Materialism

[AmateurScientist]

AS :

Just out of interest.....

I know you believe that Chalmers is wrong. But what would be the implications and consequences, as you see them, if he was correct?

What if ducks are really secret agents from another planet? What are the implications?

I needn't trouble with them, because they aren't.

I cannot reach any conclusions from supposing Chalmers' p-zombie argument is correct, because it is inherently flawed. As Yahzi correctly states, p-zombies are incoherent (I apologize if I have stated the notion of them is "illogical." Incoherent is the correct term). What conclusions can any reasonable person draw from an incoherent concept, true or not? None, as far as I can tell.

Now, if you were to ask me, what if dualism is true, what would the implications be, then my answer would be different. Nevertheless, I see little difference in this question and one along the lines of, "What if the earth had no sun or comparable star to revolve around?"

Well, the world would be very different from how it is, wouldn't it?

What relevance does this have to whether materialism implies p-zombies?

AS

 

[metacristi]

AmateurScientist

I understand that Chalmers is perhaps the most vocal modern proponent of the idea that p-zombies play a large role in dealing what he considers a fatal blow to materialism. Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

It's wrong.

What I find so astonishing is that Chalmers has been so widely embraced for just this message. He is quite the darling of many young philosophers. His message is apparently quite seductive. It is wrong, nontheless.

As far as I know Chalmers is not a dualist,the technical term used to label his view is pan-protopsychism.All he claim [as a personal,philosophical,preference not as a certitude] is that materialism as we understand it today is not enough to explain consciousness but the actual data gathered by neuroscience is a valuable part to understand it.
Here is an excerpt from an interview given by Chalmers [I downloaded it once from the net but I do not remember from where]:

You argue in your work that neuroscience will not be able to give a complete theory of consciousness. Do you think that current scientific work on consciousness is misguided?

Chalmers: Sometimes the sort of non-materialist view I put forward is seen as anti-scientific, but I don't see it that way at all. I argue that neuroscience alone isn't enough to explain consciousness, but I think it will be a major part of an eventual theory. We just need to add something else, some new fundamental principles, to bridge the gap between neuroscience and subjective experience. Actually, I think my view is compatible with much of the work going on now in neuroscience and psychology, where people are studying the relationship of consciousness to neural and cognitive processes without really trying to reduce it to those processes. We are just getting much more detailed knowledge of the associations and correlations between them. Things are still in early stages, but one can imagine that as we build up and systematize our theories of these associations, and try to boil them down to their core, the result might point us toward the sort of fundamental principles I advocate. Of course that's a long way off yet.

Compelling,I think.

 

[Win]

AS:

I understand that Chalmers is perhaps the most vocal modern proponent of the idea that p-zombies play a large role in dealing what he considers a fatal blow to materialism. Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

Your understanding is imperfect. The conceivability of p-zombies is just one arrow in the property dualist quiver. Take that argument away, and the non-supervenience of consciousness on the physical is still demonstrable.

And it is not the case that Chalmers ever suggests that property dualism is an "inevitable result" of the conceivability of p-zombies. The only result of the conceivability of p-zombies is the falsity of materialism.

It's wrong.

Your straw man is. But I've yet to read anything from you that might suggest either that p-zombies are not conceivable, or that their conceivability doesn't necessarily entail the falsity of materialism, beyond bare assertion.

What I find so astonishing is that Chalmers has been so widely embraced for just this message. He is quite the darling of many young philosophers. His message is apparently quite seductive. It is wrong, nontheless.

What I find astonshing, frankly, is that you have such a strong opinion regarding Chalmers when you pretty clearly haven't read much of his work, or if you have, haven't understood it too well. Otherwise, why would you be misrepresenting his position so completely?

Although I guess it could be just for polemic's sake.

 

[The One called Neo]

Neo

Are you talking about temperature as in the phenomenological quality?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

If we're talking about the qualitative experience associated with temperature, a feeling of warmth, coldness or whatever, then this is simply a specific instance of the more general case of the "hard problem" of consciousness (as Chalmers terms it). Obviously the qualitative experience of a given temperature is just as mysterious or non-mysterious as any other aspect of experiential consciousness.

