Is there a name for this fallacy?

[blutoski]

I don't think executing a murder or imprisoning criminals is meant to correct the wrong that was done.

For some people, it is! That's my point: I'm certain it's a bad idea, but not certain it's a logical fallacy.

"an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth"
"what's good for the goose is good for the gander"
"turnabout is fair play"

&c.

In this case, the second wrong is argued as making the first wrong somehow OK. As someone said, it is an attempt to equal things out.

Possibly. It's not clear what the reasoning was. It could also be that the person suspects the moral rule against discrimination doesn't apply there, and is providing an example that it's univerally ignored.

I think the legal thing closest to trying to right a wrong is restitution. And restitution is more like doing whatever it takes to undo a wrong. So it's not a second wrong attempting to fix the first wrong.

I would agree that there are circumstances when a second minor wrong is the right thing to do, but it doesn't undo a previous wrong. For example, affirmative action or hiring quotas do not undo the wrong of slavery. Slavery was wrong, and no matter what we do in the future it will remain a wrong marring the first chapter in U.S. history.

I wasn't arguing that it was right: I was arguing that not every bad idea is a 'logical fallacy,' and this example may just be a bad idea in action.

 

[Ocelot]

Surely it's just female logic:

As in..

Example of Male Logic
Water is wet
Fish live in water
Therefore fish are wet.

Example of Female Logic
Water is wet
Therefore fish live in trees
and you don't love me anymore.

QED

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

For some people, it is! That's my point: I'm certain it's a bad idea, but not certain it's a logical fallacy.

OK. I agree it's not a logical fallacy if punishing criminals is not meant to right a wrong.

But that's not the situation we have here. The argument is a fallacy because it is a claim that a second injustice will correct or justify the first one. Punishing criminals does not undo the crime.

I wasn't arguing that it was right: I was arguing that not every bad idea is a 'logical fallacy,' and this example may just be a bad idea in action.

I understand. However, in this case it is a fallacy, because it was stated that a second unjust act justifies a first unjust act.

In fact, if the first act was unjust (or wrong) committing a subsequent unjust act doesn't make the first act just (or right).

ETA:

I would agree that there are circumstances when a second minor wrong is the right thing to do, but it doesn't undo a previous wrong. For example, affirmative action or hiring quotas do not undo the wrong of slavery. Slavery was wrong, and no matter what we do in the future it will remain a wrong marring the first chapter in U.S. history.

I wasn't arguing that it was right: I was arguing that not every bad idea is a 'logical fallacy,' and this example may just be a bad idea in action.

I'm not certain you understand the point. The "two wrongs make a right" fallacy is a fallacy not because it's a good or bad idea to commit the second wrong, but because the second wrong is irrelevant to whether or not the first act is right or wrong.

If the debate is about the question of whether the first act was right or wrong, making an argument about a second wrong (or a wrong done by the other party--as in a "tu quoque" argument) is irrelevant. As I think Hans mentioned, both the "tu quoque" and the "two wrongs make a right" fallacy are fallacies of the type "red herring" or irrelevant arguments.

 

[blutoski]

OK. I agree it's not a logical fallacy if punishing criminals is not meant to right a wrong.

But that's not the situation we have here. The argument is a fallacy because it is a claim that a second injustice will correct or justify the first one. Punishing criminals does not undo the crime.

I'm clearly reading the anecdote differently. I'm reading it as the person is subscribing to a moral framework on the playground that allows discrimination.

I understand. However, in this case it is a fallacy, because it was stated that a second unjust act justifies a first unjust act.

In fact, if the first act was unjust (or wrong) committing a subsequent unjust act doesn't make the first act just (or right).

Or does it? That's what I'm getting at. My impression is that it comes down to whether the claim is that these are oneoffs, or whether the claim is that it's the way things are at the school.

Moral frameworks can be all-or-nothing. My impression is that the person is defending a different moral framework where discrimination is OK if it's universal, but not OK if it's unilateral.

