Materialism

[c4ts]

Well, I think there are usually defined such that they behave just like regular Win.

If so, then Zombie Win should should be able to comprehend the notion of first-person consciousness as I describe it, regardless of whether he has ever experienced it. If he can comprehend it, then he can tell me whether or not he has ever experienced it.

If he truthfully says he has not experienced first-person consciousness, then we have an objective test for detecting such consciousness in others.

There is also the possibility that your description isn't correct for some reason (poor writing skills, for example, or inadequacies in the english language), and if you are testing for p-zombies, you cannot eliminate the possibility that you could be a p-zombie yourself. If that is so, then you would not be describing first-person consciousness, but either the illusion of it, or a programmed response given the demand to describe it. If you are a p-zombie and Win is not, then what you describe may not be what Win percieves, but a false paradigm. Thus Win would truthfully answer that he has not experienced it.

If he answers that he has experienced it, then we are left with two choices:

1) He's lying (but if he would lie about it, then so would regular Win);

You could be presenting a false dillema here. It seems you are dismissing the possibility that he could behave in a way identical to telling the truth without actually doing so. In other words, he would tell an indetectible lie. The very idea of p-zombie behavior seems to be based on this kind of thing.

2) He really has experienced it, and thus he isn't a p-zombie.

Now, consider this. If Zombie Win cannot comprehend the concept of first -person consciousness, then I would argue that he is not functionally equivalent to regular Win except for having HPC, because he now lacks the same level of comprehension and capacity for imagination that Win does.

Isn't this a problem for the conceivability of p-zombies argument?

AS

It would certainly appear so, given that your paradigm is correct, and that p-zombie Win would behave differently than regular Win under particular circumstances like this one.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Win,

If you'll indulge me, it looks like I may be getting to the rest of your comments piecemeal, if that's OK with you. If you do not care to address them all, just say so. That's OK.

Now, onto this:

AS:

Dualists are willing to concede that "mind" is an entirely unique kind of matter or interaction, unlike any elsewhere in nature. Given that we ultimately came from the process of nuclear fusion within massive stars, just as all other matter known to exist in the universe, I find it hard to swallow that there is a unique kind of matter found only within human brains, and nowhere else.

Win:

Again, you really haven't put the time into understanding the position. Nobody is a substance dualist these days. I suggest you do a lot more reading, and try to engage with the ideas rather than attack them. You'll learn more.

OK, pardon my sloppiness. Look at my paragraph above and substitute "has unique properties" for "is a unique kind of matter." Same result.

Your response, the same kind of which you have provided me in the past, is one I take as at least somewhat patronizing or condescending. I'll grant you that I most likely have not spent near the amount of time wrestling with the concepts as I presume you have. Nor is it likely that I have read or studied a fraction of the material I presume you have. I do not have a post-graduate or even undergraduate degree in philosophy. Nevertheless, I have done a substantial amount of reading here, particularly about the p-zombie business, and your suggestion is that if I just could understand your arguments, I would accept them.

Sorry, Win, but there remains the possibility that I can grasp what you are getting at, but it just doesn't pass muster with me. That there is a huge divide among professional philosophers as to materialism vs. dualism should be sufficient proof that learned, intelligent persons can disagree.

Now, as to your suggestion that I "engage with" the ideas rather than "attack" them, I must scratch my head. Please do not misunderstand that I somehow equate "attacking" with an automatic response to any idea put forth by another.

As to my thought process, when presented with any new radical concept, my approach is to try to examine it, walk around it, peer under it, and to "test" it. By "testing," I mean looking for possible flaws or weaknesses. That's just how I think. It's not necessarily a measure of hostility, despite what you may think of me and my presumed approach. I simply know of no other effective way for me to "engage with" a radical new idea for me.

The very definition of a p-zombie is one of those radical new ideas for me. It is not something I have grown familiar with over the years, as you may have. I first heard of it from you, nearly a year ago. It still troubles me and appears to be incoherent with principles of materialism. I get that you agree that it is inconsistent with materialism.

As I have tried to explain, I view materialism as the default worldview. To me, it must be so, unless there is a compelling reason to accept another. I don't see p-zombies as I understand them to be that compelling reason.

