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Materialism

Now come: that thou mayst able be to know
That minds and the light souls of all that live
Have mortal birth and death, I will go on
Verses to build meet for thy rule of life,
Sought after long, discovered with sweet toil.
But under one name I'd have thee yoke them both;
And when, for instance, I shall speak of soul,
Teaching the same to be but mortal, think
Thereby I'm speaking also of the mind-
Since both are one, a substance interjoined.

First, then, since I have taught how soul exists
A subtle fabric, of particles minute,
Made up from atoms smaller much than those
Of water's liquid damp, or fog, or smoke,
So in mobility it far excels,
More prone to move, though strook by lighter cause
Even moved by images of smoke or fog-
As where we view, when in our sleeps we're lulled,
The altars exhaling steam and smoke aloft-
For, beyond doubt, these apparitions come
To us from outward. Now, then, since thou seest,
Their liquids depart, their waters flow away,
When jars are shivered, and since fog and smoke
Depart into the winds away, believe
The soul no less is shed abroad and dies
More quickly far, more quickly is dissolved
Back to its primal bodies, when withdrawn
From out man's members it has gone away.
For, sure, if body (container of the same
Like as a jar), when shivered from some cause,
And rarefied by loss of blood from veins,
Cannot for longer hold the soul, how then
Thinkst thou it can be held by any air-
A stuff much rarer than our bodies be?

Besides we feel that mind to being comes
Along with body, with body grows and ages.
For just as children totter round about
With frames infirm and tender, so there follows
A weakling wisdom in their minds; and then,
Where years have ripened into robust powers,
Counsel is also greater, more increased
The power of mind; thereafter, where already
The body's shattered by master-powers of eld,
And fallen the frame with its enfeebled powers,
Thought hobbles, tongue wanders, and the mind gives way;
All fails, all's lacking at the selfsame time.
Therefore it suits that even the soul's dissolved,
Like smoke, into the lofty winds of air;
Since we behold the same to being come
Along with body and grow, and, as I've taught,
Crumble and crack, therewith outworn by eld.

Then, too, we see, that, just as body takes
Monstrous diseases and the dreadful pain,
So mind its bitter cares, the grief, the fear;
Wherefore it tallies that the mind no less
Partaker is of death; for pain and disease
Are both artificers of death,- as well
We've learned by the passing of many a man ere now.
Nay, too, in diseases of body, often the mind
Wanders afield; for 'tis beside itself,
And crazed it speaks, or many a time it sinks,
With eyelids closing and a drooping nod,
In heavy drowse, on to eternal sleep;
From whence nor hears it any voices more,
Nor able is to know the faces here
Of those about him standing with wet cheeks
Who vainly call him back to light and life.
Wherefore mind too, confess we must, dissolves,
Seeing, indeed, contagions of disease
Enter into the same. Again, O why,
When the strong wine has entered into man,
And its diffused fire gone round the veins,
Why follows then a heaviness of limbs,
A tangle of the legs as round he reels,
A stuttering tongue, an intellect besoaked,
Eyes all aswim, and hiccups, shouts, and brawls
And whatso else is of that ilk?- Why this?-
If not that violent and impetuous wine
Is wont to confound the soul within the body?
But whatso can confounded be and balked,
Gives proof, that if a hardier cause got in,
'Twould hap that it would perish then, bereaved
Of any life thereafter. And, moreover,
Often will some one in a sudden fit,
As if by stroke of lightning, tumble down
Before our eyes, and sputter foam, and grunt,
Blither, and twist about with sinews taut,
Gasp up in starts, and weary out his limbs
With tossing round. No marvel, since distract
Through frame by violence of disease.

Confounds, he foams, as if to vomit soul,
As on the salt sea boil the billows round
Under the master might of winds. And now
A groan's forced out, because his limbs are griped
But, in the main, because the seeds of voice
Are driven forth and carried in a mass
Outwards by mouth, where they are wont to go,
And have a builded highway. He becomes
Mere fool, since energy of mind and soul
Confounded is, and, as I've shown, to-riven,
Asunder thrown, and torn to pieces all
By the same venom. But, again, where cause
Of that disease has faced about, and back
Retreats sharp poison of corrupted frame
Into its shadowy lairs, the man at first
Arises reeling, and gradually comes back
To all his senses and recovers soul.
Thus, since within the body itself of man
The mind and soul are by such great diseases
Shaken, so miserably in labour distraught,
Why, then, believe that in the open air,
Without a body, they can pass their life,
Immortal, battling with the master winds?
And, since we mark the mind itself is cured,
Like the sick body, and restored can be
By medicine, this is forewarning to
That mortal lives the mind. For proper it is
That whosoe'er begins and undertakes
To alter the mind, or meditates to change
Any another nature soever, should add
New parts, or readjust the order given,
Or from the sum remove at least a bit.
But what's immortal willeth for itself
Its parts be nor increased, nor rearranged,
Nor any bit soever flow away:
For change of anything from out its bounds
Means instant death of that which was before.
Ergo, the mind, whether in sickness fallen,
Or by the medicine restored, gives signs,
As I have taught, of its mortality.
So surely will a fact of truth make head
'Gainst errors' theories all, and so shut off
All refuge from the adversary, and rout
Error by two-edged confutation.

