Omnipotence

[ReFLeX]

Hello again...

However you cannot use two limitless adjectives that are mutually exclusive in relationship with each other and remain in the realm of logic.
Stamen [/B]

Ok... why not? What is your understanding of mutual exclusion? Don't forget that contradictions are a very real part of the Realm Of Logic...

 

[ReFLeX]

Since even if x can create y, it doesn't mean that x will create y.

Good point. It should read Cxy = x creates y.

And yes, the argument is contingent basically on what is "intrinsically impossible". The point I was trying to get at with the rock being made out of atoms is that the unliftable rock is merely a symbol for a task that most people would think surmountable for an omnipotent being (which, however, they generally equate with G-O-D), while "intrinsically impossible" does not pop into their heads. So I have been trying to think of a different task but mostly confused myself, so far...

 

[Robin]

My point is only that logically and semantically speaking:
quote:
An undefeatable team can never play in an unwinnable game.

OK, you want to be silly, so be it. If this is your only point then you are wrong an undefeatable team clearly can play in an unwinnable game. An undefeatable team might play in an unwinnable game and come to a draw. Precise definitions are important in spite of what you might think.

If, on the other hand you want to totally lose touch with reality and invent a word like "omni-victorious" then you have to provide a definition. For example can an omni-victorious hockey team win in a football match? Will they best a platoon of marines? Win any chess match? When they play tic-tac-toe do they have trouble finding an opponent who does not know how to avoid losing?

Of course they could be omni-victorious by only playing games they know they will win, like against people in wheel chairs over the age of 90.

Are they only omni-victorious as a unit or can any part of the team also be omni-victorious? If so what would happen if one half of the team played the other half?

What is a limitless adjective for that matter? Can you point me to a text on semantics that defines this term? Or is it just an adjective that goes on forever? "The dog is broooooowwwww......".

But that is semantics for you - you do a semantic analysis on a sentence, then you are obliged to do a semantic analysis on the semantic analysis etc...

 

[Mason]

I'll go with one of the more simple absurdities. Feel free to adjust wording to fit with whichever scenario is required...

Can God create a square circle?

By definition, the two are not the same and for an object to be one, it can not be the other. So, the question is more simply asked...

"Can God create something that is also something other than the something that it is?"

or

"Can God take an action which creates a logical paradox?"

Test any sample question given before me, such as the immovable object, and see if it fits with that last simplified question. I feel they all will fit nicely. I also feel this gets to the heart of the matter without playing with semantics and arguing over the conditions of one specific example. So, I'm summing it all up with that single question...

"Can God take an action which creates a logical paradox?"

And the answer is... No.

Why?

Because God is a fictitious creation, brought into existance in the minds of a primative, ignorant culture. As such, he can do nothing beyond simply existing as an icon for the ignorants in this modern culture.

Okay, that's a bit harsh and doesn't address the question...

Should a group of worshippers define their deity as an entity capable of taking actions which cause logical paradoxes, then yes, God can lift that unmovable rock or square that circle. It cannot be proven, of course, because the entity in question has already been defined as one which does not conform to the rules which are required to prove its own existance.

That's the unknowable part.

If said entity exists, and if it has this paradox trait, it exists outside of the boundaries that our current knowledge can understand. That is, whatever action it takes is irrelevant, its actual existance must follow rules that violate the observations of our known universe. As such, it is unknowable by current standards.

But we already knew all of this, so what am I actually contributing here?

I say, if it makes people happy to set properties to their deities which make it impossible to debate the deity's existance in a logical fashion simply because it makes them feel warm and fuzzy knowing they've beaten science with their personal creation, fine. You win. Your God is tougher than my textbooks...

Just don't try replacing practical knowledge of the known universe with fantasies of some water-walking con artist and call it "science".

When I started, I think I had a point. I don't remember, so I'll drop off without an actual conclu

 

[ReFLeX]

What is a limitless adjective for that matter?

This is what I was trying to get at with my questions...
Anyway, maybe it's a supersuperlative (i.e. better than the best).
Good thing my god is described by supersupersuperlatives.

