Is Dawkins wrong about eugenics?

[TragicMonkey]

My chain-smoking (for 72 years) hard drinking mother-in-law had half of a lung removed two years ago (at 83)did a little radiation, a little chemo, and is still going pretty damn strong.

There is obviously more to it than "clean living".

My great grandfather died tragically early at age 98. He was struck by lightning. Why was he outside during a thunderstorm that night? He was walking over to his girlfriend's for a booty call. Some of the neighbors claimed it was a divine judgment, but most figured if God had minded he would have acted decades earlier.

 

[d4m10n]

There's always too many unknowns. For example, the mechanism of action could be 'willing to abandon their nation and avoid military service'. The side effect could be a nation that leaves itself undefended in times of war, which is vulnerable to genocide, undoing the extended life expectancy on average.

For my nefarious purposes, the selective breeding experiment will be run by a group much smaller than an entire nation. See post #7.

 

[blutoski]

For my nefarious purposes, the selective breeding experiment will be run by a group much smaller than an entire nation. See post #7.

Wouldn't that make it even less representative for comparative fitness?

One of the complicated aspects of humanity is that we're collaborative and our competitive fitness is group based. So, regardless of isolated trait fitness, the ability of that breed to actually survive - much less function - is also dependent on cooperative effects versus other groups.

For example, if the breeding secondary effect is that the population is uglier than a rock cod, breeding costs would increase and may exceed the benefits of improved performance in the primary trait.


ETA: in the case where it's a selection of the type you describe in #7, that doesn't clear it up. Repeating my earlier example, if the mechanism of action is eschewing mandatory service, that may have worked in the past when people could disappear from entire nations and reappear elsewhere without requiring identification. Here in 2020, they probably won't evade the authorities, and the successful trait is merely an artefact of historical environment that no longer works.

Or could the trait have been that they were hyper-religious and joined cults that abstain from alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, &c. Hey, like the Shakers. Long lived. And extinct.

 

[Roboramma]

Longevity would not be naturally selected for unless it includes longevity of reproductive fitness. It does exist in nature and I am thinking of crocodilians and other reptiles such as giant tortoises. These live a very long time and retain reproductive capability. They also continue to grow throughout their long life, or I think that is at least true for the crocodilians. I think that there are also some birds (albatrosses?) with long lives that continue to reproduce into old age.

Or think about trees.

 

[Roboramma]

It’s probably not specific enough. Dog breeders are really only manipulating a couple dozen genes.

I think the lack of specificity is a feature rather than a bug. Any genes that tend to result in greater longevity are also likely to improve health along the way, as the things that lead to death in old age are really an accumulation of damage and the loss of regenerative ability. There is an issue with improving regenerative ability potentially leading to increased cancer rates, but since cancer will also lead to death it will affect longevity too. By focusing on the final outcome you can avoid selecting for something that at first looks like a good idea but leads to major problems.

Of course longevity is just a single measure, I think you'd want to look at a range of things, including some measures of health through out life. It's also certainly not entirely heritable, but we do know that the heritability is greater than zero, so there's some variation in genes that could be a target of selection.

Also, we don’t really understand why things age or why longevity doesn’t select for itself already. There must be some underlying evolutionary reason behind it and it must be deeply engrained because all animals age.

We have some good theories. There are some fundamental tradeoffs. One of them is the selection for genes with positive affects on youthful vigor even if they have deleterious affects after reproductive age.

Another tradeoff is between cancer and growth/repair. You can prevent cancer by turning off cell's ability to reproduce, but that leads to many of the problems of aging. But that's only one way that our bodies have of preventing cancer. Others may be more energy intensive, but that's one tradeoff that we don't really have to worry about too much.

We probably stand a better change of short circuiting the aging process with medicine than we do “breeding it out”.

Absolutely. I'm not advocating breeding for longevity. I am only commenting that it's a candidate for an actually "better" human.

 

[TragicMonkey]

Or think about trees.

Q: Which trees have sex in their old age?