And since the mind is of a man one part,
Which in one fixed place remains, like ears,
And eyes, and every sense which pilots life;
And just as hand, or eye, or nose, apart,
Severed from us, can neither feel nor be,
But in the least of time is left to rot,
Thus mind alone can never be, without
The body and the man himself, which seems,
As 'twere the vessel of the same- or aught
Whate'er thou'lt feign as yet more closely joined:
Since body cleaves to mind by surest bonds.

Again, the body's and the mind's live powers
Only in union prosper and enjoy;
For neither can nature of mind, alone of itself
Sans body, give the vital motions forth;
Nor, then, can body, wanting soul, endure
And use the senses. Verily, as the eye,
Alone, up-rended from its roots, apart
From all the body, can peer about at naught,
So soul and mind it seems are nothing able,
When by themselves. No marvel, because, commixed
Through veins and inwards, and through bones and thews,
Their elements primordial are confined
By all the body, and own no power free
To bound around through interspaces big,
Thus, shut within these confines, they take on
Motions of sense, which, after death, thrown out
Beyond the body to the winds of air,
Take on they cannot- and on this account,
Because no more in such a way confined.
For air will be a body, be alive,
If in that air the soul can keep itself,
And in that air enclose those motions all
Which in the thews and in the body itself
A while ago 'twas making. So for this,
Again, again, I say confess we must,
That, when the body's wrappings are unwound,
And when the vital breath is forced without,
The soul, the senses of the mind dissolve,-
Since for the twain the cause and ground of life
Is in the fact of their conjoined estate.

Once more, since body's unable to sustain
Division from the soul, without decay
And obscene stench, how canst thou doubt but that
The soul, uprisen from the body's deeps,
Has filtered away, wide-drifted like a smoke,
Or that the changed body crumbling fell
With ruin so entire, because, indeed,
Its deep foundations have been moved from place,
The soul out-filtering even through the frame,
And through the body's every winding way
And orifice? And so by many means
Thou'rt free to learn that nature of the soul
Hath passed in fragments out along the frame,
And that 'twas shivered in the very body
Ere ever it slipped abroad and swam away
Into the winds of air. For never a man
Dying appears to feel the soul go forth
As one sure whole from all his body at once,
Nor first come up the throat and into mouth;
But feels it failing in a certain spot,
Even as he knows the senses too dissolve
Each in its own location in the frame.
But were this mind of ours immortal mind,
Dying 'twould scarce bewail a dissolution,
But rather the going, the leaving of its coat,
Like to a snake. Wherefore, when once the body
Hath passed away, admit we must that soul,
Shivered in all that body, perished too.
Nay, even when moving in the bounds of life,
Often the soul, now tottering from some cause,
Craves to go out, and from the frame entire
Loosened to be; the countenance becomes
Flaccid, as if the supreme hour were there;
And flabbily collapse the members all
Against the bloodless trunk- the kind of case
We see when we remark in common phrase,
"That man's quite gone," or "fainted dead away";
And where there's now a bustle of alarm,
And all are eager to get some hold upon
The man's last link of life. For then the mind
And all the power of soul are shook so sore,
And these so totter along with all the frame,
That any cause a little stronger might
Dissolve them altogether.- Why, then, doubt
That soul, when once without the body thrust,
There in the open, an enfeebled thing,
Its wrappings stripped away, cannot endure
Not only through no everlasting age,
But even, indeed, through not the least of time?

Then, too, why never is the intellect,
The counselling mind, begotten in the head,
The feet, the hands, instead of cleaving still
To one sole seat, to one fixed haunt, the breast,
If not that fixed places be assigned
For each thing's birth, where each, when 'tis create,
Is able to endure, and that our frames
Have such complex adjustments that no shift
In order of our members may appear?
To that degree effect succeeds to cause,
Nor is the flame once wont to be create
In flowing streams, nor cold begot in fire.
Besides, if nature of soul immortal be,
And able to feel, when from our frame disjoined,
The same, I fancy, must be thought to be
Endowed with senses five,- nor is there way
But this whereby to image to ourselves
How under-souls may roam in Acheron.
Thus painters and the elder race of bards
Have pictured souls with senses so endowed.
But neither eyes, nor nose, nor hand, alone
Apart from body can exist for soul,
Nor tongue nor ears apart. And hence indeed
Alone by self they can nor feel nor be.

