Forgiven for what, eactly?

[AvalonXQ]

Interesting choice of word. If your god knows everything that's ever going to happen, then everything is predetermined. It's just that we don't know it and it feels as if events are random, as if we have some choice in the matter. In reality, you god's omniscience is equivalent to determinism.

I understand the problem now.
You (and others) see capacity as being characterized by the minimum subjective probability of an event occurring as understood by any observer.
If observer A knows that P(A)>=0.5, but observer B knows more so that P(A)>=0.25, then the capacity for A is no more than 0.25.
The existence of foreknowledge, then, reduces counterfactual capacities to zero, hence why you erroneously conclude that knowledge somehow has some constraint on action.
None of my definitions match these; no wonder we can't come to an agreement here.

 

[SOdhner]

The existence of foreknowledge, then, reduces counterfactual capacities to zero, hence why you erroneously conclude that knowledge somehow has some constraint on action.

Well, if I know that my car is red it would be wrong for me to say that it might be blue.

YOU might say "SOdhner's car might be blue" and that would be an honest statement because you don't know. That's what probablility is - it's our best guesses based off of limited information. If I have a deck of cards all shuffled up, you would say (correctly) that there is a one in fifty-two chance that the top card is the ace of spades. That's right. But in fact, the deck has already been shuffled and so the top card already is or is not the ace of spades.

1/52 is a good and correct statement of probability, but it is also correct for me to say (having peeked, or stacked the deck, or whaever) that there is in fact no chance that the top card is the ace of spades. You would say that by taking the first card you have a one in fifty-two chance of drawing that ace, and I would know that you actually have no chance.

So which one is right? I am. Your statement of probability is based off of the information you have available, and so it was an honest statement - it's not wrong, but mine is the more accurate because I am better informed. The card isn't in some sort of quantum state, waiting to be determined when you draw it, it's just that for purposes of probability we have to treat it that way.

But the deck has already been shuffled, and the ace is on the very bottom. You have no chance at all of drawing it. None.

...

Here's where my actual point comes in, which is that God didn't shuffle the deck. He's not capable of a random shuffle because he is omnipotent and omniscient. He is simply too skillful with a deck of cards to not know where all of them are ending up as he "shuffles". So the placement of each card is a deliberate choice.

He could have shuffled it to put the ace of spades on the top OR the bottom, and so he made the choice of whether or not you would draw it. Thus he bears full responsibility for all actions and it cannot be said that you have free will.

 

[SumDood]

I understand the problem now.
You (and others) see capacity as being characterized by the minimum subjective probability of an event occurring as understood by any observer.
If observer A knows that P(A)>=0.5, but observer B knows more so that P(A)>=0.25, then the capacity for A is no more than 0.25.
The existence of foreknowledge, then, reduces counterfactual capacities to zero, hence why you erroneously conclude that knowledge somehow has some constraint on action.
None of my definitions match these; no wonder we can't come to an agreement here.

Absolutely not. I've said this several times in this thread. It it not God's knowledge of the future that causes or prevents anything. God by the nature of being God causes and prevents things. He set it all into motion.

Earlier I was trying to emphasize this difference by using a '100% accurate fortune teller'. Just because this fortune teller knows what will happen in the future has no bearing on how events will unfold. He simply knows.

The difference between the fortune teller and your God is immense. Your God sees the future with 100% accuracy AND created the universe and everything in it knowing what would happen.

SOshner has a much better grasp of both the topic and the language needed to express it, so I'll just quote him:

God knows that X will happen because God knows what choice A will make -- not because there is only one choice that A can make. A has the capacity to choose X or not X, but in exercising that capacity, A chooses X and God knows this.

Right. But it's about WHEN god knows this.

God knows this PRIOR TO CREATING THE UNIVERSE.

God also knows what would happen if he created the universe in a different way.

Knowing this, god CHOOSES to create the universe in a way that will result in A choosing X.

Thus, god has chosen X.

God has free will, but A does not.

 

[laca]

I understand the problem now.
You (and others) see capacity as being characterized by the minimum subjective probability of an event occurring as understood by any observer.
If observer A knows that P(A)>=0.5, but observer B knows more so that P(A)>=0.25, then the capacity for A is no more than 0.25.