You keep trying to insist that not assuming materialism to be true is distinct from assuming materialism to be false. When you reduce this to formal logic and subsitute symbols, I can understand it. Applying it practically, however, I cannot.

Practically, if I do not assume materialism to be true, then because we are discussing a worldview--or a way of thinking itself, if you will--then in effect am I not assuming that materialism is false? Can you understand that distinguishing between the two is hardly obvious, given that it concerns a way of thinking about the world itself, not just assuming A or not-A? If there is a real distinction, please explain it to me. Otherwise, I will contend that it is a distinction without a difference.

Thanks.

AS

 

[AmateurScientist]

There is also the possibility that your description isn't correct for some reason (poor writing skills, for example, or inadequacies in the english language), and if you are testing for p-zombies, you cannot eliminate the possibility that you could be a p-zombie yourself. If that is so, then you would not be describing first-person consciousness, but either the illusion of it, or a programmed response given the demand to describe it. If you are a p-zombie and Win is not, then what you describe may not be what Win percieves, but a false paradigm. Thus Win would truthfully answer that he has not experienced it.

Interesting. OK, try this. Let regular Win explain first-person consciousness to p-zombie Win. Win does know what it is, because he is confident he has it and it's right there in front of him. I trust Win's verbal skills to adequately explain it in English to p-zombie Win (he has adequately explained the notion of first-person consciousness to me to the degree necessary for me to test for it and conclude with the same confidence Win has that I have it too).

Now, with regular Win as the mentor and p-zombie Win as the protege, why can't p-zombie Win tell?

You could be presenting a false dillema here. It seems you are dismissing the possibility that he could behave in a way identical to telling the truth without actually doing so. In other words, he would tell an indetectible lie. The very idea of p-zombie behavior seems to be based on this kind of thing.

That's just devious and wicked as hell. I don't think I like p-zombies at all.

Again, I would argue that if p-zombie Win lies this effectively, then so does regular Win (maybe he really does).

He would have to, if his behavior is exactly like Win's.

It would certainly appear so, given that your paradigm is correct, and that p-zombie Win would behave differently than regular Win under particular circumstances like this one.

Again, I've always understood p-zombie Win to be defined so that he would behave exactly the same as Win. The only difference would be the subjective feel he lacks. No one would ever be able to tell. I don't get how p-zombie couldn't tell.

If he can't, then isn't he human?

If not, then why is the real Win so confident that he is?

AS

 

[c4ts]

Interesting. OK, try this. Let regular Win explain first-person consciousness to p-zombie Win. Win does know what it is, because he is confident he has it and it's right there in front of him. I trust Win's verbal skills to adequately explain it in English to p-zombie Win (he has adequately explained the notion of first-person consciousness to me to the degree necessary for me to test for it and conclude with the same confidence Win has that I have it too).

Now, with regular Win as the mentor and p-zombie Win as the protege, why can't p-zombie Win tell?



That's just devious and wicked as hell. I don't think I like p-zombies at all.

Again, I would argue that if p-zombie Win lies this effectively, then so does regular Win (maybe he really does).

He would have to, if his behavior is exactly like Win's.



Again, I've always understood p-zombie Win to be defined so that he would behave exactly the same as Win. The only difference would be the subjective feel he lacks. No one would ever be able to tell. I don't get how p-zombie couldn't tell.

If he can't, then isn't he human?

If not, then why is the real Win so confident that he is?

AS

I don't know why the real Win is so confident. I don't think I really can know, either.

I think I've been going about this the wrong way. You seem to indicate that a p-zombie Win is more of a simulacrum of Win than a replacement. Supposedly, the p-zombie could tell he was a p-zombie, but you'd never know. But the way I envisioned a p-zombie would be something that was exactly like Win in every way, except for the fact that it wasn't really Win. This would mean that p-zombie Win could not exist at the same time as regular Win, because the only way it could exist requires it to occupy the same place as Win, at the same time, at all times, which I find inconcievable. P-zombie Win would lie as effectively as regular Win, given your test, because p-zombie Win is doing the exact same thing regular Win is doing in terms of physical motion, with the exception of a slight difference in brain activity, which you could discover without the simultaneous existence of regular Win, which I dismissed as inconcievable. There should be nothing regular Win will do that p-zombie Win will not also do.

