PWQs

[Guest]

This is a branch-thread of 'believer response pattern' in the paranormal section.

It is about qualia again......

It is an inevitable fact of life that all our experiences are subjective - we cannot escape from this. But those subjective experiences (or qualia) appear to fall into two distinct sorts of categories - firstly there are our internal emotional states - things like fear and elation. Secondly there are a collection of integrated sense impressions - the sights, sounds and touch of a physical world - we could call them "physical world qualia" - PWQs. If we go back and think about the process of science, and what it is doing, then the source of the difficulties becomes quite clear (to me, anyway). The process of physical science is the process of creating and testing a model of the behaviour of something. But what is the 'something' we are producing a model of? Is it not the case that the 'something' we are producing a model of is the behavior of PWQs?

It seems to me that this is precisely what the laws of physics model - we have no direct access to atoms or quantum waves - we have direct access only to PWQs. If we recognise this then all of the arguments about how qualia arise from matter melt away. The problems are the result of the ontological materialist claiming that the laws of physics, rather than being a model of the behaviour of PWQs, are a model of the behaviour of a self-existing physical world. Why add this extra level of abstraction into our description of reality? Why claim that TLOP are a model of a self-existing physical world and leave yourself doomed to struggle endlessly to explain what qualia are when the REAL situation is that the TLOP are a model of the behaviour of PWQs anyway?

So if you accept the above understanding of what is going on i.e. that humans experience PWQs and create an integrated set of physical laws and equations to describe the behaviour of those PWQs then we can look again at our claims regarding the relationship between the PWQs and the physical model we call TLOP.

My position :

My position is very simple, and seems to me to be an accurate reflection of the true situation - that we find ourselves experiencing PWQs and we build an abstract model we call the laws of physics to describe the behaviour of these PWQs. Therefore the relationship between PWQs and TLOP is very simple - PWQs are the thing being modelled and TLOP is a mathematical model describing its behaviour. There is no question about 'how qualia arise from matter', because 'matter' is just part of the model of qualia. No Hard Problem. No assumptions. A simple accurate statement of the way things actually are.

Eliminative Materialists position :

The eliminative materialist position is not so simple. Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'. This is claiming a very different relationship between PWQs and TLOP. In effect it amounts to a claim that PWQs belong in the model, as a small subset of the model. As a result, the eliminative materialist is faced with the task of showing how it is possible that the thing being modelled "arises" as a subset of the model itself! Eliminative materialism claims that TLOP isn't a model of PWQs at all - it claims that TLOP are a model of the behaviour of a directly-unknowable self-existing (mind-independent) physical world, and that PWQs arise from this unknowable self-existing physical world and it is therefore possible to place PWQs within the model! Here is your "Hard Problem" and it is very hard indeed. It is hard because if my position is correct then it is an attempt to claim it is possible to place the actual (entire) thing being modelled into the model as a subset of the model. It is not really surprising that this is proving a little difficult.

Just to make this even clearer I have used the example of physical models of wind behaviour. We build physical models of weather patterns and part of these use physical concepts to explaing and predict the behviour of winds. But if somebody came along and claimed that you could place the winds themselves into the mathematical model you would think they were insane, wouldn't you? It is beyond 'woo-woo' - it is just plain absurd. But when we talk about 'the winds themselves' what we really mean is the PWQs of winds - the winds we actually experience blowing. It is absurd because it is an attempt to place the thing we are modelling into the model - where it quite plainly does not belong. Yet, to claim that PWQs can be placed in the model is even more absurd, because rather than simply just trying to place the winds themselves into the mathematical model of wind behaviour, it is a claim that the whole of collection of PWQs can be placed into the mathematical model of the physical world.

Yet, every time a materialist claims that "there is no reason to believe that subjective experiences are not fully explicable as physical brain activity" they are making precisely this claim - that PWQs are just another part of the abstract model we call 'the material world'. I stand by my assertion that it is prima facie absurd. "Hard Problem" is an understatement.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

It is an inevitable fact of life that all our experiences are subjective - we cannot escape from this. But those subjective experiences (or qualia) appear to fall into two distinct sorts of categories - firstly there are our internal emotional states - things like fear and elation. Secondly there are a collection of integrated sense impressions - the sights, sounds and touch of a physical world - we could call them "physical world qualia" - PWQs.

On what grounds do you assert that they are "distinct"? Certainly you can divide up the qualia into these two groups, but that doesn't mean that they are really distinct in any meaningful way.

