How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[Q-Source]

A subjective experience is an objective event. It just looks different.

Evidence: none.

This is necessarily so unless you subscribe to some form of mysticism.

No, I am just being cautious. I cannot buy that a subjective experience is really an objective event because we haven't described any brain process such as love, fear, redness, or whatever in objective terms.

You are using a materialistic assumption to conclude that qualia "must be" an objective event.

We have a vast body of evidence which tells us (by inductive reasoning) that the mind, consciousness, "Qualia", what have you, are the result of brain processes. There is no reliable evidence to the contrary. That the mind is a brain function is more certain than the Theory of Relativity,Evidence?

Inductive reasoning?, is that the way that Einstein proved the validity of his theory?

I don't need to understand the process to point out the correlation.

But correlation does not imply causation.

I'm not asserting that we understand how subjective experience arises from physical processes, but given the nature of the evidence there is no reason not to point out that they do.

If we don't understand then we cannot be so certain about the causation of such relationship, because until now the only thing we have is a correlation.

Q-S

 

[Argo Nimbus]

Subjective experience is misunderstood objective reality. When you experience something subjectively, there is something real going on, but it's not what the subjective experience tells you it is.

Your question regards the nature of reality. Subjective experiences are patterns. Are patterns real?

Suppose I walk out onto my patio this evening to watch the Sun set and I think, "My, what a beautiful sunset!". Are you saying that it is true to say "The Sun is real" and "The Sun exists", but it's false to say "My thought is real" or "My thought exists". Somehow saying "My thought is real" is not quite the same thing as saying "A pattern exists".

It seems to me that my thoughts or subjective experiences are just as much a part of the universe as the Sun, even if they are not physical objects. Furthermore, I don't have to explain the relation between minds and brains in order to know that my thoughts exist and are real. It's one thing to say that a particular theory about the relation of minds to brains is false, but quite wrong, it seems to me, to make an issue out of whether subjective experience is real.

I can always be wrong about what causes my subjective experience, but it's hard to see how I could be wrong about having the experience. If I step on a stonefish and then touch an object that to me feels cold, I would be wrong if I said the experience of "coldness" was caused by a cold object. According to Tricky, the cause would be a hot object + stonefish toxin.

To summarize: I can be wrong about causes and relations, but that doesn't make subjective experience non-existent or not real.

--- Argo

Tricky wrote:
One of the things I heard long ago is that the peculiar toxin of the stonefish makes the unfortunate victims who step on it feel hot as cold and cold as hot.

 

[Q-Source]

Excuse me Q-source but where have you shown that qualia are not objective eperiences, please use mary and the color red.

Peace

I am not saying that Qualia are not objective processes, I don't know if they are or not. I am just asking why people assert that they are objective when in fact there is no evidence to support such assertion.

Can anyone provide a scientific paper where the experience of fear, love and redness is fully described?

Q-S

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Q, I think what people are saying is that they cannot think of a reason why qualia can't be a product of the brain. The term has so much mystery woven into it that it just begs to be taken as something that cannot be a product of the physical brain, but a lot of that mystery is fabricated.

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

By the way you immaterialists, the sensory pathways are fairly well understood, there is no major debate in neuropsychology about the way perception works.

Can't wait to see your responses.

Peace [/B]

What do you want me to respond to?

 

[Interesting Ian]

I agree. The whole concept of qualia seems to have evolved as a way of disguising some extraneous metaphysical theories as common intuitions about consciousness. Look at Interesting Ian, after all this time he can't even comprehend the notion that anyone could have different concepts about the nature of experience.

I wasn't aware that I had a concept about the nature of experience. Ok I admit I hold that people have the raw experience of redness and yes I do not understand anyone who would deny this. Are you denying this? If not then what is your point of contention with me?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Excuse me Q-source but where have you shown that qualia are not objective eperiences, please use mary and the color red.

Peace

One doesn't need to show it as the phrase "objective experience" is an oxymoron.

 

[Q-Source]

Q, I think what people are saying is that they cannot think of a reason why qualia can't be a product of the brain.

Materialists, you mean. Because Science says nothing about it.

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.

 

[Yahzi]

Q-Source

I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.

Wouldn't that argument apply to God? And to Invisible Pink Unicorns?

Skepticism is not believing in things that have no evidence. Until you have evidence, you don't believe. Show us evidence, and we will believe. Until then, we won't.

Suspending judgement for your sacred cows (while passing judgement on everyone else's) is not agnosticism or open-mindedness, it's just hypocrisy.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Q, I think what people are saying is that they cannot think of a reason why qualia can't be a product of the brain. The term has so much mystery woven into it that it just begs to be taken as something that cannot be a product of the physical brain, but a lot of that mystery is fabricated.

