Is it?

[Bri]

I'm not so sure of that. It seems to me that the immateriality of a "God" is, in fact, the real issue. How does the immaterial interact with the material world?

How doesn't really matter. It's possible that it can. Otherwise, anything immaterial would also be inconsequential, so really the only attribute we need to be concerned with is whether it is inconsequential or not.

In reality, whether or not a god is inconsequential is also irrelevant. Neither a consequential nor an inconsequential god can be disproved as both may be unfalsifiable. JetLeg not only thinks that being immaterial or inconsequential is necessary for it to be unfalsifiable (possibly a misunderstanding of what unfalsifiability means), but he also thinks that if it is unfalsifiable that means it is true.

This is the old problem that dualists cannot answer. If "mind" is truly immaterial, how does it interact with the material brain and cause action? There is simply no mechanism that we can identify. If we could identify a mechanism we would call it material -- a physical mechanism. The only other possibility is 'magic'.

That we don't know the mechanism doesn't mean it is necessarily false.

Yes, many people believe in an immaterial god that interacts with the material world. The issue is whether or not that idea is coherent. I don't think it is.

It is coherent in that it is not impossible.

Isn't the immaterial necessarily inconsequential?

Not necessarily. But even if it is, that would make the central issue inconsequentiality, not immateriality.

-Bri

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

How doesn't really matter. It's possible that it can. Otherwise, anything immaterial would also be inconsequential, so really the only attribute we need to be concerned with is whether it is inconsequential or not.

I'm not sure that it is even logically possible (with the possible exception of magic and that simply defies logic making everything possible). How can two entirely incommensurate things interact? They don't intersect in any way. Immaterial, inconsequantial::tomato, tomato. I think inconsequentiality follows from the immateriality, so I do think both are an issue, but, yes, as far as our lives are concerned the only thing that really matters is the inconsequentiality of such a "being" (and I use that term very loosely).

In reality, whether or not a god is inconsequential is also irrelevant.

Only as far as existence is concerned. An inconsequential god would have a big impact on our lives. As in no afterlife, no being held under judgment, etc.

That we don't know the mechanism doesn't mean it is necessarily false.

No, but that there cannot be a mechanism would mean that.

It is coherent in that it is not impossible.

The only possibility I can see is "magic" and that is merely a fantasy position.

 

[Bri]

I'm not sure that it is even logically possible (with the possible exception of magic and that simply defies logic making everything possible). How can two entirely incommensurate things interact? They don't intersect in any way.

It is possible that the material is a subset of the immaterial. Either way, the fact that we don't know how they interact doesn't mean that they can't.

Immaterial, inconsequantial::tomato, tomato. I think inconsequentiality follows from the immateriality, so I do think both are an issue, but, yes, as far as our lives are concerned the only thing that really matters is the inconsequentiality of such a "being" (and I use that term very loosely).

For the purposes of this discussion, inconsequentiality is the issue. But even that isn't much of an issue since a consequential being could exist without there being evidence of it, particularly if it was all-powerful and didn't want us to know for certain of its existence.

Only as far as existence is concerned. An inconsequential god would have a big impact on our lives. As in no afterlife, no being held under judgment, etc.

An inconsequential being could perhaps impact an afterlife, if there is one. But again, there is no way whatsoever to have any evidence of that.

No, but that there cannot be a mechanism would mean that.

Sure, if you could prove that there cannot be a mechanism. But I doubt that you can.

The only possibility I can see is "magic" and that is merely a fantasy position.

That you can't see another possibility doesn't mean there isn't one.

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

I'm not dismissing the idea of god on those grounds, merely pointing out the problems inherent in a full exposure of the idea of the immaterial. God may exist, but, if god is immaterial, it seems to follow that he is inconsequential.

Imagine that there is a god, an immaterial being. Each time that god thinks "I want the moon to move 5000 km towards the sun", the moon moves. Each time he thinks "I want the moon to move 5000 km away from the sun", it also happens.

