Materialism

[phobos]

Within a materialistic framework, p-zombies are incoherent by their very definition. As I understand it, a p-zombie is exactly like a human in every physical way, down to the last detail within his brain, and he walks and talks exactly like a human, except for one crucial distinction: a p-zombie lacks the first-person subjective experience, or "feel" that every human presumably has.

(snip)

Remember, we have assumed materialism to be true in our p-zombie proof. If consciousness, meaning the first-person subjective "feel," is a necessary consequence of the fully functioning human brain, then the p-zombie is also conscious. He cannot lack that which is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning brain simply because we declare that he lacks it. That is the bit of incoherence inherent in the definition of p-zombie. He cannot lack what he must have.

Right. From a materialist point of view, zombies are certainly conceivable, they just don't exist. They're far from unique in this. It's conceivable that God exists. It's conceivable that magic works. It's conceivable that people have been to Mars. It just doesn't happen to be the case.

Is it conceivable that a man might have the power to teleport himself from New York to Tokyo instantly? Sure. Does that mean we have to revise physics? No - because nobody has shown that such a man actually exists.

I mean, this IS James Randi's forum, right? How many people have we heard of who claim to have kooky super powers? I believe there's a million dollars on offer for them. Are these powers conceivable? Sure. Do they exist? Do they heck.

Imagine if you will a zombike. It's exactly like an ordinary bicycle in every physical regard, right down to the last atom, except that when you turn the pedals the wheels don't move. Holy Moses! Does this mean that the ability of a bicycle to move is some mysterious non-material entity? Does this destroy materialism? Well, it would do, if you could produce such a bicycle...

 

[AmateurScientist]

Right. From a materialist point of view, zombies are certainly conceivable, they just don't exist. They're far from unique in this. It's conceivable that God exists. It's conceivable that magic works. It's conceivable that people have been to Mars. It just doesn't happen to be the case.

Is it conceivable that a man might have the power to teleport himself from New York to Tokyo instantly? Sure. Does that mean we have to revise physics? No - because nobody has shown that such a man actually exists.

I mean, this IS James Randi's forum, right? How many people have we heard of who claim to have kooky super powers? I believe there's a million dollars on offer for them. Are these powers conceivable? Sure. Do they exist? Do they heck.

Imagine if you will a zombike. It's exactly like an ordinary bicycle in every physical regard, right down to the last atom, except that when you turn the pedals the wheels don't move. Holy Moses! Does this mean that the ability of a bicycle to move is some mysterious non-material entity? Does this destroy materialism? Well, it would do, if you could produce such a bicycle...

Thanks for responding phobos, but I think you misunderstand the point of my post. Win asked me to demonstrate why I believe the p-zombie argument put forth by some dualists supposedly to prove materialism has to be false is incoherent. That is, Win knows I don't believe in p-zombies, that their conceivability is a viable argument against materialism, or their conceptually they are even coherent. He wants me to explain why I believe that.

You selectively quoted my post and by doing so misrepresent my meaning. I know very well p-zombies don't exist. I also think even conceiving of them the way dualist philosophers often define them is an incoherent concept--that is, their definition doesn't make sense and is internally inconsistent, as long as you accept a materialist worldview, as I do.

AS

 

[Win]

AS:

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that you or someone else has said that a p-zombie would be a p-zombie but wouldn't know it. If so, then how do you know you're not a p-zombie?

Well, someone else might have said it, but not me.

What I've said is that if I were a p-zombie I would behave exactly as if I weren't. In fact, I would believe that I wasn't a p-zombie. In my case, this is a true belief. In zombie Win's case, it's a false belief.

The existence of my phenomenal consciousness, to which I have direct access, renders my belief true. Of course, zombie Win would type that, too. But he'd be mistaken.

I suspect your response, if my premise is correct, is that because you see the visual field right there in front of you. Well, that gives you first-person justification for believing it. Everyone else could simply be lying about having first person subjective feel. Right? Couldn't you be the only human on a planet of p-zombies? Yep, in principle. Yet, you don't operate on this principle, I presume. Why not? Is it because p-zombies are silly? Is it because you are a pragmatist deep down, as am I?