I think it makes no difference to p-zombie Win that he is lying, because p-zombie Win is lying using the same motions as truth-telling Win when he responds to your test. You make a good point, because it would be paradoxical that p-zombie Win lies about being a p-zombie. Regular Win, who is not a p-zombie, would respond accordingly to your test, therefore making p-zombie Win a much better liar than regular Win. However since it produces the same reaction given the same situation, I do not understand how that goes against the concievability of p-zombies. The best way to resolve the issue is to ignore the possibility that Win is a p-zombie in the first place, because it makes no difference whether he is or isn't.

 

[AmateurScientist]

I don't know why the real Win is so confident. I don't think I really can know, either.

I don't think I can either.

I think I've been going about this the wrong way. You seem to indicate that a p-zombie Win is more of a simulacrum of Win than a replacement. Supposedly, the p-zombie could tell he was a p-zombie, but you'd never know. But the way I envisioned a p-zombie would be something that was exactly like Win in every way, except for the fact that it wasn't really Win. This would mean that p-zombie Win could not exist at the same time as regular Win, because the only way it could exist requires it to occupy the same place as Win, at the same time, at all times, which I find inconcievable.

I won't presume my way is any "righter" than yours. I could be missing something crucial here--and I guess we'll have to defer for the moment to Win when he arrives on the matter to explain it better or correct us. Nevertheless, I have always taken it as given that both Wins could exist simultaneously. If not, then I think conceivability fails, as I can't conceive of p-zombies. As I have stated repeatedly, given my mode of thinking of the world, they are incoherent. I see no reason, even for the sake of argument, to abandon my mode of thinking of the world in materialistic terms in order to conceive of something which is supposed to demonstrate that my mode of thinking is wrong. I find fault with the entire approach to the conceivability argument.

Perhaps the real question here is why should I assume materialism is not true (whatever that means in practice, as I cannot really tell) in order to conceive of the existence of p-zombies? Win may be onto something in his last response to me, as I am having a disconnect here.

P-zombie Win would lie as effectively as regular Win, given your test, because p-zombie Win is doing the exact same thing regular Win is doing in terms of physical motion, with the exception of a slight difference in brain activity, which you could discover without the simultaneous existence of regular Win, which I dismissed as inconcievable. There should be nothing regular Win will do that p-zombie Win will not also do.

I agree entirely with this analysis, given my understanding of the conceivability argument.

I think it makes no difference to p-zombie Win that he is lying, because p-zombie Win is lying using the same motions as truth-telling Win when he responds to your test. You make a good point, because it would be paradoxical that p-zombie Win lies about being a p-zombie. Regular Win, who is not a p-zombie, would respond accordingly to your test, therefore making p-zombie Win a much better liar than regular Win. However since it produces the same reaction given the same situation, I do not understand how that goes against the concievability of p-zombies.

Because I take "behaves exactly like Win" to mean that p-zombie Win has exactly the same mental capacity to understand concepts described objectively to him that Win does. I don't think it's necessary to have subjective feel in order to have some understanding of a description of it. Can't you at least partly comprehend a concept you've never felt?

I've never experienced the death of a child, but I can understand at least partly that this would be devastating to all but the most uncaring of parents. I don't even have any children, but I can understand the intense grief at least in part. I can do so by simulating those feelings within myself.

Oh, but p-zombie Win doesn't experience emotions, so how could he empathize? Well, if he can't then he isn't exactly like Win in his behaviors and I could tell he is not human. If he goes through the motions of empathy convincingly, then where does he get the knowledge of how emotions feel without having ever experienced any emotions at all?

This kind of empathy is possible only through facsimile. I can empathize with a parent who has lost a child only by drawing upon emotions I have experienced myself and those I have observed exhibited by others, and using them to synthesize feelings of grief over the death of my hypothetical child so I gain a first-hand subjective "feel" of the pain.

How could a being who has never experienced "feel" or emotion empathize? If he can, then he has knowledge of those emotions. If he has such knowledge, then how could he not tell that he has never experienced any of them at all? In other words, p-zombie could indeed tell whether he is in fact a p-zombie.