This is the same worldview that holds it would be unfair to have men-only clubs in isolation, but if there are women-only clubs available, then the situation is OK.

Or that it's wrong for the government to support or denigrate a particular religion, but if they support or denigrate all of them equally, then this is an OK situation.

ETA:
I'm not certain you understand the point. The "two wrongs make a right" fallacy is a fallacy not because it's a good or bad idea to commit the second wrong, but because the second wrong is irrelevant to whether or not the first act is right or wrong.

Well, like I said: people may strongly disagree with that.

I observe that so many people argue quite strongly that in a scenario like this, the two injustices are obviously linked and not independent. I don't think this is a fallacy so much as a point of view.

If the debate is about the question of whether the first act was right or wrong, making an argument about a second wrong (or a wrong done by the other party--as in a "tu quoque" argument) is irrelevant. As I think Hans mentioned, both the "tu quoque" and the "two wrongs make a right" fallacy are fallacies of the type "red herring" or irrelevant arguments.

I think I can agree with you on "IF" the debate is about the first act alone, but I suspect the person is actually reasoning that the two acts in conjunction are OK, but the act in isolation would have been wrong.

In my opinion, the claim is not a logical fallacy; it's simply a weak and indefensible moral framework.

 

[HansMustermann]

I'm clearly reading the anecdote differently. I'm reading it as the person is subscribing to a moral framework on the playground that allows discrimination.

It being part of a framework where two wrongs even out, still doesn't excuse it. The whole stated excuse says that it evens out.

Also, in that case there is no revenge or compensation or anything, since the second wrong isn't inflicted on the perpetrator of the first one. So even the rationales for when a second wrong might be necessary, don't actually apply here.

It's like saying that if gang X keys imported cars and gang Y keys domestic cars, it evens out. It doesn't. The second wrong neither cancels out the first (just more innocents will have their cars keyed) nor is justice for the first one (it's just more innocents affected, not payback or deterrence or anything.)

At that it seems to me like you're actually committing another fallacy there, namely Converse Accident Fallacy. You're starting from some special cases where it might be argued that a second wrong might actually solve anything (though even there it is generally _not_ argued that punishment "evens out" the crime, nor that it makes it ok: otherwise we wouldn't need the concept of "recidivist", since any previous deeds would be already evened out and made ok) to a general case that really has nothing to do with it.

Or does it? That's what I'm getting at. My impression is that it comes down to whether the claim is that these are oneoffs, or whether the claim is that it's the way things are at the school.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. If the way things are at that school is injustice is ok as long as everyone gets some injustice, that would IMHO just make it worse.

Moral frameworks can be all-or-nothing. My impression is that the person is defending a different moral framework where discrimination is OK if it's universal, but not OK if it's unilateral.

Moral frameworks, or generally any mental models, can also be wrong or fallacious or whatever. It being a mental model is really no excuse.

This is the same worldview that holds it would be unfair to have men-only clubs in isolation, but if there are women-only clubs available, then the situation is OK.

A club can be argued to some extent under freedom of association. Receiving an unjust punishment from a position of authority isn't even remotely comparable.

Or that it's wrong for the government to support or denigrate a particular religion, but if they support or denigrate all of them equally, then this is an OK situation.

Again, you seem to be making a hash between something which is integral to the freedom of religion concept, and something which is plain old injustice. (If a minor one.) And again it doesn't help that the situation with religions isn't that simple, nor a case of simply wrongs evening out. If a government flat out fired anyone who belongs to any organized religion, for example, it wouldn't be "evening out" but plain old religious persecution and it wouldn't even out at all.

I observe that so many people argue quite strongly that in a scenario like this, the two injustices are obviously linked and not independent. I don't think this is a fallacy so much as a point of view.

See my example with keying cars. The injustices there are linked too, but they don't even out. At the end of the day not many people would look at their keyed car and go, "well, those guys with Toyotas and Hondas are gonna get theirs too, so I guess this is ok."

