Materialism

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

If you answer (A) then you are claiming there is absolutelty no difference between two things which have completely different descriptions. This is prima facie RIDICULOUS because the very fact they have completely different descriptions MEANS THEY DIFFER!!!!!

I'm psyched to examine this assertion. I think we should start by writing down a succinct definition of brain and mind. Then we can see how they "differ."

Here are two descriptions of a flower:

1. It has a bunch of cells.
2. It has yellow petals.
   [/list=1] Must be two different things, I guess.
   
   ~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Rusty said:
Nonsense. Can you find any definition of physicalism that requires this?

~~ Paul

Stimpson J cat ****JUST CLAIMED THIS FIVE MINUTES AGO**** :

I do not agree that your mind exists only for you. Why is that so hard for you to understand?

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty said:
Correct, but that's not all.

Mary gains whatever neural connections arise from seeing red.

Is there something about that statement that is difficult to understand? Do you not understand it, or do you disagree with it?

Under physicalism those nerual connections must be reducable to perceivable physical facts. Those facts are all that there is. Those facts are in the first book.

Once again: Learning about how a brain process works is not the same as performing the brain process. Learning everything about programming a computer is not the same as programming a computer.

~~ Paul

But the performance of the brain process must be reducable to perceivable physical facts. Those facts are all that there is. We will put those facts in one of the books.

 

[Interesting Ian]

As there appears to be quite a few people who don't understand the Mary problem I have a link (in ppt format). In order to facilitate your understanding I would suggest you crank up the volume.

http://www.hku.hk/philodep/courses/max/phil2022/2022knowagr.ppt

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Stimpson J cat ****JUST CLAIMED THIS FIVE MINUTES AGO**** :

Not to mention that the original definition Paul gave several pages back makes this exact claim with those exact words.

The post was one where Paul says something like:

"Webstesr dictionary defines physicalism as:"

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

UcE said:
I'm psyched to examine this assertion. I think we should start by writing down a succinct definition of brain and mind. Then we can see how they "differ."

Here are two descriptions of a flower:

1. It has a bunch of cells.
2. It has yellow petals.
   [/list=1] Must be two different things, I guess.
   
   ~~ Paul

1. 
   
   Wait, so you are a dualist?
   
   

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

What do you think makes a fact a physical fact, Paul?

Is it because it is a fact derived from out model of PHYSICS?

Or is it because you arbitrarily declare it to be 'physical'?

I would be forever indebted to you if you would clearly define what philosophers mean by physical fact. In particular, can you distinguish it from concept?

Until you've done that, I should probably stop.

Paul has admitted that there are 'two different sorts of facts'. All he has to do now is recognise that one of those 'sorts of facts' is part of an abstract model describable in text books because it is built up entirely from abstract concepts like 'atoms' and the other of those 'sort of facts' is a subjective experience which does not exist in the abstract model because it is the very thing that the model was invented to describe.

Isn't that right, Paul?

No. I am not using "subjective physical fact" to refer to experience. I am using it to refer to physical neural connections in the brain. Not to the knowledge of those connections, but to the connections themselves. They are in the brain, so they are physical. They are facts. But they are per-person, so they are subjective physical facts.

Again, you will not acknowledge that subjective physical facts exist.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
I'm psyched to examine this assertion. I think we should start by writing down a succinct definition of brain and mind. Then we can see how they "differ."

Here are two descriptions of a flower:

1. It has a bunch of cells.
2. It has yellow petals.
   [/list=1] Must be two different things, I guess.
   
   ~~ Paul

1. 
   
   Well, this is why I advocate E-Prime and why my signature used to be "whatever you say a thing is, it isn't".
   
   To be clear we must avoid saying "A is B" and must explain how A and B are related.
   
   Let's do this with brain process and subjective experience. What is the correct description of their relationship?
   
   1) Brain process closely correlates with subjective experience.
   2) Brain process does not differ at all from subjective experience (which makes them synonymous).

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

Well under physicalism the subjective physical facts have to be ultimately reduable to objective physical facts. If they exits only subjectively then physicalism must be false. So we can say that there exists subjective facts but they ultimately exist only as a physical arrangment of particles in the brain.

A description of the subjective physical facts must reduce to objective physical facts. Yes, the subjective physical facts exist physically in the brain.

So it is actually the physicalist that refuses to accept the existence of subjective facts.

Say what?

~~ Paul

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

UcE said:
I would be forever indebted to you if you would clearly define what philosophers mean by physical fact. In particular, can you distinguish it from concept?

Until you've done that, I should probably stop.

