Materialism

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Paul,

I'm still not catching on. Let me pick a specific set of neural connections that Mary might hypothetically obtain from seeing color: the weights in the visual cortex that specify the relative amount of each color in typical objects. There might not be such a thing, but I think we can agree that there are neural connections like this. Pick one of them.

First of all, referring to this as "memory" seems misleading. It is memory in that all neural encoding is memory, but it is not memory in the common sense of memory of events that can be retreived more or less at will.

I would say that the specific neural connections you are talking about is a part of the memory of seeing red. The memory is more than just the abstract information that we can cognitively retrieve from it at will.

That said, I don't understand why we wouldn't call this neural encoding a fact, in particular, a physical fact. Calling it something else confuses the issue when we say "Mary has learned all the physical facts about color." She cannot learn these sorts of facts by reading books (I'm assuming no robot operation here). She can gain the knowledge of how the visual cortex works, but not the personal neural connections.

On the contrary, I would say that calling them physical facts confuses the issue, since these "facts" are not abstract information. Clearly all that Mary can be expected to learn from reading a book is abstract information.

These kinds of facts are referred to as subjective physical facts by at least one writer (http://neologic.net/rd/chalmers/mdeutsch.html).

I think what we are dealing with here is primarily a semantic issue. We can call them facts, or not call them facts. This only determines which of the statements in the original though experiment is false. If we call them facts, then the claim that after reading a complete description of red, Mary will have all the facts about red, is false. If we don't call them facts, then the claim that when she sees red, she will learn new facts about red, is false.

Either way, the problem is that two statements in the thought experiment use the word "fact" in ways that must mean different things, in order for those statements to both be true under physicalism.

One approach would be to say that there is no contradiction, because the word "fact" means something different in the two statements. Another approach would be to say that she doesn't learn all the facts from reading the book. And a third approach would be to say that she does not learn any new facts when she sees red. It all depends on what you mean by "facts".

Dr. Stupid

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Do you see it yet?

Nope. Maybe it makes more sense if you think of the subjective as the only thing that exists, and that the objective is a product of it. Of course, then there is only one thing, so objective and subjective are the same.

Maybe you mean that an object and my thoughts are mutually exclusive?

It amounts to the same thing.

No more than the fact that two rocks are mutually exclusive.

I'm willing to call thoughts and feelings subjective, and other stuff objective. But I can't get the mutually exclusive part in my head.

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul :

Nope. Maybe it makes more sense if you think of the subjective as the only thing that exists, and that the objective is a product of it.

Well, from our existential point of view, which is the only point of view we have and the point of view from which we are condemned to communicate this is the truth. Subjective things are the only thing that have direct existence to you and the objective things are a product of :

a) Assuming that solipsism is false
b) Positing that there is a shared external reality
c) Investigating that reality and talking to each other about it and agreeing on a set of verifiable concepts.

So, yes - if you want to make sure that the way you think about exisence actually matches up with the existential position you find yourself in then you must accept that this is the relationship between subjective and objective.

Of course, then there is only one thing, so objective and subjective are the same.

That's not true though. If solipsism is true then there is only one thing and it is subjective and nothing is objective. If solipsism is rejected (and we can agree to reject it) then we can posit that there is a shared objective reality out there (the 'noumenon') and we can go about conducting experiments to learn about the behaviour of this objective noumenon. But regardless of what your ontological leaning it remains the truth that the subjective things directly exist in your mind and the objective things have to be the abstract products of reasoning, experimenting and communicating with other people who are presumed to be conscious like you are. What is important here is that the meanings of subjective and objective depend on our actual existential predicament, and do not change because you have a desire to assert that a particular ontological position is true or false.

I'm willing to call thoughts and feelings subjective, and other stuff objective. But I can't get the mutually exclusive part in my head.

Why subjective things cannot be objective :

Thoughts and feelings are subjective because they occur directly in your mind. The only way you could make them objective was if someone else could experience what was going on in your mind and then you could both come to an agreement on how to measure and define those mental experiences. So unless you can build a telepathy machine those thoughts and feelings cannot ever be objective. Therefore subjective things cannot be objective.

Why objective things cannot be subjective :

Objective things are objective because they do not exist in anybodies mind - they exist in a proposed shared reality that we agree how to define and measure. As soon as we have defined them and measured them then anyone else can come along, learn the concepts and methods and also measure them and verify them. However - that external reality is still just something we have proposed exists - it never enters your mind directly - you never get to experience the noumenon. Therefore objective things can never be subjective.

