Interesting Ian said:
No I'm afraid it's the only word which is appropriate. We cannot declare a causal relationship. This is because the word "causal" ought only to be employed within the context of theories describing the world. Phenomenal consciousness is not implied by the totality of physical facts about the world. It is simply tacked on to the materialist metaphysic.
I don't think you understand what the word “correlational” means. The data I’ve cited is EXPERIMENTAL in nature, ***NOT*** correlational. A correlational study is one in which the researcher looks for relationships between variables
that are not under experimental control. Application of pharmacological agents, lesion studies, and electrical stimulation are under the direct control of the experimenter. As such, we can infer causality from such studies. The word “causal” should be applied any time the experimental design is one that allows one to infer causality.
Suppose I conduct a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study of an antidepressant and find that depressed patients show significant improvement in mood when compared with the control group. In this case, the ONLY difference between the two groups is that one had the real drug and the other had the placebo. The whole point of such a rigorous design is to allow the researcher to determine causal relationships.
I would encourage you to take a course on research design. Anyone that is at all familiar with research design will tell you that such studies are experimental, NOT correlational.
As explained it is all correlational.
As explained above, you are mistaken.
Obviously not. You wouldn't talk about the taking of anti-depressants though. It's the physical changes within the brain brought about by anti-depresants which is crucial. So the question then is whether certain physical processes in the brain is one and the same thing as being in a less depressed mood.
Your argument seems to be the following:
1. All things that are physical in nature are (at least in theory) observable.
2. “Mind” is something that isn’t observable, even in theory.
3. Therefore, it must be nonphysical.
4. Physical processes alone cannot give rise to nonphysical phenomena.
5. If mind is nonphysical, then it cannot be solely the result of physical processes.
6. Therefore, consciousness must involve something like a soul.
There are several problems with this argument. First of all, the second premise assumes that the mind is not an illusion. That’s a point that many would disagree with (BillyJoe explained this idea pretty well with his “user illusion” post). So, if you want to “win” with philosophy here, you need to defeat this argument somehow.
Secondly, your fourth premise is clearly wrong if you accept the definition of “physical” given in your first premise. Take something like “mathematical ability”. Does it exist? Sure. Can you directly observe it? Nope. You can observe its effects, of course, just as you can observe the effects of “mind”. But you can’t really observe “mathematical ability”. Does this mean that mathematical ability requires something nonphysical? (Be careful before you say yes, here. Do you really want to have to argue that your calculator only works through some mystical, magical, nonphysical “something”?)
Well you're not quoting what I said. This is ludicrous. Where's the bit I put about modification? The taking of anti depressants does lead to an alleviation of mood. This I do not deny.
Yes, you did deny it. You denied it in this very post, where you claimed (incorrectly) that we can’t infer causality from such studies because they are correlational in nature. If you accept that antidepressants lead to an elevation of mood, then you also must accept that the brain plays a fundamental role in consciousness. So, if we both agree on that, then our only disagreement lies in the fact that you want to claim that something nonphysical is also necessary, whereas I claim that there is no reason to believe that. Thus, the burden of proof is on you here, because your “theory” of mind requires the existence of unproven entities, and mine does not.
What I am denying is that this somehow proves that the mind originates from the brain. I've already explained this. What is wrong with you??
What I am saying is that we have a great deal of evidence showing that the brain plays a fundamental role in consciousness. You have no evidence at all to suggest that anything nonphysical is necessary. I notice that you still have no evidence to show us.
It is not clear to me why it should be I who is required to provide evidence that the self and emotions are not identical or a property of physical processes. I'm taking the default sensible position that emotions are a manifestation of the self, and that this self is not identical to, or is a property of the physical.
As I said above, if you accept that antidepressants elevate mood by acting on the physical structure of the brain, then we both agree that the brain plays a role in consciousness. Thus, my theory of mind involves one entity: brain. Yours requires brain+[unproven nonphysical something]. Logically, the burden of proof should be on you here, because your "theory" of mind requires the existence of unproven entities and mine does not.