And since we mark the vital sense to be
In the whole body, all one living thing,
If of a sudden a force with rapid stroke
Should slice it down the middle and cleave in twain,
Beyond a doubt likewise the soul itself,
Divided, dissevered, asunder will be flung
Along with body. But what severed is
And into sundry parts divides, indeed
Admits it owns no everlasting nature.
We hear how chariots of war, areek
With hurly slaughter, lop with flashing scythes
The limbs away so suddenly that there,
Fallen from the trunk, they quiver on the earth,
The while the mind and powers of the man
Can feel no pain, for swiftness of his hurt,
And sheer abandon in the zest of battle:
With the remainder of his frame he seeks
Anew the battle and the slaughter, nor marks
How the swift wheels and scythes of ravin have dragged
Off with the horses his left arm and shield;
Nor other how his right has dropped away,
Mounting again and on. A third attempts
With leg dismembered to arise and stand,
Whilst, on the ground hard by, the dying foot
Twitches its spreading toes. And even the head,
When from the warm and living trunk lopped off,
Keeps on the ground the vital countenance
And open eyes, until 't has rendered up
All remnants of the soul. Nay, once again:
If, when a serpent's darting forth its tongue,
And lashing its tail, thou gettest chance to hew
With axe its length of trunk to many parts,
Thou'lt see each severed fragment writhing round
With its fresh wound, and spattering up the sod,
And there the fore-part seeking with the jaws
After the hinder, with bite to stop the pain.
So shall we say that these be souls entire
In all those fractions?- but from that 'twould follow
One creature'd have in body many souls.
Therefore, the soul, which was indeed but one,
Has been divided with the body too:
Each is but mortal, since alike is each
Hewn into many parts. Again, how often
We view our fellow going by degrees,
And losing limb by limb the vital sense;
First nails and fingers of the feet turn blue,
Next die the feet and legs, then o'er the rest
Slow crawl the certain footsteps of cold death.
And since this nature of the soul is torn,
Nor mounts away, as at one time, entire,
We needs must hold it mortal. But perchance
If thou supposest that the soul itself
Can inward draw along the frame, and bring
Its parts together to one place, and so
From all the members draw the sense away,
Why, then, that place in which such stock of soul
Collected is, should greater seem in sense.
But since such place is nowhere, for a fact,
As said before, 'tis rent and scattered forth,
And so goes under. Or again, if now
I please to grant the false, and say that soul
Can thus be lumped within the frames of those
Who leave the sunshine, dying bit by bit,
Still must the soul as mortal be confessed;
Nor aught it matters whether to wrack it go,
Dispersed in the winds, or, gathered in a mass
From all its parts, sink down to brutish death,
Since more and more in every region sense
Fails the whole man, and less and less of life
In every region lingers.
And besides,
If soul immortal is, and winds its way
Into the body at the birth of man,
Why can we not remember something, then,
Of life-time spent before? why keep we not
Some footprints of the things we did of, old?
But if so changed hath been the power of mind,
That every recollection of things done
Is fallen away, at no o'erlong remove
Is that, I trow, from what we mean by death.
Wherefore 'tis sure that what hath been before
Hath died, and what now is is now create.
Moreover, if after the body hath been built
Our mind's live powers are wont to be put in,
Just at the moment that we come to birth,
And cross the sills of life, 'twould scarcely fit
For them to live as if they seemed to grow
Along with limbs and frame, even in the blood,
But rather as in a cavern all alone.
(Yet all the body duly throngs with sense.)
But public fact declares against all this:
For soul is so entwined through the veins,
The flesh, the thews, the bones, that even the teeth
Share in sensation, as proven by dull ache,
By twinge from icy water, or grating crunch
Upon a stone that got in mouth with bread.
Wherefore, again, again, souls must be thought
Nor void of birth, nor free from law of death;
Nor, if, from outward, in they wound their way,
Could they be thought as able so to cleave
To these our frames, nor, since so interwove,
Appears it that they're able to go forth
Unhurt and whole and loose themselves unscathed
From all the thews, articulations, bones.
But, if perchance thou thinkest that the soul,
From outward winding in its way, is wont
To seep and soak along these members ours,
Then all the more 'twill perish, being thus
With body fused- for what will seep and soak
Will be dissolved and will therefore die.
For just as food, dispersed through all the pores
Of body, and passed through limbs and all the frame,
Perishes, supplying from itself the stuff
For other nature, thus the soul and mind,
Though whole and new into a body going,
Are yet, by seeping in, dissolved away,
Whilst, as through pores, to all the frame there pass
Those particles from which created is
This nature of mind, now ruler of our body,
Born from that soul which perished, when divided
Along the frame. Wherefore it seems that soul
Hath both a natal and funeral hour.
Besides are seeds of soul there left behind
In the breathless body, or not? If there they are,
It cannot justly be immortal deemed,
Since, shorn of some parts lost, 'thas gone away:
But if, borne off with members uncorrupt,
'Thas fled so absolutely all away
It leaves not one remainder of itself
Behind in body, whence do cadavers, then,
From out their putrid flesh exhale the worms,
And whence does such a mass of living things,
Boneless and bloodless, o'er the bloated frame
Bubble and swarm? But if perchance thou thinkest
That souls from outward into worms can wind,
And each into a separate body come,
And reckonest not why many thousand souls
Collect where only one has gone away,
Here is a point, in sooth, that seems to need
Inquiry and a putting to the test:
Whether the souls go on a hunt for seeds
Of worms wherewith to build their dwelling places,
Or enter bodies ready-made, as 'twere.
But why themselves they thus should do and toil
'Tis hard to say, since, being free of body,
They flit around, harassed by no disease,
Nor cold nor famine; for the body labours
By more of kinship to these flaws of life,
And mind by contact with that body suffers
So many ills. But grant it be for them
However useful to construct a body
To which to enter in, 'tis plain they can't.
Then, souls for self no frames nor bodies make,
Nor is there how they once might enter in
To bodies ready-made- for they cannot
Be nicely interwoven with the same,
And there'll be formed no interplay of sense
Common to each.
Again, why is't there goes
Impetuous rage with lion's breed morose,
And cunning with foxes, and to deer why given
The ancestral fear and tendency to flee,
And why in short do all the rest of traits
Engender from the very start of life
In the members and mentality, if not
Because one certain power of mind that came
From its own seed and breed waxes the same
Along with all the body? But were mind
Immortal, were it wont to change its bodies,
How topsy-turvy would earth's creatures act!
The Hyrcan hound would flee the onset oft
Of antlered stag, the scurrying hawk would quake
Along the winds of air at the coming dove,
And men would dote, and savage beasts be wise;
For false the reasoning of those that say
Immortal mind is changed by change of body-
For what is changed dissolves, and therefore dies.
For parts are re-disposed and leave their order;
Wherefore they must be also capable
Of dissolution through the frame at last,
That they along with body perish all.
But should some say that always souls of men
Go into human bodies, I will ask:
How can a wise become a dullard soul?
And why is never a child's a prudent soul?
And the mare's filly why not trained so well
As sturdy strength of steed? We may be sure
They'll take their refuge in the thought that mind
Becomes a weakling in a weakling frame.
Yet be this so, 'tis needful to confess
The soul but mortal, since, so altered now
Throughout the frame, it loses the life and sense
It had before. Or how can mind wax strong
Co-equally with body and attain
The craved flower of life, unless it be
The body's colleague in its origins?
Or what's the purport of its going forth
From aged limbs?- fears it, perhaps, to stay,
Pent in a crumbled body? Or lest its house,
Outworn by venerable length of days,
May topple down upon it? But indeed
For an immortal, perils are there none.