If we go back and think about the process of science, and what it is doing, then the source of the difficulties becomes quite clear (to me, anyway). The process of physical science is the process of creating and testing a model of the behaviour of something. But what is the 'something' we are producing a model of? Is it not the case that the 'something' we are producing a model of is the behavior of PWQs?

Sure. Science provides a model for our experiences. But that model implicitely includes the assumption that our experiences are interactions with an objective reality.

It seems to me that this is precisely what the laws of physics model - we have no direct access to atoms or quantum waves - we have direct access only to PWQs. If we recognise this then all of the arguments about how qualia arise from matter melt away.

What problems are you referring to? If you are referring to the problem of how these "PWQ's" work, then they most certainly don't melt away. No matter what philosophical approach you choose to use, the question of how consciousness actually works remains.

The problems are the result of the ontological materialist claiming that the laws of physics, rather than being a model of the behaviour of PWQs, are a model of the behaviour of a self-existing physical world.

This has nothing to do with ontology. The assumption that reality is objective is a necessary assumption of the scientific method. It is also an assumption of Idealism. It is, in fact, nothing more than a rejection of Solipsism.

Why add this extra level of abstraction into our description of reality? Why claim that TLOP are a model of a self-existing physical world and leave yourself doomed to struggle endlessly to explain what qualia are when the REAL situation is that the TLOP are a model of the behaviour of PWQs anyway?

Why assume a self-existing mental world either? The difference is that the assumptions of science constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. That is what makes them useful. That is what makes science a meaningful epistemological framework, rather than a meaningless ontological one.

You are correct in claiming that ontological materialism makes no sense. What you don't seem to understand is that ontology makes no sense. Idealism is just as meaningless as ontological materialism, and for exactly the same reasons.

My position is very simple, and seems to me to be an accurate reflection of the true situation - that we find ourselves experiencing PWQs and we build an abstract model we call the laws of physics to describe the behaviour of these PWQs. Therefore the relationship between PWQs and TLOP is very simple - PWQs are the thing being modelled and TLOP is a mathematical model describing its behaviour. There is no question about 'how qualia arise from matter', because 'matter' is just part of the model of qualia. No Hard Problem. No assumptions. A simple accurate statement of the way things actually are.

There is still a very hard problem. What is the nature of consciousness? Why is it there to begin with? What are the logical rules that describe it? You are essentially sweeping all these questions under the rug.

Saying that consciousness doesn't arise from matter, but instead that matter arises from consciousness, doesn't eliminate any questions that need to be answered, nor does it answer them. You constantly criticize materialists for not being able to explain to you how consciousness arises from matter, but can you explain how matter arises from consciousness? Can you describe, in terms of logical rules, how the mind produces the physical world?

The eliminative materialist position is not so simple. Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'.

I know of nobody who claims this. What the current scientific theories state is that consciousness is a physical process in the brain, which serves an evolutionary advantageous purpose, and which developed through the process of natural selection. There is nothing mysterious about it, other than the fact that we don't have all the details yet.

This is claiming a very different relationship between PWQs and TLOP. In effect it amounts to a claim that PWQs belong in the model, as a small subset of the model. As a result, the eliminative materialist is faced with the task of showing how it is possible that the thing being modelled "arises" as a subset of the model itself!

That is a mischaracterization of the process. What we are trying to model is the physical World that we perceive. If the process of perception is a physical process, then it can, and indeed must, be explainable within that model.

Eliminative materialism claims that TLOP isn't a model of PWQs at all - it claims that TLOP are a model of the behaviour of a directly-unknowable self-existing (mind-independent) physical world, and that PWQs arise from this unknowable self-existing physical world and it is therefore possible to place PWQs within the model! Here is your "Hard Problem" and it is very hard indeed. It is hard because if my position is correct then it is an attempt to claim it is possible to place the actual (entire) thing being modelled into the model as a subset of the model. It is not really surprising that this is proving a little difficult.

Notice the emphasis. If your position is correct, then at least one of the axioms of science are wrong. In that case, it is not just a hard problem, it is an impossible problem. But it is only a problem if the scientific method is invalid.

You cannot make assumptions that are inconsistent with the axioms of science, and conclude from them that certain classes of problem cannot be solved by science. Well, you can, but it is trivial and pointless to do so. If the axioms of science are false, then the point is moot!

Just to make this even clearer I have used the example of physical models of wind behaviour. We build physical models of weather patterns and part of these use physical concepts to explaing and predict the behviour of winds. But if somebody came along and claimed that you could place the winds themselves into the mathematical model you would think they were insane, wouldn't you?

What do you mean, put the winds themselves into the model? How is this analogous to what is being done in science? Science is trying to model consciousness. What is the problem with this?