I think you meant either for the inequality to point the other way (for it to be restrictive) or you meant to say that B knows less. If the former, I agree with the conclusion, but not if you meant the latter. In the present state it's not quite sensical. I will assume you meant that the inequalities go the other way.

The problem with this is that the probabilities are not subjective and furthermore, it's not a range, but exactly 100% or 0% in the case of omniscience.

The problem with free will and an omniscient creator is that we might think that we have a choice, but in reality we don't. It's all predetermined.

Let's say I got a rigged coin that will always fall heads up. I know that. The one who's playing thinks he's got 0.5 chance of getting tails. Who is right? The same with your god. He's got the game rigged, he's omniscient. You think you got free will. Who's right?

 

[bruto]

Bearing in mind that I don't think that there is a god, and don't think that omniscience is actually possible in the first place, and that free will is also probably an illusion, though a rather convincing one, nevertheless....

We describe God as omnipotent, which means he could do anything. It does not mean he has done everything. Does omniscience mean that God always knows everything, or simply that he could if he chose? Does an omniscient god who prefers to leave questions unanswered still preclude free will?

 

[tsig]

I see something about God -- specifically, somebody asking for details regarding God and forgiveness, which assumes the existence of God as a premise of having the discussion. I was giving people the benefit of the doubt that "magic" was essentially a term for phenomena outside of the natural world, which would certainly include the properties and capabilities of the Christian God.
But if you insist that we can assume the Christian God without assuming magic, then I'll disagree when people claim that my position includes belief in magic.
I certainMy position includes the existence of two supernatural entities -- an atemporal deity who is capable of foreknowledge of nondeterministic events, and souls that can represent nondeterministic causes for events. If those aren't "magic", then there's no "magic" in the discussion.ly don't feel that I'm the one who introduced it.

Like I said, I assumed that the whole "omnipotent atemporal supernatural diety" idea qualified as "magic" the way the term was being used. If you mean something more by "magic" (something like, "not subject to rules that can be rationally examined for consistency"), then I'm not claiming that god = magic, nor have I introduced "magic" into our discussion.

You say "If those aren't "magic", then there's no "magic" in the discussion"

Then "I'm not claiming that god = magic,".

I find those two statements contradictory.

 

[H'ethetheth]

Bearing in mind that I don't think that there is a god, and don't think that omniscience is actually possible in the first place, and that free will is also probably an illusion, though a rather convincing one, nevertheless....

We describe God as omnipotent, which means he could do anything. It does not mean he has done everything. Does omniscience mean that God always knows everything, or simply that he could if he chose? Does an omniscient god who prefers to leave questions unanswered still preclude free will?

Yes, I think so, because the fact that God can find out by some means what will happen beforehand, means that it has to be knowable with 100% certainty beforehand. If anything is knowable with 100% certainty beforehand, determinism is true.

 

[bruto]

Yes, I think so, because the fact that God can find out by some means what will happen beforehand, means that it has to be knowable with 100% certainty beforehand. If anything is knowable with 100% certainty beforehand, determinism is true.

Omniscience and indeterminism would certainly seem to be incompatible in the non-magical world where there's no god anyway, but I somehow suspect that there's a theistic fudge in store for this problem.

 

[Hellbound]

Omniscience and indeterminism would certainly seem to be incompatible in the non-magical world where there's no god anyway, but I somehow suspect that there's a theistic fudge in store for this problem.

Mmmmm...theistic fudge. Does that come with nuts?

 

[Sophronius]

Hm, having thought about it, I have to revise my earlier stance on "magic" as given to Avalon.

Technically, there is no law that says cause and effect must apply in this universe. It just seems to apply in every day life, either due to the law of large numbers or because it just does (correct me if I'm wrong, my understanding of this is fuzzy)

So as I understand it, it would be possible for something that doesn't adhere to cause and effect to exist. In other words, something supernatural. Something that can "do magic". And this wouldn't be inherently illogical, as long as you don't claim that this entity could create square circles or some-such.