Again, at parturitions of the wild
And at the rites of Love, that souls should stand
Ready hard by seems ludicrous enough-
Immortals waiting for their mortal limbs
In numbers innumerable, contending madly
Which shall be first and chief to enter in!-
Unless perchance among the souls there be
Such treaties stablished that the first to come
Flying along, shall enter in the first,
And that they make no rivalries of strength!

Again, in ether can't exist a tree,
Nor clouds in ocean deeps, nor in the fields
Can fishes live, nor blood in timber be,
Nor sap in boulders: fixed and arranged
Where everything may grow and have its place.
Thus nature of mind cannot arise alone
Without the body, nor exist afar
From thews and blood. But if 'twere possible,
Much rather might this very power of mind
Be in the head, the shoulders or the heels,
And, born in any part soever, yet
In the same man, in the same vessel abide.
But since within this body even of ours
Stands fixed and appears arranged sure
Where soul and mind can each exist and grow,
Deny we must the more that they can have
Duration and birth, wholly outside the frame.
For, verily, the mortal to conjoin
With the eternal, and to feign they feel
Together, and can function each with each,
Is but to dote: for what can be conceived
Of more unlike, discrepant, ill-assorted,
Than something mortal in a union joined
With an immortal and a secular
To bear the outrageous tempests?
Then, again,
Whatever abides eternal must indeed
Either repel all strokes, because 'tis made
Of solid body, and permit no entrance
Of aught with power to sunder from within
The parts compact- as are those seeds of stuff
Whose nature we've exhibited before;
Or else be able to endure through time
For this: because they are from blows exempt,
As is the void, the which abides untouched,
Unsmit by any stroke; or else because
There is no room around, whereto things can,
As 'twere, depart in dissolution all,-
Even as the sum of sums eternal is,
Without or place beyond whereto things may
Asunder fly, or bodies which can smite,
And thus dissolve them by the blows of might.
But if perchance the soul's to be adjudged
Immortal, mainly on ground 'tis kept secure
In vital forces- either because there come
Never at all things hostile to its weal,
Or else because what come somehow retire,
Repelled or ere we feel the harm they work,