I think I can agree with you on "IF" the debate is about the first act alone, but I suspect the person is actually reasoning that the two acts in conjunction are OK, but the act in isolation would have been wrong.

In my opinion, the claim is not a logical fallacy; it's simply a weak and indefensible moral framework.

It's weak and indefensible _because_ it makes no logical sense. Otherwise it would be trivial to defend by simply presenting a valid inference to support it. I.e., basically, _because_ of that fallacy.

 

[gnome]

I think it's "poisoning the well". She is speculating that the original recess monitor only disciplined the boys because she was female, by conjecturing that a male monitor would discipline only the girls.

 

[Cavemonster]

It's interesting that the "Two wrongs don't make a right fallacy" is described in different ways in different sources.

In the link Joe provided it is defined as:

This fallacy involves the attempt to justify a wrong action by pointing to another wrong action.

Which is not a perfect fit, and may not always even be a fallacy since "wrong" in this context is often socially defined. What makes my example different, and something I hear every day, is that a behavior is not being compared to something else that has been done, but to something the speak believes would be done. A prediction is being taken as a piece of evidence.

For instance, if someone a buck from me in the past, I could make an argument that stealing a buck back from him evens the scales. It wouldn't be an airtight argument in all moral systems, but it's in the realm of reason. If I steal a buck from someone and defend it by saying he "probably would" steal a buck from me, I'm on much more shaky territory, especially without making any kind of case for why I'm assuming how they would act in the future.



This separate explanation of the "Two wrongs don't make a right fallacy" seems to be closer to what I'm talking about.

Two Wrongs Make a Right is a fallacy in which a person "justifies" an action against a person by asserting that the person would do the same thing to him/her, when the action is not necessary to prevent B from doing X to A.

The word "would" here (my highlight) is absolutely key. It shifts the discussion from comparable behaviors in action, to comparable behaviors in prediction.

 

[blutoski]

It being part of a framework where two wrongs even out, still doesn't excuse it. The whole stated excuse says that it evens out.

Yep. That's what she's saying from what I can tell. I agree that it doesn't excuse it. My argument is that it isn't fallacious so much as morally backward.

Also, in that case there is no revenge or compensation or anything, since the second wrong isn't inflicted on the perpetrator of the first one. So even the rationales for when a second wrong might be necessary, don't actually apply here.

It is, however, inflicted on members of the category of the first one. (males)

This is why my examples were about members of categories, to create as close an analogy as possible.

It's like saying that if gang X keys imported cars and gang Y keys domestic cars, it evens out. It doesn't. The second wrong neither cancels out the first (just more innocents will have their cars keyed) nor is justice for the first one (it's just more innocents affected, not payback or deterrence or anything.)

I don't think the analogy is correct. I see it as gang X is permitted to key gang Y's cars, but also gang Y is permitted to key gang X's cars. The argument may be that it would be less just if only one group was allowed to mistreat the other.

At that it seems to me like you're actually committing another fallacy there, namely Converse Accident Fallacy. You're starting from some special cases where it might be argued that a second wrong might actually solve anything (though even there it is generally _not_ argued that punishment "evens out" the crime, nor that it makes it ok: otherwise we wouldn't need the concept of "recidivist", since any previous deeds would be already evened out and made ok) to a general case that really has nothing to do with it.

Well, I'm interpreting the kid's argument as basically that: that she feels if only girls got screwed it would be wrong, but if everybody gets screwed, it's fair.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. If the way things are at that school is injustice is ok as long as everyone gets some injustice, that would IMHO just make it worse.

I'm pretty sure it would be worse, yep. I think we agree here.

Moral frameworks, or generally any mental models, can also be wrong or fallacious or whatever. It being a mental model is really no excuse.

No, but I'm distinguishing that from a logical fallacy. It sounds like the argument could be logically sound, but with crap premises. GIGO, as they say.