First of all, I think you're equivocating between two sense of the word principle. That something may be so, in principle, doesn't render that state of affairs a principle to be followed.

That being said, knowing myself to have phenomenal consciousness, why should I conclude that no one else does, simply because it could be so, in principle? That conclusion isn't forced on me.

And again, p-zombies don't exist in the world. That a p-zombie is conceivable doesn't mean there are any. Their actual existence isn't a feature of the argument.

You seem to think that because it's "silly" to suppose that other people are really p-zombies, we can¡t draw any conclusions from their conceivability. That's just not so.

Are there really any practicing dualists?

Here, I think you're defining "practicing dualist" as someone who believes evryone else is a p-zombie.

I suppose there could be some of those around. I don't know any. Easier to be a solipsist.

There are practicing dualists, if you define that to be people who have a dualistic view on the question of phenomenal consciousness.

Yes, you wouldn't want a bunch of fuzzy thinking students misquoting you, would you?

Certainly not.

Well, as I understand it, p-zombies are used to demonstrate the falsity of materialism. If so, then we have to suppose at the beginning that materialism is true. Therefore, we are working from a materialistic framework.

On the contrary, "assume the truth of materialism" appears nowhere in the conceivability argument that uses p-zombies.

Within a materialistic framework, p-zombies are incoherent by their very definition. As I understand it, a p-zombie is exactly like a human in every physical way, down to the last detail within his brain, and he walks and talks exactly like a human, except for one crucial distinction: a p-zombie lacks the first-person subjective experience, or "feel" that every human presumably has.

And if you have assumed the truth of materialism, an entity that is my physical duplicate must have all my properties, so must be conscious.

But only if you assume materialism is true.

Within a materialistic framework, consciousness must be a necessary consequence of the physical brain processes and its structure. Yes, of course this is a bare assertion without definition proof. It is implied by the very notion of materialism.

Not arguing with you here. Just pointing out that "assume materialism to be true" is an awfully convenient place from which to begin a defence of materialism.

Remember, we have assumed materialism to be true in our p-zombie proof.

No, we haven't. Nor have we assumed it to be false.

Is that a bootstrap argument for materialism? Sure it is. What it is not, however, is a demonstrable proof that materialism is false, as I understand it is asserted to be.

It's not a bootstrap argument. It's a question begging one.

Again, the argument from the conceivability of p-zombies that materialism is false doesn't begin by assuming materialism is true. I don't know where you got that idea.

Now, switch to a dualist framework, be it property or interactive dualism. Now, p-zombies can be defined and still be coherent. If consciousness resides elsewhere from the purely physical, material brain--either in "mind" stuff, that special property of mind matter, or in a mental realm which is somehow connected with the material realm through a mysterious interaction process--then p-zombies can be exactly like humans, only without the mind stuff or connection to the mental realm. Now, p-zombies make perfect sense.

Again, I think you misunderstand the way the argument from conceivabilty works. We don't start off by saying "assume materialism" or "assume dualism."

There is nothing wrong with p-zombies, given a dualist paradigm. In order for p-zombies to be coherent, however, one has to dispense with a materialist worldview. Because of that fact, p-zombies can never have anything to say about materialism itself.

Once again, I don't understand what you mean by "coherent."

If you assert that p-zombies and their "conceivability" somehow disprove materialism, then indeed the burden falls on your shoulders to demonstrate why. Of course, you have done that to your satisfaction many, many times. I believe each time has relied upon assuming a dualistic framework in advance, however.

No. I just haven't taken your "assume materialism to be true" stance. There is a difference between not assuming materialism to be true and assuming materialism to be false. You do see that, don't you?

I thought you might get a kick out of my reading Dennett. I truly am reading it.

Consciousness Explained is a good book. The only problem is that, taking consciousness to mean HPC, it isn't. All the other parts are fine.