It is beyond 'woo-woo' - it is just plain absurd. But when we talk about 'the winds themselves' what we really mean is the PWQs of winds - the winds we actually experience blowing. It is absurd because it is an attempt to place the thing we are modelling into the model - where it quite plainly does not belong.

Nobody is trying to do that. This is an absurd strawman.

Yet, to claim that PWQs can be placed in the model is even more absurd, because rather than simply just trying to place the winds themselves into the mathematical model of wind behaviour, it is a claim that the whole of collection of PWQs can be placed into the mathematical model of the physical world.

What we are attempting to do is model the physical World. And such a model must necessarily include an explanation for how the observable World interacts with us to produce our perceptions of it.

Yet, every time a materialist claims that "there is no reason to believe that subjective experiences are not fully explicable as physical brain activity" they are making precisely this claim - that PWQs are just another part of the abstract model we call 'the material world'. I stand by my assertion that it is prima facie absurd. "Hard Problem" is an understatement.

It is only absurd if you make the a-priori assumption that physical reality is your experiences themselves, rather than something objective which you experience. But if you make that assumption, then you have already flushed science down the toilet, so the point is moot.

You can reject the assumption of objectivity if you want to, but when you do so, you are rejecting the scientific method too.

Dr. Stupid

 

[BillyTK]

A puzzled kat writes...

Anyone mind if we take a coupla steps back for a minute please? I've got a few problems with qualia--which admittedly are prolly the result of my lack of knowledge--I'd just like to iron out.

Firstly, I don't get how we have qualia, anymore than according to behaviourism we "have" operants (basic units of stimulus/response operations which compose our behaviours).

Secondly, the distinction between emotional states and sensory impressions seems somewhat arbitary as these interact with each other--my emotional state is influenced by sensory impressions; my sensory impressions are influenced by emotional state.

Finally, it's the attribution of meaning to these states which makes them significant--for instance, I'm crying because I feel sad (attribution of meaning to emotional state) as opposed to I'm crying because I've got hayfever and just snooked up a noseful of pollen (attribution of meaning to sensory impressions). These meanings are not a result of any intrinsic property of the state/perception/object being perceived but are "out there" (points at rest of world) as much as they are "in here" (taps self on head).

So apologies if this has been covered before, but i just don't get it!

 

[Guest]

Stimp

On what grounds do you assert that they are "distinct"? Certainly you can divide up the qualia into these two groups, but that doesn't mean that they are really distinct in any meaningful way.

I assert they are distinct on the grounds that one of them (the PWQs) are a representation of a percieved external reality and the other are not. How can you claim this distinction is 'not meaningful'? Nobody would claim fear and elation as being qualia that represent part of the external reality (oops...I forgot....materialists in the house....liable to claim all sorts of patent absurdities..... )

You might be able to draw a theoretical, indirect connection between internal emotional states and the physical world, but you would have to be pretty desperate to claim there is a direct connection as there is in the qualia associated with directly representing the external world. Are you that desperate?

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If we go back and think about the process of science, and what it is doing, then the source of the difficulties becomes quite clear (to me, anyway). The process of physical science is the process of creating and testing a model of the behaviour of something. But what is the 'something' we are producing a model of? Is it not the case that the 'something' we are producing a model of is the behavior of PWQs?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sure. Science provides a model for our experiences. But that model implicitely includes the assumption that our experiences are interactions with an objective reality.

Slow down.....let us examine this closely. First you say "Science is a model for our experiences - our 'physical world qualia'." Then you say But that model implicitely includes the assumption that our experiences are interactions with an objective reality.

There is a difference between objectivism and materialism. All you are claiming here is that the model of our experiences is common to all of us - that the same model seems to work for your experiences as works for my experiences - that is what makes it objective. The only conclusion/assumption required here is that solipsism is false and the laws of physics describe everybodies PWQs with equal accuracy. Yes?

There is a word for this 'objective reality' - and the word is 'noumenon'. Can we use this word?

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems to me that this is precisely what the laws of physics model - we have no direct access to atoms or quantum waves - we have direct access only to PWQs. If we recognise this then all of the arguments about how qualia arise from matter melt away.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What problems are you referring to? If you are referring to the problem of how these "PWQ's" work, then they most certainly don't melt away. No matter what philosophical approach you choose to use, the question of how consciousness actually works remains.