That, I find, is a telling gap in p-zombie Win's capacity for intellectual understanding, and not the same as his lack of merely subjective experience.

The best way to resolve the issue is to ignore the possibility that Win is a p-zombie in the first place, because it makes no difference whether he is or isn't.

Then why does conceivability as an argument against the truth of materialism matter at all?

AS

 

[The One called Neo]

If I explained to the p-zombie Win what first-person consciousness is, and feels like, then why can't he figure out that he isn't experiencing what I am describing?

AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

You also said:

Why would zombie Win also answer that he is not a zombie (or put another way, why would he believe he had access to consciousness as well, given that he cannot)?

P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

You also said:


P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html

In particular, he (Alvin Goldman), argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations.

I added the italics.

It is not a isomorphic in a physical sense, only a functional sense.

Dennett:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/unzombie.htm

It all seems rather boooooring.

 

[Win]

AS:

I'm going to be in and out today, 'cause I'm working on something else, but I will try to address all your points eventually.

First off, I'm sorry that I get snarky with you. I really will try harder not to do that.

Now then:

Practically, if I do not assume materialism to be true, then because we are discussing a worldview--or a way of thinking itself, if you will--then in effect am I not assuming that materialism is false? Can you understand that distinguishing between the two is hardly obvious, given that it concerns a way of thinking about the world itself, not just assuming A or not-A? If there is a real distinction, please explain it to me. Otherwise, I will contend that it is a distinction without a difference.

Again, I think you're equivocating. Materialism, dualism, idealism are all ways of thinking about the world. They are not preconditions for thinking at all.

So, since you don't have to commit yourself to the truth of any of these positions to think about the world, just think of yourself as a sceptic: You've suspended judgement.

Does that make it easier to see how to "not assume materialism is true."

As to my thought process, when presented with any new radical concept, my approach is to try to examine it, walk around it, peer under it, and to "test" it. By "testing," I mean looking for possible flaws or weaknesses. That's just how I think. It's not necessarily a measure of hostility, despite what you may think of me and my presumed approach. I simply know of no other effective way for me to "engage with" a radical new idea for me.

Kicking on the tires and looking under the hood, as it were, are good ideas. But hopping in and taking her for a spin is also a good idea.

What I don't like very much is standing in the lot, looking at the car and saying, "that car will never run."

See what I mean?

Moving on, zombie Win has all the beliefs that Win does. What differs between zombie Win and Win is the truth value of their beliefs. And it's the state of the world, not the state of Win that determines those truth values. Zombie Win lives in zombie world. Win lives here.

It's unproductive, I think, to talk about Win having a discussion with zombie Win, because if zombie Win lived in this world, he wouldn't be a zombie.

It's a natural fact about this world that people are conscious.

Oh, but p-zombie Win doesn't experience emotions, so how could he empathize?

But zombie Win has emotions, and he can form a model of zombie you and your zombie emotions, so he can empathize.

Loki:

But P-Zombie Win says the same thing. As far as he's concerned, he *has* direct access to phenomenal consciousness. He certainly thinks he does - he's as sure of that fact as you are. How can he be so certain he has something (access to qualia) if he hasn't? What makes him think he does?

What make zombie Win think hes has phenomenal consciousness is the same thing that makes me think I have phenomenal consciousness, briefly, a recursive self-modelling mental architecture. Why isn't that sufficient to explain consciousness? Again briefly, because that doesn't explain, can't explain, the phenomenal aspects of consciousness.

In zombie world, they'd reach the same conclusions. Only they'd be mistaken. In zombie world, ironically, the dualist zombie philosophers would be convinced that something was missing from their discription of the world, when nothing really was. The zombie materialist philosophers would insist that nothing is missing, and they'd be right. Here, the situations are reversed.

Again, I think it's important to note that the truth of our beliefs is determined by the state of the world.

 

[The One called Neo]

AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

You also said:


P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html


quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In particular, he (Alvin Goldman), argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I added the italics.

It is not a isomorphic in a physical sense, only a functional sense.

Then replace the word physical in my first sentence with the word functional. Do you still have any reservations with what I said?

