Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

[Crossbow]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

Er . .sorry, I was drunk when I said that. Not thinking straight. I was wrong. It's more of a methodological rule. Anyway, Stimpy has quite clearly stated he is a materialist/physicalist as well as a naturalist (for any onlookers that might not know, physicalism and materialism are synonymous. Not withstanding Yahweh's denials)!

Well thanks for the apology and I will remind you of it at your next tirade.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I wish you didn't make such long posts. I'll just address these 2 points for now.

I have already clearly stated that I am not a materialist or physicalist as you define the term. I am also quite happy to acknowledge that I am a naturalist, and that my position is nothing more than naturalism plus the assumption that the natural laws can be determined through observation. In fact, if you clearly state that this is what you mean by naturalism, I will even go so far as to state that my position is simply naturalism.

Apart from a disagreement about the word "naturalism" (as I think it does include the assumption that natural laws can be ascertained through observation) then this is entirely satisfactory to me.

Are you prepared to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness can be described scientifically does not require a presumption of metaphysical materialism?

This is simply the naturalist position. Of course I don't believe in naturalism, but that's irrelevant in the context of this discussion.

Are you willing to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness is a brain process does not have to be a metaphysical assumption, and that it can instead be a scientific theory?

No I am not willing here. I think you should drop this and simply maintain consciousness is scientifically explicable. You see you're implicitly conveying the idea that the brain process is primary. That is when you say consciousness is a brain process you imply that consciousness is reducible to a brain process, rather than a brian process is reducible to consciousness.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Ian,

Are you willing to acknowledge that the claim that consciousness is a brain process does not have to be a metaphysical assumption, and that it can instead be a scientific theory?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No I am not willing here. I think you should drop this and simply maintain consciousness is scientifically explicable.

Why, if I am permitted to claim that consciousness can be explained scientifically, am I not permitted to present a specific scientific theory for it? It would seem to me that the only way you could reasonably claim that this theory is not an acceptable one, would be for you to scientifically falsify it.

You see you're implicitly conveying the idea that the brain process is primary. That is when you say consciousness is a brain process you imply that consciousness is reducible to a brain process, rather than a brian process is reducible to consciousness.

Why is that not permissible? For the brain process to be reducible to consciousness, everything would have to be reducible to consciousness. The far more parsimonious theory is that consciousness is just a particular class of brain processes. The only way this could be construed as a metaphysical claim is if you have already assumed metaphysical characteristics for consciousness. But if this is the case, then you cannot even argue that consciousness can be scientifically explained.

Dr. Stupid

 

[Interesting Ian]

So the argument goes on. But I haven't got any more time to further respond to you today Stimp.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Anyone that (thinks he) knows the difference between materialism, physicalism, and naturalism has read way too much philosophy.

Unfortunately, I'm almost there.

~~ Paul

 

[Yahweh]

Anyone that (thinks he) knows the difference between materialism, physicalism, and naturalism has read way too much philosophy.

Unfortunately, I'm almost there.

~~ Paul

Or perhaps they needed to learn about all that (and more) to get the post baccalaureate or higher degree so they could be qualified to teach the stuff to teenagers...

 

[Ossai]

Interesting Ian

stating that consciousness is one and the very same thing as a physical process is a very powerful metaphysical stance!

No metaphysics necessary. I’ve repeatedly ask for clarification on your dualist stance and you have continually avoided it. Exactly where is the supernatural necessary for consciousness?

Ossai

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, I'm going to have to define both terms using my friend dictionary.com

Naturalism
The system of thought holding that all phenomena can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws.

Materialism
The theory that physical matter is the only reality and that everything, including thought, feeling, mind, and will, can be explained in terms of matter and physical phenomena.

Therefore in the 2 definitions, you can see how Naturalism is very closely related to materialism.

Nope I don't see this at all! One might as well say the following is closely related to naturalism:

"The theory that minds are the only reality and that everything, including what we refer to as physical reality and various mind states, can be explained wholly in terms of mind and its attributes such as thought, feeling and Will".

Materialism goes slightly further by saying physical matter is the only reality. Of course, Naturalism is not based on metaphysical ideals (you can tell by the way is says all phenomena are explained in terms of natural causes and laws). So, by logical reasoning, you can make the explicit assumption that Naturalism is held upright by primarily materialistic ideals.

So why not primarily idealist ideals as well?

 

[hammegk]

Anyone that (thinks he) knows the difference between materialism, physicalism, and naturalism has read way too much philosophy.

IMO, naturalism denies any possibility of dualism, but is silent as to which is the correct remaining choice -- idealism or non-idealism.

Unfortunately, I'm almost there.

~~ Paul

Nudge, nudge.... Did that get you closer, or farther away?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

IMO, naturalism denies any possibility of dualism, but is silent as to which is the correct remaining choice -- idealism or non-idealism.

Define them carefully and I'll bet they are equivalent.

~~ Paul

 

[DialecticMaterialist]

Re: Re: Re: Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

If you have discovered any errors in my proof then I'd be delighted to hear them. As a physicalist Stimpy necessarily believes consciousness supervenes on the physical. But this supervience must be of metaphysical necessity rather than logical necessity. Okie dokie?? Now please state my errors.

Begging the question in that you assume consciousness is metaphysical from the onset.


It could simply be a matter of physical necessity.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Re: Re: Re: Re: Final proof that Stimpson J Cat is wrong

Begging the question in that you assume consciousness is metaphysical from the onset.


It could simply be a matter of physical necessity.

The statement that consciousness might be metaphysical makes no sense. I assume you mean might be non-physical?

Anyway, in this thread I have not addressed the hypothesis that consciousness might be non-physical. I have assumed it is physical throughout.