If objective things can never be subjective and subjective things can never be objective then subjective and objective are mutually exclusive.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Stimpson said:

On the contrary, I would say that calling them physical facts confuses the issue, since these "facts" are not abstract information. Clearly all that Mary can be expected to learn from reading a book is abstract information.

I'm belaboring the point here, because your conclusion summarizes the issues just peachily.

I guess my problem is with using fact to mean abstract information. Part of the book learning might be something like "In a normally sighted person, the weight of red in the neural representation of an apple is .85" That is certainly a fact, but it's not really abstract information. Even less abstract, because it only pertains to one person, would be: "When Jane Doe was autopsied, her red weight was only .45"

I think we're drawing an artificial distinction between conceptual information and specific data, then calling the former facts. No?

But moving along . . .

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE,

Okay, where do we go from here?

However - that external reality is still just something we have proposed exists - it never enters your mind directly - you never get to experience the noumenon.

Does it enter my senses directly?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Does it enter my senses directly?

The noumenon can only ever be known indirectly. I am not sure that introducing the term 'senses' is going to do anything but confuse things again.

Okay, where do we go from here?

I'm still waiting for you to tell me that you understand why subjective and objective must be mutually exclusive. If we can agree on that then we can proceed with a pair of definitions we both understand and accept. This is progress in itself.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

I'm still waiting for you to tell me that you understand why subjective and objective must be mutually exclusive. If we can agree on that then we can proceed with a pair of definitions we both understand and accept. This is progress in itself.

I'll agree for the sake of discussion. If you want a religious conversion, I'm not your man.

In particular:

Objective things are objective because they do not exist in anybodies mind - they exist in a proposed shared reality that we agree how to define and measure.

Does this mean that these objective things are necessarily not a product of the subjective, in order to ensure their mutual exclusivity?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

Paul :

I'll agree for the sake of discussion. If you want a religious conversion, I'm not your man.

Religion is about faith. This is philosophy. I should hope by now you should have realised that the one thing I am specifically demanding you DO NOT DO is just 'assume', just 'believe' or 'just agree for the sake of discussion'. That is what you do at the moment when you assume materialism is true. Have I asked you to assume anything? I am trying to stop you from depending on faith, not switch your faith to a new one. I am trying to show you why my own philosophical position is based on LOGIC, not faith. Why does it need a religious conversion for you to agree on these definitions of subjective and objective? Why does it need faith? Why are you only 'agreeing for the sake of discussion'? Why won't you commit yourself to acceptance of it? The logic is solid as a rock. If you don't think so then why don't you think so?

Finding philosophical truth requires the courage to follow the logic wherever it leads. There is no point in me continuing this with you if when I take you where the logic leads you turn around and start quibbling with the definitions again. We have done that for the last year or more. I want to move on from there.

In particular:

quote:
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Objective things are objective because they do not exist in anybodies mind - they exist in a proposed shared reality that we agree how to define and measure.
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Does this mean that these objective things are necessarily not a product of the subjective, in order to ensure their mutual exclusivity?

Provided you believe that solipsism is false and other people are conscious then it logically follows that the objective things have some sort of collective existence independent of our individual minds.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

Provided you believe that solipsism is false and other people are conscious then it logically follows that the objective things have some sort of collective existence independent of our individual minds.

So if the objective is not a product of the subjective, and if the two are mutually exclusive, how does the subjective perceive the objective?

~~ Paul

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
So if the objective is not a product of the subjective, and if the two are mutually exclusive, how does the subjective perceive the objective?

~~ Paul

The subjective doesn't perceive the objective (the noumenon). The subjective only ever perceives the subjective (the phenomenon). The subjective uses reason, logic, intuition and experimentation to learn about the behaviour of the objective. In other words we assume that what we perceive to be an objective reality is indeed an objective reality, we invent abstract models to describe the behaviour of that objective reality and then we conduct experiments to test the predictions of our models. We then talk to other people and come to agreement about the models and the experiments. But all we ever actually have is the phenomenon and the models and the experiments and the agreements - we never actually get our mittens on the noumenon itself - it is the agreement and the ability to reach that agreement that makes the objective things objective.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

UCE,

So if the objective is not a product of the subjective, and if the two are mutually exclusive, how does the subjective perceive the objective?