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Then replace the word physical in my first sentence with the word functional. Do you still have any reservations with what I said?

Nope, just trying to keep things clear with AS. It seems that one of the problems that keeps coming back up is that people will say these 'p-zombies' if they are physically identical and qualia arise from physical and beliefs arise from qualia then no wonder 'p-zombie' still has beliefs that are just as true!

I'm not trying to be an ◊◊◊◊◊◊◊, just trying to help eliminate the miscommunications that can plague the argument.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Whoops, I just re-read the Chalmers article and saw that I goofed. Here is another quote from him:

Consider: if it is logically possible that my functional isomorph might lack qualia entirely, it seems equally logically possible that there could be a qualia-free physical replica of me.

Hahaha, that sounds pretty foolish.

My apologize to anyone (neo) that I may have offending.

 

[AmateurScientist]

AS:

I'm going to be in and out today, 'cause I'm working on something else, but I will try to address all your points eventually.

That's cool. It's simply the nature of trying to incorporate these sort of internet discussions into our real world lives.

First off, I'm sorry that I get snarky with you. I really will try harder not to do that.

No sweat. We each are guilty of past abuses towards each other. Mea culpa.

Again, I think you're equivocating. Materialism, dualism, idealism are all ways of thinking about the world. They are not preconditions for thinking at all.

I disagree. I'm not discussing thinking at all. I'm discussing thinking about thinking. Trying to suspend belief about materialism is indeed trying to suspend belief about how thinking and imagining themselves occur.

Talk about your recursive loops...

Isn't this like supposing that I'm not really generating my thoughts, but in fact they are being beamed into my head by some malevolent alien civilization, intent on taking over the world?

If I can imagine that, how then can I imagine a pseudo-me, exactly like me, but without the thoughts from the aliens?

If I can, then my pseudo-me isn't exactly like me, is he?

I simply cannot comprehend this sort of "conceivability."

It's inconsistent (I've been calling it "illogical" or alternately, "incoherent").

So, since you don't have to commit yourself to the truth of any of these positions to think about the world, just think of yourself as a sceptic: You've suspended judgement.

Does that make it easier to see how to "not assume materialism is true."

No. As my comments above explain, this is indeed thinking about thinking. Trying to reach a conclusion about how I can conceive of how else I might think about thinking gives me a big headache. I think it's the recursive loop again. Damn recursion.

Kicking on the tires and looking under the hood, as it were, are good ideas. But hopping in and taking her for a spin is also a good idea.

What I don't like very much is standing in the lot, looking at the car and saying, "that car will never run."

Perhaps I've noticed that the tires are bald and the brake line is cut. Maybe I'm not so eager to get into that particular car, as I deem it unsafe.

Moving on, zombie Win has all the beliefs that Win does. What differs between zombie Win and Win is the truth value of their beliefs. And it's the state of the world, not the state of Win that determines those truth values. Zombie Win lives in zombie world. Win lives here.

Thanks for clearing that bit of confusion on my part up. Apparently, in this exercise, never the twain shall meet.

Maybe this is part of the problem materialists have--your argument concerns a world that is different from ours. How then, can it tell us anything about this one, I repeat, over and over?

It's unproductive, I think, to talk about Win having a discussion with zombie Win, because if zombie Win lived in this world, he wouldn't be a zombie.

Is it really? I mean, if p-zombies are supposed to demonstrate any truths at all about this world, then they must interact with it, as Stimpson has maintained and explained to you, over and over.

It's a natural fact about this world that people are conscious.

I agree. My point of departure is in the description given for p-zombies by dualists. It matters not whether you describe them as functional analogues of humans, only lacking qualia, or as physical replicas of humans, but still lacking qualia.

It has been obvious to me--and I suppose countless other materials--all along in this and other similar discussions, that such a definition is, a priori, a supposition that dualism is true. That is to say that such a description of conceptual p-zombies is tantamount to a description of the world in which dualism reigns supreme. To be a functional analogue or a physical replica of a human, only to lack one essential characteristic of being human--possessing or having access to qualia--is in fact to inhabit a dualistic world. You are defining them in such a way that qualia must necessarily exist some place else, or to be some non-essential property, if you prefer, other than in the physical brains. This is what leads you to property dualism. To get there, however, you have already assumed it is true.