But perhaps you have in mind the scientific definition of temperature? That is to say a particular measurement, such as provided by a thermometer, representing the degree of hotness. But I don't think this helps you either because I don't think such measurements are a logical consequence of the brownian motion of molecules. It would simply be a necessary consequence due to the existing physical laws of nature. It would seem that it is at least logically possible that there could exist a Universe where ostensibly temperature, both as measured and experienced, were exactly as in this world, but where temperature was not identical or brought about by the brownian motion of molecules. Do you not think?

Actually your analogy did get me thinking though. I might do some reading up on this so as to gain a better understanding of the fundamental issues. Anyway, just did a quick search on google and found this web page http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html

quote
"Such analogies are (famously) inapplicable to the M/BP (Nagel 1974, 1986): There is no problem about seeing two sets of empirical observations as "aspects" of the same thing, given a causal model that unifies them. But there is no such causal model in the case of the M/BP. For, unlike all other empirical observations, such as lightning/electricity (or water/H2O, heat/molecular-motion, life/biogenetic-function, matter/energy, etc.), in the special case of M/B, the correlated phenomena are not of the same KIND. And that's precisely what makes this particular set of "correlations" different, and problematic. So the forecast that M/B will simply turn out to be yet another set of correlations like the rest is unpromising".
unquote

I've only skimmed through the page but seems pertinent to our debate. Now to do some reading! That is if I can discover the meaning of words such as supererogatory!

 

[AmateurScientist]

Dark Cobra :

With the greatest respect, you do not appear to understand the argument, judging from your response. The reason the p-zombie is 'indistinguishable' is because there is no practical means of making the distinction. There is no way to objectify the subjective.

UCE,

I think I have spotted part of the problem in communicating or debating about p-zombies.

You mention that there is no practical means of distinguishing between a human and p-zombie. In a sense, this correct. We cannot peer into one's skull and determine what one is experiencing, or indeed whether one is experiencing anything at all.

I don't think you can mix and match hypothetical concepts like p-zombies with practical means.

If p-zombies are hypothetical, then does it make any sense to speak of there being no practical means to establish whether or not they have subjective experience? If we can conceive of p-zombies, then why shouldn't we be allowed to conceive of a hypothetical test for subjective experience?

Not allowed, you say. That is why p-zombies, even the merely hypothetical ones, are incoherent. They are no less incoherent than a conceivable (hypothetical) test for identifying or measuring subjective experience. Does such a test seem coherent to you?

It shouldn't. "Subjective" by definition means it cannot be detected objectively, yet I have conceived of a test for detecting it. This is the realm of conceivability, after all.

AS

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Dark Cobra :

With the greatest respect, you do not appear to understand the argument, judging from your response. The reason the p-zombie is 'indistinguishable' is because there is no practical means of making the distinction. There is no way to objectify the subjective. YOU CANNOT THEN SAY THAT THE SUBJECTIVE DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS YOU YOURSELF LACK A SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT. YOU can tell that YOU are not a zombie because YOU are conscious. You can 'assume' that anything which is externally indistinguishable from a human is internally indistinguishable for a human, and it might even be a reasonable assumption, BUT IT REMAINS AN ASSUMPTION!

***You cannot base a claim of 'impossibility', logical or otherwise, ON AN ASSUMPTION, however reasonable.***

This is not complicated. Why are you having such difficulty accepting it?

You are currently providing the best example I have seen since PixyMisa of a person who appears completeley incapable of following a logical argument when their belief system is challenged.

NB : try responding to the logical argument I have posted instead of attempting to redefine the problem in order to avoid the logic.

Ok, Einstein (note the sarcasm), let's look up "indistinguishable".

in·dis·tin·guish·a·ble

adj. Not distinguishable, especially:Impossible to differentiate or tell apart: indistinguishable twins; markings that make a moth indistinguishable from its background.
Impossible to discern; imperceptible: a sound that was indistinguishable to the human ear.