A club can be argued to some extent under freedom of association. Receiving an unjust punishment from a position of authority isn't even remotely comparable.

I think it's comparable, but weak. I'm trying to think through the mind of a kid who probably isn't concentrating on government power so much as 'boys vs girls'.

Again, you seem to be making a hash between something which is integral to the freedom of religion concept, and something which is plain old injustice. (If a minor one.) And again it doesn't help that the situation with religions isn't that simple, nor a case of simply wrongs evening out. If a government flat out fired anyone who belongs to any organized religion, for example, it wouldn't be "evening out" but plain old religious persecution and it wouldn't even out at all.

I'm thinking that the analogy would be that it would be unfair if the gvt fired people from one religion, but if they fired people from all religions including the nonreligious, then it's hard to put a finger on the nature of the injustice.

See my example with keying cars. The injustices there are linked too, but they don't even out. At the end of the day not many people would look at their keyed car and go, "well, those guys with Toyotas and Hondas are gonna get theirs too, so I guess this is ok."

I think it depends on whether everybody's keying cars or just these gangs keying each other's cars.

It's weak and indefensible _because_ it makes no logical sense. Otherwise it would be trivial to defend by simply presenting a valid inference to support it. I.e., basically, _because_ of that fallacy.

Again: I see it differently. I think there's quite a few people who appear to hold this premise as a moral fact, and it's not clear that it's a reasoning error so much as a depressing worldview.

 

[blutoski]

A prediction is being taken as a piece of evidence.

This is what I was drawn to originally.
It's counterfactual reasoning, which is an inductive structure, but can be a fallacy if the probability is weak.

In my opinion, this weak premise of what a male would do does impact the argument.

 

[Harpyja]

Sorry, not seeing it.

We're talking about kids on a playground reacting to an adult punishing a group unfairly and noting that privileged group is also treated unfairly at times. Therefore, there is no privileged group. That is not a logical fallacy.

Consider a different example, not involving a playground, but two rival tribes, Tribe A and Tribe B. A man from Tribe A is convicted of petty theft against a member of Tribe B, and is sentenced to death by a judge from Tribe B. When the man objects, a member of Tribe B says, "Well, if one of us had been in the same situation, you would have treated them the same way, so it's fair."

We are not just talking about kids on a playground.

I'm sad to say I still regularly see variations of this argument, all the time.

On cursory examination, it doesn't seem to quite fit the "two wrongs don't fit a right" fallacy. However, if you consider the "second wrong" as having a perceived possibility by the group committing the fallacy to occur in the future against the group committing the fallacy, it'll work.

 

[Cavemonster]

This is what I was drawn to originally.
It's counterfactual reasoning, which is an inductive structure, but can be a fallacy if the probability is weak.

In my opinion, this weak premise of what a male would do does impact the argument.

I would say that an argument using counterfactual reasoning, to be logically sound, must present the evidence and reasoning that leads to the counterfactual claim.

It's not the low probability itself that makes it fallacious (though that's what makes it less likely to be true) it's the lack of supporting evidence for that premise.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

It's interesting that the "Two wrongs don't make a right fallacy" is described in different ways in different sources.

In the link Joe provided it is defined as:


Which is not a perfect fit, and may not always even be a fallacy since "wrong" in this context is often socially defined. What makes my example different, and something I hear every day, is that a behavior is not being compared to something else that has been done, but to something the speak believes would be done. A prediction is being taken as a piece of evidence.

For instance, if someone a buck from me in the past, I could make an argument that stealing a buck back from him evens the scales. It wouldn't be an airtight argument in all moral systems, but it's in the realm of reason. If I steal a buck from someone and defend it by saying he "probably would" steal a buck from me, I'm on much more shaky territory, especially without making any kind of case for why I'm assuming how they would act in the future.



This separate explanation of the "Two wrongs don't make a right fallacy" seems to be closer to what I'm talking about.