 

[Skeptical Greg]

Mason,

What you said, and very well, I might add..



Bottom line.. When you make stuff up, anything goes..

 

[ceo_esq]

Just as I find it difficult to characterise a being incapable of creating an unbreakable object as omnipotent in the first place.

But are we really applying the same standard? I thought we might be nearing agreement that an unbreakable object is contradictory (whether you characterize the contradiction as arising from the inherent property of objects to move when sufficient force is applied, or from something similar). Creating an unbreakable object makes equally little sense whether zero, one, or five omnipotent beings exist, leading me to conclude that the contradiction is contained within the concept itself. Notice how this is not true of Pushing in a given direction, a concept that only leads to an "impossibility" when you are O1 and there's an O2 who wants to push in a different direction from the one you're considering.

At any rate, without this constituting an appeal to authority, the meaning of omnipotence, at least as a term of art in philosophy of religion, appears by a preponderance of usage to exclude creating unliftable rocks, while including the power to push in any given direction, does it not? Perhaps your definition of the term is simply at cross-purposes with the prevailing one.

But notice how quick you are to conclude non-existence or non-omnipotence at the first sign of contradiction. If the same standard was applied to the single omnipotent being then all theology would come to a stand still.

Well, I'm inclined to say that in any logical examination, the first sign of genuine contradiction will rightfully cause an argument to be jettisoned. Wasn't that one of the revolutionary aspects of the Scholastic approach? And, broadly speaking, it seems to have resulted in great advances for rational inquiry into the philosophy of religion. It's tolerance for logical contradiction that seems to lead such inquiries to a standstill.

Can you state your objection? It seems to me that each could move any rock in any direction just so long as the other did not object. In other words they can move the rock except when moving the rock would lead to an intrinsic impossibility.

Doesn't that place the effective ability to move the rock in the hands of a third party? Whereas, if "God" says "I shall create this and it shall never be destroyed", his inability to destroy it depends only on himself.

Just as God can say "this Kingdom shall never be destroyed" (it's in Daniel somewhere I think). God retains the potentia absoluta to destroy any kingdom at any time, but to do so would lead to the situation where God lied or was wrong, which are both intrinsic impossibilities. So when Kingdom comes God cannot destroy it, even in theory, even if he chose to do so. But he still retains the potentia absoluta to do so. I only claim the same playing field.

In this scenario, as you point out, God's omnipotence is preserved because he actually retains the potentia absoluta to destroy the Kingdom, whatever it was. He also, of course, possesses the potentia absoluta to foil any effort to destroy it. But take that same God and clone him. Now we have two Gods. Perhaps they agree on what is to be done. But does each of them still possess both the absolute power to destroy the Kingdom and the absolute power to foil any effort to destroy it? The logically and intuitively obvious answer is no. The power to destroy the Kingdom is not absolute as soon as another being exists who possesses the potentia absoluta to oppose it. Those two powers can either be absolute, or they can coexist in different entities in the same universe. They cannot, by definition, simultaneously be absolute and reside in two entities in the same universe. So if you multiply an omnipotent being, each individual in the resulting pair is necessarily less powerful than the original entity, or else they cannot exist at all.

Perfect concordance is inherent since anything else is inherently impossible. Even if O1 and O2 were in eternal conflict they could never outmanoevre another omnipotent being. Think of two reasonably smart kids playing nought and crosses (tic-tac-toe). After a short time they will understand every strategy and counter and it becomes pointless to continue playing. O1 and O2 are as evenly matched as the two players and having perfect understanding would realise the futility of trying to best the other before any conflict begins.

That seems like a rational thing to do, but the problem is that it is not logically required of any two beings. But just for the sake of argument, let's accept that it's intrinsically impossible for those beings to disagree, and see if it leads to any further problems.