A: Elders

 

[The Man]

Note that neither I, nor IIRC Dawkins said anything about it passing some effectiveness threshold. Hell, I didn't even say it was a smart one. (Just using the social darwinism criterion there kinda disqualifies it from any kind of claim to intelligence)

That said, it would clearly affect the poor more than the rich, because only the poor would qualify for the aid at all.

Must be why I never claimed either of you say "anything about it passing some effectiveness threshold.".

The targeted group was the stupid even though the program was geared towards the poor. If a program isn't effective towards the group it is targeted for then the people enacting the program to affect that targeted group can oppose it on that grounds. If the program is effective towards the targeted group then it doesn't matter if you try to hide the intent of the program, it could be opposed just for its effects.

I wouldn't worry much. Pretty much just imagine now how much traction you'd get though with an objection boiling down to "OMG, it's immoral to help the poor more than the rich." Because that would be the only discrimination involved in my example.

I'm not worried and I have no need to imagine. Aspects of the criminal justice system in the USA that disproportionately affect the poor are objected to because they disproportionately affect minorities and people of color. So we have direct corollaries today.

I mean, I know there will be some nutcases who'll agree that any kind of helping the poor is wrong/distorting-the-market/whatever, but they tend to be a small minority.


Overcoming other pressures was also never a part of the definition, and it's not a criterion for efficiency. Those programs and pressures exist whether or not I start a charity to give free contraception to the poor. It's not like they'd only activate in response to it or anything. For judging effectiveness, you only have to see whether or not you end up with a result different from that baseline, and pretty much how much bang per buck do you get when you judge that difference made against the cost involved.

Essentially that objection is as daft as saying that paddles don't work, because you might not be able to row up certain rivers. Sure, but that's not the criterion for it working.

Again, your program was geared towards the poor but targeted the stupid. So "the criterion for it working" would be those poor having less stupid offspring. Given that stupid people tend to make stupid decisions the poor who would tend to use contraceptives consistently and effectively might also tend to be the smarter of them. To use your daft analogy, that would be paddling the wrong way.

 

[HansMustermann]

Must be why I never claimed either of you say "anything about it passing some effectiveness threshold.".

Yet you STILL go on as if being effective or popular has anything to do with what I was saying. In fact it was deliberately using idiotic criteria from the start, as I've already pointed out.

The actual point I was making, and quite explicitly and overtly, was that you don't have a moral objection unless it is actually doing anything "evil". What the goals might be in my head, and whatever broken reasoning and/or premises might connect those to the means for it, don't constitute much grounds for a moral objection.

The targeted group was the stupid even though the program was geared towards the poor.

Yes. "Social Darwinism" is sadly standard logic for eugenics proponents, incidentally. Incidentally yes, it's also totally stupid, but just showing that you can use it to connect things that way.

If a program isn't effective towards the group it is targeted for then the people enacting the program to affect that targeted group can oppose it on that grounds.

While they can oppose it for whatever pencils-up-the-nose underpants-on-head retarded grounds they wish, that's not the same as having a valid moral objection. "It's not the same bang per buck for my money as just killing a few people" is not much of a moral objection.

Essentially, to be blunt, you're basically just running all around the place with the goalposts at this point.

If the program is effective towards the targeted group then it doesn't matter if you try to hide the intent of the program, it could be opposed just for its effects.

Again, it can be opposed on whatever grounds. Hell, some may even oppose it because the voices in their head said so. But I'm still waiting for an example of how that could be claimed to be immoral or unethical under any major school of ethics. Basically do you have any such reasoning to offer, or are you just running with the goalposts into some completely different and suspiciously vague realm of OTHER reasons to oppose it?

I'm not worried and I have no need to imagine. Aspects of the criminal justice system in the USA that disproportionately affect the poor are objected to because they disproportionately affect minorities and people of color. So we have direct corollaries today.

If you're trying to take the discussion into the realm of the legal system, I won't stop you. Mainly because it's a MUCH narrower domain than ethics in general. What is deemed illegal is necessarily a smaller set than what might be deemed unethical.

But I'm totally up for it, if you want to limit yourself to that subset.

So, please go on. In what way would you LEGALLY oppose a program to offer voluntary contraception to the poor? Just saying that some vague principle exists is not enough. Please go on. Be specific. If you had to take me to court over starting such a program, what would be the allegations you write in the complaint? I.e., exactly what would you tell a judge to issue a subpoena for?

