For what it's worth, the typical municipal noise ordinance in the United States carves out an express exception (worded differently in different jurisdictions) for chimes, bells or carillons pealed to mark the passage of time or in connection with religious services or public holidays. Indeed, some noise ordinances have a "grandfather clause" exempting all chimes, bells or carillons in existence at the time the ordinance was passed.gnome said:
I infer from the article Gestahl linked that the proposed call to prayer over loudspeakers would violate the provisions of the ordinance currently in effect in the town in question, and what the municipal authorities are contemplating is the passage of a new ordinance (or the granting of a variance to the existing one) specifically in order to permit the local mosques to use loudspeakers.pgwenthold said:
Accordingly, the adoption of the special ordinance (or variance) would constitute the "government action" necessary to proceed with an First Amendment challenge (which would then have to be subjected to the 3-pronged Establishment Clause analysis I summarized earlier).
I suspect that restricting speech (under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment) would not really be the focus of the matter; it would be the promotion of religion (under the Establishment Clause).
Hopefully it's a bit clearer now why I suggested that some of the same considerations would be relevant in the airport case and the mosque case: for one thing, both would involve some kind of analysis of the extent to which the different loudspeaker announcements (regardless of whether government's role consisted in loaning the airport PA time, or in passing a special ordinance for the mosques) had the primary effect of advancing religion.
I don't know what the usual arrangement is, perhaps it varies widely from airport to airport. However, I'm happy to relate the specific facts from the leading court case I know of on this subject, Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 24 F. 3d 814 (6th Cir. 1994).pgwenthold said:
In that case, the City of Cleveland, pursuant to an authorizing ordinance, entered into an agreement with the Catholic Diocese of Cleveland for the use of space in the terminal of Cleveland Hopkins International Airport for the operation of a chapel. As with certain other non-profit entities operating at the airport (e.g. Travelers Aid), the diocese got the space almost rent-free (unlike commercial concessions like shops and restaurants). The diocese fixed up the space at its own expense. By agreement with the city, the diocese made the chapel available to all other interested religious groups (and, interestingly, even paid to make prayer cards from a multitude of religions available to the public).
The plaintiffs raised four Establishment Clause arguments on appeal: that (1) the Catholic chapel had the effect of impermissibly advancing the Catholic religion; (2) the lease agreement was unconstitutional because its purpose of providing religious services on public property overshadowed any secular purpose; (3) the lease reflected an unconstitutional joint partnership between church and state; and (4) the failure of the city to charge the diocese fair market rent constituted an impermissible aid to religion. They lost on all four counts.
I note in passing, purely out of anecdotal interest, that this was the same court that could ultimately hear the Michigan mosque case (as Ohio and Michigan are both located in the Sixth Circuit).