No, I am not referring to the question of how the "PWQ's" work. That is the job of physicists and/or neuroscientists. I am referring to the question of the relationship between TLOP, PWQs and the noumenon i.e. the Hard Problem and all of its manifestations rather than 'the Easy Problems'.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The problems are the result of the ontological materialist claiming that the laws of physics, rather than being a model of the behaviour of PWQs, are a model of the behaviour of a self-existing physical world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This has nothing to do with ontology. The assumption that reality is objective is a necessary assumption of the scientific method. It is also an assumption of Idealism. It is, in fact, nothing more than a rejection of Solipsism.

A lot of people get solipsism confused with idealism. Can we just both agree that solipsism has been rejected? The only solipsist round here is Franko.

If you read this post carefully you will see that I have not rejected the concept of a shared objective noumenon. Therefore the scientific method is not under threat. The question I am raising is whether the noumenon itself exists independently of the realm of mind (Not YOUR mind or MY mind, but Mind). Ths is a very important distinction, and if you want me to clarify it I will.

I re-iterate my position : TLOP are a model of the behaviour of PWQs. This is not an assumption of idealism - it is a basic statement of the truth. You have experiences of a physical world. Physics provides a model of the behaviour of those experiences (you already agreed to this). If we reject solipsism we have to accept the existence of a shared noumenon that behaves according to objectively verifiable mathematical laws. NO OTHER ASSUMPTIONS are neccesary. Specifically NO ASSUMPTIONS about the primacy of mind or matter are neccesary at this point in our reasoning. If you disagree please explain PRECISELY why.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why add this extra level of abstraction into our description of reality? Why claim that TLOP are a model of a self-existing physical world and leave yourself doomed to struggle endlessly to explain what qualia are when the REAL situation is that the TLOP are a model of the behaviour of PWQs anyway?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Why assume a self-existing mental world either?

I haven't. I am merely observing that the mental world does exist, and that TLOP is a model of the behaviour of those aspects of the mental world which appear to be representations of a physical world. I have not assumed a self-existing mental world and I have not assumed a self-existing physical world. All I have done is observe the relationship between the mental world, TLOP and the noumenon.

The difference is that the assumptions of science constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. That is what makes them useful.
That is what makes science a meaningful epistemological framework, rather than a meaningless ontological one.

Sure....we have to assume the noumenon is objective. I am not challenging this.

You are correct in claiming that ontological materialism makes no sense. What you don't seem to understand is that ontology makes no sense. Idealism is just as meaningless as ontological materialism, and for exactly the same reasons.

Why?

The reason materialism makes no sense is because it is an attempt to put the thing being modelled into the model. Idealism is simply the abscense of an attempt to put the thing being modelled into the model. So idealism does not fall foul of the same problem at all.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
My position is very simple, and seems to me to be an accurate reflection of the true situation - that we find ourselves experiencing PWQs and we build an abstract model we call the laws of physics to describe the behaviour of these PWQs. Therefore the relationship between PWQs and TLOP is very simple - PWQs are the thing being modelled and TLOP is a mathematical model describing its behaviour. There is no question about 'how qualia arise from matter', because 'matter' is just part of the model of qualia. No Hard Problem. No assumptions. A simple accurate statement of the way things actually are.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is still a very hard problem. What is the nature of consciousness? Why is it there to begin with? What are the logical rules that describe it? You are essentially sweeping all these questions under the rug.

No - I am quite happy to discuss these things, but only when we are in agreement at how I got there. In other words I can examine these problems and provide answers, but the answers will only make sense to a person who has already accepted my line of reasoning up to this point. Otherwise they keep on thinking about it like an ontological materialist and find it very difficult to understand and accept the rest of the reasoning.

Saying that consciousness doesn't arise from matter, but instead that matter arises from consciousness, doesn't eliminate any questions that need to be answered, nor does it answer them.

It totally changes the them. It replaces one set of questions with another set.

You constantly criticize materialists for not being able to explain to you how consciousness arises from matter, but can you explain how matter arises from consciousness?

I can. Whether or not I should is another question.

Can you describe, in terms of logical rules, how the mind produces the physical world?

For a start get rid of 'the mind' because you are thinking about 'your mind'. You are picturing lots of seperate minds somehow 'creating' a shared objective reality, which is of course illogical. I said 'Mind' not 'the mind'. Again, this can be done, but to do so would involve making claims that many people here would find very difficult to accept, and if previous experience is anything to go by they will continue to think like materialists and I will just end up repeating the first part of my reasoning over and over again. If you can cope with discussing this having accepted the first part of my line of reasoning then I will go on. This is VITAL. I had to accept the problems with materialism FULLY before I was able to accept the mechanism by which Mind creates matter.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The eliminative materialist position is not so simple. Materialism claims that PWQs, along with the rest of our subjective experience is an epiphenomen (or puzzling side-effect) of 'matter'.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I know of nobody who claims this.