A couple of potentially troubling things leap to mind right off the bat, athough I haven't thought too deeply about it. First, your argument as much as says that there is a special class of actions that are intrinsically impossible in a universe with both O1 and O2, but which would not be problematic in a universe with only O1 to deal with. Yet it is usually admitted that something is intrinsically impossible only if there is no conceivable universe in which it is possible. Overlooking that for now, I am led back to an observation I made a couple of paragraphs ago: assuming we agree that potentia absoluta does not extend to intrinsically impossible things, O1 has greater potentia absoluta (because fewer intrinsically impossible limitations) in a universe where he is the only omnipotent kid on the block, than in one where he shares omnipotence with another entity. The being with the greatest conceivable power exists in the first universe. Ergo, logically either one omnipotent being exists or else none do.

As I have just made up the idea I don't know. I am sure that this line of thought must have been tried previously, but I am not aware of it. It does not make any difference, appeal to authority is well known as a fallacy - it would not matter if nobody agreed on the possibility if the concept is internally consistent - which it is if put on the same playing field as the single omnipotent entity.

I'm not interested in anyone's authority per se, I'm interested in finding if anyone in the field has done substantive work on that line of argument. Their conclusions could be illuminating for our discussion.

 

[Mason]

Bottom line.. When you make stuff up, anything goes..

Aha! I think that's where I was trying to go! Thanks for finishing that for me.

ADD is a wonderful thing when you get to enjoy the same experience repeatedly as if for the first time, but not so wonderful when you're trying to relate an idea that takes more than 90 seconds to type.

 

[ReFLeX]

Hmm... ceo_esq, you have made me think of a god as more material than I ever considered before. I always had a strongly pervading schema of an invisible entity performing action-at-a-distance feats, which is more consistent with observation than God taking earthly form. But now I realize an omnipotent being by necessity would have to be able to appear materially and throw around rocks...
This is a new perspective, for me...

 

[Ossai]

ceo_esq

No, an omnipotent being can do anything except for things that can't be done, period.

Which means an omnipotent being can do everything except what an omnipotent being can’t do.

Accordingly, I conclude that neither of us is an omnipotent being. How you justify drawing the opposite conclusion is mysterious, to say the least.

Because your omnipotent being is still limited by human logic. It’s intrinsically impossible for a person to come back to life after being dead for a day and a half, and yet the omnipotent being (or some part of) supposedly did that. You’re taking the obvious examples, unmoveable rock, but leaving unexamined other items that should also be intrinsically impossible.

stamenflicker

Your argument is just as absurd as saying that undefeatable hockey team could logically play an unwinnable game.

An undefeatable hockey team can play an unwinnable game – it’s called a tie. The undefeatable team may have to continue playing for eternity in order not to lose.

The two limits are logically exclusive by definition and yet you still believe that linking them is reasonable. "This can never be broken" is a direct contradiction to "omnipotence."

Then the omnipotent being cannot create permanence, therefore permanence must be instinctually impossible. The omnipotent being must therefore be non-permanent.

You've taken basic language to the level of absurdity, which is what Lewis and others have demonstrated countless times.

No, what Lewis and other have demonstrated countless times is special pleading.

Ossai

 

[ReFLeX]

It’s intrinsically impossible for a person to come back to life after being dead for a day and a half, and yet the omnipotent being (or some part of) supposedly did that.

According to the bible that is. We're actually discussing more whether omnipotence is a meaningful concept, regardless of what religious doctrines claim their gods have done. However, when you add "not intrinsically impossible" to the limit on the abilities of the omnipotent, yes, it does mean an omnipotent being is capable of less than is generally believed. Whether resurrection is intrinsically impossible... well.

 

[stamenflicker]

Robin,

Clearly you don’t want to discuss language at all, until of course you feel that you can make a case for your view point. A limitless adjective is any modifier that by definition that by its accepted defintion contains "all" or "none" of the property it describes. So words like all, none, ever, un-, are only a few examples.

But really semantically we don't have to stay in this realm. We can move to any accepted definition of a state of being... "empty," "constant," "on" or "off" for example.

"On" is the state of being which is not off by most common logic.
"Empty" is the state of being which is not full by most common logic.
"All" is a modifier in which no thing is lacking in the modified, again in most common logic.