Again, your program was geared towards the poor but targeted the stupid. So "the criterion for it working" would be those poor having less stupid offspring. Given that stupid people tend to make stupid decisions the poor who would tend to use contraceptives consistently and effectively might also tend to be the smarter of them. To use your daft analogy, that would be paddling the wrong way.

Whether it's working was a tangent, to show that your "overcoming other pressures" argument doesn't even work to that end. And unsurprisingly, now you try to run with the goalposts even from that to something else. Again.

 

[Darat]

As a note contraceptives are made available at no cost to the poorest in our society.

 

[The Man]

Yet you STILL go on as if being effective or popular has anything to do with what I was saying.

That's the situation you laid out, that the actual intent would be concealed, leaving the results as the window available. As already noted people can and do morally oppose things based on what results.

In fact it was deliberately using idiotic criteria from the start, as I've already pointed out.

Which I recognized right away from your A and B criteria.

The actual point I was making, and quite explicitly and overtly, was that you don't have a moral objection unless it is actually doing anything "evil". What the goals might be in my head, and whatever broken reasoning and/or premises might connect those to the means for it, don't constitute much grounds for a moral objection.

Yet people do make such moral judgments based on results, particularly when intents may be unavailable, concealed or even deceptive. They can even make such objections even in spite of actual honestly asserted intents. Heck, some people morally object to just contraception and abortions in general.

Just determining if "it is actually doing anything "evil"" is a determination based on result. What "evil" results from what you are doing.

Yes. "Social Darwinism" is sadly standard logic for eugenics proponents, incidentally. Incidentally yes, it's also totally stupid, but just showing that you can use it to connect things that way.



While they can oppose it for whatever pencils-up-the-nose underpants-on-head retarded grounds they wish, that's not the same as having a valid moral objection. "It's not the same bang per buck for my money as just killing a few people" is not much of a moral objection.

Essentially, to be blunt, you're basically just running all around the place with the goalposts at this point.

Nope, the possible objections I've stated haven't changed nor the goalpost.

To be blunter, you tried to set up a scenario where intent was the determining factor of morality then restricted or concealed (sugar coated as you put) that intent. Not an uncommon situation, yet people still manage to make decisions they consider moral, your up the nose histrionics aside.

Again, it can be opposed on whatever grounds. Hell, some may even oppose it because the voices in their head said so. But I'm still waiting for an example of how that could be claimed to be immoral or unethical under any major school of ethics. Basically do you have any such reasoning to offer, or are you just running with the goalposts into some completely different and suspiciously vague realm of OTHER reasons to oppose it?

Ah, major schools of ethics, why didn’t say so? Naturally because people just always concern themselves primarily with which major schools of ethics they may or may not be conforming to when making ethical choices.

While I certainly have no interest is a discussion of the relative merits of various schools, major or minor, I’ve indulged you so far and I’m surprised that determinations based on outcome wasn’t obvious.

If one feels helping the poor or even improving the intelligence of a population in such a way is a moral responsibility or obligation. Then a resulting failure to meet that obligation is under consequentialism morally objectionable. Just as would be the potential indented and unintended negative effects of it actually working or not working.

As mentioned above objections to just abortions and contraceptives in general, those would fall under deontological ethics.

With an apparent focus on intent and action you seem to angling for some Kantian deontological approach.

If you're trying to take the discussion into the realm of the legal system, I won't stop you. Mainly because it's a MUCH narrower domain than ethics in general. What is deemed illegal is necessarily a smaller set than what might be deemed unethical.

But I'm totally up for it, if you want to limit yourself to that subset.

So, please go on. In what way would you LEGALLY oppose a program to offer voluntary contraception to the poor? Just saying that some vague principle exists is not enough. Please go on. Be specific. If you had to take me to court over starting such a program, what would be the allegations you write in the complaint? I.e., exactly what would you tell a judge to issue a subpoena for?

Nope as stated I was giving an existing corollary to what you asked me to imagine. However, as you seem to be intent on having some argument with yourself, have at it.