If dualism is inextricably bound with the definition of p-zombie, then their supposed conceivability can have no bearing on whether materialism is true or not. To conceive of p-zombies is in fact to assume that dualism is true.

Win, I have argued a very shorthand version of this objection to you numerous times before in our previous discussions. I apologize for assuming it was more obvious than it apparently is.
(In previous discussions, I have called it "tautological" or begging the question, or assuming its own conclusion).

But zombie Win has emotions, and he can form a model of zombie you and your zombie emotions, so he can empathize.

How can a p-zombie have emotions? Aren't emotions experienced subjectively and only subjectively? Emotions can be understood in part intellectually, but no one can have emotions without experiencing them. Emotions are experienced subjectively, by how they feel, and they are exhibited objectively, by how we act and respond.

This isn't a trivial issue.

Again, I think it's important to note that the truth of our beliefs is determined by the state of the world.

Yes, if you are referring to the objective truth, what you call the "truth value." There is also a subjective truth, which is the genuine belief of a proposition's truth.

I fail to understand how a p-zombie could genuinely believe he is not a p-zombie when confronted with the accusation. Necessarily entailed in the accusation is a proper understanding of the difference between a p-zombie and a human.

See Dennett's objections (it's in the link given a few posts above) to suggestions that p-zombies would not be likely to develop a "mentalistic vocabulary" without qualia. I think he puts forth essentially the same objection that I do. Perhaps I am remembering this objection from months ago when I first read it. Otherwise, I'll take due credit for developing it independently.

AS

 

[AmateurScientist]

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/goldman.html



I added the italics.

It is not a isomorphic in a physical sense, only a functional sense.

Dennett:

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/unzombie.htm

It all seems rather boooooring.

Thanks for taking the time and effort to find and post the links. I went to them, only to discover that I in fact found them myself many months ago. I recall reading precisely those same two links several times before. I believe I even bookmarked them for a while.

Chalmers' link is very difficult to follow. First, it's hard because of all the obscure terms that are most likely unfamiliar to most persons who are not professional philosophers. Second, the leaps he takes seem to be unwarranted. He loses me when he states that "it is equally logically possible that there could be a qualia-free physical replica of me." I disagree and think that in order to make such a statement he is a priori assuming that the physical cannot and does not produce the mental states giving rise to qualia. In essense, he presumes materialism is false in order to draw some conclusion about or to make a critique of it.

To me, that's invalid.

It's boring if you are not interested in or fascinated by the subject of consciousness. On the other hand, if you are so interested, then the debate is topical. It is a little technical, however, which contributes to its being dry.

AS

 

[AmateurScientist]

AS,

We can only understand first person consciousness by experiencing it for ourselves. It is not possible to define it.

Thanks again for responding, Neo.

Hmmm. I'm not convinced that p-zombies couldn't understand intellectually a description of first-person consciousness.

Perhaps any definition of first-person consciousness will be incomplete. Nevetheless, I would argue that a sufficient description of it can indeed convey the essense of it adequately to reach a true conclusion about whether or not one possesses access to it or not.

P-zombie Win would respond he is not a p-zombie because he is physically identical. The same physical laws which determine all our behaviour is the same for both Win and p-zombie Win. P-Win "believes" he is not a p-zombie only in the sense of the appropriate behaviour. He doesn't actually have the mental belief, that is to say the qualitative phenomenological feel that he is not a p-zombie. This phenomenological feel is only present with the real Win. The actual qualitative phenomenological knowing that he has a mental life is only present with the real Win. That's the way I see it anyway.

Thanks, that helps somewhat.

AS

 

[AmateurScientist]

Win,

This just leapt out at me in a huge way:

What make zombie Win think hes has phenomenal consciousness is the same thing that makes me think I have phenomenal consciousness, briefly, a recursive self-modelling mental architecture. Why isn't that sufficient to explain consciousness? Again briefly, because that doesn't explain, can't explain, the phenomenal aspects of consciousness.

"Recursive self-modelling mental architecture" Say that again and again.

Isn't this in fact subjective experience, the "raw feel" of the visual field right there in front of you?

Why are they different, as you contend?