Your statement: God (I prefer you remain consistant and use the word omnipotence here) can say "this cannot be broken" is semantically saying:

All Can [VERBS] a Cannot. That is truly what is silly.

All winning teams can [play] unwinnable games.
Ever-full glasses can [spill] until Empty.
The constant force can [exert] without energy.
Ad nauesum.

Mutually exclusive, for whoever asked, is best summed up by Russell who believed it was "ungrammatical to construct a propositional function that ranged over itself." He felt this was true in math, and eventually in his last written work, he felt it was true in language: "all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever."

Perhaps you don't find that view to popular, but Russell was keeping with good company philosophically with Wittgenstein, Hegel, Kant and others. Where these men differ is the ways in which they dealt with the logical problems you present with omnipotence.

Here's what you don't seem to get... if your reason on omnipotence is sound, then all bets are off for about anything. Russell had to invent a Theory of Types to deal with the problem, Hegel had to invent a well-construed theory of idealism, and Wittgenstein said this is all a semantic problem and "therefore of that which one cannot speak, one must remain silent." I just happen to side with Wittgenstein.

Instead of reside in the logical inconsistancy where you seem to be stuck:

Russell was convinced that classes did not exist. They therefore had to be eliminated from the technical apparatus of Principia, where they were replaced by propositional functions. But this did not, by itself, remove the paradox (since an analogue to the ‘class of all classes that do not belong to themselves’ can easily be found in terms of propositional functions), so Russell felt compelled to add the Theory of Types, which made it ungrammatical to construct a propositional function that ranged over itself. Numbers were reduced to classes, which were, in turn, reduced to propositional functions, which were ordered by the Theory of Types, and were, finally, understood to be forms of judgment.... "Only an understanding of language is necessary in order to know a proposition of logic"....To show this is not, on Russell’s understanding, to illustrate how philosophical problems can be approached through the analysis of language, but rather to show one of the ways in which ordinary language disguises ‘real’ logical form and thus to illustrate the necessity for philosophers to construct and use artificial, technical languages of their own.

from Royal Institute of Philosophy emphasis mine

He went on to say that there can logically be no such thing as denoting concepts for as soon as "the propositions that appear to contain denoting concepts are ‘fully written out’, denoting concepts disappear, just as classes, numbers and propositions themselves disappear in the ‘logically perfect language of’ Principia Matheimatica."

To be continued below....

 

[stamenflicker]

So to get back to your comments...

If this is your only point then you are wrong an undefeatable team clearly can play in an unwinnable game. An undefeatable team might play in an unwinnable game and come to a draw. Precise definitions are important in spite of what you might think.

But in a draw, you have modified the conditions of the interaction. So the omnipotent can say this will be never be broken, and they end in a draw. He says it, it happens, and it is never broken. So what?

The so what comes in when you say, "Now he must break it" which is the exact same thing as saying, "There can be no tie, the team must now win the match."

So we are still right back to the undefeatable team playing the unwinnable game. My argument does not go away just because you want to redefine the game. As for the rest of that particular response, I will let your own silly dodge speak for itself... the "what if" and "if they" and "marines" etc. Stick to what we are discussing.

Ossai said:

The undefeatable team may have to continue playing for eternity in order not to lose.

Well fine. Let them. They remain undefeated and the game remains unwinnable.

So God says "This will never be broken" and then they go on for eternity, God trying to see if he can break it. God remains omnipotent and the kingdom remains unbreakable. That logic breaks down instantly.

therefore permanence must be instinctually impossible

But permanence is not intrinsically impossible... here is what I was getting at above, if you accept Robin's logic then all bets for about anything are off. Which is why Russell and others went to great lengths to do an end around it.

Robin:

You have just said that God lacks power to prevent an object from being broken and you say I am putting limits on omnipotence? As though the power to break things were more important than the power to prevent them being broken. As though omnipotence implies unlimited destructive capacities rather than unlimited creative capacities.