I think both these definitions say the same thing.

The terms wrong and unjust and right and just are used interchangeably. And to argue that a first wrong is made right by a second wrong is the same as arguing that a first injustice is justified by a second injustice.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

I think Blutoski and UncaYimmy are making similar points: that it's not a fallacy because the girl was just stating a different moral position.

I don't think that reading holds up. I think the girl agrees that punishing only the boys was wrong/unjust in this case, but that it is made right/justified by another wrong/unjust act.

Moral frameworks can be all-or-nothing. My impression is that the person is defending a different moral framework where discrimination is OK if it's universal, but not OK if it's unilateral.

Sorry, but the idea of "universal discrimination" is logically inconsistent. The point is that the application of punishment is not done universally. If it were applied universally (punish the whole class when the individual perpetrator is unknown), then there would be no discrimination.

You can't average out wrongs to make a right. That's pretty much the point of the "two wrongs make a right" fallacy.

ETA: While not stated, I think the girl implicitly agrees that if the subsequent wrong (punishing all the girls) never happened, then the current wrong is indeed wrong.

 

[Cainkane1]

I think of what you mentioned tu quoque is the closest. I'd say it's the two wrongs don't make a right "fallacy".

http://www.fallacyfiles.org/twowrong.html

It's really just a specific type of irrelevancy or red herring argument.

However, since a 5 minute time out imposed collectively on the boys is a relatively minor thing, I think there's a decent argument to be made that the ethics of imposing such a thing is "close enough". To get real justice in an elementary school setting, you'd need a lot more adults per child, and you'd need to conduct something like a criminal trial to ascertain who is at fault for what. It's simply not worth the effort and resources, and at least some of what is being "taught" in this situation is simply obedience to authority.

To the larger political questions of gender, race, and so on, I think what often happens is the same situation can be framed narrowly or broadly.

For example, affirmative action and quotas may not be technically fair in any given situation, but in the broader context of cultural norms, there's no other way to correct generations of discrimination but with reverse discrimination. In a way, the slighter wrong is meant to correct a huge wrong that was carried out for hundreds of years and had lasting, entrenched effects on subsequent generations.)

When I was in school there were several situations where the entire class was punished for what one student had done. Once when I was in class the students below us were banging on the steam heating pipe and our teacher went down there to put a stop to it. Some genius named John thought it would be hilarious if he banged on the pipe while she was down there. The embarrassed and lividly angry teacher came back and demanded to know who did it. No one said anything and she told the class we would have to write a sentence 200 time. Something to the effect of "I will not bang on a pipe in class". He confessed and he was the only one punished. I didn't think it was fair to punish the entire class by dropping such a waste of time on everybody but thats exactly what would have happened if he hadn't spoke up.

 

[Cavemonster]

I think both these definitions say the same thing.

The terms wrong and unjust and right and just are used interchangeably. And to argue that a first wrong is made right by a second wrong is the same as arguing that a first injustice is justified by a second injustice.

I'm not quibbling over the difference between 'wrong' and 'injustice', I agree that they're interchangeable in this context. Re-read my post, I think I was pretty clear on the difference I was talking about.

The relevant difference is the subjunctive, counterfactual "would" in the second definition. It's not comparing similar events, but using a hypothesized future event as a point of comparison for judgement of a past event.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

The relevant difference is the subjunctive, counterfactual "would" in the second definition. It's not comparing similar events, but using a hypothesized future event as a point of comparison for judgement of a past event.

I disagree. You can logically debate hypotheticals and conditional statements. (You could easily recast her argument to read "If male teachers discriminate against girls, then it's right for female teacher to discriminate against boys." In that case, the truth value of the conditional part of the statement is irrelevant, because even if true, the conclusion doesn't follow.)

I understand that you also object to the girl's unsupported premise (that a male teacher would have discriminated against the girls), but that point, as I have shown, is moot. FWIW, I agree with you that her supposition was wrong and unfair. But having the facts wrong is not a logical fallacy.