Edited to add: No not physical, I mean I assumed it can be explained by naturalistic causes! LOL And I berate Stimpy from conflating physicalism with naturalism

 

[hammegk]

Define them carefully and I'll bet they are equivalent.
~~ Paul

In the sense that either fully supports the scientific method, and neither can be falsified by same, I'd agree. What differs will be one's mindset regarding "truth" "faith" & "absolute certainty".

In another sense, you can state the mind-body problem "doesn't exist"; Stimpy gave that answer once. So far as I see, this just opens the door to added complexity -- what exists that is mind and body?

The choice one makes (notice that word, choice) offers fewer logical conundrums when "mind" is considered as primary.
Free-will, HPC, & the life/non-life barrier in particular most logically inply "mind", imo (as of course my fact that *I* think ... ).

 

[Pyrrho]

If Stimpy is wrong, I don't wanna be right...

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Hammegk said:

The choice one makes (notice that word, choice) offers fewer logical conundrums when "mind" is considered as primary.

I don't think it offers fewer logical conundrums, because free will, HPC, and life/nonlife have no logical problems associated with them. That is, unless you insist on some. However, I know one thing that considering mind primary does do: completely ignore the interesting questions.

See sig.

~~ Paul

 

[Yahweh]

See sig.

Nice sig!

 

[Interesting Ian]

Ugggh God! Been ill since Friday night Been having diarrhoea about once every 30 mins yesterday, but much less frequent today. So starting to feel slightly better.

Anyway, a good simile illustrating what supervience actually means can be found here

The idea of supervenience might be introduced via an example due to David Lewis of a dot-matrix picture:

A dot-matrix picture has global properties -- it is symmetrical, it is cluttered, and whatnot -- and yet all there is to the picture is dots and non-dots at each point of the matrix. The global properties are nothing but patterns in the dots. They supervene: no two pictures could differ in their global properties without differing, somewhere, in whether there is or there isn't a dot (1986, p. 14).
Lewis's example gives us one way to introduce the basic of idea of physicalism. The basic idea is that the physical features of the world are like the dots in the picture, and the psychological or biological or social features of the world are like the global properties of the picture.

So likewise conscious states, although reducible to physical processes in the brain, are nevertheless identical to such processes. But note this does not mean consciousness and physical states of the brain are synonymous! The dots and the patterns they comprise are not synonymous with the global properties ie the actual picture, although they are identical. Likewise for consciousness. No-one would suggest otherwise; oh . . .apart from Stimpy LOL

So just as the dots in the dot-matrix picure enjoy a prime reality with the picture supervening on these dots, so the physical processes of the world have the prime reality with consciousness supervening on certain special physical states; namely those found in the brain. But saying that physical processes are primary with consciousness being derived from this primary reality is a metaphysical position. This contradicts Stimpys original position that he is a physicalist who rejects metaphysics in his interpretation of reality.

Edited to add:

Stimpy,

Ooops, just remembered you said you don't subscribe to supervenience. Is that still true now I've given an explanation of what it means?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Just a quick point about solipsism and Yahweh's and Stimpy's denial that it is a metaphysical position.

Now to hold a metaphysical or ontological position is to hold that some aspect of reality exists beyond any epistemological criteria. But this is precisely what any non-solipsistic position does, and which solipsism doesn't!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:

Now to hold a metaphysical or ontological position is to hold that some aspect of reality exists beyond any epistemological criteria. But this is precisely what any non-solipsistic position does, and which solipsism doesn't!

I'm not sure why a non-solipsistic position makes any ontological assumptions. The interesting point is that, in spite of individual errors in observation, we seem to be able to come up with coherent science. This suggests one of two things.

First, rejecting solipsism, it might be that we are observing events that are common to all of us. This is the idea that there is an external reality, though this need not be an ontological assumption, merely an assumption that what we observe obeys logical rules. And that assumption is continually tested as we do science.

Now, even though Stimpson says that the above scenario assumes the rejection of solipsism, it seems to me that it does not strictly require it. Instead, solipsism could simulate the same scenario. My mind could project a world that obeys logical rules, but at the same time mess up my perceptions in odd ways to fool me into thinking that I'm fallible. In other words, it could project incorrect perceptions for me, while at the same time projecting other people who have the correct perception of those same events.

Now, which scenario requires fewer strange assumptions?

~~ Paul

 

[hammegk]

I'm not sure why a non-solipsistic position makes any ontological assumptions. The interesting point is that, .....we seem to be able to come up with coherent science. This suggests one of two things.

...the idea that there is an external reality, though this need not be an ontological assumption, merely an assumption that what we observe obeys logical rules. And that assumption is continually tested as we do science.

Now, even though Stimpson says that the above scenario assumes the rejection of solipsism, it seems to me that it does not strictly require it. Instead, solipsism could simulate the same scenario. My mind could project a world that obeys logical rules, but at the same time mess up my perceptions in odd ways to fool me into thinking that I'm fallible. In other words, it could project incorrect perceptions for me, while at the same time projecting other people who have the correct perception of those same events.

Now, which scenario requires fewer strange assumptions?

~~ Paul

Unfortunately, rejecting solipsism to me is "faith" -- that it is not so -- and that all of us "think".

Rejecting dualism -- imo the only logical choice, leaves the 2 (ontological) choices:

I think, implying:...........................I am, implying:
Free Will, Goals.............................MPB algorithm; Random inputs
Life; energy per se.........................Non-life; matter per se
Qualia & HPC...................................Turing machine
“Possible” answers to “Why”............No meaning

One can make one's own choice, but what I am aware of makes the choice most logically "I Think".

Note that science to date works fine under either assumption.