I didn't say anything of the sorts. I said language puts the limits on your argument and the fact that you chose to accentuate the limits of omnipotence but not unbreakableness is illogical. As to what is more important, that should have no bearing on the logic.

Stamen

 

[Robin]

Clearly you don’t want to discuss language at all, until of course you feel that you can make a case for your view point.

I have been arguing language with you for a while, you are just ignoring me, misquoting me or creating straw man.

You (ie Robin): God can create an object and say "this can never be broken"

Me (ie stamenflicker): The undefeatable hockey team plays the unwinnable game.

But the undefeatable hockey team clearly can play in the unwinnable game as I showed in my last post to you (draw or called game). Did you even mention this? No. So I have been discussing language with you all along but you have not been answering my points.

You want to switch terms as though one word was as good as the other - 'omni-victorious', 'ever winning', 'all winning'. You should just make up your mind and provide a precise definition as I asked.

Your statement: God (I prefer you remain consistant and use the word omnipotence here) can say "this cannot be broken" is semantically saying:

All Can [VERBS] a Cannot. That is truly what is silly.

"All-lying person can never tell the truth". There you are an "All Can [verbs] a Cannot". But is makes perfect sense. I already told you it depends on the original connotation. I can simply restate the semantically identical:
God can say "this will endure forever".
All Can [VERBS] a Can. So the semantically identical sentence is both silly and sensible? What is silly is your semantics.

Oh and don't try to scare me with philosopher name dropping, I am aware of them thank you very much. What you have not done is explained how any of them are relevant to what you are saying. If you think that you can define omnipotence in PM then feel free to demonstrate. They would all be rolling in their graves to hear their names co-opted to such a lame argument as you are making.

Robin:
quote:
You have just said that God lacks power to prevent an object from being broken and you say I am putting limits on omnipotence? As though the power to break things were more important than the power to prevent them being broken. As though omnipotence implies unlimited destructive capacities rather than unlimited creative capacities.

stamenflicker: I didn't say anything of the sorts. I said language puts the limits on your argument and the fact that you chose to accentuate the limits of omnipotence but no unbreakableness is illogical. As to what is more important, that should have no bearing on the logic.

Oh yes you did:

Robin: If God has limitless power why can't he prevent an object from being broken?

stamenflicker: The same reason an omni-victorious hockey team could never logically play unwinnable hockey match

So I am asking you again 'Can God prevent an object from being broken, say for the period of 1 hour?'

 

[Robin]

But are we really applying the same standard?

Show me where I use any line of argumentation that is unique to multiple omnipotences. I have tried to use traditional theology.

I thought we might be nearing agreement that an unbreakable object is contradictory (whether you characterize the contradiction as arising from the inherent property of objects to move when sufficient force is applied, or from something similar). Creating an unbreakable object makes equally little sense whether zero, one, or five omnipotent beings exist, leading me to conclude that the contradiction is contained within the concept itself.

Not really reaching agreement. I still think that an omnipotent being must be able to make an unbreakable object (logically as well as theologically) and that I have made a pretty good case for it. As I said right at the beginning the physical properties of the object are irrelevant.

Definition : If an object cannot be broken for whatever reason in any circumstances even by God then it is unbreakable

In order to create an unbreakable object an omnipotent being must be able to:

1. Create an object
2. Refrain from breaking the object himself
3. Prevent the object from being broken otherwise
4. Keep a promise

Now these four seem almost axiomatic for an omnipotent being and allows God to say:

I have made this and it shall not be broken
or for the semanticians:
I have made this and it shall endure

After God has said this then it is intrinsically impossible for the object to be broken even if the object is the most delicate crystal figure and God can muster all the forces of creation he still cannot break it since this would lead to the intrinsic impossibility of him being a liar or wrong. It would not be a matter of him preserving it from his own volition because he could not break it even if he chose to.

I cannot see how any of that can be denied. On the contrary I think that would be a definition for a benevolent omnipotent being - why does an omnipotent being need destructive powers at all? Doesn't omnipotence include the power of getting it right in the first place? Why does God's pencil need an eraser on the end?

