Free will = randomness?

[Filip Sandor]

What is randomness anyway?

Randomness is something well illustrated in our attempt to explain the behaviour of physical things with relation to other physical things without being able to explain the cause of all the physical states we observe as a result of something else...

If you really wanna break it down, determinism only explains how things relate to eachother, but it doesn't explain why anything is how it is.

 

[jan]

Still, it seems no form of physics explains our apparent ability to have varrying degrees of control over different situations..

There are many philosophers who tried to explain our ability to make decisions, using state of the art physics. I, personally, fail to see why it's such a big deal. But perhaps that's because I am a p-zombie.

One such attempt, not one I favour much, but which could be of some comfort for those who don't want to be p-zombies too, is that of Daniel Dennett. It goes, more or less, like this: there are different stances, and the physical stance is one of them. You may view a human person from the physical stance, and then it would show as a deterministic machine. But that stance would be, in many cases, not very insightful, useful or helpful. In some cases, it's better to adopt the "design stance". In other cases, it's better to adopt the "intentional stance". For example, if someone asks you "why did you do that?", an answer could be "because neurons fired in my brain, and a signal was conveyed to my muscles, and so on." But if you wanted to discribe somebody why you had done what you have done, that would require tons of pages of explanation on the cellular level, and even more tons of pages of explanation if you want to describe it on the level of single atoms. So what you usually do, is to use terms like intention and will to describe your motivation. Which are perfectly valid for those kinds of describtions: that's what those terms are made for, actually. That means, it all depends on the level of describtion: on one level, no free will exists. On another level, free will does exist.

I don't know if that was a good representation of Dennetts stance on stances. Since I myself am quite content with mere apparant free will and feel no need for true, indeterministic free will, I feel that his instrumentalistic version of free will is a bit unnecessairy. But what I was trying to say is: there are attempts to explain our apparent free will, and they do not necessarily need to invent a new kind of physics.



Some further remarks about determinism (inspired by your "lost post"):

I would say that is is possible to imagine a logical consistent version of a deterministic world. Perhaps you know Conway's "Game of Life": that's a model of a universe with discrete states following one another, and every state is perfectly determined by its preceding state. That means, if you know one state, you can compute all the following states, without any surprise.

I would say that empirical observations indicate that our universe is of a different type – there seems to be holes in the determinism of our world. But since there are several different ways how you can make sense of Quantum Physics, I would hesitate to claim that we know for certain that our world shows true randomness (as opposed to a mere lack of knowledge on our behalf).

 

[Refus de Sejour]

It's pretty clear where someone religious people might get there idea of free will from and the fact that their faith in it makes believing in free will very straight forward and easy

I'm not so sure about this. Freewill in a religious context seems just as difficult as in a non-religious one. Someone may have faith in God granting us freewill, but if this idea is investigated further it comes up against the same problems as an atheist perspective would.

 

[jan]

Now this is an interesting idea. Is it possible that there could be an unobservable nexus between the supernatural and the natural by means of subtle skewing of quantum mechanical probabilities? Is this the trapdoor that lets in the supernatural, yet keeps it hidden from us?

I think somebody with a more thorough understanding of Quantum Physics would have to check if there are any obstacles, but I think one could device a theory that would allow the supernatural to leak into our world through this hole. But, as you stated, it would then no longer be supernatural, since we can observe it.

A different question is whether that would allow us to have real free will, one that is neither deterministic nor random. I still lack the imagination to think of a third way. Even if some quantum events could be triggered by some kind of spiritual world, the question remains: does this spiritual world follow strict, deterministic rules? And if it doesn't, how does that constitute free will?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Jan said:
A different question is whether that would allow us to have real free will, one that is neither deterministic nor random. I still lack the imagination to think of a third way. Even if some quantum events could be triggered by some kind of spiritual world, the question remains: does this spiritual world follow strict, deterministic rules? And if it doesn't, how does that constitute free will?

I'm in the same boat. I cannot picture some other way that the spirit world could make decisions. It would have to use a process that was partly algorithmic, possibly partly random, and also partly . . . partly . . . some other thing . . . decisulicious.

~~ Paul

 

[Filip Sandor]

Personally, I don't think a purely deterministic Universe constitutes a logical matrix for even the idea of free will so it begs the question in my mind, why does the idea that I have a varying degree of free will seem so logically sound?