For, lo, besides that, when the frame's diseased,
Soul sickens too, there cometh, many a time,
That which torments it with the things to be,
Keeps it in dread, and wearies it with cares;
And even when evil acts are of the past,
Still gnaw the old transgressions bitterly.
Add, too, that frenzy, peculiar to the mind,
And that oblivion of the things that were;
Add its submergence in the murky waves
Of drowse and torpor.

http://classics.mit.edu/Carus/nature_things.3.iii.html
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
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This is not what you've said before! I'm pleased though you're now being sensible about it. So you now concede that materialism entails that reality exists in abstraction from our perception of it. Good!
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Of course it does! Good grief man, have you never once listened to single word I have said!

In fact listening to you is precisely the problem! You contradict yourself time after time after time!

Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?

OK, 3 points. What is wrong with my definition of objective reality which you were quite happy to accept before? Namely where an objective reality simply means the idea that people with appropriate unimpaired senses, or appropriate instruments, will sensorily experience pretty much the same as each other in the same situation. Why do you need to introduce the idea of a reality existing independently of our perceptions in order to define objective reality?

Secondly, what is the nature of this reality existing independently of our perceptions? Does redness as experienced rather than a particular wavelength exist independently of our perceptions? Bear in mind that what we see is very heavily moulded by our minds. Indeed I would suggest that what we sensorily experience is inevitably moulded by low level theory and that the theoretical lens which we view the world constitutes reality. You, on the other hand, subscribe to a reality existing in abstraction from our theories (as the Universe would still exist in a full-blooded sense even if all consciousnesses ceased to be). So how can we talk about a reality existing in abstraction from such theories?? Tell me what it is like man!

Thirdly, doesn't this admission by you that reality exists in abstraction from our perceptions, and indeed reality would still exist in a "full-blooded" sense even though all consciousnesses in the Universe were to cease to exist, make a nonsense of your claim that your materialism makes no ontological claims? Is it not the fact that in essence your materialism is not significantly different from the materialism of 100 years ago??
 
Ian,

Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?
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OK, 3 points. What is wrong with my definition of objective reality which you were quite happy to accept before? Namely where an objective reality simply means the idea that people with appropriate unimpaired senses, or appropriate instruments, will sensorily experience pretty much the same as each other in the same situation.

I never agreed to that definition. In fact, it is nonsensical. For one thing, it requires that you have already accepted that other people objectively exist. How can I define the term "objective existence" in such a way that its own definition refers to itself? Can you say circular?

The conception of objective reality must be defined independently of other people. Only once it is defined is it even meaningful to say that other people exist.

Why do you need to introduce the idea of a reality existing independently of our perceptions in order to define objective reality?

I don't I. Materialism does not claim that reality exists independently of our perceptions, but rather that our perceptions are a part of reality. Specifically, I am a subset of reality (I exist), and my perceptions are the interaction between me and the rest of reality.

Secondly, what is the nature of this reality existing independently of our perceptions?

Since it does not exist independently of my perceptions, the question is meaningless. The nature of reality can be determined by analyzing how it interacts with me.

Does redness as experienced rather than a particular wavelength exist independently of our perceptions?

Of course not. You have just defined it to be "as experienced", so how could it possibly exist independently of the process of experiencing it (perception)?

Bear in mind that what we see is very heavily moulded by our minds.

Which is exactly why reality cannot be both objective, and also our perceptions.

Indeed I would suggest that what we sensorily experience is inevitably moulded by low level theory and that the theoretical lens which we view the world constitutes reality.

Yes. That is exactly why we need the scientific method. The only way to learn anything about the actual objective reality, is to take into account the subjective bias inherent in our perceptions.

You, on the other hand, subscribe to a reality existing in abstraction from our theories (as the Universe would still exist in a full-blooded sense even if all consciousnesses ceased to be). So how can we talk about a reality existing in abstraction from such theories?? Tell me what it is like man!

What do you mean? Our observations give us information about reality. Since our observations are our only source of information about it, we must describe it in terms of them. The non-existence of our minds would not change the way things work, though. It would just mean that there is nobody there to observe it. So what?

Thirdly, doesn't this admission by you that reality exists in abstraction from our perceptions, and indeed reality would still exist in a "full-blooded" sense even though all consciousnesses in the Universe were to cease to exist, make a nonsense of your claim that your materialism makes no ontological claims?

No. As I have stated many times before, the individual axioms of materialism, of which that is one, are not individually falsifiable, but the complete framework is. This means that materialism as a whole is not a metaphysical hypothesis, but a falsifiable theory, for which it is possible to accumulate supporting evidence.