I mentioned all the evidence for survival. But really it's not a question of evidence because what we need to consider are competing metaphysical hypotheses. Does it make sense to suppose emotions are identical to, or are entailed by physical processes for example? These are the type of questions you need to address to see if your materialism is intelligible.
I have addressed these questions by citing evidence that clearly shows that the brain plays a very fundamental role in consciousness. I have repeatedly asked you for evidence showing us that consciousness requires something nonphysical, and you have no such evidence to offer.
Yes and it's irrelevant because my metaphysical hypotheses equally accounts for such correlations. Namely the soul operates through the brain, but is appropriately "filtered" by the brain, depending upon its condition, thereby resulting in the mind.
Your hypothesis does not account equally well for such observations. (THEY ARE NOT CORRELATIONS!!!!) My explanation requires only known phenomena (the brain). Your explanation requires the existence of a soul that is necessary for consciousness. Yet, you have offered us absolutely no evidence at all to support this idea. (Remember: even if you are completely convinced that the soul exists, that does nothing to support your position. You hypothesis requires a soul that
plays a crucial role in human consciousness . So, you have to not only show us that the soul exists, but you need to also show us evidence that the soul is necessary for consciousness. Good luck on that one, my friend.

)
Appealing to Occams razor is vacuous because materialists always define the most simple position as the one in accordance with their metaphysic, ie materialism.
I don’t think you understand Occam’s razor. Occam’s razor simply says that, if you have two competing explanations for a given observation, the one that is most likely to be right (all else being equal) is the one that requires the fewest unproven elements. My explanation for consciousness requires only the brain – an element that we both know exists and we both know plays a role in consciousness. So, my theory of mind requires zero unproven elements. Yours requires at least one (the undefined, nonphysical “something” that you seem so reluctant to tell us anything about).
If you applied Occams razor to TV sets you would conclude that the story line of a TV programme has its origin in the TV set's internal components!
Nonsense. If I apply Occam’s razor to TV sets, I conclude that the function of the TV can be explained using known phenomena. Again, you are misunderstanding Occam’s razor. It does **NOT** say that “the simplest explanation is the right one”.
Answered this above and in previous post.
Where? Where have you shown us any evidence at all to support your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical?
I could argue that correlations are equal evidence for my hypothesis. We need the brain to filter out certain perceptions and realities, otherwise I hazard a guess that we wouldn't be able to operate proficiently in this empirical reality.
The evidence I've cited is designed to show that the brain is necessary for consciousness, and that there is a
very strong relationship between brain activity and consciousness. You want to add something nonphysical. I'm simply challenging you to justify that claim.
You need to understand what "scientific proof" means. It's impossible to have scientific proof for survival. For scientific proof to work you need a theory. A theory which has predictions which subsequent experimentation either fullfills or falsifies.
If you have no theory and no testable predictions, then on what grounds do you expect us to accept your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical? Suppose I decide that human consciousness is really a computer program running on some alien machine somewhere, with a little touch of magic thrown in by an alien wizard named Bob. This absurd “theory” of mind can explain all of the available data, too. (i.e. we think we have physical bodies and brains, but that’s just because the computer program fools us with tricky input) If I can’t provide any evidence to support this silly idea, why should anyone take it seriously?
By the same token, if you can't provide any evidence to support your assertion that consciousness requires something nonphysical, then why should we take
that idea seriously?
The soul can't be identified with the mind because the mind changes all the time whilst presumably the soul would be unchanging. Think about what your mind is now compared to when you were 5 years old. The soul is that which makes you the very same person now, as when you were 5, or drunk, or suffering from Alzheimers etc.
Ok, so if the mind is not equal to soul, then you have to explain the basis for your assumption that the soul must play a role in human consciousness. Why couldn’t a religious person believe that he has a soul that contributes nothing at all to what he currently experiences as “mind”?
But even if materialism is correct, that doesn't mean the mind is an illusion now does it??
Can you prove to us that the mind is NOT an illusion (as described by BillyJoe)?
I believe the self is ontologically self-subsistent.
Do I understand you correctly? Are you saying that our minds have no ultimate origin?