~~ Paul
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The subjective doesn't perceive the objective (the noumenon). The subjective only ever perceives the subjective (the phenomenon). The subjective uses reason, logic, intuition and experimentation to learn about the behaviour of the objective. In other words we assume that what we perceive to be an objective reality is indeed an objective reality, we invent abstract models to describe the behaviour of that objective reality and then we conduct experiments to test the predictions of our models. We then talk to other people and come to agreement about the models and the experiments. But all we ever actually have is the phenomenon and the models and the experiments and the agreements - we never actually get our mittens on the noumenon itself - it is the agreement and the ability to reach that agreement that makes the objective things objective.

(Emphasis mine.) If we assume that what we percieve is an objective reality, and "we" are subjective, then how can you claim that the subjective is not percieving the objective? This is nothing less than rejecting the assumption that you just claimed to make.

Furthermore, if your perceptions are not of objective reality, then you cannot possibly draw any logical conclusions about objective reality from your perceptions.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Win]

Stimpy:

No, that's pretty much exactly what I was getting at. In other words, would you say that the content of phenomenal consciousness is logically dictated by the physical brain activity, but that the existence of phenomenal consciousness cannot be derived from the physical brain activity?

I wouldn't say logically dictated, in the sense of logically necessitated, because I can conceive that instead of experiencing the quale, red, I experience instead the qualitatively different quale, gred, such that the content, per se, of phenonomenal consciousness isn't determined by the physical state of my brain.

That being said, I think that every given phenomenal state has a corresponding physical information state. Every time you have physical state A, you also have phenomenal state A*. So, in that sense, the content of a phenomenal state is related to the physical state by virtue of both being realizations of the same information by different means. What the particular qualitative content of the phenomenal state is, however, is independent of the physical state.

This would also imply that it is not possible, using information only available in set A, to determine the existence of set B, or the nature of the rules that describe how set B depends on set A.

As to the first, yes. We do, however, have knowledge of the existence of set B, the phenomenal set, by virtue of our direct access.

As to the second, I don't think so. One thing we can do is define the properties that any set B, and any relation between set A and set B, must necessarily have. Another is that, simply because set B is physically unobservable doesn't mean that we can't look for some Ur-set on which the properties of both sets A and B depend, then test our predictions using the A set only. Of course, this depends on there being an Ur-set and on there being competing theories of the Ur-set such that by experimentally confirming one, we can reject others and thereby draw conclusions about set B.

Ultimately, it is these considerations, and stubborness, that prevent me from adopting mysterianism as a position.

When you say "physically realized information", I know what that means. It means either storage or processing of the information (or a combination of the two), by some sort of physical process. I would thus be inclined to interpret the phrase "phenomenally realized information" to mean some sort of phenomenal storage or processing of the information.

I see what you mean. When I said no storage, I meant to indicate that I don't think there is a "phenomenal memory bank," as it were, in which phenomenal experiences are stored.

As to processing, I agree that there must be a mechanism for the realization of information phenomeally, and we might call the operation of that mechanism, the "processing" of information phenomenally. I don't know what that mechanism is.

When I say physically realized information, I mean that there is a representation of a set of facts, in our case in our brains as, presumably, weightings of and connections between neurons. The phenomenal realization consists of the same facts represented within phenomenal consciousness, for example, the phenomenally experienced visual field.

Again, I don't like the word "stored" because that suggests a persistence across time that I'm not willing to commit to.

 

[Guest]

UCE,
(Emphasis mine.) If we assume that what we percieve is an objective reality, and "we" are subjective,

"We" aren't subjective. "We" are the subject. Subjective things are subjective with respect to us.

....then how can you claim that the subjective is not percieving the objective? This is nothing less than rejecting the assumption that you just claimed to make.

OK - confusion over the term 'perceive'. We percieve subjective things directly. We percieve the objective things indirectly. We reason about their existence, and by means of our reason we can be said to indirectly perceive the noumenon. I don't think I have contradicted myself. Does that clarify?

Furthermore, if your perceptions are not of objective reality, then you cannot possibly draw any logical conclusions about objective reality from your perceptions.

