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Richard T. Garner and "Beyond Morality"

Wowbagger

The Infinitely Prolonged
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For SkeptiCamp NYC 2013, I will be participating in a debate about whether or not objective moral truths exist. Can science answer normative questions?

(I say "Yes". But, that's not the point of this thread.... At least, not yet.)

My opponent belongs to a branch of moral theory called Error Theory. One of its champions seems to be Richard T. Garner, author of a book called Beyond Morality.

I figured it might be a good idea to pick the minds of this forum, a little, about that. But, since search results have yielded nothing about him, so far, I figured I would start this thread.

So, I'd like to know if anyone, here, has anything to say about his ideas: Pro or Con.

I have not read the book, yet. But, I aim to go through it soon, in preparation for this debate. My opinion, so far, is that he might be a bit... wooish. But, I could be wrong about that. Anyone care to steer me in any particular direction?
 
My only opinion is that his book is way too expensive.
Y'know, that did strike me as weird. But, perhaps it was out of print?

There are used copies available for around $15.00.

I don't always buy used books. But, when I do, it's usually a book I think I won't like very much; but would still be willing to give it a fair chance.
 
These are two distinct positions. It is possible to answer in the affirmative to the first while negative to the second.

What's the motion being debated?
It looks like we will focus on "objective moral truths exist" as the motion being debated, as it is probably a little more fundamental.

We started trying to debate the motion "science can answer moral questions", in our initial discussions. But, we wound up getting into the former.

We might end up touching on both in our debate. I think my opponent would answer "No" to both, and I "Yes" to both, anyway.

I think the second is more important and interesting. But, since the first is a prerequisite, I suppose we should establish that, first.
 
My 2 cents worth.

Morality is human herd behaviour as applied to individuals. Each of us behaves the way the group expects, Not doing so is immoral.
Herd behaviour is an evolutionary phenomenon.
Any definition of morality that does not take account of evolution is incomplete. And probably pointless.
Moral absolutes certainly exist for humans and groups of humans, where one person constitutes the minimum group size.
While similar absolutes may exist for other animals, that is a result of similar properties of groups and has nothing to do with morality itself.

From the Stanford link, I find myself immediately disagreeing with the first line-
"
Mackie's arguments for the moral error theory

The Argument from Relativity (often more perspicaciously referred to as “the Argument from Disagreement”) begins with an empirical observation: that there is an enormous amount of variation in moral views, and that moral disagreements are often characterized by an unusual degree of intractability."

In fact, morality varies very little. Practically every group in existence, and most in the past would agree very closely on what is moral. Eating yourself is not. Slaughtering large numbers of children is not. Doing what you are told, is. That such behavioural rules are in fact common to most herd animals in rudimentary forms, as well as repeated across practically all human cultures, points strongly to a genetic origin.

But a meta question can always be asked. Just because every horse, chimp and human agrees that behaviour X is the right thing to do, does that mean that at a higher level it is still right?

That is probably a meaningless question, but one beloved of moral philosophers everywhen.
 
My 2 cents worth.

Morality is human herd behaviour as applied to individuals. Each of us behaves the way the group expects, Not doing so is immoral.
Herd behaviour is an evolutionary phenomenon.
Any definition of morality that does not take account of evolution is incomplete. And probably pointless.
Moral absolutes certainly exist for humans and groups of humans, where one person constitutes the minimum group size.
While similar absolutes may exist for other animals, that is a result of similar properties of groups and has nothing to do with morality itself.

From the Stanford link, I find myself immediately disagreeing with the first line-
"
Mackie's arguments for the moral error theory

The Argument from Relativity (often more perspicaciously referred to as “the Argument from Disagreement”) begins with an empirical observation: that there is an enormous amount of variation in moral views, and that moral disagreements are often characterized by an unusual degree of intractability."

In fact, morality varies very little. Practically every group in existence, and most in the past would agree very closely on what is moral. Eating yourself is not. Slaughtering large numbers of children is not. Doing what you are told, is. That such behavioural rules are in fact common to most herd animals in rudimentary forms, as well as repeated across practically all human cultures, points strongly to a genetic origin.

But a meta question can always be asked. Just because every horse, chimp and human agrees that behaviour X is the right thing to do, does that mean that at a higher level it is still right?