AS

 

[Guest]

AS :

I disagree and think that in order to make such a statement he is a priori assuming that the physical cannot and does not produce the mental states giving rise to qualia. In essense, he presumes materialism is false in order to draw some conclusion about or to make a critique of it.

This is the same hurdle that PixyMisa can't even see over , let alone get over. Chalmers neither presumes materialism nor presumes that it is false. You appear to be saying that in order for P-zombies to be logically possible, that one has to have 'presumed' materialism is false. But the logical possibilitiy or non-possibility of P-zombies does not depend on materialism - it is the other way around. The concept of a P-zombie is built from concepts we use to describe and make sense of our whole experiences of reality - that very same reality we are trying to figure out the nature of. We know what we mean when we talk about mental things and physical things. Materialism makes it neccesary that the mental things are part of the physical things. It does not logically follow that the mental things are part of the physical things. It only follows if you insist materialism must be true.

In terms of your complaint :

he is a priori assuming that the physical cannot and does not produce the mental states giving rise to qualia

The truth is :

"he is a priori assuming that the physical may not not produce the mental states giving rise to qualia"

Chalmers assumes a neutral position. By contrast, in order to escape the logic it is neccesary for you to either assume materialism is true, and therefore force qualia to be physical (however counter-intuitive) or to accuse him of assuming that materialism is false, even though he has no need to do so.

 

[Peskanov]

Hello again, UCE; as I see you are interested again in the thread, I am back for more

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quote:
The concept of a P-zombie is built from concepts we use to describe and make sense of our whole experiences of reality - that very same reality we are trying to figure out the nature of. We know what we mean when we talk about mental things and physical things.
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As I pointed to you some time ago, the concepts related to thinking (mind, consciousness, qualia) come all from intuition and are very fuzzy. Every philospher draws his own frontiers and moves the basic definitions to his own camp.
Do you agree?

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quote:
Materialism makes it neccesary that the mental things are part of the physical things. It does not logically follow that the mental things are part of the physical things. It only follows if you insist materialism must be true.
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It has been said tons of times. Correct, it does not follow; instead it is assumed. If you provide evidence that it can not be assumed, you have falsified materialism.


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quote:
"he is a priori assuming that the physical may not not produce the mental states giving rise to qualia"

Chalmers assumes a neutral position. By contrast, in order to escape the logic it is neccesary for you to either assume materialism is true, and therefore force qualia to be physical (however counter-intuitive) or to accuse him of assuming that materialism is false, even though he has no need to do so.
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Neutral? The hypothesis of a p-zombie afirms that it's possible to obtain human behaviour without conscience.
This is not neutral at all. It is a very critical, very dangerous assumption, which is not accepted by materialists.
Can you explain, in steps, how can Chalmers reach that conclusion?
IMO a person which proposes a p-zombie and a materialist are using different definition if consciousness. It would probably help to set a minimum definition of it, or at least to list some properties accepted by both parts.

A note: counter-intuitive concepts are normal in science and materialism. Anything related to electricity is counter-intuitive to me, for example. I don't think this should a problem anymore for philosophers.

 

[Win]

AS:

I disagree. I'm not discussing thinking at all. I'm discussing thinking about thinking. Trying to suspend belief about materialism is indeed trying to suspend belief about how thinking and imagining themselves occur.

Let me try this a different way.

Imagine a person who has no position regarding the truth of materialism, idealism or dualism. She hasn't reached a conclusion yet, but is still mulling over the positions.

Under your conception, would she not really be thinking about these questions at all? Or would she really have accepted the truth of one of the positions, only she's just not aware of it?

Or is it that she has to provisionally accept the truth of one of the positions, at least implicitly, before beginning to think about consciousness? How might one find oneself in the position of implicitly assuming the truth of materialism, even when believing that one hasn't?

I think you'll have to admit that it's possible to think about these things without first accepting materialism is true, or false.

Perhaps I've noticed that the tires are bald and the brake line is cut. Maybe I'm not so eager to get into that particular car, as I deem it unsafe.

So take it for a very slow drive around the parking lot. Oh wait, let me guess, you've also noticed that it's leaking gasoline ... and ... there's a lion in the front seat ... and ... a bomb, no wait, a nuclear bomb ...