I guess that all we would see in the physical universe is that the moon moves for no reason at all. It would be indeed a breakup of nature's laws. But, if we were able to measure god's mind,we would be able to see at least a statistically significant correlation between god's thoughts about the moon, and the movement of the earth.

You might say that we cannot, but it is irrelevant.



By the way, you can imagine god B, who doesn't have the power to move the moon, but he does have the power to read god A's mind. Such a god would be able to establish the correlation.

It is all hypothetical.


(In my posts above, I was talking of an inconsequential god. )

 

[drkitten]

I'm not sure that it is even logically possible (with the possible exception of magic and that simply defies logic making everything possible).

What's wrong with "magic" as an explanation? More accurately, why do you assume that your logic is valid in an area completely outside of its observational base?

The laws of physics we know about are derived from the study of the material; the immaterial is under no obligation to respect those laws. And, in fact, Gell-Mann has a skeletal theory of how "information" can affect mass/energy while possessing neither. If there's some definition of "material" that you're using that applies to information (and not to its carrier), I'd like to hear it.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

OK, I obviously didn't explain myself very well, so I will try again. Please bear with me since these are new ideas to me, though I am sure they are not new ideas in any sense.

I am arguing by means of definitions. That is why I invoked the idea of logical impossibility, though even there I am not completely sure since I haven't thought this through completely.

What do we mean by material? In the past this was easy since it meant "made of matter". But now the line between matter and energy has been irrevocably smeared. They are equivalent.

We used to use the idea of spooky action at a distance as the analogy of the immaterial affecting the material world. Now we know that gravity, the biggest spooky 'actor' at a distance in the book is a routine material force at home in the materialistic universe. 'Energy' played a similar role -- just look at those metal filings lining up. We now speak of four forces, three of which we have 'explained' or at least cobbled together in a unified theory and they act via 'particles'. This 'stuff' that is not made of matter supposedly but acts on matter was always our analogy for the immaterial acting on the material world. But now we know that it is all material.

So, we turn to consciousness. Thoughts. They are immaterial, right? The only experience we have of thoughts is our own and those we discuss them with. I cannot point to a thought and say -- look, there it goes. Thoughts have existence only in their instantiation within our brains -- that is how they can have an effect in the material world/plane.

These are, of course, our experiences and refer to the material world, and you may argue that it is unfair to discuss the immaterial by recourse to the material.

But what do we mean by 'immaterial'? It is defined in contradistinction to 'material'. I have no means of discussing the immaterial except by recourse to the material because that is how immaterial is defined.

What do we mean by 'material'? In essence, it means that which has an effect within the world. If something takes up no space, cannot be detected, has no force in the world, then it is not part of the material world. It is immaterial, the opposite of material.

While we used to speak of immaterial forces in the world -- gravity, light, etc. -- we now know that they are material. We know they are material because they act in the world. We can measure them, quantify them, etc.

The immaterial, by definition, is not material. One of its properties, if we can even speak of such a thing should be that it has no effect on the world. If it did have an effect on the world then we would call it a material force. It might be one that we do not currently understand, but if those things that have an effect in the material world are defined as material (that is how we use the word now that we understand the equivalence of matter and energy, energy being a measure of things that have an effect in the material world), then the immaterial, by definition, cannot affect the material world.

So, to answer your questions: God moving the moon with his mind would constitute a new material force that can be measured. It wouldn't be immaterial. God's mind would therefore be material.

Second issue, a mind that is 'immaterial' doesn't make sense. It has no boundary. I don't see how you could define such a 'thing'. Mind is only sensical as a term if it has a boundary. Thought can only occur by contrast, comparison, analogy, etc. which require boundaries. I could try and fudge a concept of an 'immaterial mind', but I would only be fooling myself. I see other people and they seem to think. I cannot see their minds, so I think mind is immaterial. But that is because mind is not a 'thing', it is action. Action requires something that acts. The immaterial acting makes no sense. By definition there isn't anything there to act in the first place.