That is probably a meaningless question, but one beloved of moral philosophers everywhen.

*sigh*

Why is it that when we are talking about subject matter that is obviously scientific, then the tendency is to use phrases such as:


It appears as though...
The weight of evidence suggests...
There is support for the view that...


Yet, when the same people turn their attention to something far more complicated and contentious like morality then suddenly pronouncements are made with strident and dogmatic certainty.

In red are all the particular dogmatic assertions I am talking about.

This post appears to be confusing a number of problems here, namely the distinction between descriptive ethics, normative ethics and meta-ethics.

I would probably agree that a descriptive ethics needs to take into account evolutionary theory, and broad similarities in what constitutes right or wrong may point to an evolutionary origin.

But evolution also appears to have placed in us certain behavioural dispositions such as infidelity in men, caring for kin above strangers and various other things that we may want to apply our reasoning to to determine whether or not it is right to do those things.

You then give a moral relativist idea that suggests that going along with the herd is the right thing to do and not doing so is immoral. It is unclear whether or not you mean this descriptively or in a normative sense. But how about the idea that by running away with Jim to free him, Huckleberry Finn was being immoral by stealing property - i.e a slave?

You sneer at the idea that moral philosophers love their "meaningless" question about if everyone believed X then would it make it right, but indeed why not tell us the answer anyway. If everyone in society thought owning slaves was right then would it make it right?

Or how about, if everyone in society (except the slaves themselves who are not really considered social beings anyway) thought that slavery was right, but only one person objected, then is that person immoral in your view?

Also, while you may disagree that there is an enormous variation in moral views, I take it that you would at least agree that there is a very meaningful variation in human views and that the follow up is also true, that where there are moral disagreements these moral disagreements are indeed intractable:

For an example of intractability, very few people say "I'm okay with you having abortions if you want one, but I am against."

Similarly people don't say that about slavery either, or the right of women to vote, and many other things.

Similarly, people find it hard to take the moral relativist view of honour killing, burka-wearing, FGM, circumcision in boys, polygyny and various other things.

If you do not believe me then take a look at the threads in politics and social affairs, current events etc...
 
Morality is human herd behaviour as applied to individuals. Each of us behaves the way the group expects, Not doing so is immoral.
I think this is largely right. But, I would alter that last part: "Not doing so might be considered immoral, at first. But, if the consequences ended up being good, it will change the group's mind."

Herd behaviour is an evolutionary phenomenon.
Any definition of morality that does not take account of evolution is incomplete. And probably pointless.
I wholeheartedly agree with that!!

Moral absolutes certainly exist for humans and groups of humans, where one person constitutes the minimum group size.
While similar absolutes may exist for other animals, that is a result of similar properties of groups and has nothing to do with morality itself.
There might be absolute core sources of morality (from our evolutionary inheritance). But, they are not necessarily "absolute" once they bubble up to the societal level. Societies do have the opportunity to warp and change their behaviors, even away from previously natural absolutes, if doing so ends up helping everyone even more.

In fact, morality varies very little. Practically every group in existence, and most in the past would agree very closely on what is moral. Eating yourself is not. Slaughtering large numbers of children is not. Doing what you are told, is. That such behavioural rules are in fact common to most herd animals in rudimentary forms, as well as repeated across practically all human cultures, points strongly to a genetic origin.
It is often helpful to separate moral concepts into two categories: Proximate details, and Ultimate causes.

Across human societies, there might be a great variety in how the proximate details of moral codes are formed: Creating the ILLUSION that there is a wide variety of moral values out there.

However, when studied carefully, we find there are a LOT more universals hidden within that variety, than would first meet the eye. This, in theory, is because these moral systems have their roots in the same ultimate causes.

But a meta question can always be asked. Just because every horse, chimp and human agrees that behaviour X is the right thing to do, does that mean that at a higher level it is still right?

That is probably a meaningless question, but one beloved of moral philosophers everywhen.

I think, in the long run, we have no control over it. (At least in theory.) Anyone who argues against where our natural morality is leading us, will eventually be tossed aside, while everyone else goes with that flow. The flow can only be rerouted if you can demonstrate that the new route is better.

Yet, when the same people turn their attention to something far more complicated and contentious like morality then suddenly pronouncements are made with strident and dogmatic certainty.
I, for one, try to avoid the language of dogmatic certainty.