 

[AmateurScientist]

U

AS:

What I've said is that if I were a p-zombie I would behave exactly as if I weren't. In fact, I would believe that I wasn't a p-zombie. In my case, this is a true belief. In zombie Win's case, it's a false belief.

The existence of my phenomenal consciousness, to which I have direct access, renders my belief true. Of course, zombie Win would type that, too. But he'd be mistaken.

This is truly puzzling to me. If zombie Win would also believe he had phenomenal consciousness, then what makes you so confident that you're not a zombie?

Again, the visual field thing? If so, then why would zombie Win also type that? Why? Is he a liar or mistaken? How can he be mistaken if he has no visual field right there in front of him?

First of all, I think you're equivocating between two sense of the word principle. That something may be so, in principle, doesn't render that state of affairs a principle to be followed.

Yeah, I did do that, didn't I? Made for a nice segue, don't you think?

That being said, knowing myself to have phenomenal consciousness, why should I conclude that no one else does, simply because it could be so, in principle? That conclusion isn't forced on me.

And again, p-zombies don't exist in the world. That a p-zombie is conceivable doesn't mean there are any. Their actual existence isn't a feature of the argument.

You seem to think that because it's "silly" to suppose that other people are really p-zombies, we can¡t draw any conclusions from their conceivability. That's just not so.

I know that the actual existence of p-zombies isn't part of the argument. No, I don't think that it's silly just because they don't really exist, although, and I'm not telling you again, they don't really exist! LOL.

It's silly because it's incoherent. "Incoherent" means lacking internal consistency. The very definition of p-zombie seeks to have it both ways, under a materialist framework.

Look, you cannot use the conceivability of p-zombies to demonstrate the falsity of materialism unless you postulate a priori that materialism is false. Any thoughtful materialist can see that p-zombies cannot be exactly like humans physically, yet lack subjective feel, as materialism holds that subjective feel is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning physical brain. Therefore, p-zombies can't be p-zombies--they're humans instead, given your definition of them.

Here, I think you're defining "practicing dualist" as someone who believes evryone else is a p-zombie.

I suppose there could be some of those around. I don't know any. Easier to be a solipsist.

I've often wondered about this. Exactly how would one go about being a practicing solipsist? Wouldn't you stay in bed all the time and not eat or get up? Why would you need to? Think about it.

I suppose a truly practicing dualist who believed in the conceivability that p-zombies could exist and there is no way he could ever be sure if anyone but himself were a p-zombie might venture to treat everyone else as if they were unconscious automatons. What difference would it make?

By "practicing" I mean someone who put his money where his mouth is.

On the contrary, "assume the truth of materialism" appears nowhere in the conceivability argument that uses p-zombies.

Then how can it possibly be used to demonstrate the supposed falsity of materialism?

And if you have assumed the truth of materialism, an entity that is my physical duplicate must have all my properties, so must be conscious.

But only if you assume materialism is true.

Of course. My point exactly. That is why I believe p-zombies are an incoherent concept.

Not arguing with you here. Just pointing out that "assume materialism to be true" is an awfully convenient place from which to begin a defence of materialism.

It's not just convenient. It's necessary if the conceivability of p-zombies has any bearing at all on whether materialism must be false.

No, we haven't. Nor have we assumed it to be false.

Again, then what relevance do they have to materialism?

No. I just haven't taken your "assume materialism to be true" stance. There is a difference between not assuming materialism to be true and assuming materialism to be false. You do see that, don't you?

Ah, but Grasshopper, I do see the difference.

What you fail to grasp is what I thought was implicit. I and many others assume materialism as a default state. Why? Given how we observe science to work in all other matters--save quantum mechanics--consciousness has to arise from somewhere. If there is no there from which it can arise, then it must arise from within the only place it could--the brain. Your property dualism is nothing but speculation from the default perspective. We have looked at brains under eletron microscopes, and all we have seen are neurons and other cells. We have seen no "mind stuff" contained within brains.

