. Perhaps it is just that I am so dense that I cannot understand any of this highfallutin philosophizing stuff? It is certainly possible. So, explain it to me as though you were explaining it to a child. What is mental and what is physical?

process of calculation is extended

So I can touch the process of calculation? Really? THe process? I can touch the innards of a computer. I can touch the innards of a computer when it is doing its thing. I'm actually touching the process of calculation? I'm actually touching the working of a program?

So you see how silly all this sounds?

Sorry, I'm not bothering with the rest. I think I'll go back to my comfortable little world of absolute self-delusion and actually think about ways to solve these issues instead of claiming that the problem is soluble only by defining it away.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

OOPS! Now you're an eliminative materialist.

Wobble...

Argument by labeling people until you piss them off so much that they refuse to carry on the conversation with you.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Geoff, this is really quite simple. If you do not want us to entertain the possibility that consciousness (or whatever) is just brain function, then you have to present us with a logical proof. I think it is quite unlikely that you can present us with empirical evidence. That's all there is to it.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Geoff, this is really quite simple. If you do not want us to entertain the possibility that consciousness (or whatever) is just brain function, then you have to present us with a logical proof.

How does one assess whether the logical proof works when you are faced with a bunch of people who are quite happy to redefine "sheep" as "saucepans"? If you can get them to the point where they have been forced to say that "saucepans are really sheep", but you can't make them see that this is an absurd statement then you can go no further. And if they follow it up with "We want empirical evidence that's saucepans aren't really sheep!", what do you do next? Shrug, that's what you do. You can get a creationist to say something utterly ridiculous and completely implausible, but if the creationists simply sits there and tells you that it doesn't sound implausible to him, then you simply have to let him believe whatever absurdity he has chosen to believe.

You don't get it. There is no reason why I have to prove to you (empirically) that (A) isn't the same as (B) unless (A) is understood and recognised as a synonym of (B). If they are generally defined, understood and recognised (with good reason) as being different, then the onus is on YOU, not me, to defend your claim.

I think it is quite unlikely that you can present us with empirical evidence. That's all there is to it.

~~ Paul

"I still believe in the Bible! You won't shake my faith! Sheep are saucepans! Sheep are saucepans! SHEEP ARE SAUCEPANS! PROVE THEY AREN'T!"



The structure of the argument I am supposed to debunk/disprove:

"If sheep aren't saucepans, then materialism is false. Therefore sheep are saucepans (and you'll have to prove why this isn't the case)."

Sorry, but I don't. Not when my argument is:

""If sheep aren't saucepans, then materialism is false. Sheep aren't saucepans. Materialism is false."

One of these arguments relies defining A=B when A is nothing like B. The other doesn't.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Argument by labeling people until you piss them off so much that they refuse to carry on the conversation with you.

~~ Paul

Cyborg's posts are valueless. He doesn't listen, doesn't understand, keeps changing his position and every time he posts in this thread I have to say exactly the same things over and over again in reply. So yes, in the case of this particular individual I would rather he went away and discussed something he has the first clue about instead of filling my thread up with pointless posts.

 

[cyborg]

Erm....sorry, but what has the fact that the definition of "sheep" bears no resemblance to the definition of "saucepan" got to do with the fact that sheep aren't saucepans?

Absolutely everything.

If everyone agreed sheep were saucepans then sheep are saucepans. That what we would currently understand as being sheep and saucepans wouldn't have changed one iota doesn't change this.

This was discussed in one of the other threads with the tiger example. Just what IS a tiger? Is it a creature with four legs, a head, and stripes? What if it loses a leg? Is it its DNA? Is it still so if it's just stored in an electronic form and not chemical? Etc... That the animal that we understand as being a tiger would remain so whatever answers we decide to come up with is the whole point. These terms are for human benefit only, they don't fundamentally affect reality.

Because the brain processes and subjective experiences have implications for the nature of reality, you want me to grant you that in this very special case it is OK to equate things with completely different definitions.

No, I want you to accept that the definitions do not form a fundamental part of reality - they are solely for human benefit. Without out our existence these things cease to be. What you want is for a human-centric view of reality to provide fundamental existents. I am not so arrogant to believe that how I perceive anything is going to affect how things actually are.

This amounts to "Absurd statements are OK if they are the only way to defend materialism, because materialism is true."

Again, it's not about defending materialism (or anything else you want me to be or defend); it's about pointing out why your ideas are fundamentally flawed despite your claim that they lead to a more complete metaphysical understanding of reality.

Yep, just like almost all normal people understand what brain processes are and what subjective experiences are. The only people who don't seem to be able to recognise the difference are materialists.

Yeah, just like almost all normal people understand that souls really exist and are responsible for love and such despite what those materialists say.

Good. Then you're not an eliminative materialist.

Oh wow! That's amazing!

Oh wait, I don't give a crap how you decide to label me.

Oh well, bummer.