But evolution also appears to have placed in us certain behavioural dispositions such as infidelity in men, caring for kin above strangers and various other things that we may want to apply our reasoning to to determine whether or not it is right to do those things.
Morality only begins with evolution. It can warp and change according to societal needs. Theoretically, these needs can be predicted and anticipated based on population size, environmental factors, and perhaps other empirically measurable factors.

Morality seems to be more of an emergent system, than a natural process itself.

You then give a moral relativist idea that suggests that going along with the herd is the right thing to do and not doing so is immoral.
I already noted above, that societies can accept deviation from the herd, if that deviation proves to be in everyone's best interests. (Though, it often takes time to recognize that. And, in the meantime you might be considered "immoral" by accident.)

For an example of intractability, very few people say "I'm okay with you having abortions if you want one, but I am against."
I think most Pro Choice people say this.

In any case, there ARE objective ways to resolve issues of abortions, slavery, voting rights, honor killing, burka wearing, circumcision, polygamy, etc. The more science says about their pros can cons, and under what circumstances those pros and cons appear, the more that will influence our morality.

In the rare event of a tie: If an issue proves to be of no moral relevance, what-so-ever; then it will eventually cease to be a moral issue in the future, even if it looks like one, now. And, will merely be an issue of personal preference. (I cannot think of a good example of this, yet, though.)
 
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I just have to ask you this, Wowbagger, because I don't see any evidence in your posts.

Do you know about the distinction between descriptive and normative ethics?

For example, while you may be able to argue for altruism having an evolutionary basis (descriptivism) it does not tell us that we should be altruistic in any given time (normativism/prescriptivism).

Why should I do X? is a perfectly intelligible question even if you can answer that the majority of people would be better off if I did it.

angrysoba said:
For an example of intractability, very few people say "I'm okay with you having abortions if you want one, but I am against."

Wowbagger said:
I think most Pro Choice people say this.

No. Most pro-choice people are in favour of abortion, so why would they say they are against it? And quite obviously if someone is pro-choice then they are pro-choice, that doesn't really tell us anything non-tautological.

Wowbagger said:
In any case, there ARE objective ways to resolve issues of abortions, slavery, voting rights, honor killing, burka wearing, circumcision, polygamy, etc. The more science says about their pros can cons, and under what circumstances those pros and cons appear, the more that will influence our morality.

In the rare event of a tie: If an issue proves to be of no moral relevance, what-so-ever; then it will eventually cease to be a moral issue in the future, even if it looks like one, now. And, will merely be an issue of personal preference. (I cannot think of a good example of this, yet, though.)

Again, I cannot work out if you are making a descriptive claim or a normative or a meta-ethical claim.
 
Do you know about the distinction between descriptive and normative ethics?
Yes, I've been down that road in other debates. And, there is a normative manner in which I can place my arguments...

Why should I do X? is a perfectly intelligible question even if you can answer that the majority of people would be better off if I did it.
It's not merely a matter of what would be better for the majority of people.

It's that, in the long run, that majority has no control or choice over the character of the solutions they will converge on. Society will, perhaps eerily, converge on what is in their best interests, regarding health, wealth, and well being, etc. Even if some people try to deviate from that.

*Individuals* have a choice, of course. But, if their choice goes against what is best for everyone, then that individual will get swept aside by everyone else.

If that deviant individual is lucky enough to obtain lots of power, it might take longer to topple their regime, but topple it will. And then everyone can go back to doing what is best for everyone, after that.

"Why should I do X?" becomes a question of: "Should I be part of what everyone is eventually going to do, anyway, because it is in the best interests of society? Or, should I be one of those historic footnotes that gets swept to the side, while everyone else does what is in the best interests of society?"

In this way, we can approach normative answers to these types of questions.

No. Most pro-choice people are in favour of abortion, so why would they say they are against it?
Perhaps I read that wrong. I think a lot of them would be against it for themselves. But, they would not judge other people who have one.
 
Yes, I've been down that road in other debates. And, there is a normative manner in which I can place my arguments...

It's not merely a matter of what would be better for the majority of people.