We have two choices. Come up with a logical explanation for why qualia cannot be physical, or wait until we understand what they really are and how they work. The former project requires a good definition of quale, which I haven't seen yet.

~~ Paul

There are people in this thread claiming that qualia do not exist eg Synaesthesia.

You ask for a definition so I shall quote from my oxford companion to philosophy:

qualia. The subjective qualities of conscious experience (plural of the Latin singular quale). Examples are the way sugar tastes, the way vermilion looks, the way coffee smells, the way a cat's purr sounds, the way it feels too stub your toe. Accounting for these features of mental states has been one of the biggest obstacles to materialist solutions to the mind-body problem, because it seems impossible to analyse the subjective character of these phenomena, which are comprehensible only from the point of view of certain types of conscious being, in objective physical terms which are comprehensibility to any rational individual independently of his particular sensory faculties.

Bearing in mind that definition it seems to me that anybody who denies the existence of qualia are barking mad.

 

[Dancing David]

So:
as I have said before why is there objection to saying that qualia are the labels put on the perceptions brought to our frontal cortex. The labels are placed thier by the thinking parts of our brains, ie the parts that represent silent speech.

I agree that qualia as such exist but that they are stiil part of the neurochemical process in our brains.

There is an awful lot of research on how the brain percieves the color red, seriously it is getting pretty well defined, even in the eighties they were mapping the exact ares where the neural processing occured to create the 'projected' images that our frontal cortex then labels.

It is that we don't have the exact steps in how silent speech (IE thought) occurs?

Peace
PS Thank You for discussing this.


Interesting Ian: why is objective experience oxymoronic? We do seem to have good models for how the brain arrives at the visual perception of red.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Q said:

I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.

Our brain is physical. It does all sorts of wonderful things, including having subjective experiences. There is no evidence for any nonphysical aspects of our brains so I see no reason why qualia should be any different, unless you simply proclaim them so.

qualia. The subjective qualities of conscious experience (plural of the Latin singular quale). Examples are the way sugar tastes, the way vermilion looks, the way coffee smells, the way a cat's purr sounds, the way it feels too stub your toe. Accounting for these features of mental states has been one of the biggest obstacles to materialist solutions to the mind-body problem, because it seems impossible to analyse the subjective character of these phenomena, which are comprehensible only from the point of view of certain types of conscious being, in objective physical terms which are comprehensibility to any rational individual independently of his particular sensory faculties.

Say what?

Bearing in mind that definition it seems to me that anybody who denies the existence of qualia are barking mad.

What we're denying is that qualia needs to be this magical thing that just can't possibly be explained in terms of the brain. Even if I understood the above definition, note the use of the word seems.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

quote:
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I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.
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Our brain is physical. It does all sorts of wonderful things, including having subjective experiences. There is no evidence for any nonphysical aspects of our brains I see no reason why qualia should be any different, unless you simply proclaim them so.

Errr . . .I think that you're attributing to me that which was actually said by Q-Source. She'll be livid! LOL

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qualia. The subjective qualities of conscious experience (plural of the Latin singular quale). Examples are the way sugar tastes, the way vermilion looks, the way coffee smells, the way a cat's purr sounds, the way it feels too stub your toe. Accounting for these features of mental states has been one of the biggest obstacles to materialist solutions to the mind-body problem, because it seems impossible to analyse the subjective character of these phenomena, which are comprehensible only from the point of view of certain types of conscious being, in objective physical terms which are comprehensibility to any rational individual independently of his particular sensory faculties.
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Say what?

Oh come on Paul! How simple do you want a definition to be?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bearing in mind that definition it seems to me that anybody who denies the existence of qualia are barking mad.
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What we're denying is that qualia needs to be this magical thing that just can't possibly be explained in terms of the brain. Even if I understood the above definition, note the use of the word seems.

Some people are denying the existence of qualia such as Synaesthesia (sp?).

Anyway, wasn't David Smith originally asking how qualia can be the same thing as neurons firing?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Errr . . .I think that you're attributing to me that which was actually said by Q-Source. She'll be livid! LOL

Oopsie doopsie!

Oh come on Paul! How simple do you want a definition to be?

The last sentence of the definition ain't even gots proper grammer.

Some people are denying the existence of qualia such as Synaesthesia (sp?).

I think he is denying that qualia are a coherent concept. He is not denying that we have complex subjective experiences that we don't completely understand yet. The term qualia is laden with mystical trappings.

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

The last sentence of the definition ain't even gots proper grammer.

Actually there's 2 mistakes there (although not my fault. It's this ar*ehole voice recognition software! Easier to just type the damn thing out). Anyway, it should be to stub your toe and not "too". In the last sentence it should be comprehensible rather than comprehensibility. The last sentence is rather long and unweildy I agree.