Whether it's working was a tangent, to show that your "overcoming other pressures" argument doesn't even work to that end. And unsurprisingly, now you try to run with the goalposts even from that to something else. Again.

Yes, it was clear that you want "whether it's working" to be a "tangent". However, the scenario you set up deliberately limits and intentionally conceals the intent of the actions leaving only the results of the actions upon which to make moral determinations.

ETA: If I recall correctly it was Aristotle who held that evil was the result of ignorance. By that regard, deliberately making your scenario ignorant (stupid as you put it) you were essentially making it evil or at least deliberately increasing its potential for evil results.

ETA2: Oops looks like that was Socrates, sorry.

 

[The Man]

As a note contraceptives are made available at no cost to the poorest in our society.

Sure, but probably along with educational programs or materials for safer sex practices and family planning. The obvious intent being to help people make better life choices. Not just to be throwing contraceptives at some people hoping they will breed less.

 

[HansMustermann]

To be blunter, you tried to set up a scenario where intent was the determining factor of morality then restricted or concealed (sugar coated as you put) that intent. Not an uncommon situation, yet people still manage to make decisions they consider moral, your up the nose histrionics aside.

Actually what I've been saying is to stop being so focused on the intent, especially when it boils down to guessing what the intent might be. Something can have the noblest intents and be done in an evil way (e.g., a lot of horrible human experimentation in WW2 had the intent to cure certain ills), and conversely something can have an evil and/or stupid intent but do something good. While, yes, not being particularly effective at actually achieving anything evil.

You need it to actually DO something evil to be a crime. Or at least propose to do something evil, to have a moral objection. Is all I'm saying.

 

[The Man]

Actually what I've been saying is to stop being so focused on the intent, especially when it boils down to guessing what the intent might be. Something can have the noblest intents and be done in an evil way (e.g., a lot of horrible human experimentation in WW2 had the intent to cure certain ills), and conversely something can have an evil and/or stupid intent but do something good. While, yes, not being particularly effective at actually achieving anything evil.

Ah, that explains a lot. Thank you, I always appreciate efforts at actual communication.

Had you related that intent before I simply would have stated that I'm no more or less focused on intents than I am on results or consequences. Much like results, intents can be all you have or need in some situations.

Let's consider someone, not in any survival type situation, who has related their intent to eat the livers (with or without fava beans) of their two roommates. We can further stipulate that this person is a surgeon specializing in liver transplants, only intends to eat parts of the roommates livers and particularly intends that the roommates survive the, well, organ donation. Does one really need to see how this plays out in order not only to morally object to that intent but even to have some moral duty to see that even its attempt in never enacted?

You need it to actually DO something evil to be a crime. Or at least propose to do something evil, to have a moral objection. Is all I'm saying.

Technically, morally and legally, no you don't. Neglect is both a civil and criminal legal concept. If one has a duty to preform and neglects that, they can be morally, civilly and even criminally culpable. While the neglect can be intentional and even result from some action it can also be the result of unintentional inaction. Just as a quick example, one not even recognizing or realizing that they have said duty. So no evil intent yet still a crime.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_negligence

In criminal law, criminal negligence is a surrogate mens rea (Latin for "guilty mind") required to constitute a conventional as opposed to strict liability offense. It is not, strictly speaking, a mens rea because it refers to an objective standard of behaviour expected of the defendant and does not refer to their mental state.[1]

So no evil intent, no evil act but simply a failure to perform an expected duty.

 

[Red Baron Farms]

Is Dawkins wrong about Eugenics?
Yes

Primarily simply because when deciding to breed for "improved" traits, the traits themselves are self contradictory. A big tall heavy man might make a great basketball player, but there are 100 other occupations those same traits will be counter-productive.

 

[theprestige]

Is Dawkins wrong about Eugenics?
Yes

Primarily simply because when deciding to breed for "improved" traits, the traits themselves are self contradictory. A big tall heavy man might make a great basketball player, but there are 100 other occupations those same traits will be counter-productive.

Breeding improved traits doesn't work because it works, but only for the goal you actually set?