Difficult to understand or make out; vague: indistinguishable speech._(nd-stnggw-sh-bl)

If a person is a p-zombie, then his brain is abnormal, and he therefore differs from a normal human.

But how do I know this? Thoughts, feelings, etc, are the RESULT OF chemicals and brain processes! Take scientific study of love, as in a recent Discover magazine, scientists can induce and observe the direct results of feeling of attachment. That is one example.

When chemicals, such as oxytocin (an example from Discover magazine, are at similar levels in each person who reports the same emotion, and when playing around with said chemical you are able to play around with the bonds they form...



You always take on each argument and ignore previous arguments. Perhaps I should dig up Stimpson J. Cat's argument that is relevant to this...

Also, you ignored my questions. Gee, I wondered why...



..oh yeah... and talk about BASELESS ASSUMPTIONS...

There is no way to objectify the subjective. YOU CANNOT THEN SAY THAT THE SUBJECTIVE DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS YOU YOURSELF LACK A SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT.

 

[Lord Kenneth]

How about this...

Are what we see on computer screens the result of the computer's processes?

Can computer processes be observed, in action?

Do computers have a subjective viewpoint?

Are computer processes objective?

 

[AmateurScientist]

AS:



Your understanding is imperfect. The conceivability of p-zombies is just one arrow in the property dualist quiver. Take that argument away, and the non-supervenience of consciousness on the physical is still demonstrable.

Well, honestly, most of my understanding, as it were, came from reading your many posts about his arguments. I have read some snippets of his material on the web, and I have been to his website several times. If my understanding is imperfect, which of course it is, you are partly to blame, Professor.

And it is not the case that Chalmers ever suggests that property dualism is an "inevitable result" of the conceivability of p-zombies. The only result of the conceivability of p-zombies is the falsity of materialism.

My mistake. It was a false dichotomy, as there exist other possibilities for worldviews, such as idealism.

I never said anything about whether it implied property dualism.

Your straw man is. But I've yet to read anything from you that might suggest either that p-zombies are not conceivable, or that their conceivability doesn't necessarily entail the falsity of materialism, beyond bare assertion.

Snippy tone noted. I have yet to read anything by you that could get around the fact that p-zombies are an incoherent concept and thus their alleged "conceivability" implies nothing.

What I find astonshing, frankly, is that you have such a strong opinion regarding Chalmers when you pretty clearly haven't read much of his work, or if you have, haven't understood it too well. Otherwise, why would you be misrepresenting his position so completely?

Win, you sound quite defensive here. I haven't read his work. I am presently reading Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained,, and I find his arguments and his presentation of them quite compelling.

I am not attempting to misrepresent Chalmers' work. I qualified my statement that it was my understanding of his p-zombie argument. I made not other representations about his work as a whole, or even about his beliefs. I said he is wrong about p-zombies. Don't generalize that comment to include any supposed remark or belief about his work as a whole. I make no representations or claims that I am familiar at all with the rest of his work or beliefs.

Does that mean I can't comment on his p-zombie argument as I've seen or heard it presented? If so, then I can scarcely comment upon or hold opinions about much of anything or anyone. I have hardly read all the works of Scott Fitzgerald, yet I feel quite entitled to hold an opinion about The Great Gatsby, as I have indeed read and studied it.

Although I guess it could be just for polemic's sake.

Second snide remark noted. Why is this necessary, oh champion of civility?

AS

 

[Win]

A general note on what it means for a p-zombie to be "indistinguishable" from a person.

I am incapable of distinguishing whether any given individual I might meet is a p-zombie or a person. On the other hand, I know I'm not a p-zombie. Therefore a p-zombie and a person are not indistinguishable in principle, because I can tell the difference as regards myself. And so can you.

AS:

Well, honestly, most of my understanding, as it were, came from reading your many posts about his arguments. I have read some snippets of his material on the web, and I have been to his website several times. If my understanding is imperfect, which of course it is, you are partly to blame, Professor.

I will try my best to bring greater clarity to my expositions of Chalmers's work in future.