Loki does.

What the current scientific theories state is that consciousness is a physical process in the brain,

That is materialism, not science....come on Stimp....

...which serves an evolutionary advantageous purpose, and which developed through the process of natural selection. There is nothing mysterious about it, other than the fact that we don't have all the details yet.

And that is pointless materialist dogma that doesn't even belong in this thread. We all know what current orthodox materialism dogma is.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is claiming a very different relationship between PWQs and TLOP. In effect it amounts to a claim that PWQs belong in the model, as a small subset of the model. As a result, the eliminative materialist is faced with the task of showing how it is possible that the thing being modelled "arises" as a subset of the model itself!
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That is a mischaracterization of the process. What we are trying to model is the physical World that we perceive.

Exactly! You are modelling PWQs. You are modelling physical world qualia. You are modelling "the physical world you percieve"

If the process of perception is a physical process, then it can, and indeed must, be explainable within that model.

And this is a unneccesary and meaningless piece of materialist dogma tacked onto the end of a correct statement. It amounts to "If materialism is true then materialism is true." What is the point in even saying this? You are saying "If materialism is true then we can put the thing being modelled into the model". Since this is ABSURD, then materialism must be false. It is no good saying "I don't care if it is absurd, if materialism is true then we must be able to do this".

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eliminative materialism claims that TLOP isn't a model of PWQs at all - it claims that TLOP are a model of the behaviour of a directly-unknowable self-existing (mind-independent) physical world, and that PWQs arise from this unknowable self-existing physical world and it is therefore possible to place PWQs within the model! Here is your "Hard Problem" and it is very hard indeed. It is hard because if my position is correct then it is an attempt to claim it is possible to place the actual (entire) thing being modelled into the model as a subset of the model. It is not really surprising that this is proving a little difficult.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notice the emphasis. If your position is correct, then at least one of the axioms of science are wrong.

Yikes!

First, if I am not correct then you need to explain why I am wrong. Secondly, you need to explain which axiom of science I have rejected. If it is that the noumenon is objective then you are wrong, because I have accepted that the noumenon is objective.

You cannot make assumptions that are inconsistent with the axioms of science, and conclude from them that certain classes of problem cannot be solved by science.

I haven't, Stimp. Think about it CAREFULLY. Which axiom of science have a contradicted. Science does not claim primacy of matter. It requires only that the noumenon be objective.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Just to make this even clearer I have used the example of physical models of wind behaviour. We build physical models of weather patterns and part of these use physical concepts to explaing and predict the behviour of winds. But if somebody came along and claimed that you could place the winds themselves into the mathematical model you would think they were insane, wouldn't you?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What do you mean, put the winds themselves into the model? How is this analogous to what is being done in science? Science is trying to model consciousness. What is the problem with this?

I mean putting the winds themselves into the model, which is prima facie absurd.

Two paragraphs :

We are modelling our experiences. We experience wind. We would not try to put the wind we experience into a mathematical model of wind behaviour, because that would be silly.

We are modelling our experiences. We experience PWQs. We would not try to put the PWQs into a mathematical model of PWQ behaviour, because that would be silly.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is beyond 'woo-woo' - it is just plain absurd. But when we talk about 'the winds themselves' what we really mean is the PWQs of winds - the winds we actually experience blowing. It is absurd because it is an attempt to place the thing we are modelling into the model - where it quite plainly does not belong.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nobody is trying to do that. This is an absurd strawman.

Is it?

WHY?

Think about it carefully and tell me why this is a strawman.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, to claim that PWQs can be placed in the model is even more absurd, because rather than simply just trying to place the winds themselves into the mathematical model of wind behaviour, it is a claim that the whole of collection of PWQs can be placed into the mathematical model of the physical world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

What we are attempting to do is model the physical World.

Really?

Earlier in your post you agreed that "Science provides a model for our experiences."

So which is it?

A) Does science provide a model for our experiences?
B) Or does science provide a model for the physical world?

Here is the source of your confusion. The true situation is (A). You want to claim (B), but have no basis for making the claim. As a result you end up claiming both interchangeably and do not even realise you are doing it.

And such a model must necessarily include an explanation for how the observable World interacts with us to produce our perceptions of it.

Please untangle your position!

(A) or (B)?

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet, every time a materialist claims that "there is no reason to believe that subjective experiences are not fully explicable as physical brain activity" they are making precisely this claim - that PWQs are just another part of the abstract model we call 'the material world'. I stand by my assertion that it is prima facie absurd. "Hard Problem" is an understatement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

It is only absurd if you make the a-priori assumption that physical reality is your experiences themselves, rather than something objective which you experience.