Oh, we can't see it because it isn't physical? But even you admit it has to interact with or somehow be a property of the physical. If so, as Stimpy points out, then it must interact with the brain. How? There is no evidence, and there can be no evidence suseptible to empirical study, of such funky interaction. Therefore, either it's all just brains, or we can never know.

As Dennett contends, the dualist's position is essentially a surrender. We give up; we can never know. Why don't we just make up some stuff to explain it or give up looking?

What kind of defeatist nonsense is that?

I'm among the many who isn't willing to capitulate and declare that science cannot tell us, even in principle, where mind comes from. Many of us are pretty darn sure there is no "there" there. When we look at the brain, we are looking at the mind, unless it's not functioning sufficiently. It is indeed the result of the structure and process going on within it. Pretty cool, huh?

Just because it's somewhat mysterious as to the how, is no reason to dismiss it as untrue or impossible.

Consider how a new life is created, whether it's a human life or a maple tree. Until recently, no one had a clue where life came from, except to declare that it was outside the province of science and within that of religion. God gives us the miraculous gift of life.

Right. Now we accept that it's DNA and cell division. There's nothing "miraculous" about it. The truth is far more wondrous, however, than simply "God put it there."

I regard "mind" in an analogous fashion. It's not some miraculous mystery. It's neurons firing in concert.

Sure, studying "mind" is unique in that we have to use "mind" itself to study it. It doesn't make the subject matter a special case, however. It just presents unique difficulties.

Dualists are willing to concede that "mind" is an entirely unique kind of matter or interaction, unlike any elsewhere in nature. Given that we ultimately came from the process of nuclear fusion within massive stars, just as all other matter known to exist in the universe, I find it hard to swallow that there is a unique kind of matter found only within human brains, and nowhere else.

Consciousness Explained is a good book. The only problem is that, taking consciousness to mean HPC, it isn't. All the other parts are fine.

Too bad it was written before Chalmers' writings. It would be nice to see a direct rebuttal of Chalmers' arguments in it.

AS

 

[billydkid]

Re: Re: I disagree!!

You truly can't imagine?

Well, yeah, I can't imagine. I can imagine why might think they should feel diminished, but that they actually do, no I can't imagine. It is as though they feel their existance itself is somehow delegitimized by not having its significance validated through some sort of external, other worldly endorsement or something. It strikes me as fundamentally liberating to realize that we are truly the captains of our own ships.

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Oh, look, UCE cowers away! Leaving my questions unanswered...

If you take a p-zombie to mean "a human that appears to be normal but doesn't have conciousness", nothing is proved. The point is moot. Materialism explains that for it to be a p-zombie, it would not have the same brain components/structure/whatever as a normal human.

A computer does operations based on its hardware. A computer can't, say, scan a picture without a scanner or something with a scanning ability. Human brains cannot intepret emotions or things our brains have no component or ability to handle.

Dualists assume you can't verify whether something has conciousness or not, because they assume that the "mind" is in another world-type thing.

 

[c4ts]

I was just thinking... wouldn't the existence of p-zombies render things like morality completely moot? Sure, they're screaming a lot and acting like they're in pain, but they don't feel anything because they're p-zombies and are incapable of percieving pain.

 

[Loki]

Win,

The existence of my phenomenal consciousness, to which I have direct access, renders my belief true.

If Win is a P-Zombie...

then you're convinced you have access to qualia,

and you can conceive of P-Zombies which don't have access to qualia,

and you know you're not one of them because you have this internal direct access that you can depend upon.

Except you're wrong.

So, tell me again exactly how you know you're not a P-Zombie??

 

[Lord Kenneth]

I was just thinking... wouldn't the existence of p-zombies render things like morality completely moot? Sure, they're screaming a lot and acting like they're in pain, but they don't feel anything because they're p-zombies and are incapable of percieving pain.

In that case, killing such a p-zombie would be no different then killing a biological robot. Well, that's with all things, concious or not... but a biological robot without the same brain processes of a human that only emulates human responses.

 

[INRM]

Why should they be? What problems does it solve, other than a few linguistic condrums?