What is my problem with magic? It is cheating. It destroys any possibility of rational discussion. My magic can make a square circle. If 'magic' can be invoked to perform logical impossibilities, then there is no sense in discussing any of this once it is brought into the picture.

 

[JetLeg]

Bri, I still owe you an answer.

What do we mean by 'material'? In essence, it means that which has an effect within the world. If something takes up no space, cannot be detected, has no force in the world, then it is not part of the material world. It is immaterial, the opposite of material.

You have two different ideas inside your definition of material
-1- Takes space in the world
-2- Has effect upon things that take space in the world.

I think that I showed with my god example that -1- and -2- don't always have to go hand in hand from a strictly logical point of view. Therefore, your definition of "material" is a complex definition which includes two terms that go together, but do not have to, from a logical point of view. Do you agree?

Second issue, a mind that is 'immaterial' doesn't make sense. It has no boundary. I don't see how you could define such a 'thing'. Mind is only sensical as a term if it has a boundary. Thought can only occur by contrast, comparison, analogy, etc. which require boundaries. I could try and fudge a concept of an 'immaterial mind', but I would only be fooling myself. I see other people and they seem to think. I cannot see their minds, so I think mind is immaterial. But that is because mind is not a 'thing', it is action. Action requires something that acts. The immaterial acting makes no sense. By definition there isn't anything there to act in the first place.

What do you mean by boundary? A spatial boundary, or a logical one? The immaterial by definition cannot have a spatial boundary, so what is your point?

Action always happens to something, you cannot have an action without a thing that the action happens to.

I think that it is an important point that defining a mind as immaterial is not enough. Seems you cannot define something by saying what it is not. Seems that you need to have something positive to say about the mind.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Bri, I still owe you an answer.



You have two different ideas inside your definition of material
-1- Takes space in the world
-2- Has effect upon things that take space in the world.

I think that I showed with my god example that -1- and -2- don't always have to go hand in hand from a strictly logical point of view. Therefore, your definition of "material" is a complex definition which includes two terms that go together, but do not have to, from a logical point of view. Do you agree?

No. First I did not say that for something to be material it must take up space in the world. Some of the things we call material take up space and others do not. A photon takes up no space.

I was enumerating examples of what we call material not defining material as having to have all those characteristics.

Those things that we call material have an effect in the world in some way. That is part of what it means to have an effect.

I disagree with you because you seem to be defining an "immaterial entity" as having an effect in the world. If what we mean by material is "that which has an effect in the material world" -- that is how we use the term -- then the immaterial, being non-material, cannot have an effect in the world.

What do you mean by boundary? A spatial boundary, or a logical one? The immaterial by definition cannot have a spatial boundary, so what is your point?

That is my point. No spatial boundary, so thought makes no sense.

Action always happens to something, you cannot have an action without a thing that the action happens to.

Yes, that is my point. How can we define the immaterial as a "thing". It is boundaryless. It has no limits. I think it is undefined.

I think that it is an important point that defining a mind as immaterial is not enough. Seems you cannot define something by saying what it is not. Seems that you need to have something positive to say about the mind.

What I am saying is that I don't see how you can do that with an immaterial starting point.

 

[JetLeg]

That is my point. No spatial boundary, so thought makes no sense.
Yes, that is my point. How can we define the immaterial as a "thing". It is boundaryless. It has no limits. I think it is undefined.

Well, if so, it does follow from your assumptions.

If only things that have spatial boundaries exist, then the immaterial doesn't exist because it does not have spatial boundaries.

But we need to think if the assumption is correct. It seems you beg the question, by assuming that only things that have spatial boundaries exist. It is exactly what needs to be proven in the first place.

 

[JetLeg]

Eh...