Doesn't that place the effective ability to move the rock in the hands of a third party? Whereas, if "God" says "I shall create this and it shall never be destroyed", his inability to destroy it depends only on himself.

No, his inability to destroy it relies on the properties of omnipotence and logical coherence - having made the statement the matter is out of his hands. Which is the same case with O1 and O2.

Notice how this is not true of Pushing in a given direction, a concept that only leads to an "impossibility" when you are O1 and there's an O2 who wants to push in a different direction from the one you're considering.

You mean that God is incapable of mustering two opposing forces if he chooses to do so? Remember if you have infinite force then there is no such thing as "full power" each force that God could muster would be infinite and equal. So pushing in a given direction is a concept with one, as well as many omnipotences. Why would God choose to push in different directions? Why would O1 and O2?

But there is no special pleading here, conventional theology says that an omnipotent being cannot do the wrong thing. So if one God does something it must be the right thing. Any action that prevents it must by definition be the wrong thing. And since an omnipotent being cannot do the wrong thing the other God cannot push the other way by application of traditional theology.

At any rate, without this constituting an appeal to authority, the meaning of omnipotence, at least as a term of art in philosophy of religion, appears by a preponderance of usage to exclude creating unliftable rocks, while including the power to push in any given direction, does it not? Perhaps your definition of the term is simply at cross-purposes with the prevailing one.

I am not entirely sure that is true. Traditional theology points out that saying God cannot do x and not x is no challenge to omnipotence, but does not propose any method of resolving which. The Lewis argument is well known because Lewis is a popular writer and is the only theology that some people read. So there is really just a preponderance of references back to Lewis, who was the first to admit that he was no theologian.

I do not even really understand the argument it seems to say "God cannot do X permanently because that would imply a limit on God's power to undo X and God's power is unlimited" which would give God no power to do anything permanent.

That seems like a rational thing to do, but the problem is that it is not logically required of any two beings.

That an omnipotent being is rational is axiomatic. That a rational being must act rationally is tautological.

First, your argument as much as says that there is a special class of actions that are intrinsically impossible in a universe with both O1 and O2, but which would not be problematic in a universe with only O1 to deal with. Yet it is usually admitted that something is intrinsically impossible only if there is no conceivable universe in which it is possible.

And there is a special class of actions that are intrinsically impossible in a universe with only O1 but which would not be a problem with no omnipotent being to deal with. An omnipotent being is incapable of sinning or making a mistake - but this intrinsic impossibility does not exist unless omnipotence exists. No problem of hell or free-will versus predestination in a universe without a God in it. Things like human evil, disaster, disease, pain, suffering all make perfect sense without omnipotence, but with omnipotence are deep intractable philosophical problems largely involving intrinsic impossibilities which are themselves unique to omnipotence.

Also, some of my arguments hold in any universe - for example two rational intelligent people will not try to win against each other at tic-tac-toe - so the principle holds true without any God.

Overlooking that for now, I am led back to an observation I made a couple of paragraphs ago: assuming we agree that potentia absoluta does not extend to intrinsically impossible things, O1 has greater potentia absoluta (because fewer intrinsically impossible limitations) in a universe where he is the only omnipotent kid on the block, than in one where he shares omnipotence with another entity. The being with the greatest conceivable power exists in the first universe. Ergo, logically either one omnipotent being exists or else none do.

But as you said yourself, intrinsic impossibility is a null set. The set of things God can't do is no smaller than the set of things that O1 and O2 can't do. If you accept that they can't disagree then O1 and O2 are each as powerful as God, and combined they are also as powerful as God (property of infinity). What can God do that O1 and O2 can't? After all God cannot overrule another omnipotent being.

But it should not be hard to work up some theology to show why a dyad is superior. At the very least there is some great symbolism there - male and female, equal and different etc...

But does each of them still possess both the absolute power to destroy the Kingdom and the absolute power to foil any effort to destroy it?