I think he is denying that qualia are a coherent concept.

And if qualia are incoherent then they don't exist!

He is not denying that we have complex subjective experiences that we don't completely understand yet. The term qualia is laden with mystical trappings.

Mystical trappings?? Not according to the definition I've supplied! How can the taste of sugar be mystical??

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

It's not that the subjective experiences are laden with mystical trappings, it's the definition and attributes of the concept of qualia that are, what with all the ineffability and intrinsicality and what-not.

I'm not suspicious of the idea that subjective experience is complex and interesting. I'm suspicious of the philosophical masturbation surrounding the discussion of qualia.

~~ Paul

 

[PixyMisa]

Evidence: none.

Wrong.

As Paul pointed out, the brain is a physical thing. All evidence - and it's an absolutely huge amount of evidence from neuroscience, clinical psychology, biochemistry, general medicine and everyday life - all of this evidence tells us that the mind is a function of the brain. There is no reliable evidence to suggest otherwise.

If the mind is a brain function, so are "Qualia". It's that simple.

No, I am just being cautious. I cannot buy that a subjective experience is really an objective event because we haven't described any brain process such as love, fear, redness, or whatever in objective terms.

Doesn't matter. The only alternative is some form of mysticism. It is hugely unlikely that any such thing is true; we have never seen anything to suggest it.

You are using a materialistic assumption to conclude that qualia "must be" an objective event.

I'm using evidence. If you have any evidence to suggest that "Qualia" are not the result of objective events, present it. If you're right, you'll probably win multiple Nobel prizes, because you'll have overturned the fields of Physics, Chemistry and Medicine at the very least.

Inductive reasoning?, is that the way that Einstein proved the validity of his theory?

Yes. Or rather, it is how researchers have shown the Theory of Relativity to be correct.

But correlation does not imply causation.

It can do. Look at what the correlations are. Trying to suggest anything other than mind being a brain function is just trying to push water uphill. With a fork.

Just look for a moment at how things that effect the brain also effect the mind.

Drugs.
Injuries.
Hypoxia.
Electrical stimuli.

None of this would make the slightest sense if the mind wasn't a function of the brain.

If we don't understand then we cannot be so certain about the causation of such relationship, because until now the only thing we have is a correlation.

"A" correlation? A vast body of related and self-consistent evidence is what we have.

 

[PixyMisa]

Somehow saying "My thought is real" is not quite the same thing as saying "A pattern exists".

Why?

It seems to me that my thoughts or subjective experiences are just as much a part of the universe as the Sun, even if they are not physical objects.

Why do suggest that subjective experiences are not physical?

Furthermore, I don't have to explain the relation between minds and brains in order to know that my thoughts exist and are real. It's one thing to say that a particular theory about the relation of minds to brains is false, but quite wrong, it seems to me, to make an issue out of whether subjective experience is real.

All the evidence we have shows that the mind is a result of a physical process. You can't see the physical process, because "You" are in fact the result of the process. All your thoughts are really patterns of neurons firing in your brain. If you won't say that a pattern is real, then your thoughts aren't real either. If you accept a pattern as a real thing, then your thoughts are real.

I can always be wrong about what causes my subjective experience, but it's hard to see how I could be wrong about having the experience. If I step on a stonefish and then touch an object that to me feels cold, I would be wrong if I said the experience of "coldness" was caused by a cold object. According to Tricky, the cause would be a hot object + stonefish toxin.

The problem is, if you deny reality to patterns, you have also denied it to your own thoughts on a subjective level.

To summarize: I can be wrong about causes and relations, but that doesn't make subjective experience non-existent or not real.

No, it's your definition of real that does that.

Again: Are patterns real?

 

[PixyMisa]

Materialists, you mean. Because Science says nothing about it.

Wrong. Science has a hell of a lot to say about it. Try reading something on the subject.

I think that we only have one choice, if we say that qualia are objective then we have to prove it, otherwise let's hold an agnostic position.

Q-S, you seem to be looking fo a deductive proof. You don't get that in the real world. You get inductive support for theories. You can get conclusive evidence which falsifies a theory, but you can't prove one.

The support for a physical origin of mind is overwhelming, if you take the time to look at some of it. It's not proven, and will never be proven. But we'll continue piling up more supporting evidence and more detailed theories, because that's is what Science does.

 

[PixyMisa]

And if qualia are incoherent then they don't exist!

That would follow, yes.

Mystical trappings?? Not according to the definition I've supplied! How can the taste of sugar be mystical??

It isn't. It's a brain function. I mean, you can follow the nerve pathways from the tongue to the brain and watch the neurons firing. To believe that the taste of sugar is not a brain function requires you to believe in some form of Dualism or something even more nonsensical.