In related logic, we can't build better airplanes because the moment we build a better supersonic fighter, we've built a worse subsonic passenger liner.

Also, we can't breed better chickens, because the moment we breed a better egg layer, we've bred a worse meat source.

And we can't build better cars, because the moment we build one with better mileage, we've built one with worse off-road handling.

Let's see... What else? Oh! We can't train better athletes, because the moment we train a better basketball player, we've trained a worse soccer player.

We can't make better candy, because an improved Skittle is a highly dysfunctional Mars bar.

We can't design better websites, because the moment we optimize for e-commerce we've de-optimized for discussion forums.

We can't have a better holiday this year, because the moment we decide to visit Euro-Disney we've killed any chance of a visit to Mount Fuji.

Uh... Can't really tie one on, because every shot of whiskey I drink is one less shot of tequila I could have drunk in its place.

Can't brew better beer, because a better IPA is just a worse Pilsner.

Can't improve our metallurgy, because better steel is just worse iron, when you think about it.

Can't improve education, since a better liberal arts program is also a much worse STEM program.

Etc.

 

[HansMustermann]

Let's consider someone, not in any survival type situation, who has related their intent to eat the livers (with or without fava beans) of their two roommates. We can further stipulate that this person is a surgeon specializing in liver transplants, only intends to eat parts of the roommates livers and particularly intends that the roommates survive the, well, organ donation. Does one really need to see how this plays out in order not only to morally object to that intent but even to have some moral duty to see that even its attempt in never enacted?

Yes, but even then what you can object to is an actual objectionable ACT or intention to commit one, like cutting up someone without a medical reason to. If, say, said roommates needed to be operated for liver cancer and he intends to eat the extracted tumour, well, it's rather distasteful and I wouldn't accept an invitation to dinner from that guy, but that's about it.

Again it boils down to intending to do an actual evil act, in this case as means. You can't just start from "he intends to eat a human liver" and fill in whatever blanks you need to get an objection.

Or in more formal terms what we have there is the fallacy of faulty generalization. You have a subset of implementations that are objectionable, and you rush to tar with the same brush every goal that might or might not use the same implementation as equally objectionable.

Technically, morally and legally, no you don't. Neglect is both a civil and criminal legal concept. If one has a duty to preform and neglects that, they can be morally, civilly and even criminally culpable. While the neglect can be intentional and even result from some action it can also be the result of unintentional inaction. Just as a quick example, one not even recognizing or realizing that they have said duty. So no evil intent yet still a crime.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criminal_negligence


So no evil intent, no evil act but simply a failure to perform an expected duty.

As that link and even your quote tells you, it is a substitute for MENS REA, not for ACTUS REUS. You still need an objectionable act -- in this case, failure to do one's duty -- to have a legal case.

In fact, for all intents and purposes, negligence is a degree of mens rea, as far as justice is concerned.

I also don't see how it's relevant to the discussion at hand. I'm talking about whether you can object to a goal which may or may not be achieved by evil means, just because it COULD be achieved by evil means. Failure to do one's duty, when such a legal duty exists, IS filed under evil in the justice system, so we're basically back to needing an evil act for it to count. It still doesn't say that the goal alone makes it qualify as such.

Basically think of this: Let's say a shingle falls off my house and kills someone. The degrees of mens rea can go anywhere from I INTENDED that guy to be killed, which makes it shoot all the way up premeditation, to an average person wouldn't have thought that the roof needed another inspection, in which case it's none at all. With negligence being somewhere in between.

BUT, and this is the important part, some evil act still has to have happened before you can take me to court for that roof. Either some shingle actually falls on some guy, or you can show that I fail to comply with some safety regulation, or SOMETHING. Just my not giving a flip about that roof is not it.

 

[The Man]

Yes, but even then what you can object to is an actual objectionable ACT or intention to commit one, like cutting up someone without a medical reason to. If, say, said roommates needed to be operated for liver cancer and he intends to eat the extracted tumour, well, it's rather distasteful and I wouldn't accept an invitation to dinner from that guy, but that's about it.

Great, so intention can be morally objectionable, glad we could agree on that.