Second snide remark noted. Why is this necessary, oh champion of civility?

You're right, of course. I apologize. I'll try to do better in the future.

I never said anything about whether it implied property dualism.

Except for this:

Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

I have yet to read anything by you that could get around the fact that p-zombies are an incoherent concept and thus their alleged "conceivability" implies nothing.

In what way is the concept "incoherent?" What could you mean by that? Or is the burden on me to demonstrate the "coherence" of the concept?

I am presently reading Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained,, and I find his arguments and his presentation of them quite compelling.

Eek.

I am not attempting to misrepresent Chalmers' work. I qualified my statement that it was my understanding of his p-zombie argument. I made not other representations about his work as a whole, or even about his beliefs. I said he is wrong about p-zombies. Don't generalize that comment to include any supposed remark or belief about his work as a whole. I make no representations or claims that I am familiar at all with the rest of his work or beliefs.

And I retract any representations I may have made, other than that you have misrepresented Chalmers's position with regard to p-zombies.

Does that mean I can't comment on his p-zombie argument as I've seen or heard it presented? If so, then I can scarcely comment upon or hold opinions about much of anything or anyone. I have hardly read all the works of Scott Fitzgerald, yet I feel quite entitled to hold an opinion about The Great Gatsby, as I have indeed read and studied it.

Fair enough. By way of analogy, you don't understand The Great Gatsby.

 

[Guest]

Note to all :

I am suffering from intense boredom of ontology. I will not convince the believers that materialism is false. I rather suspect that impartial on-lookers will have come to their own conclusions by now. I pass the baton to Win and Neo.

 

[The One called Neo]

Ugh, it must be the Brit in you...

Look, it's simple.

Phylogeny is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Claudistics is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

You would think so wouldn't you? But this is what is so strange about about experiential consciousness in that it does not appear to be detectable by any means whatsoever! If we could be certain of your statement then solipsism wouldn't be a live issue. But this seems a strange stance to adopt given that I know I have awareness and yet it is conceivable, and therefore arguably logically possible, that other people amount to no more than what one can gleam from public accessible objective facts.

In short then I think the statement "If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B" begs the question. After all, what you are really saying here is that "If A, by virtue of publically accessible objective facts, is indistinguishable from B then A=B. But of course one might be able to argue that B is distinguished from A by other than publically accessible objective facts.

 

[Q-Source]

It has precisely the opposite effect on me. Don't you find it fantastically amazing that the universe can organize itself into such incredible creatures as ourselves? Honestly, I can not imagine why anyone would feel diminished by this. It doesn't make us any less exotic or amazing. In fact, it makes us more so. This is the miraculous aspect of the universe and nature - that it can and does "create" out of its own accord "beings" and beings such as us. That is can create consciousness of itself.

Yes, it is amazing that a system of organised atoms is capable of creating consciousness. However, it is even more amazing that consciousness can exercise introspection.

I like Yahzi's reasoning, I am not making any objection. I was rather referring to the discussion that philosophers and common men have had about consciousness for hundreds of years. What for?, just to end with an answer like Yahzi's?.

Of course, most of them won't accept such answer, so the discussion will continue.

 

[Q-Source]

Note to all :
I am suffering from intense boredom of ontology. I will not convince the believers that materialism is false. I rather suspect that impartial on-lookers will have come to their own conclusions by now. I pass the baton to Win and Neo.

Oh, you were trying to convince somebody?

 

[The One called Neo]

Re: I disagree!!

It has precisely the opposite effect on me. Don't you find it fantastically amazing that the universe can organize itself into such incredible creatures as ourselves? Honestly, I can not imagine why anyone would feel diminished by this.

You truly can't imagine?

 

[The One called Neo]

Re: yes, very good!

Originally posted by Yahzi


I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Simple, elegant, meaningful, logical. Couldn't ask for more.

Hmmm . . .take a look at my response to Yahzi and have a look at this web page http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Papers/Harnad/harnad00.mind.humphrey.html

 

[AmateurScientist]

Note to all :

I am suffering from intense boredom of ontology. I will not convince the believers that materialism is false. I rather suspect that impartial on-lookers will have come to their own conclusions by now. I pass the baton to Win and Neo.

Not to knock you, Geoff, as I intend no genuine disrespect by this, but does anyone else see the irony and humor in UCE's leaving this thread because others are too persistent for him?

(To relative newcomers, I'm referring to his former incarnation's unfortunate habit of dogging every materialist within reach, relentlessly pounding the same points and arguments. Many left out of frustration, or as UCE puts it, "boredom of ontology.")

This is rich.

AS

 

[Guest]

Not to knock you, Geoff, as I intend no genuine disrespect by this, but does anyone else see the irony and humor in UCE's leaving this thread because others are too persistent for him?

No, I am genuinely bored. The argument against materialism is so blatant that demonstrating it involved endless repetition. The materialists just 'refuse' to see it. I am sure that anyone with no beliefs to defend will already have understood it. There is no point in me repeating it any more. I could spend the rest of my life typing in the same things over and over again. I have better things to do.

 

[The One called Neo]

It's more than a feeling (with apologies to Boston). It is true because of how we define objects or beings. If an object has all the characteristics of A, and behaves exactly like A, and is indistinguishable from A, then it is A.

See my reply to another poster regarding this assertion (posted earlier today).

The materialist paradigm insists that a p-zombie that has a fully functioning brain identical to a human's will by definition experience the same things a human will. Thus, the p-zombie will be a human.


Remember, the p-zombie argument is supposed to be a proof of the falsity of materialism. It isn't.

It would be if they are logically possible.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

You're appealing to our feelings here in order to convince us that we are all material creatures living in a material world. But most non-materilists would emphatically agree with you in your sentiments.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



I'm not trying to appeal to anyone's feelings. I'm trying to use rational arguments and critiques of others' arguments.

I'm afraid I'm compelled to agree with Win that you have said nothing beyond bare assertion.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The problem for the materialist is that given his belief that the physical world is closed, that is to say given that everything that happens is due to prior physical causes, then we must say that a talking and walking duck does so entirely as a result of physical causes. More generally the entirety of human behavior is due to physical causes. Thus a p-zombie which is physically identical to a human being would act exactly the same as a human being. The only way to get around this would be to assert that p-zombies are logically impossible. This is equivalent to maintaining that physical processes within the brain logically necessitate the qualitative feel of consciousness. But obviously you need to provide reasons for supposing this to be so.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



You keep trying to shift the burden of proof onto my shoulders.

Are you denying that you need to provide some justification for the idea that consciousness is logically necessitated by physical processes?

I believe the idealists or dualists of any stripe bear the burden of proving why we shouldn't adopt a materialist paradigm.

I find that most unreasonable. Normally when someone asserts something to be true they are required to give at least some justification for their position.

We are confident materialism is true because there is no credible, reliable evidence to suggest otherwise. Subjective impressions of a metamind are just that.

It really isn't a question of evidence though is it? The question is being able to dream up the best interpretation of the ultimate nature of reality. Any "evidence" will already be implicit in the particular intepretation we choose to subscribe to. The pertinent question is looking at the competing merits and problems of each intepretation. It seems to be that the materialists claim that consciousness is logically necessitated is a fatal one.

Research in neuroscience suggests that consciousness is a mere byproduct of the brain's inner workings.

Which research is this?

Plenty of empirical data suggest that our conscious awareness of a volitional bodily movement, for instance, arises approximately .5 to .8 second after the neuronal activity corresponding with the decision to engage that part of the body in movement occurs. What does that fact suggest to you?

Well I'm afraid I don't believe it

It is incorrect to suggest that this implies interactive dualism. That merely begs the question of how matter might interact with "mind." That is terribly messy and non-parsimonious. Once again, no one has ever found any evidence of any interactive mechanism or other kind of "mind stuff."

What attempts have been made to find "mind stuff"?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, if we are to take your feelings seriously, shouldn't we also take peoples feelings that love, hope, despair etc are not numerically identical to a series of neurons firing? In which case the feelings you have expressed ought to compel us not to adopt materialism, but rather interactive dualism or idealism.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Once again, it's not my "feelings" that suggest p-zombies cannot exist. It's the way they are defined.

Plenty of scientific research suggests that indeed emotions are the result of chemical and hormonal reactions to stimuli

Wouldn't emotions sometimes be partially a result of something happening in your personnel life?

 

[AmateurScientist]

A general note on what it means for a p-zombie to be "indistinguishable" from a person.

I am incapable of distinguishing whether any given individual I might meet is a p-zombie or a person. On the other hand, I know I'm not a p-zombie. Therefore a p-zombie and a person are not indistinguishable in principle, because I can tell the difference as regards myself. And so can you.

Win,

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to recall that you or someone else has said that a p-zombie would be a p-zombie but wouldn't know it. If so, then how do you know you're not a p-zombie?

I suspect your response, if my premise is correct, is that because you see the visual field right there in front of you. Well, that gives you first-person justification for believing it. Everyone else could simply be lying about having first person subjective feel. Right? Couldn't you be the only human on a planet of p-zombies? Yep, in principle. Yet, you don't operate on this principle, I presume. Why not? Is it because p-zombies are silly? Is it because you are a pragmatist deep down, as am I?

Are there really any practicing dualists?

I will try my best to bring greater clarity to my expositions of Chalmers's work in future.

Yes, you wouldn't want a bunch of fuzzy thinking students misquoting you, would you?

In what way is the concept "incoherent?" What could you mean by that? Or is the burden on me to demonstrate the "coherence" of the concept?

Well, as I understand it, p-zombies are used to demonstrate the falsity of materialism. If so, then we have to suppose at the beginning that materialism is true. Therefore, we are working from a materialistic framework.

Within a materialistic framework, p-zombies are incoherent by their very definition. As I understand it, a p-zombie is exactly like a human in every physical way, down to the last detail within his brain, and he walks and talks exactly like a human, except for one crucial distinction: a p-zombie lacks the first-person subjective experience, or "feel" that every human presumably has.

Within a materialistic framework, consciousness must be a necessary consequence of the physical brain processes and its structure. Yes, of course this is a bare assertion without definition proof. It is implied by the very notion of materialism.

Remember, we have assumed materialism to be true in our p-zombie proof. If consciousness, meaning the first-person subjective "feel," is a necessary consequence of the fully functioning human brain, then the p-zombie is also conscious. He cannot lack that which is a necessary consequence of having a fully functioning brain simply because we declare that he lacks it. That is the bit of incoherence inherent in the definition of p-zombie. He cannot lack what he must have.

Is that a bootstrap argument for materialism? Sure it is. What it is not, however, is a demonstrable proof that materialism is false, as I understand it is asserted to be.

*********

Now, switch to a dualist framework, be it property or interactive dualism. Now, p-zombies can be defined and still be coherent. If consciousness resides elsewhere from the purely physical, material brain--either in "mind" stuff, that special property of mind matter, or in a mental realm which is somehow connected with the material realm through a mysterious interaction process--then p-zombies can be exactly like humans, only without the mind stuff or connection to the mental realm. Now, p-zombies make perfect sense.

There is nothing wrong with p-zombies, given a dualist paradigm. In order for p-zombies to be coherent, however, one has to dispense with a materialist worldview. Because of that fact, p-zombies can never have anything to say about materialism itself.

********

If you assert that p-zombies and their "conceivability" somehow disprove materialism, then indeed the burden falls on your shoulders to demonstrate why. Of course, you have done that to your satisfaction many, many times. I believe each time has relied upon assuming a dualistic framework in advance, however.

Eek.

I thought you might get a kick out of my reading Dennett. I truly am reading it.

And I retract any representations I may have made, other than that you have misrepresented Chalmers's position with regard to p-zombies.

Thanks.

Fair enough. By way of analogy, you don't understand The Great Gatsby.

Don't I?



AS

 

[AmateurScientist]

Neo,

Thanks for responding. I'll have to find my neurological research sources and get back to you later.

AS