Remember that through the application of the scientific method, I can conclude not only that other people exist, but that they are fundamentally no different than me. I can observe that when they die, their own perceptions of reality cease, as evidenced by the fact that the mechanism by which they make those perceptions, is non-functional. I can therefore conclude that when my own perceptions cease, that reality will continue to exist. This is an epistemological claim, not an ontological one.

Is it not the fact that in essence your materialism is not significantly different from the materialism of 100 years ago??

The difference is that it is not based on an incoherent notion of ontological reality, but rather on a definition of reality as being me, plus anything that interacts with me, plus anything that interacts with that, and so on.

It is very simple. I define existence as follows:

1) I exist.

2) Anything that interacts with something that exists, also exists.

Given that, if I were to cease to exist, that does not imply that everything else that currently exists would no longer exist. That is just silly.

Just because I describe reality in terms of my observations, does not mean that I believe that reality is somehow dependent on my observations for its very existence.

Dr. Stupid
 
Q-Source said:
In Economics we always make the following assumptions:
there is perfect information among consumers and producers,
goods are homogeneous, agents are rationals, there is free entry
to the market, etc.
Wow! :eek:
No wonder it's called the dismal science.
You could never make a prediction because
every one of those assumptions is wrong.
 
Hello UCE

I understand this. But Chalmers 'Hard Problem' remains real, and causes us to be forced to make one exception to this rule when it comes to answering the quesiton of the fundamental relationship between mind and matter. Once you accept the Hard Problem exists then sciences epistemological privilege, with regard to this one specific question, must be forfeit. The Hard Problem renders materialistic science theoretically incapable of answering the question. Ever.


Indeed but there are possible interpretations that are very close to an 'extended materialism' as I defined it above.Chalmers for example is a panprotopsychist,he believes that what we name qualia is 'embedded' at a fundamental level of Reality [Planck level] with what we name matter [possible in the form of superstrings for example],that's why we cannot explain it.No need to introduce a metamind.Some might name this 'idealism' in the virtue of the usual definition of materialism but if 'qualia' does indeed exist at the ultimate level of reality then by extension I can include it in the 'physical objects' category.
Penrose refined further this position by introducing it in the frame of QM.Qualia is a fundamental aspect of reality which our mind 'access';conscious experience is seen as an emergent propriety created by computable processes and non computable platonic influences existing at the fundamental level of reality in a superposition of states.Microtubules in the brain are thought to produce the 'wave collapse' of the fundamental influences.




But it is also theoretically impossible to ever prove that we have created artificial consciousness. We can never reach the point you speak of.


Chalmers proposed an imaginary ,for the moment only,experiment that could falsify at least strong AI.If after replacing all neurones of a human being with a special kind of relays we would obtain the same consciusness as before then we can conclude that mind is computable-therefore strong AI is correct:machines can become conscious once a certain threshold of neuronal-like complexity is reached.




Ultimately I think the answer is that materialism is correct, within its domain. The problem is that the scientific world has a tendency to treat it as the domain of 'everything'. The whole of materialistic science can be taken, intact, and placed within consciousness. Then you can see that from the two different perspectives both models can make sense. The answer to this question is the same as the answer to many other questions. You have X and Y which appear to be opposites but are in fact complementary halves of a deeper truth that can only be grasped by taking a step back. The relationship between idealism and materialism is similar to the relationship between 1 and -1.


I understand your point but we must be aware of the fact that even this metamind could very well be at a level that it is not the fundamental level of reality.Even if you are correct that a metamind exist we cannot assess that this metamind is fundamental.Nonwithstanding that some might name this metamind God. Ultimately it is very possible that even this metamind can be reduced at some 'building blocks' of matter at an ultimate level of reality which are 'mindless'.Materialism could still hold then.
My personal point of view is close to that of Russell or Bohm:what we name mind and matter are effects of something fundamental which is both of them and though neither of them...
 
Neo,

So, given our initial presumption that we are wholly material creatures living in a wholly material world, we can then say Darwinism explains why consciousness arose. But what it does not do is vindicate materialism in any shape or form.
But the point being made by uce is that it invalidates materialism - which it doesn't, as far as I can see.
 
UCE


From the ABSTRACT

A non-local order is one that involves interconnection, that is, active information flows that are independent of time and space or the movement of particles at the speed of light.


Unfortunately it was proved fairly recently [in the mid 1990-th] that we cannot use nonlocality to send information with ultraluminal speeds.This gives sufficient reason,for the moment, to not accept the claim of many that science proved that all our minds are interconnected being the 'projections' of a supermind.
Note I do not claim that this is impossible but only that for the moment this claim does not follows directly from scientific facts.Indeed the 'supermind' theory is still a possibility even in an 'extended materialism' frame.Incidentaly I am a supporter of the metamind theory in the extended materialism frame but as a matter of belief only.I am open to all logically acceptable possibilities compatible with the observed reality.
 