Again it boils down to intending to do an actual evil act, in this case as means. You can't just start from "he intends to eat a human liver" and fill in whatever blanks you need to get an objection.

What blanks, where are the blanks that need to be filled in? You just said above (and before) that one can morally object to just the “intention to commit” “an actual objectionable ACT “. Lots of people would find the intent to commit the act of eating a human liver morally objectionable. Now you will note that I did remark "not in any survival type situation". So one could fill in some blanks where intending to eat a human liver is simply less morally objectionable than dying, or allowing someone else to die. I recall an interview with someone who was forced to eat dead human bodies to survive. The kid who initially survived the crash (or whatever it was) with him would not eat the dead and eventually just lay down and died. However, later due to the ignominy of being labeled a cannibal the interviewee said that if he had it over to do again he would have just laid down and died with the kid. For the kid dying was less morally objectionable than eating the dead bodies. For the guy eating the bodies was less morally objectionable, at least at that time.

Or in more formal terms what we have there is the fallacy of faulty generalization. You have a subset of implementations that are objectionable, and you rush to tar with the same brush every goal that might or might not use the same implementation as equally objectionable.

Since I specifically referenced “a subset of implementations” where eating the liver was less morally objectionable than other possibilities, a “survival type situation”. I explicitly wasn’t rushing to “tar” anything with anything. Again if you want to have a discussion or argument with just yourself, have at it. No need to try to include me as any part of it.

People do tend to morally object to the eating of humans by humans, whether you or ‘Dr. Liver’ morally object as well or not. That you might find it simply distasteful doesn’t detract from that.

As that link and even your quote tells you, it is a substitute for MENS REA, not for ACTUS REUS. You still need an objectionable act -- in this case, failure to do one's duty -- to have a legal case.

In fact, for all intents and purposes, negligence is a degree of mens rea, as far as justice is concerned.

It seemed to me here…

You need it to actually DO something evil to be a crime. Or at least propose to do something evil, to have a moral objection. Is all I'm saying.

That you were saying one needed evil intent “to actually DO something evil”. Sorry if I misread that.

I also don't see how it's relevant to the discussion at hand. I'm talking about whether you can object to a goal which may or may not be achieved by evil means, just because it COULD be achieved by evil means. Failure to do one's duty, when such a legal duty exists, IS filed under evil in the justice system, so we're basically back to needing an evil act for it to count. It still doesn't say that the goal alone makes it qualify as such.

Yet above you asserted one could object to the intent to commit an evil act, “Or at least propose to do something evil, to have a moral objection.” In the post before? Thus by your own assertions the simple goal of “to do something evil” can have “a moral objection”.

Basically think of this: Let's say a shingle falls off my house and kills someone. The degrees of mens rea can go anywhere from I INTENDED that guy to be killed, which makes it shoot all the way up premeditation, to an average person wouldn't have thought that the roof needed another inspection, in which case it's none at all. With negligence being somewhere in between.

Which is why I pointed out that the neglect can be intentional or unintentional, so not just “somewhere in between” but neglect applies all throughout that range of exemplifications of various intents.

BUT, and this is the important part, some evil act still has to have happened before you can take me to court for that roof. Either some shingle actually falls on some guy, or you can show that I fail to comply with some safety regulation, or SOMETHING. Just my not giving a flip about that roof is not it.

Yes, “fail to comply with” “SOMETHING” like, you know, a statute or a law. Under the law the act is the omission, or the failure to act under the law. While some other event, an audit, a whistle blower, an unrelated incident or as you note a causally related incident, may be what brings attention to that failure to act. The failure is still there even if no one, including the one that had the duty to act, ever knows about it.

As noted in the link, negligence doesn’t refer to the state of mind of the defendant. So while “not giving a flip about that roof” when you had a legal duty to give that “flip” can be exactly it, it doesn’t have to be. A person could be trying to give all the “flips” they can about the roof yet still fail to perform as legally required. Never even knowing of that failure if it is never brought to light. Again, as I noted above I may have just misread what you were trying to say in the previous post about seemingly an evil act requiring an evil intent.

 

[HansMustermann]

Well, then let me clarify things.