Idealism that is indistinguishable from materalism is pointless. Idealism that can be distinguished from materialism is false (as Randi's million demonstrates).

It is not that we defend our belief system; it is that we reject unnecessary beliefs. In this we are entitled to be dogmatic to the extreme, since what we are defending is the very basis of Reason itself.

All that intensity you feel is merely the sharp edge of Occam's Razor.

Um, Occam's Razor doesn't always work.

-INRM

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Um, Occam's Razor doesn't always work.

-INRM

No one denies that Occam's Razor can lead us to the wrong answer.

However, it leads us to what is most probably the correct answer with the information currently given.

 

[Win]

AS:

This is truly puzzling to me. If zombie Win would also believe he had phenomenal consciousness, then what makes you so confident that you're not a zombie?

My direct access to the fact of the existence of phenomenal consciousness.

It's silly because it's incoherent. "Incoherent" means lacking internal consistency. The very definition of p-zombie seeks to have it both ways, under a materialist framework.

Incoherent means lacking consitency with something else. If what you're trying to get at is that, were materialism to be true, p-zombies would be impossible, I agree.

But again, you're begging the question.

Look, you cannot use the conceivability of p-zombies to demonstrate the falsity of materialism unless you postulate a priori that materialism is false.

Not so. I guess you really are having a hard time with the difference between "assume matrialism is false" and "not assume materialism is true."

I suppose a truly practicing dualist who believed in the conceivability that p-zombies could exist and there is no way he could ever be sure if anyone but himself were a p-zombie might venture to treat everyone else as if they were unconscious automatons. What difference would it make?

Again, no dualist that I know of (and in particular me) believes that p-zombies are naturally possible, in that sense of "could exist." Dualists believe that everyone is conscious, AS. To suggest that dualism requires the belief that others "could" be p-zombies is just a straw man.

Then how can it possibly be used to demonstrate the supposed falsity of materialism?

If an argument that uses p-zombies doesn't begin by assuming materialism is true, how can it demonstrate the falsity of materialism? Are you really asking this?

The argument isn't a reductio.

Dualists are willing to concede that "mind" is an entirely unique kind of matter or interaction, unlike any elsewhere in nature. Given that we ultimately came from the process of nuclear fusion within massive stars, just as all other matter known to exist in the universe, I find it hard to swallow that there is a unique kind of matter found only within human brains, and nowhere else.

Again, you really haven't put the time into understanding the position. Nobody is a substance dualist these days. I suggest you do a lot more reading, and try to engage with the ideas rather than attack them. You'll learn more.

As Dennett contends, the dualist's position is essentially a surrender. We give up; we can never know. Why don't we just make up some stuff to explain it or give up looking?

Frankly, if dualism is true, and a consequence of that is that we'll just never be able to understand consciousness, well, that's reality for you. There are lots of things that we'll never know. Denying reality so that you can feel better about never surrendering doen't strike me as too sensible.

I don't think dualism requires our ignorance however.

Loki:

So, tell me again exactly how you know you're not a P-Zombie??

By virtue of my direct access to my own phenomenal consciousness.

 

[c4ts]

Um, Occam's Razor doesn't always work.

-INRM

In this particular case, I think it does.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Win,

I'll try to respond to all of your points at a later time, but at the moment I'm tired and only wish to ask this one thing.

AS:

quote:This is truly puzzling to me. If zombie Win would also believe he had phenomenal consciousness, then what makes you so confident that you're not a zombie?

Win:

My direct access to the fact of the existence of phenomenal consciousness.

OK, since I'm not satisfied with that answer, as I believe my question--taken in context with the surrounding remarks which you did not address--recognized that as implicit, I'll ask it another way and perhaps this time you'll understand me more clearly.

Why would zombie Win also answer that he is not a zombie (or put another way, why would he believe he had access to consciousness as well, given that he cannot)?

I genuinely do not understand how. I am not trying to lead you down the path only to spring a trap on you, as I have accused you (and still suspect ) you of doing in the past.

BTW, Loki asked you essentially the same question and you gave him the same glib response.

