Simple question: What is an object?

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

As far as my beliefs are concerned nothing is external to consciousness. And even if there were 'things' external to consciousness then they could never, by definition, be known to be so.

You explain your position below, Berkeley said it too.

we can reach consensus on objects via commonality of perception then description.

Still, here I do not understand. What does it mean commonality of perception? In the material objetive model two different consciousness see the same object because objects are real independently of if there are consciousnesses or not. They are external and objective. Period.

So, again, can you dissect your model? Explain it as clearly as the material model?

I think you may be driving at something else there. To which my answer would be that when no individual conscious being is perceiving a particular object, that object does not 'flip into non-being', because all aspects of reality are simultaneously parts of (made of, if you like) a universal omniscient consciousness.

Ok, now there should be a way to differentiate among an "external, objective, material world" and this "universal omniscient consciousness" that you talk about. How can you do that? Is there a way to pick one over the other with total confidence?

When, as individuals, we perceive that particular object, we are perceiving that particular aspect of the universal consciousness.

An "aspect" of the universal consciousness is not something I can understand. For a start, if consciousness perceives.. how can it be also perceived?

 

[Jimbo07]

Some forms of experience do not fit well with materialism,

Which amongst these are completely distinguishable from acts of imagination?

...

The verbal/philosophical elevation of consciousness to primary (or even supernatural) status conflicts sharply with physical observation.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

in vision, an object is a space surrounded by contours.

Thats a good answer. In fact, some attempts to give vision to robots are based on relatively simple algorithms like this one. It also calls my attention that the definition here is based on contrast, this is, a way to separate "something" from "something else" is to find such contrasts.

 

[plumjam]

Still, here I do not understand. What does it mean commonality of perception? In the material objetive model two different consciousness see the same object because objects are real independently of if there are consciousnesses or not. They are external and objective. Period.

I sleep and dream. If, during a dream, I perceive a chair and describe it, and another character in my dream describes the chair similarly to myself.. then would you say that the chair was a real, external, and objective object?
You probably would not.. you would probably argue that it was just perception and description relating to a non-real non-external non-objective experience.
Exactly the same could be said of our waking experience. There's no difference.
So in that sense there's no way we can be sure that the objects of our daily waking lives are 'real' or not.

So, again, can you dissect your model? Explain it as clearly as the material model?

I'm not sure what you mean by dissect in this context.
I guess it would have some commonalities with monist idealism. A dream of the Universal Mind, the Universal Mind being our own essential nature, if you like.

Ok, now there should be a way to differentiate among an "external, objective, material world" and this "universal omniscient consciousness" that you talk about. How can you do that? Is there a way to pick one over the other with total confidence?

Why differentiate? Why want to?
Nothing exists apart from the universal omniscient consciousness. The supposed objective material world you mention is just one aspect of it.

An "aspect" of the universal consciousness is not something I can understand.

You can understand your own thoughts and imaginings can't you?

For a start, if consciousness perceives.. how can it be also perceived?

Good question. The great mystics say that the way to knowledge is to set the individual consciousness to perceiving itself and its own nature. This is done by turning the attention back inwards, rather than outwards via the 5 senses. This is done with spiritual practice, such as meditation and prayer.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Object is a vague English word that has obvious meaning and application when used informally, but when tortured philosophically/scientifically really doesn't mean too much.

I suspect that statement sounds like I'm being facile, but I think it is a very sound statement. It's much like trying to identify when squirrel species x becomes squirrel species y. We can identify the x, and y, but there is no clear transition. That does not make the word species meaningless, it does mean that the word needs to be reserved for macro situations and recognize where we are getting to the point where we are squabbling about the meaning of a word instead of learning about squirrels.

Well put. I'm Wittgenstenian in this sense, the meaning of a word is its use, and there are language games in which one can twist the use to the point of breaking it. Still, it calls my attention that, sometimes, both "normal people" and skeptics use the words to mean the same thing on their daily life. Going deeper is interesting. I believe at least for some of us!

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Anything that can have a description covering property and/or behaviour that is verifiable by independent observation.

I like this one a lot. I noticed that you avoided here to make an ontological claim. Guess it is on purpose and my question is why?

 

[plumjam]

Which amongst these are completely distinguishable from acts of imagination?

How is your life completely distinguishable from an act of imagination? It isn't really.

The verbal/philosophical elevation of consciousness to primary (or even supernatural) status conflicts sharply with physical observation.