I was saying that in the justice system you really need both. You need both something bad to have happened, and you need to judge the degree of intent. Well, that being more like from actual intent to do it, to it not even being foreseeable by an average person of average intelligence, with negligence being somewhere in between.

Just for record sake, though, even though it's called criminal negligence, in the vast majority of cases it's not actually enough to get convicted in the criminal system. It usually has to go all the way up to recklessness for that. In a civil lawsuit, though, well, it depends on how good your lawyer is and what other statutes like strict responsibility essentially bypass that.

It's also not generally the case that the law requires some kind of a thought police. The law tends to not require that you care or not care about something. The law tends to require that some actual event HAPPENS or respectively DOESN'T HAPPEN. E.g., it might require that I get my car or my roof inspected at regular intervals, but it does not explicitly legislate that I should CARE deeply about the car or the roof.

So basically, as I've said, the law doesn't and can't require me to give a flip about the roof. If all you have is me saying that I don't give a flip about the roof, you don't have a case.

Now, if some Actus Reus did happen, you could use such statements to try to establish the degree of mens rea. E.g., if I had said that I don't give a flip if someone gets brained by a tile, that would indicate for example that I already knew that someone can get killed. That might help push the degree of responsibility up to recklessness.

But until some actual violation happens -- e.g., I'm driving a car that has not been inspected since 2000 -- you don't have a case. Just Mens Rea isn't enough.

There may be cases where SAYING something is the illegal act (e.g., hate speech, calling in a fake bomb threat, etc) but still, the principle is the same: you have to actually DO something illegal or not DO something legally mandatory before there is a case. Just intent is not enough. I could say that I intend to call in a bomb threat, and it wouldn't count for anything until I actually do. (But then if I do call in a bomb threat, saying so beforehand might help push the Mens Rea all the way up to premeditation.)

Ethics philosophy is a bit more relaxed than that, in that we can discuss hypotheticals and whatnot. We can discuss whether intending to actually do a certain evil act is a bad idea. So I'm essentially allowing a bit more wiggle room there, than if we were to go by the "something must have actually happened or not happened" standard of justice.

But still, it seems to me like even then it must be intent to actually do an evil act before it's objectionable. Just intending to achieve some vague goal, that may be achieved by evil means or may not involve any such, is not ground enough to have an objection.

E.g., if I *ahem* covet my neighbour's ass, achieving that goal may involve trying to befriend and seduce her, or may involve straight up raping her. The latter is evil, the former is not. You can't blame the goal just because some of the possible means towards that end are evil. What you can condemn is planning to actually do something evil, not having a goal that may incidentally allow something evil as a shortcut.

 

[The Man]

Well, then let me clarify things.

I was saying that in the justice system you really need both. You need both something bad to have happened, and you need to judge the degree of intent. Well, that being more like from actual intent to do it, to it not even being foreseeable by an average person of average intelligence, with negligence being somewhere in between.

Just for record sake, though, even though it's called criminal negligence, in the vast majority of cases it's not actually enough to get convicted in the criminal system. It usually has to go all the way up to recklessness for that. In a civil lawsuit, though, well, it depends on how good your lawyer is and what other statutes like strict responsibility essentially bypass that.

It's also not generally the case that the law requires some kind of a thought police. The law tends to not require that you care or not care about something. The law tends to require that some actual event HAPPENS or respectively DOESN'T HAPPEN. E.g., it might require that I get my car or my roof inspected at regular intervals, but it does not explicitly legislate that I should CARE deeply about the car or the roof.

So basically, as I've said, the law doesn't and can't require me to give a flip about the roof. If all you have is me saying that I don't give a flip about the roof, you don't have a case.

Now, if some Actus Reus did happen, you could use such statements to try to establish the degree of mens rea. E.g., if I had said that I don't give a flip if someone gets brained by a tile, that would indicate for example that I already knew that someone can get killed. That might help push the degree of responsibility up to recklessness.

But until some actual violation happens -- e.g., I'm driving a car that has not been inspected since 2000 -- you don't have a case. Just Mens Rea isn't enough.