I have made no such assumption. In fact I have made the second assumption "that it is something objective which we experience". I expressly DO NOT assume that physical reality is the experiences themselves. I do not even believe this to be true!

But if you make that assumption, then you have already flushed science down the toilet, so the point is moot.

Well, I haven't made that assumption, so the point is not moot.

You can reject the assumption of objectivity if you want to, but when you do so, you are rejecting the scientific method too.

The scientific method is a tool for investigating the behaviour of PWQs. It is a tool for investigating the behaviour of an objective shared noumenon. It DOES NOT require that the noumenon is the prime reality and that PWQs are an epiphenomen. That is materialism, not science.

 

[c0rbin]

Well said Stimpson!

Why assume a self-existing mental world either? The difference is that the assumptions of science constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. That is what makes them useful. That is what makes science a meaningful epistemological framework, rather than a meaningless ontological one.

Why argue that the hand has five fingers so it fits the glove?

UCE, is the storm on Jupiter red even when you or I are not looking at it?

 

[Guest]

Re: A puzzled kat writes...

Anyone mind if we take a coupla steps back for a minute please? I've got a few problems with qualia--which admittedly are prolly the result of my lack of knowledge--I'd just like to iron out.

Firstly, I don't get how we have qualia, anymore than according to behaviourism we "have" operants (basic units of stimulus/response operations which compose our behaviours).

You don't "get" how we have qualia?

Surely the only point is that we do have qualia.

Secondly, the distinction between emotional states and sensory impressions seems somewhat arbitary as these interact with each other--my emotional state is influenced by sensory impressions; my sensory impressions are influenced by emotional state.

True, these things do influence each other - the mind is a whole thing. But this doesn't mean the distinction between sensory impressions and emotional states doesn't exist. The picture of your girlfriend in your visual field is easy enough to distinguish from your emotional feelings about your girlfriend, isn't it?

 

[Guest]

Corbin :

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Why assume a self-existing mental world either? The difference is that the assumptions of science constitute a falsifiable hypothesis. That is what makes them useful. That is what makes science a meaningful epistemological framework, rather than a meaningless ontological one.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Why argue that the hand has five fingers so it fits the glove?

I'm not. Please see my reply to Stimpson. I have assumed neither a self-existing mental world or a self-existing physical world. I am merely pointing out that out physical models are directly models of our experiences of the physical world. The are indirectly models of an objective noumenon. That the noumenon is objective does not require it to pre-exist before the phenomenal world of consciousness.

UCE, is the storm on Jupiter red even when you or I are not looking at it?

Corbin,

Can you try answering the questions I asked instead of back-slapping Stimpson and responding with other questions designed to pull the thread off course?

"Red" is meaningless without a human observer. This is off-topic and has already been discussed at length before. Can I ask you, with respect, to address the questions and issues I actually raised?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: A puzzled kat writes...

Secondly, the distinction between emotional states and sensory impressions seems somewhat arbitary as these interact with each other--my emotional state is influenced by sensory impressions; my sensory impressions are influenced by emotional state

Stimpy
On what grounds do you assert that they are "distinct"? Certainly you can divide up the qualia into these two groups, but that doesn't mean that they are really distinct in any meaningful way.

One set represents the external world and the other set represents qualia which are generated internally. A case of a former would be a family of our PWQ's which we label a particular table. Now if we both viewed this table from the same distance away and from the same perspective we would experience very similar PWQ's. On the other hand my experiencing a particular emotion of some kind is something you would ned to infer from my bodily behaviour. So basically PWQ's constitute an objective external world, where as other mental events generated wholly internally are irreducibly subjective. For example no-one else can literally experience my pain.

UCE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If we go back and think about the process of science, and what it is doing, then the source of the difficulties becomes quite clear (to me, anyway). The process of physical science is the process of creating and testing a model of the behaviour of something. But what is the 'something' we are producing a model of? Is it not the case that the 'something' we are producing a model of is the behavior of PWQs?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Stimpy
Sure. Science provides a model for our experiences. But that model implicitely includes the assumption that our experiences are interactions with an objective reality.

Not interactions with an objective reality. Rather consitutes an objective reality. This objective reality is simply a consensus of subjectivity.

UCE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems to me that this is precisely what the laws of physics model - we have no direct access to atoms or quantum waves - we have direct access only to PWQs. If we recognise this then all of the arguments about how qualia arise from matter melt away.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


STIMPY
What problems are you referring to? If you are referring to the problem of how these "PWQ's" work, then they most certainly don't melt away. No matter what philosophical approach you choose to use, the question of how consciousness actually works remains.