It's that, in the long run, that majority has no control or choice over the character of the solutions they will converge on. Society will, perhaps eerily, converge on what is in their best interests, regarding health, wealth, and well being, etc. Even if some people try to deviate from that.

*Individuals* have a choice, of course. But, if their choice goes against what is best for everyone, then that individual will get swept aside by everyone else.

If that deviant individual is lucky enough to obtain lots of power, it might take longer to topple their regime, but topple it will. And then everyone can go back to doing what is best for everyone, after that.

"Why should I do X?" becomes a question of: "Should I be part of what everyone is eventually going to do, anyway, because it is in the best interests of society? Or, should I be one of those historic footnotes that gets swept to the side, while everyone else does what is in the best interests of society?"

In this way, we can approach normative answers to these types of questions.

Perhaps I read that wrong. I think a lot of them would be against it for themselves. But, they would not judge other people who have one.

I cannot follow what you are saying at all.

If you are going to go into a debate then you may need to have a much clearer argument than you are making right now, because it sounds incoherent and a bit woo-ish to me at the moment.
 
Anyway, while I disagree with the apparent premise that science can tell us what we ought to do (normative), as opposed to why we have a certain moral sense (descriptivist), which science can provide answers to, I think that you may be on a better track arguing the case that you have mentioned, that what look like massive disagreements in morality may in fact reduce to primary ethical concerns and that some people do indeed make an error when they think X is correct as it may contradict other beliefs that they have.

I think that there were some good examples of this in Plato's Gorgias where someone makes the claim that each person should always do what is best for themselves and others can go hang. Socrates managed to show that person, or at least those who were listening and were capable of being convinced that his interlocutor was being contradictory.

Similarly, arguments about moral relativism and arguments for a divine source of morals also turn out to be contradictory or incoherent. If you can demonstrate that your opponent's argument is incoherent then you have a better chance in the debate than you would if you start presenting all these unsubstantiated claims that you make in your posts above.
 
I think that you may be on a better track arguing the case that you have mentioned, that what look like massive disagreements in morality may in fact reduce to primary ethical concerns and that some people do indeed make an error when they think X is correct as it may contradict other beliefs that they have.
That is certainly a key point I will be making.

Though, the question will come up: If moral truths really do exist, then where do they come from? Certainly not a divine entity?!

The answer is they come out of natural forces! These forces include natural selection and various emergent properties of societal behavior. Together, they form the origins and enforcement of moral values.

I know that all sounds descriptive, so far.

But, they become normative once we recognize that we don't really have much of a choice in the manner: These naturally-forming values have an eerie way of becoming inescapable and binding, within that society. Deviations from them can exist, for a little while, but such alternative values would be inherently unstable, and just won't last very long.

There are a truckload of predictions that come out of this, regarding the nature of so-called "Moral Authority", various non-intuitive aspects of moral judgment we can tease out in experiments, etc.

I cannot follow what you are saying at all.
I hope the above straightens out the concepts a little.

If not, I have some ideas that can clarify things, further: But, I am in the midst of writing that out for my opening remarks. Once I have a solid draft down, I can offer it.
(It is certainly a great challenge communicating an extremely complicated subject, to a partly skeptical, and mostly astute crowd, in under 5 minutes!!)

There is science at every step, I can assure you. And, I am building a set of references for these arguments, because I know they will be demanded. And, I will offer that, too, once it is ready.
 
That is certainly a key point I will be making.

Though, the question will come up: If moral truths really do exist, then where do they come from? Certainly not a divine entity?!

The answer is they come out of natural forces! These forces include natural selection and various emergent properties of societal behavior. Together, they form the origins and enforcement of moral values.

I know that all sounds descriptive, so far.

But, they become normative once we recognize that we don't really have much of a choice in the manner: These naturally-forming values have an eerie way of becoming inescapable and binding, within that society. Deviations from them can exist, for a little while, but such alternative values would be inherently unstable, and just won't last very long.
There are a truckload of predictions that come out of this, regarding the nature of so-called "Moral Authority", various non-intuitive aspects of moral judgment we can tease out in experiments, etc.
I hope the above straightens out the concepts a little.

If not, I have some ideas that can clarify things, further: But, I am in the midst of writing that out for my opening remarks. Once I have a solid draft down, I can offer it.
(It is certainly a great challenge communicating an extremely complicated subject, to a partly skeptical, and mostly astute crowd, in under 5 minutes!!)