And observation only happens within consciousness. So this position is already undermined.

 

[Phaedrus74]

A fine distinction, but false. You have come along with me in a discussion and we agreed that one has to have faith either in one's ontology or epistemology in order to escape circularity and solipsism, and in order to be able to attempt to make any meaningful statements at all about reality.
Therefore, all world views which are not solipsism, including materialism, are based entirely on faith.

I am sorry but I did not say anything of the sort. The notion "faith" was introduced by you, and while I am willing to commit to the statement that I take materialism on faith this is a long way removed from stating that my belief that materialism offers the best starting point for enquiry is founded on faith. This distinction is crucial, think upon it and get back to me.

I'll get back to your other point in a second, hang on....

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'm not sure what you mean by dissect in this context.
I guess it would have some commonalities with monist idealism. A dream of the Universal Mind, the Universal Mind being our own essential nature, if you like.


Why differentiate? Why want to?
Nothing exists apart from the universal omniscient consciousness. The supposed objective material world you mention is just one aspect of it.

What he means by 'dissect' is -- carry the idea "nothing exists apart from the universal omniscient consciousness" to its logical conclusion. You may be surprised by what you find if you are honest in this endeavor.

For instance, depending on how you used the word 'apart' above, one consequence is that 'you' do not exist as an entity in the way that many people seem to think.

All monisms arive in the same place when examined critically. The problems arise from unstated dualisms -- you seem to be flirting with property dualism at the very least, and it is winking back.

 

[Phaedrus74]

Experience is grounded in experience. Materialism is just one of a host of interpretive schema that one can superimpose upon that experience. Some forms of experience do not fit well with materialism, so materialism (like here at JREF) is forced to deny such forms of experience.
Unfortunately for materialists experience is rather stubborn in this regard, and always will be.

Amongst the host of interpretive schemata available, science starting from materialism is the most useful. That it cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for every experience is a (temporary) nuisance, not an anomaly.

 

[Jimbo07]

How is your life completely distinguishable from an act of imagination? It isn't really.

Not completely, no, and it's a fair retort (because I used the word). Perhaps I should have said, "practically distinghuishable."

And observation only happens within consciousness.

I'm not sure that this is true, or at least, if it is for certain definitions of "observation", "consciousness" and "true", then I'm not sure that it is important.

In order to assert the primacy of consciousness, you'd have to deny the primacy of experience. If experience does not come first, why have unpleasant experiences at all?

If, on the other hand, you accept (for want to explain injury, say) that experience comes first, common experience suggests that consciousness is not primary.

 

[plumjam]

I am sorry but I did not say anything of the sort. The notion "faith" was introduced by you, and while I am willing to commit to the statement that I take materialism on faith this is a long way removed from stating that my belief that materialism offers the best starting point for enquiry is founded on faith. This distinction is crucial, think upon it and get back to me.

I'll get back to your other point in a second, hang on....

In post 72 you said:
"If you do not therefore treat either your theory of knowledge or your ontology as given you end up with the following:" -->(circularity)

In this context taking either one's epistemology or ontology as 'given' is an act of faith. No more, no less.
So, from that point onward, all the systems of thought, and statements you make regarding reality which this act of faith enable, would fall apart if the initial act of faith were taken away.

 

[Phaedrus74]

I like this one a lot. I noticed that you avoided here to make an ontological claim. Guess it is on purpose and my question is why?

Credit goes to Robin, of course. What I liked about his definition was its instrumental nature: It describes (very broadly) conditions under which something can be considered an object. It does not seek to specify the nature of the "thing" in question, this would be ontology.

Do I not like ontology? I like ontology fine as a mental exercise, it has on the other hand precious little uses beyond that.

 

[plumjam]

Amongst the host of interpretive schemata available, science starting from materialism is the most useful. That it cannot offer a satisfactory explanation for every experience is a (temporary) nuisance, not an anomaly.

Science is not an interpretive schema, it is an epistemological methodology. The interpretive schema is what is slapped on top of the results of the methodology once the results are in.
Currently what is usually slapped onto it is materialism.

Science, as an epistemological methodology, would work no different than it does today if it were to have any other interpretive schema slapped onto it afterwards, such as idealism etc...

In fact, idealism, being a broader based world view, would be in a better position to cope with the anomalous data which cannot be accommodated within materialism and are therefore widely denied, ridiculed or just ignored.

 

[plumjam]

Not completely, no, and it's a fair retort (because I used the word). Perhaps I should have said, "practically distinghuishable."

