Time for me to chime in, a little bit.
Genes, we are told, are the fundamental basis for evolution. Actually, genes are not even definable from within molecular biology and, when used as a foundation for evolutionary theory, they produce a theory that is grossly inconsistent with other fields of science.
I think you are suffering, a little, from the Tyranny of a Discontinuous Mind (a term Dawkins uses to describe our difficulty to conceptualize non-discrete categories). Genes are not straight-forward separable from each other, and into phenotypic effects, because nature is not obligated to make things easy for us to delineate. But, that does
not mean that genes, as a model for bits of material that express phenotypic effects, that are subject to selection pressures*, can not work within science. As such a model, genes work tremendously better than anything previous.
Read more closely to what Schneibster, had said (emphasis mine):
We DO understand molecular biology, we DO understand the central paradigm of DNA, and we DO know how sequences are expressed and proteins produced, and how production is inhibited or promoted to control the expression. And while we don't yet understand precisely how these expressions, inhibitions, proteins, and non-coding RNA sequences PRECISELY specify EVERY phenotype, we know FOR CERTAIN that they do; and we can in fact identify quite a few phenotypes' precise loci (although most of them require multiple different proteins, expressions, inhibitions, non-conding RNA sequences, and/or promotions).
(*germ-line more so than somatic, of course)
You are trying to understand social evolution by introducing a meme, as analogous to a gene, and then saying that, of course, a meme is not really like a gene at all. Presumably, when you say "UP" you might really mean "DOWN." Sorry, I just thing that's nonsense.
Okay, now would be an excellent time to write about how genes and memes are fundamentally similar to each other, and how they differ in their environment:
Genes and Memes are both basic replicators. For scientific purposes, Replicators can be called such, if they exhibit the following properties** very well:
Longevity: The longevity of a single copy is not as important as the longevity of any copy of that "information". A single instance of a gene may die, but it has the ability to live on, as new copies in offspring. A single instance of a meme may "die" (if a specific person dies, or merely forgets the idea), but the idea it conveys has some ability to live on, as new copies in other people.
Fecundity: The ability to reproduce. Some specific items may reproduce more effectively than others, because they are subject to selection pressures. Genes that are more successful in passing themselves on, have higher fecundity. This usually means they are beneficial to the overall survival of the host,
but not always.
Memes have the ability to reproduce, by getting "absorbed" into people's minds. (Humans are particularly susceptible to these replicators, because of our pliable brain structure.) Some are more successful than others, and, like genes, this success is not always to the overall benefit of the host. They copy well, because they copy well.
Copy-Fidelity: The ability to be copied with minimal, if any, errors. Genes clearly have an advantage, here, because they are reliant on a physical structure. Memes are more prone to errors, because they have no physical presence. Memes "sacrifice" physical presence for more efficient fecundity. But, even so, it is possible that the evolution of social ideas can be tracked, and broken down into individual memes.
When someone says memes are analogous to genes, they mean both can be demonstrated to exhibit these properties. Clearly, though, there are differences in their environment and how they replicate.
(** personal note: in my
thread for listing non-living replicators, the "definition" of a replicator is much looser. For the purposes of that thread, Crystals are considered replicators, though in the above definition, they clearly would not be.)
The differences, to reiterate, stem from the fact that genes have physical material to work off of, and memes do not. Genes are passed on through germ-line transmission, and that means only to offspring of the parent(s). Memes transmit more effectively, jumping to any brain that will absorb them, no matter their physical relationship (although their cultural upbringing could have an impact on whether they will absorb any given meme or not).
Since memes can propagate with more freedom than genes, it is going to be more difficult specifying and measuring each individual one, according to their "phenotypic" effects on the person.
But, that does not mean the endeavor is impossible. Just like genes, we are starting to identify basic trends in social evolution, in which the model of memes is at least some-what useful.
This is unlike pseudoscience, which is counterproductive in nature.
The correct way to construct a general form of evolutionary theory is to seek measurable attributes, characteristics and processes that are necessarily present in ALL forms of evolution and construct the theory around them. Bioepistemic evolution argues that data is necessarily present in all forms of evolution and that evolutionary theory should be built around data and the processes to which it is necessarily subject.
The only comment I want to add here, is only somewhat relevant, but important to communicate:
It is possible that, like physical evolution, social evolution can work at different levels of units. Physically, we can map evolution at the species, family, individual life-form, cell, and ultimately gene. Perhaps memes can be identified at certain levels, as well: world-level, country or national level, community level, circle-of-friends-and-family level, etc. And, some levels at which they could overlap those: age group, religion, etc.
The point of bringing this up, here, is to communicate the idea that perhaps some of the conflicting views about what separates one meme from another could come from some people measuring the population at different levels.
The theory of memes was constructed out of the recognition that social ideas evolve, and that certain specific ideas seem to permeate people, at different levels of observation.
Social data is formatted differently from genetic data and is subject to different interpretative and selective processes. I argue that a theory of social evolution should investigate the format of social data and the interpretative and selective processes to which that data is subject. I think it is completely meaningless to simply declare, as memetics effectively does, that the formatting of social data must be like that of a gene. That is patently not so.
Actually, I think your ideas of meme theory is a little distorted. Memetics
already tries to model social data to the selective processes to which it is subject. Why would it be developed otherwise?
No one is saying memes MUST be like a gene, in ALL respects: declaring that is almost straw-man like:
Scientists already understand memes are not like genes. However, they do share quite a bit in common, and not just at a superficial level. Check out those three properties I listed above, again, if you must.
So, with that, I continue to argue that memes, at worst, can still be classified as a protoscience.