Metaphors tend to break down. I hope you've taken my meaning.

Maybe this is part of the problem materialists have--your argument concerns a world that is different from ours. How then, can it tell us anything about this one, I repeat, over and over?

P-zombies tell us something about logical possibility. Logical possibility tells us something about our world. The natural impossibility of p-zombies has no effect on the argument from conceivability, because it's logical possibility that's required to make the argument go through.

Is it really? I mean, if p-zombies are supposed to demonstrate any truths at all about this world, then they must interact with it, as Stimpson has maintained and explained to you, over and over.

Actually, I understood Stimpy to be making that point about qualia, not p-zombies.

Anyway, even though he's "explained it to me over and over," I still find his ideas about causation misconceived. And his arguments about qualia in this regard based on a mistaken intuition.

If dualism is inextricably bound with the definition of p-zombie, then their supposed conceivability can have no bearing on whether materialism is true or not. To conceive of p-zombies is in fact to assume that dualism is true.

Dualism isn't "inextricably bound with the definition of p-zombie." There's no need to mention p-zombies at all to make the argument from conceivability. Substitute "person who sees gred not red," where "gred" is a color sensation qualitatively different to red, and the person is otherwise physical indistinguishable from a normal person, for p-zombie and the argument still goes through.

As to the last, for a p-zombie universe to exist, dualism would have to be true. To conceive of p-zombies doen't require belief in the truth of dualism. Do you see the difference?

How can a p-zombie have emotions? Aren't emotions experienced subjectively and only subjectively? Emotions can be understood in part intellectually, but no one can have emotions without experiencing them. Emotions are experienced subjectively, by how they feel, and they are exhibited objectively, by how we act and respond.

Emotions are experienced subjectively. But a p-zombie has them without experiencing them. No one does have them without experiencing them. This doesn't mean that it's logically impossible to have them without experiencing them.

Yes, if you are referring to the objective truth, what you call the "truth value." There is also a subjective truth, which is the genuine belief of a proposition's truth.

The truth value is the truth value. Genuine belief isn't the same as true belief.

I fail to understand how a p-zombie could genuinely believe he is not a p-zombie when confronted with the accusation. Necessarily entailed in the accusation is a proper understanding of the difference between a p-zombie and a human.

A p-zombie genuinely believes he's not one. He's just mistaken.

Isn't this in fact subjective experience, the "raw feel" of the visual field right there in front of you?

This being a recursive, self-modelling mental architecture.

No. It's the physical analogue underlying our phenomenal judgements. It's what "causes" us to have our beliefs about qualia. It's what's "in our brains," as it were. But it's not a quale.

The cause of our beliefs is not the justification for our beliefs.

Every part of this argument relies on the acceptance of one fact: Qualia exist. *We* know this because *we* have direct acces to the fact of the existence of a phenomenal world.

A p-zombie would say the same thing, but he wouldn't have that direct access.

As I've said before, "qualia don't exist" is a perfectly acceptable position. If, however, you accept their existence, I think you are compelled to accept the falsity of materialism.

 

[The One called Neo]

Whoops, I just re-read the Chalmers article and saw that I goofed. Here is another quote from him:



quote:
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Consider: if it is logically possible that my functional isomorph might lack qualia entirely, it seems equally logically possible that there could be a qualia-free physical replica of me.
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Hahaha, that sounds pretty foolish.

My apologize to anyone (neo) that I may have offending.

If something is physically identical, then it follows it must also be functionally identical. However the converse of course need not be true. Thus one could imagine creating an android which is a replica of myself, and which is therefore functionally identical to myself (behaves and talks exactly like me), but is obviously not physically identical as it contains electronic circuitry.

At the risk of going slightly off topic would such an android be conscious ie experience qualitative phenomenological states? It seems to me that a materialist would say that the android would be conscious by definition. A property dualist would, I suppose, say that consciousness within the android is physically necessitated.

But what would interactive dualists or idealists maintain? Maybe they would deny that such an android is possible at all maintaining that human behaviour is not amenable to an algortihmic description.

 

[Win]

Neo:

A property dualist would say that consciousness within the android is naturally necessitated.