We've already done this. In fact I did it again on the last page.

Something is physical if it is both a cause and an effect.

It is a cause if it's occurance necessitates the occurance of something else.

It is an effect if it's occurance was necessitated by a prior state.

No. I am not using "subjective physical fact" to refer to experience. I am using it to refer to physical neural connections in the brain. Not to the knowledge of those connections, but to the connections themselves. They are in the brain, so they are physical. They are facts. But they are per-person, so they are subjective physical facts.

Again, you will not acknowledge that subjective physical facts exist.

~~ Paul

Subjective physical facts under physicalism must ultimately be reducable to objective physical facts. So truly 'subjective' facts cannot co-exist with physicalism.

You are not a physicalist Paul. I've been telling you this for pages and pages. You are a dualist!

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So it is actually the physicalist that refuses to accept the existence of subjective facts.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Say what?

~~ Paul

A subjective fact cannot be objective.

 

[Guest]

Subjective physical facts under physicalism must ultimately be reducable to objective physical facts. So truly 'subjective' facts cannot co-exist with physicalism.

[/B]

This is correct. Stimpson continually claims that subjective things are 'actually' objective under materialism.

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

This is correct. Stimpson continually claims that subjective things are 'actually' objective under materialism.

Of course, if he accepted that subjective facts actually existed subjectively then he wouldn't be a physicalist. I wonder why Paul keeps insisting that WE recognize subjective facts. Personally I see subjective facts constantly. It's the physicalist who has to assert that we aren't really seeing subjectively, we just think we are.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Stimpson J cat ****JUST CLAIMED THIS FIVE MINUTES AGO**** :

quote:
I do not agree that your mind exists only for you. Why is that so hard for you to understand?

What does that have to do with Rusty's statement:

Under physicalism all subjective facts must be reducable to a state where any human can perceive them (making them objective).

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul

I would be forever indebted to you if you would clearly define what philosophers mean by physical fact. In particular, can you distinguish it from concept?

A physical fact is a part of the objective model of reality built upon the tenets of physicalism. Physicalism starts with a declaration that there exists an objective reality made of atoms/strings/waves/energy and that everything which exists can be explained in terms of this model. Physicalism requires that ALL THINGS are ultimately derived from this proposed objective reality i.e. that all things which exist are ultimately objective. That is why Stimpson claims that his mind does not only exist for him.

quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paul has admitted that there are 'two different sorts of facts'. All he has to do now is recognise that one of those 'sorts of facts' is part of an abstract model describable in text books because it is built up entirely from abstract concepts like 'atoms' and the other of those 'sort of facts' is a subjective experience which does not exist in the abstract model because it is the very thing that the model was invented to describe.

Isn't that right, Paul?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. I am not using "subjective physical fact" to refer to experience. I am using it to refer to physical neural connections in the brain. Not to the knowledge of those connections, but to the connections themselves.

There is nothing "subjective" about a neural connection. It is a physical thing. PERIOD.

They are in the brain, so they are physical. They are facts. But they are per-person, so they are subjective physical facts.

They are not per-person. Anyone can slice your brain open and verify it for themselves.

Again, you will not acknowledge that subjective physical facts exist.

Well, until today I hadn't heard anyone propose such an idea....

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

Under physicalism those nerual connections must be reducable to perceivable physical facts. Those facts are all that there is. Those facts are in the first book.

Rusty, buddy, slap yourself upside the head. The description of the connections are objective physical facts. The connections themselves are subject physical facts. Even if you could perceive them, you wouldn't have the connections in your own brain.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul :

What does that have to do with Rusty's statement:

1) I do not agree that your mind exists only for you.

2) Under physicalism all subjective facts must be reducable to a state where any human can perceive them (making them objective).


You do not see the connection between these two statements?

 

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Rusty said:
Rusty, buddy, slap yourself upside the head. The description of the connections are objective physical facts. The connections themselves are subject physical facts. Even if you could perceive them, you wouldn't have the connections in your own brain.

~~ Paul

Exactly my point! Exactly! That is why physicalism is false, because those subjective facts must be reducable to objective facts! If they are not then physicalism is false!

Paul, you aren't a physicalist!

Are you a dualist? Idealist of some type?

Welcome to the dark side *BWAHAHAHAHHAHAAHA*

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Rusty said:

Wait, so you are a dualist?

Sorry, I forgot the sarcasticon.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

1) Brain process closely correlates with subjective experience.
2) Brain process does not differ at all from subjective experience (which makes them synonymous).

First define subjective experience.

~~ Paul