Well, the same would apply. We are almost always fooled into believing our dreams contain 'real' objects.

In order to assert the primacy of consciousness, you'd have to deny the primacy of experience.

Yeah, and I do. The cinema screen is more primal and enduring than the images playing on it. Without the screen no image would be able to form. When the images stop coming the screen remains.

If experience does not come first, why have unpleasant experiences at all?

I'm not sure what you're driving at here. Maybe you're asking why life exists. Which would be a much larger and longer topic

If, on the other hand, you accept (for want to explain injury, say) that experience comes first, common experience suggests that consciousness is not primary.

Common experience would not be experience without consciousness.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

In fact, idealism, being a broader based world view, would be in a better position to cope with the anomalous data which cannot be accommodated within materialism and are therefore widely denied, ridiculed or just ignored.

In what possible way is idealism a broader based world-view? Most scientists do not slap materialism onto their endeavors. Most never think about ontology at all. They just do their thing and look at the results.

 

[plumjam]

What he means by 'dissect' is -- carry the idea "nothing exists apart from the universal omniscient consciousness" to its logical conclusion. You may be surprised by what you find if you are honest in this endeavor.

For instance, depending on how you used the word 'apart' above, one consequence is that 'you' do not exist as an entity in the way that many people seem to think.

I realise that very well, and have for almost 20 years. It is the central message, and lived experience, of all the great mystics.

All monisms arive in the same place when examined critically. The problems arise from unstated dualisms -- you seem to be flirting with property dualism at the very least, and it is winking back.

Monist materialism ends up with mythical 'matter', that no one as yet has experienced. Idealist monism ends up with self-realisation/God-realisation which some people have experienced. So it is the superior of the two.
If I speak dualistically sometimes, it's because that's the way most people here and in broader society view and state the problem, i.e. God up there and us down here. It's unavoidable to do so, really.

 

[plumjam]

In what possible way is idealism a broader based world-view? Most scientists do not slap materialism onto their endeavors. Most never think about ontology at all. They just do their thing and look at the results.

This is so wrong it's amusing.
Idealism is broader in that it more easily accommodates psychological, paranormal, spiritual, and other anomalous experience than does materialism.
Most scientists do not slap materialism onto their endeavours? I'd beg to disagree. They spend a good 15 years in a materialism-based education system, plus the rest of their careers in a largely materialist world of academia. If some scientists escape this kind of thinking they've done pretty well against the odds.

Witness the evolution/I.D. controversy.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I realise that very well, and have for almost 20 years. It is the central message, and lived experience, of all the great mystics.


Monist materialism ends up with mythical 'matter', that no one as yet has experienced. Idealist monism ends up with self-realisation/God-realisation which some people have experienced. So it is the superior of the two.
If I speak dualistically sometimes, it's because that's the way most people here and in broader society view and state the problem, i.e. God up there and us down here. It's unavoidable to do so, really.

Monism is monism. That's all there is to it. We cannot know what the ultimate substance is. What you are doing is adding characteristics to the ultimate substance.

If there is no 'you' what could you possibly mean by 'self-realization'?

There is no God up there and us down here within any monistic position. If 'we' are a consequence of the 'mind of God', then 'we' are a part of God and there is no 'us'.

If all of what we call the material world is ultimately thought, that includes our brains. Since this world that we see follows rules, the same thing we describe using 'material monism' -- thought is brain function -- must apply to 'idealist monism' as well. If it does not, then you are engaging in some form of hidden dualism -- actually it isn't hidden at all, it is just plain old property dualism.

All monisms must end in the same place. The rest is mere labelling.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

This is so wrong it's amusing.
Idealism is broader in that it more easily accommodates psychological, paranormal, spiritual, and other anomalous experience than does materialism.
Most scientists do not slap materialism onto their endeavours? I'd beg to disagree. They spend a good 15 years in a materialism-based education system, plus the rest of their careers in a largely materialist world of academia. If some scientists escape this kind of thinking they've done pretty well against the odds.

Witness the evolution/I.D. controversy.

No it doesn't. Not unless you are harboring unrevealed dualisms. If you are a monist, please tell me how you could ever come to a different conclusion than other monists, thought properly applied? Monism is monism.

ETA:

Dude, you aren't flirting any more. Property dualism is kissing you full on the lips.

Scientists exist in a scientific milieu. Most never consider ontology. They would throw that fish back as unproductive.