<snip>
No, the US would not have attacked because:
The US and Japan were still at peace and engaged in [futile] negotiations to settle their differences. Attacking the Japanese task force at sea without a declaration of war would have been a bad way to start a war and, in a sense, roughly equivalent to the attack on Pearl Harbor except in reverse with negative influences on US public opinion.
Not exactly.
From a War Department
message to all Pacific commands, November 27, 1941:
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
The Navy Department copied all Pacific commands on this message the following day.
Further, the
Enterprise and her escorts sailed from Pearl Harbor on November 28, 1941, with a half squadron of Marine fighters to reinforce Wake Island. As soon as she was under way, the following
order was issued:
U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (CV6)
CV6/A16-3(11-Kz) At Sea,
November 28, 1941.
BATTLE ORDER NUMBER TWO - 41
Subject: Supervisor - Instructions for.
- The Supervisor of the Watch will see that the following provisions for action against hostile craft are carried out whenever conditions warrant:
- Current developments have changed the "challenging" situation to some extent, in that we are now on a war basis and must be ready to open fire without hesitation should suspicious contacts be made.
- Carrier doctrine - for exercise or for war - still requires use of evasive tactics in all cases of possible hostile contact. ENTERPRISE must not disclose its presence by challenging or opening fire unless we are obviously being sighted or will soon be sighted. Fire emergency identification signal if ENTERPRISE comes under fire or appears in danger of being fired upon and immediately thereafter open fire if the correct answer to challenge is not properly made.
- If a submarine is encountered at close range immediately turn toward or away, depending on whether she is forward or aft of the beam. Open fire, and if turning toward, attempt to ram the submarine, unless she makes the proper recognition signal. In that case give submarine as wide a berth as possible and have plane guard [destroyer] check on identity.
- At night, if the plane guard fails to challenge when a contact with any unknown vessel, other than a submarine, is made, ENTERPRISE shall challenge immediately and open fire without delay, unless proper identification is made by the stranger.
- Until the return of ENTERPRISE to port, the Supervisor, as direct representative of the Captain, will consider all submarine contacts to be hostile vessels and will take immediate necessary action to avoid attack and will order fire to be opened when deemed necessary, without waiting for the Captain's arrival on the bridge.
- Fire against aircraft, or vessels other than submarines, will not be opened without reference to the Captain, except when it is evident that an actual attack on ENTERPRISE is being made.
(Signed) G. D. MURRAY
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.
APPROVED, November 28, 1941.
(Signed) W. F. Halsey
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force [emphasis added]
To prove otherwise [that the Japanese planned a surprise attack] would require that the US expose its cryptanalytic efforts, possibly to the point of revealing specific messages that pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor.
No. What possible reason other than a planned surprise attack would the Japanese have had for sending six aircraft carriers into the waters north of Oahu? "Routine maneuvers, scheduled months in advance?" The American public would have known that a surprise attack had been intended, particularly given the prevailing American views on Japanese deceit and treachery.
It should be noted that the Japanese didn't plan on starting the war without a declaration, it just worked out that way. So Pearl Harbor would still have been a surprise attack, just that it was supposed to be AFTER the ultimatum was delivered --
The 14-Part Message was neither a declaration of war, nor an ultimatum, nor a breaking of diplomatic relations. It simply stated that there seemed to be no point in continuing the negotiations on the China issue. Some historians have opined that the the message was only intended to salve the feelings of the personnel carrying out the attack, rather than satisfy Japanese national honor or world public opinion.
the basic idea with surprise that even if the enemy got word of the incoming attack they would be unable to change dispositions or mount an effective defense or counter-action which is why the ultimatum was supposed to be delivered at 1 PM Eastern (7 AM Hawaii) with the assumption that there would not be enough time to pass the alert to affected commands much less that the alerted commands could do anything constructive.
Agreed, but again, the intention was likely only to give the IJN personnel who carried out the attack a fig leaf that would allow them to feel that they had not participated in a dishonorable attack, in violation of Japanese warrior tradition.
On the second, if the US was overwhelmingly successful in striking the IJN task force, sinking all the carriers . . .
The US had no forces available that could have struck such a blow at the Japanese. There were only two aircraft carriers available in the area, and even assuming a Midway-like "miracle," the best that might have been hoped for would have been four Japanese carriers sunk. More likely such an engagement would have resulted in the destruction of
Enterprise and
Lexington, with some damage to a couple of the Japanese carriers. Note also that the Japanese expected to lose about 1/3 of the strike force.
. . . Japan might have conceded rather than continue what would have been a "illegal" surprise attack on their forces and a presumptive declaration of war by the US. Probably Japan would have continued the war since the US would have been in turmoil due to the "surprise attack on the peaceful Japanese". A Japanese strike at the Phillipines might have been viewed as "retaliation" for the "treacherous US attack". This assumes that the US attacked before Japan delivered its ultimatum.
Again, I completely disagree with your assumption that the US would have been in "turmoil," or that a preemptive attack on the Japanese strike force would have been in any way perceived as "treacherous." The mere presence of the Japanese strike force near Hawaii would have been
prima facie evidence that a surprise attack was in the offing, and might well have served as a
casus belli even with no engagement between American and Japanese forces.
It should be remembered that the war faction in Japan was invested in the idea of establishing a Japanese Empire to secure for itself resources for its industry. It would be an incredible loss of face to give up on that. OTOH, the war faction might have been toppled in favor of a peace faction. So there is that possibility.
If the Tojo government had collapsed at that point, it likely would have been replaced by an even more militaristic one (if that can be imagined).
In the end, if the US had tumbled to the surprise attack, and changed its dispositions to mount as effective defense as possible, and managed to conceal all that from the spy at the Consulate, that the best that might have been achieved would be to scare off the Japanese task force.
How would the Japanese have been "scared off" if these preparations had been concealed from their diplomats?
They [the IJN task force] were under orders to withdraw if discovered prior to Dec 7 with discretion to proceed if discovered on Dec 7. Remember that until the ultimatum (Japan's effective declaration of war) was delivered the US could not lawfully attack the task force.
Again, I totally disagree with this. So did Admiral Halsey. And as has been noted, the first shots were fired by the USS
Ward, well before the 14-part message was delivered.