The One called Neo said:



Epiphenomenalists/weak dualists would take issue with this. On the other hand interactive dualists, idealists and materialists would all agree with this. Now for the materialist our behaviour is wholly a consequence of environmental stimuli and physical processes within the brain ie the world is physically closed. So how does the materialist reconcile this apparent paradox?

He does so by claiming that consciousness is either to be identified with such physical processes, or that consciousness is a logical consequence of such physical processes. Thus the problem is then solved and materialists can claim that consciousness is necessary for behaviour, and of course conversely p-zombies are logically impossible i.e they are no logically possible Universes where p-zombies exist.

So, given our initial presumption that we are wholly material creatures living in a wholly material world, we can then say Darwinism explains why consciousness arose. But what it does not do is vindicate materialism in any shape or form.

Are you in agreement with this?
Jesh, this thread moves fast! I dont really give a d*mn about 'isms of any kind. What matters to me is that the world appears to be real, it appears to follow rules, I must act as if I make choices, and all speculations of a non-physical realm are, while interesting, just that: Speculations.

Hans
 
Ian


My personal position is that the usual definition of materialism [valid also for my definition] is an assumption,an axiom which fully deserves the label 'belief'.However given the actual success of science in explaining the observed facts it has epistemological privilege over all other views.It could [why not?] prove to be even correct.


Why do people keep repeating this idea that science somehow suggests or implies the correctness of materialism. It emphatically does not! Science does not vindicate materialism in any shape or form. Indeed science is vastly more consistent with idealism. I'm somewhat weary of repeating this point time after time after time.


It's clear that we must have a reference point preferably the one which makes sense in a parsimonious manner by the observed reality:consequently science is 'pragmatic' using the least number of axioms.
I've never implied that science vindicated [usual] materialism but only that in the virtue of the parsimony principle [usual] materialism is the easiest way to make sense of the observed reality.It 'works for all our practical purposes' at least now.I consider that usual materialism [=the privileged working assumption] is rather an axiom [in spite of the fact that we 'confirm it' everyday] 'raised' at the 'power' of 'fallible objective truth'.That's all.
Given that science bases its assumptions on a certain number of axioms and moreover is fallible this does not imply that [usual definition of] materialism is true.


The latest research in neurology and AI point out that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon of matter which,moreover,seems to be computable.

I think not.


I did not imply that science prove that but only that it tends toward that based on some inductive inferences.This simply means that the 'usual materialism' hypothesis should be checked first.But it still remain a hypothesis for the moment nothing more.

Inductive inferences are widely used in science.In this case scientists observed that some of the 'inputs' appearing in both AI [like some chess programs for example] and human consciousness [mechanical relays-firing neurons] produce the same 'output'-an 'intuitive' type of thinking.Hence the belief that usual materialism should be checked first,being the most promising 'working hypothesis'.
This neither implies that usual materialism has been proved correct nor that we should believe that usual materialism is correct.
 
UndercoverElephant said:

Again, this problem disappears when it is explained what is meant by "people". People are indeed made of atoms. It is the ontological status of the atoms themselves which alters under idealism. The entire physical world still exists, and still behaves as it does under materialism, it just doesn't self-exist all on its ownsome - it exists in the form of information in a higher Mental Reality. People are made of atoms.


UCE,

This statement is internally inconsistent; it is self-contradictory.

Your description of the material world is such that it is a subset of a larger world--the Metamind, as you call it. You might as well call it "God." There is no practical difference.

As Q-Source has already indicated, your supposition that such a Metamind exists is based on nothing but faith. There is absolutely no evidence that a Metamind or collective consciousness exists. Your inference that it does exist because of the "spooky action at a distance," as Einstein called it--non-locality and instantaneous transmittal of information--is unfounded. Simply because such apparently instantaneous transmittal occurs between related pairs of particles, recently discovered, cannot be explained within a relativistic paradigm, does not yield the result that idealism is the inevitable conclusion.

Instead, you "explain" away certain apparent mysteries observed in science by declaring them to be metaphysical. How convenient! There are no hard problems of consciousness or physical mysteries at all if it's all just a meta-thought!

The contradiction arises from the fact that materialism holds that the physical world is all there is. Everything that exists is physical matter or a resultant property of the physical. Thus, a Metamind which exists outside this physical world, as a greater set containing the subset of material world must, is incoherent. It contradicts your assertion that a physical world which behaves as it does under materialism exists within it.

Essentially, your paradigm is little more than an assertion that we are merely players in God's daydream. The joke is on us, of course, as we don't know that we're just p-zombies.

Sorry, but your brand of idealism/materialism being yin and yang isn't very satisfying intellectually, despite your attempts to dress it up with references to various esteemed philosophers and physicists.