OOPS! Now you're an eliminative materialist.

Oh wow! That's amazing!

Oh wait, I don't give a crap how you decide to label me.

Oh well, bummer.

If you could get beyond your hard-on for poisioning the well by insisting on labelling me then maybe you could concentrate on what I'm saying.

Minds are patently not material because as I have been trying to get across to you they do not seem to have any fundamental existence. There is no evidence that they do. The best you've proposed is a 'mind of the gaps' argument. That would be argument from ignorance. What a mind is is what humans understand them to be. Show otherwise and you've shown that they have some fundamental existence.

Cyborg, what do you think the labels refer to?

They refer to things we understand as having the properties that we ascribe to those labels; whatever the fundamental propety of existence these things actually have.

This is why definitions are important, why they must unavoidably come from some first prinicples of a theory of reality and why all metaphysical systems will end up being axiomatic.

So if we take the current scientific understanding of reality where do we arrive? We start from our axioms; everything is made up of some really small stuff. Bigger stuff is made from the smaller stuff. Stuff interacts in deterministic ways. From that we build up theories about the big stuff, like how brains works, how the evolution of life proceeded, what makes a thing a tiger and so on...

None of the concepts about the bigger stuff is actually fundamental to reality, it is at the end of the day just the smallest stuff doing what it does. That is precisely what it means to say minds are an abstraction; there's nothing there that is fundamental apart from the small stuff. Such concepts are for human benefit.

So when you come in saying, yeah fine, all that emperical stuff that has led to the above understanding of how the world works is all fine and dandy but damn, there's a huge problem that can only be solved here if we take the mind abstraction and add it to the axioms of reality. No-one is buying it. You want us to add a new axiom without there being any demonstrated pressing need to do so in order to describe what we experience as reality.

 

[cyborg]

Cyborg's posts are valueless. He doesn't listen, doesn't understand, keeps changing his position and every time he posts in this thread I have to say exactly the same things over and over again in reply

My irony meter just broke!

Thanks Geoff! More costs I don't need to incur...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

How does one assess whether the logical proof works when you are faced with a bunch of people who are quite happy to redefine "sheep" as "saucepans"?

Proof by loud proclamation doesn't count.

You don't get it. There is no reason why I have to prove to you (empirically) that (A) isn't the same as (B) unless (A) is understood and recognised as a synonym of (B). If they are generally defined, understood and recognised (with good reason) as being different, then the onus is on YOU, not me, to defend your claim.

No one is saying that the concept of the brain is the same thing as the concept of consciousness. That would be silly.

"I still believe in the Bible! You won't shake my faith! Sheep are saucepans! Sheep are saucepans! SHEEP ARE SAUCEPANS! PROVE THEY AREN'T!"

Go shout this at Ian. He might agree with you.

"If sheep aren't saucepans, then materialism is false. Sheep aren't saucepans. Materialism is false."

Yup, that is the structure of your argument:

If brains aren't consciousness, then materialism is false. Brains aren't saucepans. Materialism is false.

Unfortunately, no one is claiming that brains are consciousness. What people are suggesting is that brain function results in events we call consciousness. Similar to computer hardware resulting in events we call computation. Yet, for some reason, we don't have to spend time masturbating over whether computation is a fundamental existent.

Now do you care to show the logical proof that consciousness can't be the result of brain function?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul,

I'll try to take a step back from this.....

Unless you are an eliminativist then there really are two different conceptual systems in everyday usage to talk about aspects of our experience. They are the 1st-person perspective and the 3rd-person perspective, which map directly onto "subjective" and "objective". Denial of the above claim is rank absurd.. This distinction lies at the heart of all our problems.

There's two ways of talking about these issues. You can either (A) start by accepting this natural division into two perspectives and admit the obvious fact that "mental" is a label we give to things describable from the 1st-person perspective and physical is the label for 3rd-person things, or you can (B) try to redefine "mental" as belonging to the class of 3rd-person things.

We are arguing about what is the most reasonable thing to do. i.e. what should be the default position. You are claiming that the default position is (B). I am claiming it is (A).

The default position has to be (A) every time. If you want to claim that "mental" should be redefined as belonging to the class of 3rd-person objective things then the burden of proof is well and truly yours, not mine. I'm not redefining the dictionary. You are. Now, there are cases where the dictionary definitions are wrong, and must be changed. But you cannot just arbitrarily change them and offer no explanation as to why they have been changed. Following so far? NOW - everything spins on how you justify this drastic and counter-intuitive alteration to the meanings of the words. How are you going to do so without simply declaring physicalism to be true? You can't. So we are left with a situation where the only way to defend physicalism is to redefine the important words to be used in the debate, and to justify this redefinition by asserting that materialism must be demonstrated false by some other means. Sorry, Paul, but if you are allowed to redefine words willy-nilly and provide no valid justification for doing so then the argument is over and the materialists have lost it.