UndercoverElephant
Pachyderm of a Thousand Faces
- Joined
- Jan 17, 2002
- Messages
- 9,058
I have today been told by a materialist that he doesn't know what I could possibly mean "inherently subjective" and he sees no reason why subjective experiences like "seeing red" should be "anything more than physical processes".
(1) The physicalist worldview:
Materialism (or physicalism, doesn't make much difference which) is a worldview which treats the external physical world as the only reality. Nearly all of modern science implicitly works within this framework, and modern science has painted us a picture of a big bang, stellar evolution, the formation of the solar system and the long, slow evolution of life on this small blue planet. Eventually, after hundreds of millions of years, complex creature have evolved which have brains and behave intelligently. There are a quite few unanswered questions, but in nearly all of those cases it is quite reasonable to believe that scientific materialism will eventually be able to provide those answers.
(2) The blatantly undeniable facts about consciousness:
This thread was provoked by a person telling me that he had no idea what I meant by "inherently subjective". When I replied that he had no way of knowing how I experience redness, his response was the one in the opening paragraph of this post. This cannot and will not be allowed to stand unchallenged, because it is completely absurd and the sort of people posting on this site really should know better. Everybody here knows exactly what is meant by "the experience of seeing red". They also know exactly what is meant by "physical brain". All I wanted this materialist to accept, for the purposes of the original thread, was that there are certain things that are inherently subjective, like my experience of red. This claim was rejected. Just like in I was asked in Sunday School to believe that Jesus turned a basket of fishes into food for five thousand people, I was asked at the JREF to believe that there is no discernable difference between the experience of seeing red and processes in a physical brain. It is blatantly ridiculous to claim that one basket of fishes can feed five thousand. It is no less blatantly ridiculous to claim that one cannot tell the difference between a physical process in a brain and the inherently subjective experience of seeing red.
(3) The mistake which has occured:
The materialist in question cannot possibly mean that he does not know the difference between the experiences of seeing red and a physical brain process. What, in fact, he actually meant was this: If the physicalist worldview is correct then it follows that everything we call "mind", and all of the contents of "mind", including the experience of seeing red, must be something happening in a brain. Such experiences are, after all, always associated with brains (as far as we know, but it's reasonable to believe it is always true). So what has happened is that the assumption/belief that physicalism is true has been added to the observation that minds seem to occur when there are living brains around. Of course we only know of minds because we are intimately familiar with our own. We never experience anybody-else's - that would be silly (no-one here believe is telepathy, I assume). So the materialist, in order to make sense of these two beliefs (that physicalism is true, that minds only occur when there are living brains around) are both correct, has to end up claiming that somehow, minds "are nothing more than brain processes". The alternative appears to be that one of the above pair of beliefs must be wrong.
4) What the materialist is actually entitled to claim if he doesn't want to descend to a "fishes-and-the-five-thousand" standard of critical thought:
It is not credible to say that brain processes and subjective experiences are indistinguishable. Anyone reading this who is feeling the urge to think down those lines go and take a cold shower. When you have finished your cold shower have another think about whether you can tell the difference between the experience of seeing red and a physical brain process.
(M1) What the materialist is actually entitled to say is the following:
"Somehow, in some way that we really do not understand, subjective experiences and brain processes are one and the same thing. They must be, otherwise we cannot understand where the additional "thing" has come from. It would be incompatible with physicalism."
(M2) What the materialist is not entitled to say:
"I cannot tell the difference between subjective experiences and brain processes. They are identical, and indiscernable. I do not know what you mean by "inherently subjective". No such things exist."
In M1, there is no rank absurdity. There is an admission that we really do know the difference between subjective experiences and brain processes, an admission that we don't know exactly how one "arises" from the other, and an admission that the position being defended is being based upon a desire to defend physicalism.
In M2, we have descended to sunday-school thinking in defence of physicalism. It is plainly absurd and nobody who was thinking honestly, critically and fearlessly could ever say it.
Conclusion:
The real situation, whether you are a materialist or not a materialist, is that we can indeed tell the difference between a physical process and a subjective experience. We may wish to claim that "in some way" they are one and the same thing. So they appear to be both the same and different, depending on how you look at it. This I can tolerate. But I cannot tolerate any more supposedly intelligent people trying to tell me that they are indistinguishable, identical and that they have no idea what I mean by "inherently subjective". I'll tell you what I mean by "inherently subjective". I mean the experience of seeing red. Even if you think that "in some unknown way" experiences and brain processes "are the same thing" you also know d*mned well that in another very obvious way, they are also different. The brain process is objective and the subjective experience is, well, subjective. So at the very least we have "two different perspectives on the same thing".
You can claim the two perspectives are somehow two perspectives on "the same thing". But do not insult my intelligence by expecting me to believe there are not even two perspectives. And once you accept that there are two perspectives then there is no need to go on claiming you don't know what "subjective" means, or what minds are, or how experiencing red is "anything over and above a physical processes". It is "over and above" a physical process simply on the grounds that all other physical processes have only one perspective and only in this case is there a second one. So the thing which is "over and above a physical process" is the subjective experiences associated with the relevant brain activity. Now, what the consequences of this are going to be for the wider worldview of the materialist is no immediate concern of mine - and whether or not you think this disproves materialism is another matter entirely. Maybe the problem can be solved. Just do not try to tell me you do not even know what the problem is, because you might just as well tell me that Jesus fed five thousand people with a single basket of fishes. And that would be stupid, wouldn't it?