The problem of how a material world can produce consciousness or intelligibly be said to equate to consciousness. The questioon of how consciousness works is meaningless, like asking how physical laws work. Consciousness simply exists. Besides the question of what consciousness is was not the topic of debate.

UCE
The problems are the result of the ontological materialist claiming that the laws of physics, rather than being a model of the behaviour of PWQs, are a model of the behaviour of a self-existing physical world.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Stimpy
This has nothing to do with ontology. The assumption that reality is objective is a necessary assumption of the scientific method. It is also an assumption of Idealism. It is, in fact, nothing more than a rejection of Solipsism.

You don't understand. There is absolutely no problem with supposing that reality is objective even if one is an idealist.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well said Stimpson!



Why argue that the hand has five fingers so it fits the glove?

UCE, is the storm on Jupiter red even when you or I are not looking at it?

Corbin,

What would a cats grin look like without a cat?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

I assert they are distinct on the grounds that one of them (the PWQs) are a representation of a percieved external reality and the other are not. How can you claim this distinction is 'not meaningful'? Nobody would claim fear and elation as being qualia that represent part of the external reality.

I don't understand your distinction. Are you saying that experiencing blueness when looking at the sky is a representation of reality, but experiencing fear when looking at a tiger is not? How are these really different, other than the trivial difference that we've called blue a sense and fear an emotion?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

UcE said:
I don't understand your distinction. Are you saying that experiencing blueness when looking at the sky is a representation of reality, but experiencing fear when looking at a tiger is not? How are these really different, other than the trivial difference that we've called blue a sense and fear an emotion?

~~ Paul

Paul,

Look at my first post in this thread for an answer to your question.

 

[slimshady2357]

Re: Re: A puzzled kat writes...

One set represents the external world and the other set represents qualia which are generated internally. A case of a former would be a family of our PWQ's which we label a particular table. Now if we both viewed this table from the same distance away and from the same perspective we would experience very similar PWQ's. On the other hand my experiencing a particular emotion of some kind is something you would ned to infer from my bodily behaviour. So basically PWQ's constitute an objective external world, where as other mental events generated wholly internally are irreducibly subjective. For example no-one else can literally experience my pain.

Well, no one can literally experience your vision field either.

Not interactions with an objective reality. Rather consitutes an objective reality. This objective reality is simply a consensus of subjectivity.

I think what you mean is that the 'objective' part is simply the consensus of subjectivity. I don't think you really mean that the consensus constitutes reality? Or do you?

The reason I ask is this. If you want to divide your mental events into PWQ's and internally generated Q's, I would ask... What is generating the PWQ's?

Consensus? ?[/b]

You don't understand. There is absolutely no problem with supposing that reality is objective even if one is an idealist.

Did you read the sentence where he said:

The assumption that reality is objective is a necessary assumption of the scientific method. It is also an assumption of Idealism

bolded by me

Of course he knows there is no problem with supposing reality is objective for an Idealist! He even says it is necessary!

Adam

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

One set represents the external world and the other set represents qualia which are generated internally. A case of a former would be a family of our PWQ's which we label a particular table. Now if we both viewed this table from the same distance away and from the same perspective we would experience very similar PWQ's. On the other hand my experiencing a particular emotion of some kind is something you would ned to infer from my bodily behaviour. So basically PWQ's constitute an objective external world, where as other mental events generated wholly internally are irreducibly subjective. For example no-one else can literally experience my pain.

This is a strong argument for a real external world. Tables appear similar to many people because they are both forming subjective images of the same external object. Fear is different (is it really?) because it is predominantly internally generated.

However, first things first. Is the sameness of our views of the table really all that much greater than the sameness of our fears? We seem to be able to talk about fear with one another and understand what we're talking about just fine.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul

I don't understand your distinction. Are you saying that experiencing blueness when looking at the sky is a representation of reality, but experiencing fear when looking at a tiger is not? How are these really different, other than the trivial difference that we've called blue a sense and fear an emotion?

Well, let's pretend the tiger is a tame tiger called Fluffy and you are visiting its owner, not knowing he owns a tiger. You and the owner walk out into the back yard and come face to face with Fluffy. You both see the same PWQ of Fluffy - you see the same tiger. But you are mortally terrified but Fluffys owner knows he is relatively harmless and goes and pats him on the head. There's your distinction. PWQs refer to an objective 'external' reality. Your fear is your own. And yes, everybody sees the same sky.

 

[BillyTK]

Re: Re: A puzzled kat writes...