I think that truth is relative, and not objective. It is defined by the personal views. So an argument is really the only way to settle what is true. And if you can't win someone in an argument , you can't know that you are right and he is wrong. And if you can't disprove someone's views, you can't win an argument. So unless I abandon the above ideas, you have the chance of forcing me into admiting that faeries exist because they can't be disproven.

From wiki on relativism :

The term often refers to truth relativism, which is the doctrine that there are no absolute truths, i.e., that truth is always relative to some particular frame of reference, such as a language or a culture

Truth is relative not only to a culture, but to person. No objective truth, each one and his own. So, the only way you can disprove the truth of someone is by arguing him out of it. If you can't argue a religious person out of his truth, you can't know if he is right or wrong.

 

[Bri]

As an aside, this whole discussion about material vs. immaterial doesn't matter as far as the topic of the thread is concerned. The only question is whether or not JetLeg's god can affect the world, and even that is only marginally relevant.

JetLeg's question is whether or not these three beliefs concerning an unfalsifiable proposition P are equally valid:

1. the belief that P is true.
2. the belief that P is false.
3. having no belief whatsoever that P is true or false until further evidence presents itself.

What JetLeg doesn't get is that he himself holds belief (3) or possibly (2) concerning the existence of faeries, the big brother of his god, the gods of other religions, pixies, Harry Potter, gnomes, elves, the Loch Ness Monster, hobbits, Klingons, and unicorns.

The question is why he would expect anyone else to hold belief (1) about the existence of his god without evidence.

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

A proposition is either true or false, regardless of who believes or doesn't believe it.

-Bri

Again, how do you show that it is true with unfalsifiables?
It is easy to prove it with falsifiables. But with unf?

 

[Bri]

If you can't argue a religious person out of his truth, you can't know if he is right or wrong.

So what?

We've already conceded that point. The same can be said for faeries, the big brother of his god, the gods of other religions, pixies, Harry Potter, gnomes, elves, the Loch Ness Monster, hobbits, Klingons, and unicorns but you don't believe in them.

So why would you expect anyone to believe in your god without evidence?

-Bri

 

[Bri]

Again, how do you show that it is true with unfalsifiables?
It is easy to prove it with falsifiables. But with unf?

Again, so what?

Faeries, the big brother of his god, the gods of other religions, pixies, Harry Potter, gnomes, elves, the Loch Ness Monster, hobbits, Klingons, and unicorns -- all unfalsifiable.

Do you believe in all of them?

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

So what?

We've already conceded that point. The same can be said for faeries, the big brother of his god, the gods of other religions, pixies, Harry Potter, gnomes, elves, the Loch Ness Monster, hobbits, Klingons, and unicorns but you don't believe in them.


-Bri

Well, it seems that I should, actually. It is quite a logical implication of the "personal truth" idea...

 

[Bri]

Do you?

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

Not so far.

But I have either to consider this idea, or to re-consider the "personal truth" idea.

I think that democracy is based in some extent upon the idea that one's beliefs should be respected we don't have a way to determine which ones are the right ones, so all should be respected equally.

 

[Bri]

OK, so JetLeg -- I believe in the existence of a god who created the entire universe, the material and the immaterial, the consequential and the inconsequential. Except that I believe he would never create a god as silly as your god, and therefore my god precludes the existence of your god.

Do you also believe in my god?

By the way, the majority of the world likely believes that your god does not exist. Does that mean that your god doesn't exist?

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

In what is he different from my god specificaly?

 

[Bri]

I think that democracy is based in some extent upon the idea that one's beliefs should be respected we don't have a way to determine which ones are the right ones, so all should be respected equally.

Yes! That's what I've been telling you all along. There is no way to know what unfalsifiable beliefs are right and which are wrong. In many cases they contradict one another so we know that they can't all be right.

So, just realize that your belief is only opinion and respect the beliefs of others. [ETA: Note that respecting the beliefs of others doesn't necessarily mean believing the beliefs of others.]

Could it be that you're finally getting that?

-Bri