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Materialism

Lord Kenneth

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Nov 25, 2002
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I decided to make a topic. Because.

Well, I want Ian and UCE to explain to me why materialism is, well, silly (that's what they think, obviously).

Also, I haven't discussed things in this realm very much, so go easy on me (explain things in ways I can understand).
 
Dark Cobra said:
I decided to make a topic. Because.

Well, I want Ian and UCE to explain to me why materialism is, well, silly (that's what they think, obviously).

Also, I haven't discussed things in this realm very much, so go easy on me (explain things in ways I can understand).

Stare deeply into Pandoras' box...... ;)

The problem is known as the mind-body problem and it is very well described here :

http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/mind.htm

NB : Most materialists encountering this paper misunderstand statement 5 :

1. For any system, every fact about the whole is a necessary consequence of the nature and relations of the parts.

2. People are made of atoms.

3. Atoms are purely physical objects, with nothing but physical properties and physical relations to one another.

4. People have mental states.

5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.

Just to avoid that discussion, I should point out that statement 5 is about linguistics, and is a natural consequence of a linguistic dualism which really does exist. All five of the above theses can be succesfully defended as true.

The solution to the mind-body problem that works is Berkeleys solution, however this is generally dismissed as 'ludicrous', mainly because it isn't properly understood:

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~ursa/philos/az98.htm

My own take on the solution, posted on another site about a year ago :

http://www.mythical.net/cgi-bin/ubbcgi/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=2&t=000122


The problem I have found is that the materialists will defend their belief system as fanatically as any Christian. They are not interested in the solution. They are interested in trying to demonstrate the problem doesn't exist. But the problem does exist, which is why it has been argued about continuously for 400 years.
 
Another view says that there simply are no mental phenomena. There is only the physical world. The existence of consciousness, therefore, must be some kind of massive delusion: contrary to popular opinion, nobody has any opinions, desires, or feelings. We are all just mindless automata. This lunatic view may be called radical materialism or eliminative materialism.

Franko is constantly defending this one. All he does is add the Logical Goddess as a controller of the functions of these automata. "You are made of atoms. Atoms obey TLOP. Therefore, you obey TLOP." (Given that TLOP are the commands of the LG, so that "obedience" to TLOP is actually obedience of the Goddess's every whim.)

A fifth view is that mental phenomena are, surprisingly, a subset of physical phenomena. All mental states, it turns out, are really states of the central nervous systems of animals. "Pain" just happens to be another word for a certain kind of brain state, just as "light" happens to be another word for electromagnetic radiation within a certain range of wavelengths. This view is called the mind/brain identity theory.

So the case for 5 is that physical states are the cause for mental action, because the mind itself operates within the boundaries of the physical world. This is not absurd, as far as I can tell.

Finally, there is (5). What reason is there for thinking that is true? Well, we can compare it with a number of similar principles to get the general idea. In moral philosophy, there is a principle sometimes called Hume's law that says it is not possible to derive a normative judgement from a descriptive judgement. A normative judgement is a judgement about what is good or bad, right or wrong, and a descriptive judgement is basically anything else. Another way this is stated is that you cannot deduce an "ought" from an "is": you can't derive what ought to be the case solely on the basis of what is the case. This principle is almost universally acknowledged. And it is merely part of a more general pattern. For example, you can't derive a statement describing distances from any set of statements that don't describe distances. You can not derive a statement about colors from any set of non-color statements. You can't derive geometrical statements from non-geometrical ones. And generally, if you have an inference in which the conclusion talks about one thing and the premises talk about something else, the inference is invalid. In the same way, it is a conceptual truth that you cannot derive a mental description from a physical description. After all, just consider some physical concepts, such as spatial/geometrical properties, mass, force, and electric charge. Is it plausible that there is any way that these concepts could be used to explain what it feels like to be in pain? Say whatever you like about masses, positions, and forces of particles, you will not have ascribed any mental states to anything.