Why you would ASSUME something like this to be the case when there is no compelling evidence for it remains a mystery to me, however.

And why you would then assume that this entity must be the one described in the Christian Bible, and that everything written in that Bible must be literally true regardless of all the evidence that points in the opposite direction, is even more baffling.

 

[iknownothing]

Among creationists, the notion of a variety of progenitor "kinds" for which there is clear fossil evidence of descent to modern species is usually accepted, with those "kinds" matching up nicely with God's creation and Noah's preservation.
We're drifting off-topic and should probably address this elsewhere if at all.

I would be interested if you wanted to start a thread on it.

I am curious as to where you find "clear" evidence that all modern species descended from "kinds" in some kind of rapidly accelerated evolution in a few thousand years.

 

[catsmate]

I've always found it odd that religious people who believe in the concept and value of free will given by God, don't find natural selection to fall in line more with such a God than a design. Natural selection is the ultimate expression of free will. Making everything be as it is, forever, is the opposite of free will.

Because they feel the need to believe/are told to believe that they are somehow special? Not just the product of evolution.

 

[SumDood]

I must admit that I'm quite surprised and disappointed that Avalon hasn't responded in this thread in 3 days. Just when things were getting interesting too.

 

[tsig]

I must admit that I'm quite surprised and disappointed that Avalon hasn't responded in this thread in 3 days. Just when things were getting interesting too.

I'm not. Whenever a believer feels the logical coils closing too tightly they disappear. It's magic.

 

[AvalonXQ]

I don't really have anything else to contribute. I got to the point where I felt like I had explained my position very well, understood the counterpoints, and understood the reason why there's a disconnect between my position and contrary positions. The additional replies just seemed to me to be re-hashes of what had already been said.
When I didn't see anything I felt I needed to respond to, and when I didn't have anything else that I wanted to get across, I stopped posting.
But apparently if I stop posting at any point in any thread, certain posters are going to claim I was "defeated", as if an internet thread is some sort of mortal combat between ideas.
Discussions are generally about getting to the root of disagreements, not resolving them.
I'm not a fan of "victory by endurance", where whoever parrots their position the longest is crowned the winner.
If you have something else interesting to say, say it. If you have a question you believe I haven't answered, ask it.
Heckling's not becoming.

 

[Aitch]

I'm not. Whenever a believer feels the logical coils closing too tightly they disappear. It's magic.

Nah, it's an 'emergency temporal shift'; he'll re-appear sometime in the future.

 

[tsig]

I don't really have anything else to contribute. I got to the point where I felt like I had explained my position very well, understood the counterpoints, and understood the reason why there's a disconnect between my position and contrary positions. The additional replies just seemed to me to be re-hashes of what had already been said.
When I didn't see anything I felt I needed to respond to, and when I didn't have anything else that I wanted to get across, I stopped posting.
But apparently if I stop posting at any point in any thread, certain posters are going to claim I was "defeated", as if an internet thread is some sort of mortal combat between ideas.
Discussions are generally about getting to the root of disagreements, not resolving them.
I'm not a fan of "victory by endurance", where whoever parrots their position the longest is crowned the winner.
If you have something else interesting to say, say it. If you have a question you believe I haven't answered, ask it.
Heckling's not becoming.

Post 646:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=6561127&postcount=646

 

[Rincewind]

Mmmmm...theistic fudge. Does that come with nuts?

Of course - folks like Kent Hovind, et al.

I’ve tried to follow the posts where free-will was being discussed, but I’m still undecided about what my take on it is.

Here’s a simple “for instance”:

It’s Saturday evening, late, and I’m just about to go to bed.
I decide that, for a change, I’ll go to MacDonalds on Sunday morning for breakfast. Yup - I like to live dangerously, sometimes.
However, when I wake up on Sunday, the weather is blowing a gale, with torrential rain, so I say,” Sod that for a game of soldiers. I’m going back to bed”.
This being Britain, though, by about 09:00 the sun’s out, there’s no wind or rain and it’s a beautiful morning.
So I get up and head off for a MacMuffin or similar.

Now, looked at from my perspective, I could say that I’ve exercised my free will three times.