Hi UCE, thanks for your reply!

You don't "get" how we have qualia?

Surely the only point is that we do have qualia.

My bad for not explaining enough--I can understand qualia as an entity in a model for understanding what's going on in our headsin the same way "operants" are useful to behaviourism or ego/superego/id to psychodynamic theory but it doesn't mean the latter two exist in any kind of way independently of the theory that posits them. Are maybe a better example; I can create a picture in my head of my wife. I can call that picture a mental image. But because I can term it such, it doesn't mean I literally have mental images in my head--like my old philosophy tutor used to say, "saying we have mental images in our heads is as meaningful in explaining our mental activity as saying God puts pictures in our heads..."

True, these things do influence each other - the mind is a whole thing. But this doesn't mean the distinction between sensory impressions and emotional states doesn't exist. The picture of your girlfriend in your visual field is easy enough to distinguish from your emotional feelings about your girlfriend, isn't it?

Yeah, but don't tell my wife about it But seriously, no it's not, because the picture of my girlfriend evokes those emotional feelings--it's fundamental to the way I relate to the picture; it's fundamental to the way I attribute significance to the picture. If I didn't, it'd just be a picture that I wouldn't attach much significance to--in fact I'd prolly hardly notice it. Now, I'm not suggesting that the emotions I attach to the picture are any intrinsic property of the picture itself, 'cos afterall it's just a sheet of paper with various chemicals coated on it. But it's the meanings I attach to the picture which give it existence for me.

Hope that explains it!

Cheers

Billy

 

[Win]

UCE:

Ah, but how can you know that the "physical world qualia" associated with Fluffy are the same for me as for Fluffy's owner.

In fact, why should I believe that Fluffy's owner has qualia at all?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Well, let's pretend the tiger is a tame tiger called Fluffy and you are visiting its owner, not knowing he owns a tiger. You and the owner walk out into the back yard and come face to face with Fluffy. You both see the same PWQ of Fluffy - you see the same tiger. But you are mortally terrified but Fluffys owner knows he is relatively harmless and goes and pats him on the head. There's your distinction. PWQs refer to an objective 'external' reality. Your fear is your own. And yes, everybody sees the same sky.

My fear is my own. So is the color I perceive Fluffy to be. So is the way Fluffy smells. So is the volume of his roar. So are the memories I have of other tiger experiences. And so is the color of the sky, especially if I'm color blind. Everything is my own. What does this have to do with the difference between perceptions and emotions?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul

This is a strong argument for a real external world. Tables appear similar to many people because they are both forming subjective images of the same external object. Fear is different (is it really?) because it is predominantly internally generated.

'real' meaning what?

Meaning 'shared' or 'objective', yes.

Meaning 'ontologically primary to mind'? WHY?


Adam :

Well, no one can literally experience your vision field either.

No, but we can agree that our visual fields seem to be representative of a shared objective reality (noumenon).

The reason I ask is this. If you want to divide your mental events into PWQ's and internally generated Q's, I would ask... What is generating the PWQ's?

The PWQs may well be 'generated' by brain machinery, but in the end they are representative of data recieved from our sense organs. The IGQs are generated from internal information that does not represent sense data.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

The PWQs may well be 'generated' by brain machinery, but in the end they are representative of data recieved from our sense organs. The IGQs are generated from internal information that does not represent sense data.

Nonsense. I can walk up to a large dog and pat it on the head. Someone else sees the same dog and is instantly afraid. Why? Because that person had bad experiences with dogs in the past. Those sensory experiences got wired up as fear. When they are repeated, they are again experienced as fear.

This distinction is untenable. And I still don't understand why the distinction is interesting.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Win

Ah, but how can you know that the "physical world qualia" associated with Fluffy are the same for me as for Fluffy's owner.

In fact, why should I believe that Fluffy's owner has qualia at all?

Because I already agreed to reject solipsism. We can re-examine solipsism at the end of the line of reasoning, but introducing it at this point is unhelpful.

I assume both an objective noumenon and that other people have qualia because rejecting either leaves me with a simplistic form of solipsism that I find too unpleasant to be worth contemplating.


Paul :

My fear is my own. So is the color I perceive Fluffy to be. So is the way Fluffy smells. So is the volume of his roar. So are the memories I have of other tiger experiences. And so is the color of the sky, especially if I'm color blind. Everything is my own. What does this have to do with the difference between perceptions and emotions?

Everything is your own, yes. But the PWQs associated with Fluffy are still 'translations' of some sort of shared objective noumenon. Your fear is not - it is entirely dependent on your (lack of) knowledge about Fluffy being a tame tiger.