The whole reason we have to use reason to perceive the objective is because the only things we can directly percieve are subjective. If this wasn't so, we wouldn't need science because we would directly know the objective world.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Win said:

I see what you mean. When I said no storage, I meant to indicate that I don't think there is a "phenomenal memory bank," as it were, in which phenomenal experiences are stored.

I think I have the wrong idea of what phenomenal experiences are. I think of phenomenal as meaning sensory, in which case it would seem that there is a memory of sensory experiences. What do you mean by "phenomenal experience"?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

UcE said:

OK - confusion over the term 'perceive'. We percieve subjective things directly. We percieve the objective things indirectly. We reason about their existence, and by means of our reason we can be said to indirectly perceive the noumenon. I don't think I have contradicted myself. Does that clarify?

I'm afraid not. Do we perceive the objective, or do we reason about it? If all we do is reason about it, then it would seem to be nothing more than a subset of the subjective, in which case the two are not mutually exclusive.

~~ Paul

 

[Win]

Paul:

I think I have the wrong idea of what phenomenal experiences are. I think of phenomenal as meaning sensory, in which case it would seem that there is a memory of sensory experiences. What do you mean by "phenomenal experience"?

On the assumption that you're using the particular "you" here, here's what I think.

"Phenomenal experience" refers to the raw feels, as it were, of what's going on in your brain. It's not confined to sensory processing, although some of the most usual examples, what red looks like, what strawberries taste like, are the phenomenal experience of sensory processing.

Other phenomenal experiences include the experience of emotions, what love is like, or the experience of thinking, what considering these questions is like.

There is a memory of sensory input and processing, but no memory of sensory phenomenal experience. As I've said before, we have experiences of memories, not memories of experiences.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Wow, okay. That seems to be almost the opposite of the dictionary definition of phenomenal, but I'll go with it.

So phenomenal experiences are the experiences of the phenomena going on in our brains?

Why do you think we can't record memories of such experiences? I realize that such memories would be markedly different from the memories of an external event, but I don't see what precludes them. Many of my strongest emotional memories "feel" as if they are memories of previous internal experiences, not memories of events.

As I've said before, we have experiences of memories, not memories of experiences.

But what is a memory?

~~ Paul

 

[Win]

Paul:

Wow, okay. That seems to be almost the opposite of the dictionary definition of phenomenal, but I'll go with it.

Many of the terms used in this discussion are philosophical terms of art. Try a dictionary of philosophy. Also, some of terms are ones the long standing participants in these discussions have come to agree on.

So phenomenal experiences are the experiences of the phenomena going on in our brains?

Yes. But replace phenomena with information processing. It's less confusing that way.

Why do you think we can't record memories of such experiences? I realize that such memories would be markedly different from the memories of an external event, but I don't see what precludes them. Many of my strongest emotional memories "feel" as if they are memories of previous internal experiences, not memories of events.

Because they're not physical. There's no place to record them.

And the distinction isn't that memories are only of external events. You can have a memory of an emotional state. You just can't have a memory of a phenemenal experience of an emotional state.

But what is a memory?

A pattern in your brain, containing a record of a previous state of your brain.

 

[Guest]

UcE said:
I'm afraid not. Do we perceive the objective, or do we reason about it? If all we do is reason about it, then it would seem to be nothing more than a subset of the subjective, in which case the two are not mutually exclusive.

Isn't the whole point of science to objectify the subjective? It is the very fact that we reason about it that makes it objective. But once it has becomes objective it isn't subjective any more, so it isn't a 'subset' of the subjective, no.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Win,

As to the second, I don't think so. One thing we can do is define the properties that any set B, and any relation between set A and set B, must necessarily have.

But we don't have access to any information about set B. Keep in mind that when I say that, I mean that our brains, which ultimately are going to have to do all of the work of figuring this stuff out, do not have access to any information about set B.

Another is that, simply because set B is physically unobservable doesn't mean that we can't look for some Ur-set on which the properties of both sets A and B depend, then test our predictions using the A set only. Of course, this depends on there being an Ur-set and on there being competing theories of the Ur-set such that by experimentally confirming one, we can reject others and thereby draw conclusions about set B.

Doesn't this violate the premise that set A is causally closed?