It's still just mysticism or idealism under any other name.

I do give you points for creativity, however, and also for being well-versed in the subject matter.

AS
 
AmateurScientist said:
As Q-Source has already indicated, your supposition that such a Metamind exists is based on nothing but faith. There is absolutely no evidence that a Metamind or collective consciousness exists.

I can't speak for UCE but I can assure you that my belief in a metamind is not a faith. It would be more accurate to say that the materialists base their belief system on faith. Haven't got time to expand at the moment though cos going out soon and will be out all day.
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
Stimpy
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Materialism holds that reality is what we perceive, and not our perceptions itself. How many times have I told you this?
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II
OK, 3 points. What is wrong with my definition of objective reality which you were quite happy to accept before? Namely where an objective reality simply means the idea that people with appropriate unimpaired senses, or appropriate instruments, will sensorily experience pretty much the same as each other in the same situation.
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Stimpy
I never agreed to that definition. In fact, it is nonsensical. For one thing, it requires that you have already accepted that other people objectively exist. How can I define the term "objective existence" in such a way that its own definition refers to itself? Can you say circular?

People do exist. We can see them. touch them, hear them etc. Whether they are p-zombies or not is irrelevant.

The conception of objective reality must be defined independently of other people. Only once it is defined is it even meaningful to say that other people exist.

Rubbish. Objective reality must be defined in terms of a consensus in what people actually experience. Got to go now, will finish this post later.
 
John Lockard said:

Wow!
No wonder it's called the dismal science.
You could never make a prediction because
every one of those assumptions is wrong.

Actually, Economists can make very accurate predictions.
They start by assuming that there are perfect conditions in order to explain what is an ideal scenario. Thanks to that, it is possible to alter the assumptions and see what happens in reality.

I don't see what is wrong with that. It is not exclusive of Economic Science and it is the only possible way to understand what's going on.

Q-S
 
That is correct, and it is the way to do things scientifically: If a parameter cannot be established, that is, its probable range is unknown, it must be assumed ideal. Of course, if too many parameters are set that way, the confidence level of the result becomes low, but it would be even worse if those parameters were given an arbitrary range because the result would now contain imaginary figures.

So, while it may seem counterintuitive, the most correct result is actually reached by assuming unknown parameters ideal.

Hans
 
Ian,

I never agreed to that definition. In fact, it is nonsensical. For one thing, it requires that you have already accepted that other people objectively exist. How can I define the term "objective existence" in such a way that its own definition refers to itself? Can you say circular?
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People do exist. We can see them. touch them, hear them etc. Whether they are p-zombies or not is irrelevant.

This argument is only valid once you have accepted that reality objectively exists. To use the existence of said humans in your definition of "objective reality" is therefore nonsensical.

The conception of objective reality must be defined independently of other people. Only once it is defined is it even meaningful to say that other people exist.
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Rubbish. Objective reality must be defined in terms of a consensus in what people actually experience. Got to go now, will finish this post later.

Must be? Why? What is wrong with the definition I gave? And once again, how can objective reality be defined in terms of a consensus of what people experience, when the very idea that other people do exist, depends on reality being objective?

In order for there to be a consensus of people's experiences, those people must objectively exist.

Dr. Stupid
 
Q-Source said:
For the first time, you agree with me. ;)
Not at all, I agree with you often, but this being a debate forum, the tendency is to post only if we disagree ;) .

(Not, of course, that you can take silence as acceptance :D )

Cheers,
Hans :cool:
 
UndercoverElephant said:


For me, P-Zombies are a nonsense that are implied by materialism. They are logically possible. That is their only purpose. They do not need to actually exist, any more than Schroedingers cat.

But this is precisely what the materialist must dispute. He cannot agree to your declaration here, otherwise materialism is refuted. The logical possibility of P-zombies are implied by the idea that the world is physically closed. Obviously materialism holds the world is physically closed. But the materialists avoids the p-zombie conclusion by asserting that once we have certain physical processes, such as that which obtains in brains, then it is logically necessary that we also have consciousness. This means that even in absolutely totally different Universes where there are different physical laws of nature, or indeed no physical laws at all, experiences must accompany certain given physical processes. At least this was my understanding although I've never read any of David Chalmers arguments.

It does seem to me though that the onus is on the materialist to demonstrate that consciousness is logically entailed by certain given physical processes (as opposed to naturally entailed by physical laws).
 
Neo
But the materialists avoids the p-zombie conclusion by asserting that once we have certain physical processes, such as that which obtains in brains, then it is logically necessary that we also have consciousness.
But the materialists avoids the hot water without heat conclusion by asserting that once we have Brownian motion, such as that which obtains in hot water, then it is logically necessary that we also have temperature.

Does my variation of your argument strike you as at all problematic?

If not, then why would substituting "temperature" for "consciousness" make a difference?
 

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