I think the reason most of us raise the question of free will at all is deeply rooted, perhaps even unconsciously, in our fear of being 'trapped' and imobalized by the laws of physics somehow, but why would an otherwise rational, intelligent person experience such a profound doubt about their own state of being if not for the fact that they do have a free will? I mean seriously, take away the math and ask yourself.. what is the purpose of all this [life] if we don't have at least some ability to choose our actions?

Anyone with a real thirst for knowledge and understanding should naturally come to asking these kinds of questions if they are investigative enough and logical enough in their thinking.

By the way, that's just my opinion, no offense to anyone.

 

[jan]

I think the reason most of us raise the question of free will at all is deeply rooted, perhaps even unconsciously, in our fear of being 'trapped' and imobalized by the laws of physics somehow, but why would an otherwise rational, intelligent person experience such a profound doubt about their own state of being if not for the fact that they do have a free will?

I do not doubt that you indeed feel a strong need to have a free will. But I still have trouble to understand why, and I don't think that your observations are universal.

A little story: we meet on monday, and I tell you that I have worked all weekend to determine whether there is a libertarian free will, or not. And, lucky enough, I came to a conclusion. This conclusion is based on empirical evidence, using some heavy mathematical wizardry, but without doubt, it shows that there indeed is a libertarian free will.

Now you are very happy, you are dancing in the street and inviting all your friends to have a big party.

The next day we meet again. Unfortunately, I have to tell you that I found a flaw in my calculations. I don't know how this could happen, but on some occasion, I forgot to carry a minus sign, and if I do the calculation again, the outcome is quite different: now my argument proves that you don't have a libertarian free will. Of course, this time I have checked everything double and triple, but there is no room for doubt left: you don't have a free will.

This is very sad news for you. Depressed you went home. You no longer see any sense in your life.

But what, I may ask you, is the difference between monday and tuesday? Why can't you be as happy and merry on tuesday as you have been on monday? What, exactely, changed? What if I would have kept my mistake secret, what if I had lied to you, so you would have never known that you don't have a free will? Would it have made any difference? What difference?

 

[Filip Sandor]

A different question is whether that would allow us to have real free will, one that is neither deterministic nor random. I still lack the imagination to think of a third way. Even if some quantum events could be triggered by some kind of spiritual world, the question remains: does this spiritual world follow strict, deterministic rules? And if it doesn't, how does that constitute free will?

I guess the answer would be that it doesn't, but we would still be faced with the same dilemma, a mathematical existence with no purpose.

This is problably gonna sound crazy, but what if there is such a thing as a Soul and it's Will is not entirely arbitrary, but influenced by an intrinsic desire to 'improve' things rather than being forced to improve things.

Gotta go.. something has come up. Talk to y'all later!

 

[Dymanic]

I am determined to exersize free will

Originally posted by Paul C. Anagnostopoulos

Is this the trapdoor that lets in the supernatural, yet keeps it hidden from us?

If a skunk sneaks in through the catdoor, are we obligated to give it its own food bowl?

Originally posted by jan

I don't know if that was a good representation of Dennett's stance on stances

That's pretty much what I get. In his own words "...we find it natural to keep track of the complexities of atoms and the stranger denizens of the world of subatomic physics by treating them rather like tiny agents because our brains are designed to treat everything we encounter as an agent if possible -- just in case it really is one."

 

[Filip Sandor]

I do not doubt that you indeed feel a strong need to have a free will. But I still have trouble to understand why, and I don't think that your observations are universal.

A little story: we meet on monday, and I tell you that I have worked all weekend to determine whether there is a libertarian free will, or not. And, lucky enough, I came to a conclusion. This conclusion is based on empirical evidence, using some heavy mathematical wizardry, but without doubt, it shows that there indeed is a libertarian free will.

Now you are very happy, you are dancing in the street and inviting all your friends to have a big party.

The next day we meet again. Unfortunately, I have to tell you that I found a flaw in my calculations. I don't know how this could happen, but on some occasion, I forgot to carry a minus sign, and if I do the calculation again, the outcome is quite different: now my argument proves that you don't have a libertarian free will. Of course, this time I have checked everything double and triple, but there is no room for doubt left: you don't have a free will.

This is very sad news for you. Depressed you went home. You no longer see any sense in your life.