There is science at every step, I can assure you. And, I am building a set of references for these arguments, because I know they will be demanded. And, I will offer that, too, once it is ready.

Okay well I look forward to reading it, but I have to tell you that I am highly skeptical of the highlighted portions and I think that the claims are going to be difficult if not impossible to substantiate. I could be wrong, of course.

But the most important difficulty is in demonstrating the logical validity of the argument which I think cannot be done.
 
The answer is they come out of natural forces! These forces include natural selection and various emergent properties of societal behavior. Together, they form the origins and enforcement of moral values.

I know that all sounds descriptive, so far.

But, they become normative once we recognize that we don't really have much of a choice in the manner: These naturally-forming values have an eerie way of becoming inescapable and binding, within that society. Deviations from them can exist, for a little while, but such alternative values would be inherently unstable, and just won't last very long.

I can't see this as anything but a descriptive claim.

You use the word "binding" here, but only to mean that the value has become accepted by the society, not in the sense that one "really" ought to accept the value for reasons other than enlightened self-interest in order to escape condemnation.

Let us take a simple example. Let us suppose that a particular society has very few resources and has begun to kill off its elderly and frail members, in order to better distribute resources. One is required to admit to the elders when a family member is incapable of contributing.

This would be consistent with the picture you paint above, and we could certainly see that such a social norm may develop. In this case, we could even say that a person with a frail family member ought to report him, for purely prudential reasons.

But your account does not say that such a person has a moral obligation to do so. You don't even hint as to why this is the case. The claim that "Society X punishes those who don't follow this rule," is not at all similar to what we mean when we say, "One ought, on moral grounds, to follow these rules."
 
But, they become normative once we recognize that we don't really have much of a choice in the manner: These naturally-forming values have an eerie way of becoming inescapable and binding, within that society. Deviations from them can exist, for a little while, but such alternative values would be inherently unstable, and just won't last very long.

This is still a descriptive rather than normative claim. Try again.
 
Okay well I look forward to reading it, but I have to tell you that I am highly skeptical of the highlighted portions and I think that the claims are going to be difficult if not impossible to substantiate. I could be wrong, of course.
I am working on that. But, do you agree that in principle, if I were to substantiate the ideas, it would qualify as answering normative questions? I am not asking you to agree that it does, right now. Only that it WOULD, IF I can substantiate that.

I only ask because it seems I already have doubters:
I can't see this as anything but a descriptive claim.

This is still a descriptive rather than normative claim. Try again.
 
You use the word "binding" here, but only to mean that the value has become accepted by the society, not in the sense that one "really" ought to accept the value for reasons other than enlightened self-interest in order to escape condemnation.
It is not merely that society accepts it, that makes it binding. It is that natural forces make certain things good to do or bad. And, society eventually figures those out, and adopts them.

Though, it is more complicated than that, because a lot of those natural forces are emergent properties of the collective society. But, even as such, it is (perhaps eerily) not something the society really has any control over.

It is possible to convince everyone in a society to do the wrong thing: Perhaps something that hurts a lot of people for arbitrary reasons. Those things would be accepted by society, for a while, but they would still objectively be wrong. Eventually, they will figure that out, and reverse the bad ideas. (Assuming at least some of them survive.)

That moment when society corrects itself is one of the eerie ways in which natural forces "conspire" to bend society towards what is objectively right.

But your account does not say that such a person has a moral obligation to do so.
The moral obligation becomes apparent when we recognize that questions such as "Should I do X?" often turn into questions of:

"Should I be part of what everyone is eventually going to value, anyway, because it happens to be in the best interests of society? Or, should I be one of those historic footnotes that gets swept to the side, while everyone else does what is in the best interests of society?"

There could be detractors from naturally occurring morality. Someone does have the freedom to say: "I wish to be a footnote of evil, in history, by doing what is against the best interests of the society's very survival!"
(Though, I don't think they would actually say it quite like that.)

But, this is not a problem unique to natural morality.

Even if morality came to us from a divine entity, it could still have detractors. Someone would have the freedom to say: "I will NOT do what God said I should. And, I WILL do what God said I must never do!"

Not even God would be 100% perfectly binding, if He existed.
 

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