There may be cases where SAYING something is the illegal act (e.g., hate speech, calling in a fake bomb threat, etc) but still, the principle is the same: you have to actually DO something illegal or not DO something legally mandatory before there is a case. Just intent is not enough. I could say that I intend to call in a bomb threat, and it wouldn't count for anything until I actually do. (But then if I do call in a bomb threat, saying so beforehand might help push the Mens Rea all the way up to premeditation.)

OK, thanks, that clarifys things.

Ethics philosophy is a bit more relaxed than that, in that we can discuss hypotheticals and whatnot. We can discuss whether intending to actually do a certain evil act is a bad idea. So I'm essentially allowing a bit more wiggle room there, than if we were to go by the "something must have actually happened or not happened" standard of justice.

But still, it seems to me like even then it must be intent to actually do an evil act before it's objectionable. Just intending to achieve some vague goal, that may be achieved by evil means or may not involve any such, is not ground enough to have an objection.

Certainly an understandable position, even if not one some others might take.

E.g., if I *ahem* covet my neighbour's ass, achieving that goal may involve trying to befriend and seduce her, or may involve straight up raping her. The latter is evil, the former is not. You can't blame the goal just because some of the possible means towards that end are evil. What you can condemn is planning to actually do something evil, not having a goal that may incidentally allow something evil as a shortcut.

In the spirit of clarifying things

The point I was trying to make before was that sometimes the goal isn't vague at all. If one's goal is specifically to rape (not just some role playing game), your neighbor, does one really need know how that goal is going to be implemented before it is objectionable?

Prior to that it was simply that goals tend to drive means of implementation which when effective, meaning the results tend to align with the goals (not some bang for the buck efficiency thing), tend to drive results. At no point was I trying to cite one as primary over another but somehow it must have seemed as if I was claiming goals are the thing, no matter how vague.

Now in the case of eugenics, while simply improving humans can be a vague and subjective goal. The original meaning was inherently and explicitly racist both in its goal, to improve the "racial quality of future generations", and its intended implementation, the use of race as the metric of “quality”. As I noted before while one can broaden the definition beyond that, to say go more in line with modern genetics. That’s going to tend to weaken the very moral objection to eugenics Dawkins was arguing for as well as tend to give its original racist stereotypical underpinnings an air of genetic viability.

As I think both of us have noted before that neither one of us would have a problem with a group of people that voluntarily choose to adhere to a particular ethnic standard in their normal breeding habits. Myself, I wouldn't call that eugenics, not just for the reasons noted above but also since (as I've noted before) "selective breeding" in humans is meant to imply a selective process beyond just normal human breeding selection habits.

 

[HansMustermann]

If one specifically intends to do an evil act, such as rape, we can object indeed.

As for eugenics, well, what l I was trying to say is that it's a vague and (likely intentionally) poorly defined notion.

Even in ye olde days, when racism was cool and all the cool kids did it, most of the time eugenics actually tended to not be defined as specifically favouring one actual race over the other. It tended to be defined in terms of objectively making the species better. E.g., better IQ.

Also the use of "race" or "racial" was more vague those days. Nowadays we tend to be more careful with the term "race", but back then it ranged from the whole human species to even what today we'd call "culture". E.g., there's even a letter from Adolf where even he is struggling to define the "jewish race" as what we'd call a "subculture", and he's making it very clear that it's not genetic.

So basically even the talk about "improving racial quality" was not necessarily as bad as what that would mean today.

But basically you have to remember that even before WW2, at no point during the 20'th century except for exactly 3 years in Germany, was it cool to say that you outright want all blacks to die out. I mean even in Nazi germany prior to 1942, the NSDAP officials were swearing they totally would never do something as barbaric as, well, what they ended up doing anyway.

I mean, don't get me wrong, I'm not saying they were nice people, nor that they didn't want to kill off a few races. It just wasn't cool to say it in public.

So eugenics per se was framed in terms of seemingly more objective criteria.

The problem was more that it was only half of the equation. The other half was all the pseudo science for why other races are inferior. E.g., that blacks and asians are somehow inherently dumber.

So you know, the gist was that such a respectable "science" as eugenics totally wasn't about some petty wish to make the blacks disappear. They just somehow happened to not be the better humans that we were trying to breed.