(1) The physicalist worldview:
Materialism (or physicalism, doesn't make much difference which) is a worldview which treats the external physical world as the only reality. Nearly all of modern science implicitly works within this framework, and modern science has painted us a picture of a big bang, stellar evolution, the formation of the solar system and the long, slow evolution of life on this small blue planet. Eventually, after hundreds of millions of years, complex creature have evolved which have brains and behave intelligently. There are a quite few unanswered questions, but in nearly all of those cases it is quite reasonable to believe that scientific materialism will eventually be able to provide those answers.
(2) The blatantly undeniable facts about consciousness:
This thread was provoked by a person telling me that he had no idea what I meant by "inherently subjective". When I replied that he had no way of knowing how I experience redness, his response was the one in the opening paragraph of this post. This cannot and will not be allowed to stand unchallenged, because it is completely absurd and the sort of people posting on this site really should know better. Everybody here knows exactly what is meant by "the experience of seeing red". They also know exactly what is meant by "physical brain". All I wanted this materialist to accept, for the purposes of the original thread, was that there are certain things that are inherently subjective, like my experience of red. This claim was rejected. Just like in I was asked in Sunday School to believe that Jesus turned a basket of fishes into food for five thousand people, I was asked at the JREF to believe that there is no discernable difference between the experience of seeing red and processes in a physical brain. It is blatantly ridiculous to claim that one basket of fishes can feed five thousand. It is no less blatantly ridiculous to claim that one cannot tell the difference between a physical process in a brain and the inherently subjective experience of seeing red.
(3) The mistake which has occured:
The materialist in question cannot possibly mean that he does not know the difference between the experiences of seeing red and a physical brain process. What, in fact, he actually meant was this: If the physicalist worldview is correct then it follows that everything we call "mind", and all of the contents of "mind", including the experience of seeing red, must be something happening in a brain. Such experiences are, after all, always associated with brains (as far as we know, but it's reasonable to believe it is always true). So what has happened is that the assumption/belief that physicalism is true has been added to the observation that minds seem to occur when there are living brains around. Of course we only know of minds because we are intimately familiar with our own. We never experience anybody-else's - that would be silly (no-one here believe is telepathy, I assume). So the materialist, in order to make sense of these two beliefs (that physicalism is true, that minds only occur when there are living brains around) are both correct, has to end up claiming that somehow, minds "are nothing more than brain processes". The alternative appears to be that one of the above pair of beliefs must be wrong.
4) What the materialist is actually entitled to claim if he doesn't want to descend to a "fishes-and-the-five-thousand" standard of critical thought:
It is not credible to say that brain processes and subjective experiences are indistinguishable. Anyone reading this who is feeling the urge to think down those lines go and take a cold shower. When you have finished your cold shower have another think about whether you can tell the difference between the experience of seeing red and a physical brain process.
(M1) What the materialist is actually entitled to say is the following:
"Somehow, in some way that we really do not understand, subjective experiences and brain processes are one and the same thing. They must be, otherwise we cannot understand where the additional "thing" has come from. It would be incompatible with physicalism."
(M2) What the materialist is not entitled to say:
"I cannot tell the difference between subjective experiences and brain processes. They are identical, and indiscernable. I do not know what you mean by "inherently subjective". No such things exist."
In M1, there is no rank absurdity. There is an admission that we really do know the difference between subjective experiences and brain processes, an admission that we don't know exactly how one "arises" from the other, and an admission that the position being defended is being based upon a desire to defend physicalism.
In M2, we have descended to sunday-school thinking in defence of physicalism. It is plainly absurd and nobody who was thinking honestly, critically and fearlessly could ever say it.
Conclusion:
The real situation, whether you are a materialist or not a materialist, is that we can indeed tell the difference between a physical process and a subjective experience. We may wish to claim that "in some way" they are one and the same thing. So they appear to be both the same and different, depending on how you look at it. This I can tolerate. But I cannot tolerate any more supposedly intelligent people trying to tell me that they are indistinguishable, identical and that they have no idea what I mean by "inherently subjective". I'll tell you what I mean by "inherently subjective". I mean the experience of seeing red. Even if you think that "in some unknown way" experiences and brain processes "are the same thing" you also know d*mned well that in another very obvious way, they are also different. The brain process is objective and the subjective experience is, well, subjective. So at the very least we have "two different perspectives on the same thing".
You can claim the two perspectives are somehow two perspectives on "the same thing". But do not insult my intelligence by expecting me to believe there are not even two perspectives. And once you accept that there are two perspectives then there is no need to go on claiming you don't know what "subjective" means, or what minds are, or how experiencing red is "anything over and above a physical processes". It is "over and above" a physical process simply on the grounds that all other physical processes have only one perspective and only in this case is there a second one. So the thing which is "over and above a physical process" is the subjective experiences associated with the relevant brain activity. Now, what the consequences of this are going to be for the wider worldview of the materialist is no immediate concern of mine - and whether or not you think this disproves materialism is another matter entirely. Maybe the problem can be solved. Just do not try to tell me you do not even know what the problem is, because you might just as well tell me that Jesus fed five thousand people with a single basket of fishes. And that would be stupid, wouldn't it?
Last edited:
