Materialism

[Guest]

Unrepentant Sinner

Ugh, it must be the Brit in you...

Look, it's simple.

Phylogeny is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Claudistics is based on the principle that:

If A is indistinguishable from B then A=B.

Both are core principles of Biology. If your premise that A is indistinguishable from B then A does not necessarily = B is true, then both areas of study must be abandoned and Biology loses one of it's most important tools for studying the fossil record and the DNA evidence of interrelationships of species.

Right...the problem here is that you are taking an example of things which occurs entirely in the physical world and trying to apply it to something which crosses the divide between the physical world and the mental world. Your are trying to argue that consciousness is not a special case and that the same techniques that can be applied to physical science can be applied to the study of the ontological question about the relationship between mind and matter. It is a straightforward attempt to use scientific principles to apply to a metaphysical/ontological question, followed by a complaint that if I insist on a philosophical answer to this philosophical question that I somehow invalidate the original scientific disciplines that work perfectly well within the physical world. Science does not fall in a heap and collapse because it admits that metaphysics isn't physics!

As I stated, In my admittedly tangental premise, the simple fact that if we accept your if A is utterly undistinguishable from B, A still =/= B, and those two tools must be rejected.

Wrong. You are trying to apply a scientific tool to a philosophical question and then trying to claim that if I do not let you get away with that that it somehow invalidates those scentific tools. Do you understand the difference between science and philosophy?

Can you not put your tea and crumpets down long enough to understand the ramifications of your assertion?

Now you sound like Stimpson.

It makes no difference at all to any other question than the Hard Problem itself. Consciousness really is a special case. This is not the science forum. This is the philosophy forum. The Mind/Body problem is, by definition, a philosophical problem. Admitting it is a philosophical problem has no ramifications on science whatsoever, apart from that science is spared the task of trying to answer a question it has always been logically incapable of answering.

- edited to add, spare me the navel gazing crap about p-zombies, do you deny that your assertion re: A=/=B invalidates Phylogeny and Claudistics?

Phylogeny and Claudistics are totally unaffected by this.

 

[Yahzi]

Neo

Are you talking about temperature as in the phenomenological quality?

I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

 

[AmateurScientist]

Neo

I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

Excellent analogy Yahzi. Thanks. That provides me with a new way of thinking about consciousness.

AS

 

[Q-Source]

That is all it is: and the phenomena of henomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

The King of Reductionism !

It makes me feel reduced to nothing

 

[Loki]

uce,

(Dark Cobra wrote ) : It implies conciousness isn't supernatural, or are physical in some way.
...
(uce wrote) : No DC, it imples P-ZOMBIES.

It doesn't imply P-Zombies - materialism currently doesn't require or eliminate P-Zombies, it's happy to work with both (and yes, you make this point also!)

(Dark Cobra wrote) : P-zombies are logically impossible because of the way they are defined.
...
(uce wrote) : Why? WHY? WHY WHY WHY
You just assert things. No evidence. No logic.

I agree with you on this uce - P-Zombies are not logically impossible. They may in fact be impossible, but I can't find any logic chain that eliminates them.

An absolute, undeniable, logically inevitable FACT. There is no objective means of determining whether a physical entity has a subjective internal state. It is logically impossible.

I'd agree with this also (!!!)

The fact that p-zombies are indistinguishable from humans is a limitation of the scientific method, not any logical or ontological limitations.

Finally, a disagreement! To me, this is where you go too far. Even if true, this is the heart of the "concievability implies logical possibility". P-Zombies are just a thought experiment. As such, they tell us something about what "might be". They do not, and cannot as far as I can see, force us to conclude that something "must be".

 

[Lord Kenneth]

Please note that you misquoted me, I did not say p-zombies are impossible.

Although, I do agree with that.

Why are p-zombies impossible?

Well, if a "p-zombie" is indistinguishable (this includes internal organs INCLUDING the brain) from a human, then it is a human. It, having the same brain or near same brain it is indeed concious just like the human is.

 

[Lord Kenneth]

UCE, it has already been explained to you.

1. All things I (and others) have observed as being concious are living things.

2. With no brain activity, there is no conciousness, at least none observed. During sleep or other periods of reduced brain activity, there is LESS consiousness.

3. Thinking ability is in the brain. And, basically, conciousness IS thinking.

Let me ask you a question, UCE... what DOES a brain do?

If someone is knocked unconcious, is he concious?

 

[billydkid]

I disagree!!

The King of Reductionism !

It makes me feel reduced to nothing

It has precisely the opposite effect on me. Don't you find it fantastically amazing that the universe can organize itself into such incredible creatures as ourselves? Honestly, I can not imagine why anyone would feel diminished by this. It doesn't make us any less exotic or amazing. In fact, it makes us more so. This is the miraculous aspect of the universe and nature - that it can and does "create" out of its own accord "beings" and beings such as us. That is can create consciousness of itself.

 

[billydkid]

yes, very good!

Neo

I am presenting temperature as an allegory for phenomenology.

Temperature is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like temperature: they are neither hot nor cold. However, they possess Brownian motion, and this energy, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call temperature.

Conciousness is not a fundamental force of nature. It does not exist on the atomic scale. Molecules do not possess anything remotely like phenomoneology: they neither feel nor think. However, they possess organization, and this organization, when measured in quantity, produces the effect we all call conciousness.

Your phenomenology is exactly like temperature: it is a handy way of describing what a statistically significant collection of atoms do. That is all it is: and the phenomena of phenomenology is no more exotic than the phenomena of temperature. The only difference is you happen to be inside looking in. Interesting, yes: possibly even ironic: but not world-shattering.

Simple, elegant, meaningful, logical. Couldn't ask for more.

 

[ebola]

UCE:

1) Are there, or are there not p-zombies?

2) How do you know?

3) If ( from your point of view ), from a hypothetical materialistic standpoint, there are p-zombies, is there no way to distinguish them from humans?

4) How do you know?

5) If you cannot distinguish p-zombies from humans, then are they not identical to humans?

6) How do you know?

7) If p-zombies are identical to humans, how are they not humans?

8) Do you agree that "identical to" and "indistinguishable from" are synonymous?

Eric

 

[AmateurScientist]

Amateur Scientist

Agreed. The p-zombie argument put forth by dualists is silly for several reasons, one of which is that the way philosophers define p-zombies--responding to questions, going to work, playing basketball, eating, doing everything humans do except for having the experience of those things--is absurd on its face.

Yes everyone feels that it is.

[/QUOTE]

It's more than a feeling (with apologies to Boston). It is true because of how we define objects or beings. If an object has all the characteristics of A, and behaves exactly like A, and is indistinguishable from A, then it is A.

The materialist paradigm insists that a p-zombie that has a fully functioning brain identical to a human's will by definition experience the same things a human will. Thus, the p-zombie will be a human.

Remember, the p-zombie argument is supposed to be a proof of the falsity of materialism. It isn't.

You're appealing to our feelings here in order to convince us that we are all material creatures living in a material world. But most non-materilists would emphatically agree with you in your sentiments.

I'm not trying to appeal to anyone's feelings. I'm trying to use rational arguments and critiques of others' arguments.

The problem for the materialist is that given his belief that the physical world is closed, that is to say given that everything that happens is due to prior physical causes, then we must say that a talking and walking duck does so entirely as a result of physical causes. More generally the entirety of human behavior is due to physical causes. Thus a p-zombie which is physically identical to a human being would act exactly the same as a human being. The only way to get around this would be to assert that p-zombies are logically impossible. This is equivalent to maintaining that physical processes within the brain logically necessitate the qualitative feel of consciousness. But obviously you need to provide reasons for supposing this to be so.

You keep trying to shift the burden of proof onto my shoulders. I believe the idealists or dualists of any stripe bear the burden of proving why we shouldn't adopt a materialist paradigm.

We are confident materialism is true because there is no credible, reliable evidence to suggest otherwise. Subjective impressions of a metamind are just that.

Research in neuroscience suggests that consciousness is a mere byproduct of the brain's inner workings. Plenty of empirical data suggest that our conscious awareness of a volitional bodily movement, for instance, arises approximately .5 to .8 second after the neuronal activity corresponding with the decision to engage that part of the body in movement occurs. What does that fact suggest to you? To any reasonable person it should suggest that the brain activity occurs first, and then the "mind" becomes aware of it.

It is incorrect to suggest that this implies interactive dualism. That merely begs the question of how matter might interact with "mind." That is terribly messy and non-parsimonious. Once again, no one has ever found any evidence of any interactive mechanism or other kind of "mind stuff."

Moreover, if we are to take your feelings seriously, shouldn't we also take peoples feelings that love, hope, despair etc are not numerically identical to a series of neurons firing? In which case the feelings you have expressed ought to compel us not to adopt materialism, but rather interactive dualism or idealism.

Once again, it's not my "feelings" that suggest p-zombies cannot exist. It's the way they are defined.

Plenty of scientific research suggests that indeed emotions are the result of chemical and hormonal reactions to stimuli and the neuronal activity resulting from them. This is perfectly consistent with a materialistic view. It does not suggest interactive dualism of idealism. I don't have any romantic notions about emotions coming from the heart or anywhere else other than the brain and its interactions with the endocrine system, or with foreign substances introduced into the body (e.g., drugs). I'm not at all concerned with others' "feelings" about where emotions might come from. "Feelings" do not determine physical truth. Science is not a democratic process.

AS

 

[Yahzi]

P-zombies are logically impossible because of the way they are defined.

P-Zombies are incoherent.

Image that a duck is defined as a bird that swims. Now imagine a duck that can't swim. What have you got? Because I just got a headache.

Once you can do that, then you can imagine mental processes that are exactly like mental processes in all ways, except they lack an attribute that defines them as mental processess.

What this boils down to is: imagine a duck that is exactly like a duck in all ways, except it isn't a duck.

You can't posit the results of mental states without positing the mental states. And you can't separate the qualia of mental states from the definition of mental states anymore than you can separate swimming from the definition of a duck.

Qualia aren't useless baggage of the mental states, they are the mechanism by which the mental states interact with each other. How can you imagine mental states interacting with each other to produce the effects of thought without imagining the mechanism by which the mental states interact with each other?

If you separate qualia by defining them to not be crucial to the interaction of mental states, then yes, you can create p-zombies, but you have also just determined that everyone is a p-zombie, because you have defined qualia to be meaningless supernumaries to thought.

Qualia either matter - in which case they cannot logically be absent - or they don't matter - in which case, it doesn't matter!

 

[Guest]

Please note that you misquoted me, I did not say p-zombies are impossible.

Although, I do agree with that.

Why are p-zombies impossible?

Well, if a "p-zombie" is indistinguishable (this includes internal organs INCLUDING the brain) from a human, then it is a human. It, having the same brain or near same brain it is indeed concious just like the human is.

Dark Cobra :

With the greatest respect, you do not appear to understand the argument, judging from your response. The reason the p-zombie is 'indistinguishable' is because there is no practical means of making the distinction. There is no way to objectify the subjective. YOU CANNOT THEN SAY THAT THE SUBJECTIVE DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS YOU YOURSELF LACK A SUBJECTIVE VIEWPOINT. YOU can tell that YOU are not a zombie because YOU are conscious. You can 'assume' that anything which is externally indistinguishable from a human is internally indistinguishable for a human, and it might even be a reasonable assumption, BUT IT REMAINS AN ASSUMPTION!

***You cannot base a claim of 'impossibility', logical or otherwise, ON AN ASSUMPTION, however reasonable.***

This is not complicated. Why are you having such difficulty accepting it?

You are currently providing the best example I have seen since PixyMisa of a person who appears completeley incapable of following a logical argument when their belief system is challenged.

NB : try responding to the logical argument I have posted instead of attempting to redefine the problem in order to avoid the logic.

 

[UnrepentantSinner]

O.k. UCE, I can do is offer my willingness to agree to disagree.

I need to use the time to figure out where this p-kinkajoo fits on the phylogenetic tree.

 

[Solitaire]

Robot boy
Again - it depends what you mean by 'interact'. Take the example of Schroedingers cat - it is entirely possible that the cat is both dead and alive till it is observed. The observation forces the 'collapse of the wave-function' and the cat ends up either dead or alive. There has been an interaction here, but the nature of the interaction is such that physics cannot investigate it because it is a metaphysical interaction rather than a physical one.

Pretty good, but be carefull. The observer that collapses the wavefunction
of the system is not a person, not a cat, not even a bacterium. A molecule,
even more an atom, or even better still a subatomic particle can re-entangle
the cats state with the rest of the universe.

Think about things like Bells 'non-locality' and 'quantum entanglement'.
These phenomena tell us that the Universe is non-local - that particles
seperates by vast distances are somehow directly connected at a deeper
level of reality. Materialists look at this evidence and just feel confused.
"It is a mystery" said Stimpson J Cat. Well, not to me it isn't. If the physical
world is composed of information residing in a 'metamind' then quantum
entanglement and non-locality are standard fare. It is the materialists
insistence on the self-existence of the physical world and their rejection
of non-locality that causes them to be mystified [NB Bells theorem is
mathematical FACT, and entanglement has been experimentally
demonstrated - the materialists just scratch their heads].
[/B]

Oh dear an error. You cannot transfer information, only entropy -
as in pure randomness. Another way to state it is: all noise, no signal.
It's really not a mystery, just conservation of momentum, I think.

 

[Peskanov]

UCE,

-----
quote:
Of course I'm not going to find a materialist who believes this. If they did, then they'd have to admit materialism is false. Turkeys don't vote for Christmas. The hypothesis that the subjective is a subset of the objective is forced upon materialists by their belief system, just as 7-day creationism is forced upon biblical literalists. In neither case am I interested in their beliefs. I am interested in logic and facts.
----

The only real fact is your own existence, and you know it. For the rest, you must work with whatever your senses bring. And materialism is both logic and evident, as far as I can see.

----
quote:
I see no logical reason why a brain should have an associated mind. All I see is arm-waving and unsubstantiated assertions.
----

You see no logical reason? Let's look one of many possible.
You directly perceive an internal discurse, and also memories. You can recall how you got a big part of your language you use in your thinking, but you don't know the residence of all this information or its nature. You also ignore it's limitations (how many words can I remenber?).
Study of the brain provides explanations for all those parts of your mind; what you perceive and what you not. Are you denying memory is part of your mind?
And the relation goes in the other way too: what is the function of the brain? Is the brain providing a memory mechanism just remenber how to move the muscles to scratch your nose? What is that big area of the brain which shows activity when you use language in your mind?
Is this arm-waving? You are rejecting what your senses told of the brain and the whole evolution behind it labelling them as sophisticated illusions! Im my view, this is unsubstantiated assertions unless you provide evidence.

-----
quote:
YES, if is a FACT. An absolute, undeniable, logically inevitable FACT. There is no objective means of determining whether a physical entity has a subjective internal state. It is logically impossible. If it was not logically impossible then it would be possible to logically eliminate solipsism. It is not logically possible to eliminate solipsism.
----

I said nothing about solipsism, not even imply it. As I said before, I know the only possible fact that can be determined is my own existence. For the assumtions we made, probability is the our best resource.
I am defending materialism. Can be a subjective internal state be detected in materialism? Yes, under materialist definitions. To disprove materialism you have to show these definitons are wrong, which you didn't.

----
quote:
I am not ignoring it. It is irrelevant to this specific question. Please explain how you think neuroscience can eliminate solipsism.
----

It does not; and all this has nothing to do with declaring materialism false.

----
quote:
The proof is here : How can you ever prove anything exists at all except for the contents of your own mind?
-----

What? Not proving materialism is not equal to disproving it. What kind of proof is this?
It's like saying "I can't prove tomorrow will rain. So, tomorrow will not rain"

----
quote:
As soon as you accept that you cannot eliminate the possibility that anything exists except the content of your own mind you must also accept that you cannot prove that the entities you percieve as other human beings have an internal state. If you want me to elaborate further I can do so, but you are an intelligent person and I think you know this is true anyway.
----

You keep forgetting that is YOU who is disproving materialism. I am not trying to prove it, I perfectly know it's not possible to prove anything outside my existence and logics.
I am debatting here to show that the materialist definitions addressing the mind are good, coherent, and that they can not be used for materialism refutal.

----
quote:
How does one detect consciousness in another physical entity?
----

Under materialism definitions?
1st step. Look for a brain. The external signs that we associate with our internal mind are only found in animals having an advanced brain.
2nd step. Finding consciousness; Instead of explaining it for myself (it's long), Google for the next words and make your own idea: consciousness 40 hz

----
quote:
How can you tell the difference between an extremely intelligent machine mimicking consciousness and an extremely intelligent machine which is actually conscious?
----

The question does not make sense in materialism. Materialism is telling you the contrary history. BTW, in materialism is assumed life & mechanism are not exclusive.

----
quote:
If you cannot, and you cannot , then the debate has nowhere to go. P-Zombies are not logically impossible. Once you accept that they are logically possible, then materialism cannot be convincingly defended.
----

I can not and I have not to. It has been told many times. In materialism P-Zombies are logically impossible.
Current materialist hypothesis about mind says consciousness is part of it; your behaviour depends on it as well as in the other functions of the mind. You can not replicate this mechanism without all his parts.

 

[Guest]

Peskanov

How can you tell the difference between an extremely intelligent machine mimicking consciousness and an extremely intelligent machine which is actually conscious?
----

The question does not make sense in materialism.

Then I rest my case. I rest my case because this question does make sense, and is extremely important. You are correct - materialism cannot even get to grips with the question, let alone have any hope of providing an answer.

edited :

This has been the problem all along. Every time that someone says "P-zombies are indistinguishable from humans" it is because "distinguishable" mean "objectively/scientifically distinguishable" and this in turn depends on materialism. My whole complaint about materialism is that it cannot touch subjective consicousness - it cannot define it, cannot observe it, cannot comprehend it - it might as well not exist. So it is a bit backwards for the materialists to then say "because our metaphysical system cannot comprehend subjective consciousness we will define entities which are conscious (1st person) and entities which are not conscious as "the same thing". I find it qute astonishing that the supposedly intelligent people here continue to peddle this line of 'reasoning'. It is roughly equivalent to a biblical literalist responding to big bang theory with "According to Biblical literalism there was no history of the Earth prior to 12,000 years ago, therefore there is no difference between biblical history and cosmological history. We can't make sense of your question."


What is it like to be a bat?

Apart from its own interest, a phenomenology that is in this sense objective may permit questions about the physically basis of experience to assume a more intelligible form. Aspects of subjective experience that admitted this kind of objective description might be better candidates for objective explanations of a more familiar sort. But whether or not this guess is correct, it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective. Otherwise we cannot even pose the mind-body problem without sidestepping it.

The materialist side-step is alive and well and living at JREF.

 

[metacristi]

AmateurScientist

Enough said about p-zombies. It is a cheat, plain and simple. I don't care how esteemed David Chalmers is among his groupies. He's wrong and not nearly as clever as he and his followers like to think he is.

You are harsh with Chalmers,in fact he is not a supporter of functional P-zombies.Here is an excerpt from his page dedicated to Zombies:


The first is that of a functional zombie, a non-conscious system physically different from but functionally isomorphic to a normal human. For example, a system with silicon chips instead of neurons. (This idea also goes by the more prosaic name of "absent qualia".) Some use the logical possibility of such a functional zombie to argue against reductive functionalist theories of consciousness (which hold that consciousness = functioning). Some go further and argue that functional zombies might even exist in the actual world, suggesting that any form of functionalism or artificial intelligence is doomed. Others (like me) deny that functional zombies could actually exist, so that AI is not threatened.

The other related idea is that of the zombie within, which has recently gotten some play in psychology and neuroscience. It turns out that quite a lot of human activity can be accomplished unconsciously -- e.g. unconscious perception, memory, and learning. And some (notably Milner and Goodale) have argued that there are major neural pathways devoted to unconscious processing of visual inputs that leads directly to motor action. This has led some to suggest that each of us contains a "zombie within" that unconsciously produces many of our motor responses, without our realizing it.

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/zombies.html


Prcactically he agrees that a human having all the neurons changed with a special type of silicon chips [mechanical relays] should have the same personality,qualia and self awareness included.Functional P-zombies are less probable in his view.

 

[AmateurScientist]

AmateurScientist




You are harsh with Chalmers,in fact he is not a supporter of functional P-zombies.Here is an excerpt from his page dedicated to Zombies:

I understand that Chalmers is perhaps the most vocal modern proponent of the idea that p-zombies play a large role in dealing what he considers a fatal blow to materialism. Chalmers postulates hypothetical p-zombies, not real zombies, as a means of suggesting that dualism is an inevitable result of their conceivability.

It's wrong.

What I find so astonishing is that Chalmers has been so widely embraced for just this message. He is quite the darling of many young philosophers. His message is apparently quite seductive. It is wrong, nontheless.

AS

 

[Guest]

AS :

Just out of interest.....

I know you believe that Chalmers is wrong. But what would be the implications and consequences, as you see them, if he was correct?