But what, I may ask you, is the difference between monday and tuesday? Why can't you be as happy and merry on tuesday as you have been on monday? What, exactely, changed? What if I would have kept my mistake secret, what if I had lied to you, so you would have never known that you don't have a free will? Would it have made any difference? What difference?

Jan,

For me this is more of a mental struggle than a real life hazard. I openly admit I don't like the idea of there being no free will, but I am also a very logical person, so the idea would necessarily impact my own decision making and would work to convince me over time that I have less freedom than I really do in my life.

On the other hand, if you told that free will exists for certain I would tell you that this was my suspiscion all along. If I look depressed by this debate it's not because I'm a depressed person, but the idea if no free will itself, when not fully understood, can be depressing for sure.

Your methodology differs in that you are more ready to ignore the apparent contradictions when you consider the depth of our experience of "free will" vs. our observations of physics and other 'orderly' phenomenon and cap it with a question mark, perhaps knowing that there is no need to complicate something that doesn't yield a satisfying answer.

Either way *as long as you're not just playing dumb* (and I don' think that you are) it's perfectly fine, in my opinion.

Edited to ad:

I don't thing it's as simple as you make it sound, but that's because I don't believe in either strict determinism or chaos, I think there is a relative balance in both that gives us 'room to move around', but doesn't allow us to cross certain borders. The most confusing thing about this to me is why we want to do what we want to do. It seems as if the more I know about what influences me the more freedom I have to avoid bad influences, but at the same time I feel as though I am more compelled make certain choices, except I don't feel 'forced' as much as when I don't understand what's 'pushing' me.

 

[Filip Sandor]

I got a better idea for a new thread on this stuff that might make for a more constructive discussion.

I'll post it later...

The 'yes' vs. 'no' debate lacks color in my opinion.

 

[c4ts]

Randomness is something well illustrated in our attempt to explain the behaviour of physical things with relation to other physical things without being able to explain the cause of all the physical states we observe as a result of something else...

If you really wanna break it down, determinism only explains how things relate to eachother, but it doesn't explain why anything is how it is.

So in a deterministic model, randomness is action with unknown causes, whereas a non-deterministic model presents randomness as action without a cause. Both models seem flawed, where one model assumes that there has to be a cause, and the other assumes there cannot be a cause. Or is there no supposition of cause without evidence in either model?

 

[Filip Sandor]

So in a deterministic model, randomness is action with unknown causes, whereas a non-deterministic model presents randomness as action without a cause. Both models seem flawed, where one model assumes that there has to be a cause, and the other assumes there cannot be a cause. Or is there no supposition of cause without evidence in either model?

The only deterministic model that seems plausible to me is one that one that can show how all physical events are interrelated with perfect accuracy, but such a model lacks insite into any fundamental reasoning as to why things are the way they are and so we are left in a position that will only allow us to assume that the energy that is 'moving' things around has always existed and never had an ordered cause. Still, I think this model is fine for describing physical events.

The problem with a purely random reality is that we shouldn't see any order and we do in fact see order. I think in reality there is kind of a balance between order and chaos that allows for free will to exist. Under this model we can make choices, but we're also limited in our choices by the orderly nature that overlaps the with the random nature of things on reality.

I think another major problem in finding an answer to the problem of free will is that we are looking for concrete answers to something that contradicts concreteness and we are left only guessing or approximating... the way I am doing right now!

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

c4ts,

So in a deterministic model, randomness is action with unknown causes, whereas a non-deterministic model presents randomness as action without a cause. Both models seem flawed, where one model assumes that there has to be a cause, and the other assumes there cannot be a cause. Or is there no supposition of cause without evidence in either model?

I disagree. A nondeterministic model does not require that what is being modeled be non-deterministic. It just leaves out whatever structure that determinism produces.

For example, statistical mechanics works perfectly well as a model for complex systems of deterministic particles with many degrees of freedom. They don't have to actually be random for the model to be good.

Likewise, the standard model of QM is a nondeterministic model. This does not mean that reality must be nondeterministic in order for QM to be a good model of it. It just means that if reality is deterministic, then this model is leaving out some of the structure and order of reality. but since this is structure and order which we have no evidence for anyway, this is not a problem. Not unless people get confused, and start imagining that our scientific models are 100% accurate descriptions of reality.


Dr. Stupid