But you can completely alter a mental state by physically affecting the brain. For example, you can introduce hallucinogenic chemicals or perform a lobotomy. Consequently, you can mitigate or deny certain mental states such as "pain" through the introduction of drugs like morphine. Just because the experience of pain is unintelligible or inexplicable does not mean it is not occuring in a strictly physical sense. The interpretation and operation of consciousness for a conscious human being undeniably bound to the brain, for if the brain is removed or ceases to function, consciousness is no longer possible, just as vision goes away if the eyes are removed. There are also medical studies involving MRI which show links between electromagnetic activity in the brain and mental activity. The argument presented againsts 5 suggests that consciousness occurs without the presence of a physiscal body to support it, and if that is true, I would appreciate some evidence to support it.

I also do not understand this statement here:
In the same way, it is a conceptual truth that you cannot derive a mental description from a physical description.
The problem is, how can a description exist without mental interpretation?
 
UCE,

1. For any system, every fact about the whole is a necessary consequence of the nature and relations of the parts.

2. People are made of atoms.

3. Atoms are purely physical objects, with nothing but physical properties and physical relations to one another.

4. People have mental states.

5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.

Please, not this nonsense again. :rolleyes:

Just to avoid that discussion, I should point out that statement 5 is about linguistics, and is a natural consequence of a linguistic dualism which really does exist. All five of the above theses can be successfully defended as true.

Given that those five statements cannot all be true, under any logical framework, the above is clearly false. There are several possibilities:

2 is false: People are not really made of atoms, but instead also have some sort of non-physical component (dualism).

3 is false: Atoms are not purely physical objects, but can instead be affected by some non-physical agency (supernaturalism).

4 is false: People do not have mental states, under whatever definition of "mental" you are using.

5 is false: Any statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from a set of purely physical descriptions.

Materialism would assert that either 4 or 5 is false, depending on how you define "mental". But any logical framework must hold that at least one of the above is false, or else it is logically inconsistent.

As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental", in which case a materialist would argue that number 4 is false, and number 5 is thus meaningless.


Dr. Stupid
 
It seems to me that...

1. Humans are made up of what is in the universe.

2. Ideas and thoughts are processed in the brain.

3. The brain is made up of what is in the universe.

So then, ideas and thoughts of humans are the result of biological processes.
 
Stimpson J. Cat said:
As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental"

Thank you for clearing that up.
 
Although this is a bit off the discussion, it seems odd that UCE is quick to talk about how dogmatic materialists are, when he is quick to use language that is almost insulting even though it is obvious one can simply be mistaken.

He himself should know that, after all, he has said he has switched points of view.
 
It would follow that the refutation of materialism would require the confirmation of existence outside the universe as it can be percieved or comprehended by man, not merely explanations of actions or things within the system by the introduction of a force whose origins are external to that universe. Without such knowledge, if the force itself is found to occur entirely within the universe, then it can be incorporated into materialism. In this case, the force would be self-awareness, and it is dependent upon physical properties of the matter from which the human brain is composed.

This dependence leaves two possibilities, either matter is a property of the mind, or the mind is a property of matter. Unless I am presenting a false dilemma (if I am, please provide another possibility), only one of them is true.

I say matter is not a property of the mind, because the state of the mind does not affect matter. To say otherwise would require evidence of a mind existing without matter to support it.
 
I'm going to be selective about what I respond to in this thread, for reasons of being bored of endless repetition.

But I liked this :

Stimp :

Given that those five statements cannot all be true, under any logical framework, the above is clearly false.

I maintain that some sort of mentalism, linked to above, provides a solution which allows all 5 theses to be true at the same time.

The original paper rejects Berkeley...

1) because it is "lunatic", in the authors opinion

and

2) "idealism a denial of (2) and (3) insofar as it implies there aren't any atoms"

...which is a straightforward failure to understand idealism. The atoms exist, they just don't exist independently of the mental realm.
 
Dark Cobra said:
It seems to me that...

1. Humans are made up of what is in the universe.


The physical Universe. We are currently discussing the relationship between consciousness and matter. Which is more 'real'?