In other words, let's imagine that we did have two competing theories about the Ur-set. Could they possibly make different predictions about observations made in set A? If set A is causally closed, then nothing that is not a part of set A can have any affect on it. By claiming that set A is causally closed, you are saying that set A could be exactly the way it is without there being anything else at all. In fact, this is exactly what you are saying when you say that p-zombies are logically possible.

Ultimately, it is these considerations, and stubborness, that prevent me from adopting mysterianism as a position.

If set A is causally closed, then by definition, no observation made within set A could possibly reveal whether or not there is anything besides set A, or any information about it. This means that as long as you accept that it is possible that materialism is correct, property dualism is, at best, a competing theory which makes no additional testable claims. It must therefore be rejected in favor of the more parsimonious theory, materialism.

After all, you could postulate an infinite number of such additional layers of reality, with an unlimited degree of complexity of relationships. Why bother?

When you say "physically realized information", I know what that means. It means either storage or processing of the information (or a combination of the two), by some sort of physical process. I would thus be inclined to interpret the phrase "phenomenally realized information" to mean some sort of phenomenal storage or processing of the information.
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I see what you mean. When I said no storage, I meant to indicate that I don't think there is a "phenomenal memory bank," as it were, in which phenomenal experiences are stored.

As to processing, I agree that there must be a mechanism for the realization of information phenomenally, and we might call the operation of that mechanism, the "processing" of information phenomenally. I don't know what that mechanism is.

OK. A more pertinent question would be, do you think it is possible, at least in principle, to find out?

When I say physically realized information, I mean that there is a representation of a set of facts, in our case in our brains as, presumably, weightings of and connections between neurons. The phenomenal realization consists of the same facts represented within phenomenal consciousness, for example, the phenomenally experienced visual field.

Again, I don't like the word "stored" because that suggests a persistence across time that I'm not willing to commit to.

Fair enough. This raises another subtlety about the Mary problem, though. If there is no storage of this "phenomenal information", then I would assert that Mary "gains something new" everytime she experiences red, regardless of whether she has experienced it before or not, and then immediately loses it again.

In other words, I do not think that you can meaningfully say that Mary "learns" any new phenomenal facts when she sees red for the first time, because "learning" implies that the information is stored in some way.


UCE,

"We" aren't subjective. "We" are the subject. Subjective things are subjective with respect to us.

So, are "we" subjective, or objective? Neither?

....then how can you claim that the subjective is not percieving the objective? This is nothing less than rejecting the assumption that you just claimed to make.
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OK - confusion over the term 'perceive'. We percieve subjective things directly. We percieve the objective things indirectly. We reason about their existence, and by means of our reason we can be said to indirectly perceive the noumenon. I don't think I have contradicted myself. Does that clarify?

Crystal clear. It is still a contradiction, though, because by asserting that objective and subjective are completely distinct things, there is no way to logically justify drawing conclusions about objective things from subjective things.

There must be a relationship. And as soon as you assert the existence of a relationship, it is no longer possible to draw this absolute distinction you insist on.

For example, if subjective things and objective things are different, distinct things, then in order for there to be any relationship between them, they must either interact, or both be products of the same thing.

If they interact, then the interaction must be both objective and subjective. What's more, this would cause aspects of the subjective things (those that interact with the objective things) to become indirectly observable, by means of the objective things they interact with. That is, unless you assume a one-way interaction, in which case you end up with essentially the same position Win is advocating, and the same problem I am addressing with him.

On the other hand, if they are both products of the same thing, then that thing must be both subjective and objective. In this case, you end up with essentially the same situation. That thing just adds another level of abstraction to the problem.

By the way, this is all dualism. I thought you said you were an idealist?

Furthermore, if your perceptions are not of objective reality, then you cannot possibly draw any logical conclusions about objective reality from your perceptions.
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The whole reason we have to use reason to perceive the objective is because the only things we can directly percieve are subjective. If this wasn't so, we wouldn't need science because we would directly know the objective world.

You missed my point. If we accept your premises, then we can't use reason to perceive the objective, because we cannot possibly draw any logical conclusions about objective reality from our perceptions of subjective things.

Isn't the whole point of science to objectify the subjective? It is the very fact that we reason about it that makes it objective. But once it has becomes objective it isn't subjective any more, so it isn't a 'subset' of the subjective, no.

I think I may see what you are trying to get at here. You are essentially saying that the objective does not exist at all, but rather that it is simply an abstract model of our subjective experiences, right?

Dr. Stupid