Let’s now take a step back for the wider perspective - assuming that God exists and he’s fully loaded with all of the omnis.

Clearly, He would have known that I was going to make these decisions.

Now, for me, comes the difficult bit. If He had decided that I ought to eat a MacMuffin, so made me change my mind after fixing the weather, then I’d have to suggest that I really didn’t have free-will, only the illusion of it.

However, if all He has is foreknowledge of my actions and doesn’t interfere, then maybe I do have free-will. Effectively, a disinterested omniscient being who took no advantage of foreknowledge would not be in control of my decisions.

It's a bit like a parent telling a child “Don’t touch that hot pan” and knowing what the kid’s most likely next action will be! The parent knows what’s going to happen, but the child’s free-will isn’t constrained. Bad analogy, I know.

As I said, I’m still undecided about this - but thanks to you all for the discussion so far - I have something new to think about!

 

[bruto]

Of course - folks like Kent Hovind, et al.

I’ve tried to follow the posts where free-will was being discussed, but I’m still undecided about what my take on it is.

Here’s a simple “for instance”:

It’s Saturday evening, late, and I’m just about to go to bed.
I decide that, for a change, I’ll go to MacDonalds on Sunday morning for breakfast. Yup - I like to live dangerously, sometimes.
However, when I wake up on Sunday, the weather is blowing a gale, with torrential rain, so I say,” Sod that for a game of soldiers. I’m going back to bed”.
This being Britain, though, by about 09:00 the sun’s out, there’s no wind or rain and it’s a beautiful morning.
So I get up and head off for a MacMuffin or similar.

Now, looked at from my perspective, I could say that I’ve exercised my free will three times.

Let’s now take a step back for the wider perspective - assuming that God exists and he’s fully loaded with all of the omnis.

Clearly, He would have known that I was going to make these decisions.

Now, for me, comes the difficult bit. If He had decided that I ought to eat a MacMuffin, so made me change my mind after fixing the weather, then I’d have to suggest that I really didn’t have free-will, only the illusion of it.

However, if all He has is foreknowledge of my actions and doesn’t interfere, then maybe I do have free-will. Effectively, a disinterested omniscient being who took no advantage of foreknowledge would not be in control of my decisions.

It's a bit like a parent telling a child “Don’t touch that hot pan” and knowing what the kid’s most likely next action will be! The parent knows what’s going to happen, but the child’s free-will isn’t constrained. Bad analogy, I know.

As I said, I’m still undecided about this - but thanks to you all for the discussion so far - I have something new to think about!

That's sort of how I tend to see it, and yet every time I try to see it that way, either my own mind or that of someone else here reminds me that there's a difference between a parent being essentially sure of an outcome, and a God being entirely sure of it. If God can be entirely sure of the outcome (and even if he doesn't care and doesn't think about it in time), it can only mean that it is, in some way, already determined. The only way around this, as far as I can see, is to fiddle with the idea of what time is and is not*, because to an omniscient God, the entire history of the world either is, or could be, apprehended simultaneously, and if that is the case the future is already past.

You can't say "I'm about to think about a hippopotamus, but not yet."

If you do manage to reconcile omniscience with free will, I think you'd have to conclude that in a theistic universe, time travel must be an option, but "that would be neat" is not a very good rationale for the leap of faith for most of us.

* edit to add, or one might get around it by fiddling with the idea of what causality is: for example you could decide that free will exists as long as God doesn't predict, but that when god thinks ahead, he short-circuits normal causality. Bishop Berkeley might have had something to say on this score, but I don't remember that far back.

 

[SOdhner]

If you have a question you believe I haven't answered, ask it.

I've got several, but they've been asked enough times that at this point it seems safe to say you don't have an answer. As you said, at some point that has to just be the end of the discussion - there's no point in me asking yet again.

Effectively, a disinterested omniscient being who took no advantage of foreknowledge would not be in control of my decisions.

Right. The problem is that god is generally believed to have created the entire universe, so it's not possible to be disinterested. He knew you would get that McMuffin when he made the universe the way he did, so that choice wasn't yours - it was his.