Yes. But O1 and O2 can under no circumstances whatsoever exercise the power to destroy the Kingdom, and neither can God. God cannot exercise the powers simultaneously and O1 and O2 cannot exercise the powers at the same time. If you can't do something it makes no difference how many reasons there are that you can't do it.

I'm not interested in anyone's authority per se, I'm interested in finding if anyone in the field has done substantive work on that line of argument. Their conclusions could be illuminating for our discussion.

I would be interested too, but I am not aware of it - the closest is the Christian doctrine of the Trinity one God three Persons.

 

[Robin]

But permanence is not intrinsically impossible... here is what I was getting at above, if you accept Robin's logic then all bets for about anything are off. Which is why Russell and others went to great lengths to do an end around it.

You say that "permanence is not intrinsically impossible". But on the other hand you say something unbreakable is intrinsically impossible if there is an omnipotent God. So some object could be permanent but breakable? But if something was unbreakable wouldn't it also be permanent? You appear to be flip-flopping on this issue. Are you saying that permanence is not intrinsically impossible, but would be intrinsically impossible with an omnipotent God?

At least tell me if you have a semantic problem with this sentence?

God can create an object and say "this will last forever".

 

[ReFLeX]

Mutually exclusive, for whoever asked, is best summed up by Russell who believed it was "ungrammatical to construct a propositional function that ranged over itself."

This doesn't tell me what your understanding of mutual exclusion is, not even close. It's a simple question, I thought I would get a simple obvious answer, but instead you quoted someone else's jargon. To be honest I don't know exactly what a Propositional Function Ranging Over Itself is, but I do know the word mutual requires TWO entities, as I'm sure you do. So explain in your own terms, and try to do it in as few words as possible, please.

 

[Robin]

This doesn't tell me what your understanding of mutual exclusion is, not even close. It's a simple question, I thought I would get a simple obvious answer, but instead you quoted someone else's jargon. To be honest I don't know exactly what a Propositional Function Ranging Over Itself is, but I do know the word mutual requires TWO entities, as I'm sure you do. So explain in your own terms, and try to do it in as few words as possible, please.

He has quoted someone elses jargon without understanding it. A propositional function ranging over itself is something else.

Mutual exclusion is an easy concept and has been around for a few millienia before Russell.

 

[ReFLeX]

But the undefeatable hockey team clearly can play in the unwinnable game as I showed in my last post to you (draw or called game). Did you even mention this? No.

... I'm pretty sure he did, actually. Stamenflicker said:

But in a draw, you have modified the conditions of the interaction. So the omnipotent can say this will be never be broken, and they end in a draw. He says it, it happens, and it is never broken. So what?

In case somehow you missed that, Robin.

...conventional theology says that an omnipotent being cannot do the wrong thing. So if one God does something it must be the right thing.

... sounds like a case for a deterministic God to me, heh. God can't even make choices! (No, not really...)

That a rational being must act rationally is tautological.

I don't think so. Are we not rational beings? I don't always act rationally, in fact I sometimes act completely irrationally, unfortunate as it is. Maybe I miss the point.

 

[Robin]

Sorry, my mistake, you did respond to this.

But in a draw, you have modified the conditions of the interaction.

What have I modified? I have modified nothing, I have never accepted that there was ever any link between the two sentences. My original position was put on page 1 and I have seen nothing that would make me want to modify it. You are saying Robin's sentence must be false because stamenflicker can make up a totally separate sentence and if stamenflickers sentence does not make sense then Robin's cannot either. Your whole argument is closer to South Park than Wittgenstein.

I have merely pointed out that the second sentence "The undefeatable hockey team plays the unwinnable game" that you claimed a number of times was intrinsically impossible was in fact possible.

You must admit that it is very sloppy to say something is intrinsically impossible if it is in fact possible. Would Heidegger do that? Would Wittgenstein?

It is up to you to fix the blunder and restate your argument not for me to try to work around your imprecisions and tease out what you really meant to say.

I have shown that the two sentences are in no way comparable. God is not a hockey team, God does not win when something gets broken.

Still, I would like to know if you have a problem with the following sentence:

God can create an object and say "this will last forever".