AS

 

[c4ts]

The way I understand it, if Win is a p-zombie, Win cannot percieve his own lack of consciousness, nor the fact that he is a zombie. Thus, the triggered response would be to deny that he is a p-zombie, since there is no p-zombie stimulus to respond to. If Win figures out that he is a p-zombie, then he can't really be one, because he would have to, in some way, consciously percieve a lack of consciousness, which is impossible from a standpoint where there can't be consciousness. You can only tell you were unconscious after you wake up, not during that time.

 

[AmateurScientist]

The way I understand it, if Win is a p-zombie, Win cannot percieve his own lack of consciousness, nor the fact that he is a zombie. Thus, the triggered response would be to deny that he is a p-zombie, since there is no p-zombie stimulus to respond to. If Win figures out that he is a p-zombie, then he can't really be one, because he would have to, in some way, consciously percieve a lack of consciousness, which is impossible from a standpoint where there can't be consciousness. You can only tell you were unconscious after you wake up, not during that time.

First, thanks for responding.

Well, this sounds a lot like "How do you know whether or not you're dreaming?"

I don't doubt that this is the "correct" answer, but I don't think I buy it as an intellectually satisfying answer.

If I explained to the p-zombie Win what first-person consciousness is, and feels like, then why can't he figure out that he isn't experiencing what I am describing? He is supposed to be just as smart as regular Win. He has the same capacity to understand concepts as regular Win. Why can't p-zombie Win understand the same concepts Win can?

I don't care whether or not he is programmed to deny his p-zombieness. After sufficient explanation from me, he should be able to tell whether or not he has it.

Alternatively, after attempting to explain the concept of first-person consciousness to p-zombie Win, then I should be able to tell that he either doesn't get it or doesn't have it. That would be an objective test for first person consciousness, and thus p-zombie Win cannot be conceived of because by definition he can't be.

The argument fails either way.

AS

 

[c4ts]

I think the problem is that I misunderstood the concept of a p-zombie. I had thought p-zombie Win would behave exactly like regular Win in any given situation.

 

[Loki]

Win,

By virtue of my direct access to my own phenomenal consciousness.

But P-Zombie Win says the same thing. As far as he's concerned, he *has* direct access to phenomenal consciousness. He certainly thinks he does - he's as sure of that fact as you are. How can he be so certain he has something (access to qualia) if he hasn't? What makes him think he does?

In case it's not obvious, I'm confused....

 

[AmateurScientist]

I think the problem is that I misunderstood the concept of a p-zombie. I had thought p-zombie Win would behave exactly like regular Win in any given situation.

Well, I think there are usually defined such that they behave just like regular Win.

If so, then Zombie Win should should be able to comprehend the notion of first-person consciousness as I describe it, regardless of whether he has ever experienced it. If he can comprehend it, then he can tell me whether or not he has ever experienced it.

If he truthfully says he has not experienced first-person consciousness, then we have an objective test for detecting such consciousness in others.

If he answers that he has experienced it, then we are left with two choices:

1) He's lying (but if he would lie about it, then so would regular Win);

2) He really has experienced it, and thus he isn't a p-zombie.

Now, consider this. If Zombie Win cannot comprehend the concept of first -person consciousness, then I would argue that he is not functionally equivalent to regular Win except for having HPC, because he now lacks the same level of comprehension and capacity for imagination that Win does.

Isn't this a problem for the conceivability of p-zombies argument?

AS

 

[Yahzi]

Neo

Universe where ostensibly temperature, both as measured and experienced, were exactly as in this world, but where temperature was not identical or brought about by the brownian motion of molecules.

But - temperature is simply the name we give to many instances of Brownian motion!

So no, I don't think it is ostensible.

in the special case of M/B, the correlated phenomena are not of the same KIND.

I found this unconvincing.

That is if I can discover the meaning of words such as supererogatory!

And supervenince, and supernumary. I got a frickin' degree in philosophy without ever once using the word "supervenince," but it seems to be all the philosophical rage these days.

Fashion.