Even if that subjunctive part were true, her conclusion would still be wrong.

The problem isn't with the truth value of her premises. Even if she had a true (or stipulated) premise, her conclusion still doesn't follow. Even if it were factual that a male teacher would similarly discriminate against girls, it still wouldn't make the discrimination against the boys right.

And the name of the flaw in her argument is the two wrongs make a right fallacy.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

Consider a different example, not involving a playground, but two rival tribes, Tribe A and Tribe B. A man from Tribe A is convicted of petty theft against a member of Tribe B, and is sentenced to death by a judge from Tribe B. When the man objects, a member of Tribe B says, "Well, if one of us had been in the same situation, you would have treated them the same way, so it's fair."

This would be a pure tu quoque argument, which--as noted--is related to the two wrongs make a right fallacy, but slightly different.

I like your approach though, to get this off the playground. As I mentioned earlier, kids often have an overinflated and practically irrational sense of justice. To discuss this argument, we have to ignore that context.

Only in situations like these does it make sense to use "close enough" group punishment. It's not really fair, but there are other issues (teacher to student ratio and the waste of time and resources to seek true justice for such minor problems, for one; the idea of obedience to authority rather than rule by democracy, for another).

On cursory examination, it doesn't seem to quite fit the "two wrongs don't fit a right" fallacy. However, if you consider the "second wrong" as having a perceived possibility by the group committing the fallacy to occur in the future against the group committing the fallacy, it'll work.

I disagree. Again, whether or not the girl was wrong about the second wrong happening is moot. Even if she were correct, her logic is flawed because, in fact, two wrongs don't make a right. That is, a second wrong doesn't change the first wrong into a right.

 

[JoeTheJuggler]

A prediction is being taken as a piece of evidence.

That's moot. Even if her prediction were right, it wouldn't change the first wrong into a right.

ETA: Bad evidence (or a false premise) is not a logical fallacy. In this case, it doesn't matter because the fallacy is there whether or not the premise is true.

For instance, if someone a buck from me in the past, I could make an argument that stealing a buck back from him evens the scales. It wouldn't be an airtight argument in all moral systems, but it's in the realm of reason.

No, in fact it wouldn't. You'd both be guilty of stealing. A second theft would not make the first theft not a theft, morally speaking.

Change "stealing a buck" to "committed assault on" and you'd see plainly that the second wrong does not make the first wrong right.

What if Bernie Madoff tried something like your approach? What if most of his victims came by their wealth immorally (or even illegally)? Would that make his crime of fraud morally OK?

 

[Cavemonster]

No, in fact it wouldn't. You'd both be guilty of stealing. A second theft would not make the first theft not a theft, morally speaking.

Change "stealing a buck" to "committed assault on" and you'd see plainly that the second wrong does not make the first wrong right.

What if Bernie Madoff tried something like your approach? What if most of his victims came by their wealth immorally (or even illegally)? Would that make his crime of fraud morally OK?

By some moral systems it would.
Remember the legend of Robin Hood, the hero?

He robs from the rich and gives to the poor, and he's justified by the notion that those rich he takes from are in effect robbers themselves by perpetuating a system of severe economic inequality.

If all of Madoff's victims were seen to have come about their wealth immorally or illegally,(EDIT: And Madoff was clearly aware of this) he would no doubt be a folk hero in some, not insignificant circles.

Remember that aside from Robin Hood, we have a whole culture of comics dedicated to vigilantism, and a whole history of films celebrating heroes for revenge. It's so ubiquitous, that many test audiences cause a film's ending to be changed if the villain does not receive what they see as appropriate comeuppance.

 

[Skeptical Greg]

No, in fact it wouldn't. You'd both be guilty of stealing. A second theft would not make the first theft not a theft, morally speaking....
...

Since when is recovering stolen property, theft and morally wrong?