Although this is a bit off the discussion, it seems odd that UCE is quick to talk about how dogmatic materialists are, when he is quick to use language that is almost insulting even though it is obvious one can simply be mistaken.

He himself should know that, after all, he has said he has switched points of view.

It was partly the strength of my own certainty when I held the opposite view that motivates me to conduct myself like this. I KNEW I was right. I do not want to be insulting. I understand precisely why the skeptical/materialist/scientistic viewpoint persists, and would even go so far as to say I would not like to live in a world where it did not exist. It isn't wrong. It is half right.
 
UndercoverElephant said:
I'm going to be selective about what I respond to in this thread, for reasons of being bored of endless repetition.

Why don't you elaborate instead? That would end the repetition, rather than make you a part of it.
 
UndercoverElephant said:


The physical Universe. We are currently discussing the relationship between consciousness and matter. Which is more 'real'?

Conciousness is apparently a product of matter (and energy processes).
 
I say matter is more real than consciousness (given that neither one is unreal), because matter keeps on existing, even when you don't.
 
Originally posted by Stimpson J. Cat -
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From Website
5. No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stimp
As for number 5 being a natural consequence of linguistic dualism, that is only true if you are using a dualistic definition of "mental", in which case a materialist would argue that number 4 is false, and number 5 is thus meaningless.


Dr. Stupid [/B]

5 cannot be meaningless. It's meaning is perfectly self-evident and clear. Either mental facts can be derived from physical facts or they can't be. What conceivable meaning could there be in ascribing it as meaningless?
 
c4ts said:
I say matter is more real than consciousness (given that neither one is unreal), because matter keeps on existing, even when you don't.

How do you know this?
 
Interesting Ian said:


How do you know this?

I witnessed the death of my grandmother. After she died, her body continued to exist, so we hired specialists to dress it up and bury it. Nothing was observed to leave the body as it ceased to function and behave like my grandmother. Essentialy, the matter remained, but it was no longer conscious.
 
No statement ascribing a mental predicate can be derived from any set of purely physical descriptions.

Or they've simply misinterpreted a lack of expressiveness of one or more description systems as a "proof" of something being indescribable.

As an example, a handheld scientific calculator with a 64x64 plotting display that can handle 128 variables is poorly suited to describe a complex 3D structure that contains billions of unique operating parts.

If you only have one sheet of typing paper, describing how a space shuttle works, down to the last line of code in the computer that controls a waste vent fan in the privy is problematic.

We may not live to see it, but a system of description that contains enough information at once to contain a valid model of "human mind" will come.

If you really don't think that grey meat in your skull is imporant for anything, you can always remove it and then let us know how it went.
 
evildave said:
If you really don't think that grey meat in your skull is imporant for anything, you can always remove it and then let us know how it went.

Heh heh... I'm adding that to my sig.
 
The problem I have found is that the materialists will defend their belief system as fanatically as any Christian. They are not interested in the solution.

Why should they be? What problems does it solve, other than a few linguistic condrums?

Idealism that is indistinguishable from materalism is pointless. Idealism that can be distinguished from materialism is false (as Randi's million demonstrates).

It is not that we defend our belief system; it is that we reject unnecessary beliefs. In this we are entitled to be dogmatic to the extreme, since what we are defending is the very basis of Reason itself.

All that intensity you feel is merely the sharp edge of Occam's Razor.
 
c4ts said:


Why don't you elaborate instead? That would end the repetition, rather than make you a part of it.

Well, that rather depends who asks the question. I can't be bothered to refute Stimpson claiming that "People are made of atoms" is wrong. It is a rather pathetic claim made by someone who should know better, but also knows there is no better way of refuting the proof. I realise some other people haven't been through this a hundred times already.


DC

Conciousness is apparently a product of matter (and energy processes).

Why is that 'apparent'?


c4ts :

I say matter is more real than consciousness (given that neither one is unreal), because matter keeps on existing, even when you don't.

How do you know that?

If all conscious beings died and left a completely lifeless Universe, in what manner could it be said to 'exist'?


I witnessed the death of my grandmother.

"I witnessed..."
 

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