Everything

[jan]

Before trying to catch up answering some of the previous posts (thanks for your nice words, Taffer, it's a pleasure to have these discussions with all of you), I would like to make some more general statements, to be able to refer to them later.



Definitions

Down to the pits of terminology and definitions:

A universe shall be, for the sake of this post, a totality of all that exists. Depending on the concept and definition, this does or doesn't include mathematics.

A world shall be, for the sake of this post, an entity that has no informational input after its creation, that is, a world is something for which physicalism is true.

I choose this definition to permit a simulated reality to be a world. Within a world, it is possible to simulate another world, which depends only on its "physical" laws and initial conditions; therefore, it received input only at creation time; on the other hand, such a simulated world has output, since it is possible to observe it.

So a world can be contained within another world, or be caused by another world, or depend on another world. A world that is not contained in another world (that doesn't depend on another world or exports information to another world) may be called a root world. This doesn't mean that there has to be a root world: it is conceivable that all worlds are contained worlds (imagine an infinite chain of worlds, one contained within the other).

The universe, according to this definition, has to exist. It is therefore useless to ask why the universe exists. But I don't know of any principle that could tell us how many worlds the universe contains. Since we exist, it must contain at least one world; but it still could be possible that the universe contains just one world, or infinite many of them.

This allows a reformulation of the question of the opening post: why does the universe contain at least one world, and not none?



The Anthropic Principle And Reasons To Be

If we assume that there are lots of different worlds, it is easy to explain why our world has conditions favorable for the development of life. This is no longer true if we assume that there is just one world: in this case, it is an open question why this world is favorable for the development of life.

Furthermore, we can imagine an alternative universe that contains no world. But since there is, per definition, only one universe, we can't pick and choose among different alternatives: we can't argue that among all those universes, one has to contain a world, since there is only one.

If we, based on whatever reason, rule out the possibility that randomness plays any role in the number of worlds the universe contains, then the number of worlds must be the number that it is, necessarily. There couldn't be more or less. But that is not an explanation: based on the assumption of missing randomness, we can assume that there must be a reason why there is the number of worlds there is, but that doesn't tell us the reason, so it doesn't provide us with an answer to the question why the universe contains as many world as it contains.



Alternative Physics

Case 1: Slight Variation

The image above shows a perpetuum mobile. It consists of a locomotive (a), and a pair of magnets (b), connected with a bar. The locomotive (called Emma), being made of iron, is attracted by the magnets and moves forward, thereby pushing the magnets.

Why doesn't this work in our world, but only in Lummerland? The magnets would be attracted by the locomotive, and therefore, the total system of locomotive and magnets would not move. This, it seems, is not just an accidental property of magnets; it is expressed in the idea that each actio equals an opposite reactio; more fundamentally, such a machine would violate the rule of conservation of energy. And that means that not only this specific, but any kind of perpetual motion machine is impossible in our world.

So although the variation of physics in this alternative world depicted above seems innocent and slight, it inevitably touches fundamental principles of our world.

Instead of saying "Any alteration of physical laws, be it as drastic as one wishes, is bound to be a mere cosmetic and superficial change", one could say: "even the most slightest and seemingly harmless change of physical laws leads to a world that is fundamentally different from our world".



Case 2: Synthetic Variation

This time, the image depicts an object of a world that looks far less familiar. This world is a certain cellular automaton, namely, Conway's Game of Life. It is an infinite orthogonal two-dimensional lattice with states of "on" and "off", and a rule to go from one discreet "tick" in time to the next. The image above shows a breeder, a structure moving to the right and leaving, like a puffer, a trail of guns, each gun shooting gliders. The pattern therefore shows quadratic growths.

It is also possible to built a pattern that replicates itself. It is also possible to built a universal turing machine (in fact, a universal computer has been built by Paul Chapman, although it is not a turing machine, but a Minsky Register Machine). If physicalism is correct and dualism is wrong, then it would be possible to built self-replicating, conscious beings within the world of life (although, one has to admit, it is uncertain whether natural selection would work very well within the Game of Life: small errors often have dramatic consequences, so a single mutation could not only kill its carrier, but an entire ecosystem; there are also problems with perception, since it is difficult within the world of the Game of Life to perceive something without destroying it).

It would also be possible to built a giant computer within the Game of Life that runs a giant simulation, one that simulates a world similar to our world — or maybe our world is just a simulation, computed on a machine that has been built in a world with the physics of the Game of Life.

Unlike the previous example, the physics of this world is not just the physics of our world, with some twist added. Instead, it is built from scratch. Therefore, it is no surprise that fundamental rules of our world, like the conservation of energy, don't hold in this world.






Edited to add: a missing "Case 2:"

 

[jan]

Originally posted by Taffer
As you say, this is just a question of terminology. I refrain from giving a name to that which is outside the universe, as I believe we can never know it in any way.

Unfortunately, those terminological issues should be solved nevertheless, even if thy are boring and uninteresting. Your sentence is, for example, highly ambigious:

Assuming that Taffer's "universe" = jan's "universe": there can't be anything outside the universe per definition. We know that, because it's an analytic truth.

Assuming that Taffer's "universe" = jan's "world": I explained why I think that it is untrue that we can never know. Anyway, even if we can't gain any knowledge about the realms outside our world, we can nevertheless talk about them. At least, that's just what we are doing now. If we are talking about it anyway, why make this talk harder than necessary by refusing to adopt a convenient terminology?

It seems to me you are confusing "modeling" and "creating". I can model a world that is outside our world. I just can't create it, per definition, since I can't do anything outside our world, since if I could, this "outside" would be part of our world.

I do not see how this matters, nor do I understand the difference. Sure, you can model things on the 'ouside unvierse', but it wouldn't be accurate. Perhaps you'll need to explain this further.

For example, the Game of Life is a model of a world. A computer simulation of it may or may not be a world; that would depend on how the simulation is done. There are two severe restrictions: our simulations are bound in time, and also in space. Some simulations are naturally bound (that is, only a part of the world is inhabited anyway, and nothing ever leaves this part, and change ceases after a finite period); in those cases, the simulation is a world. Otherwise, all we have is a theoretical model, which we can't create, we can only discuss it. For example, I guess it would be technically impossible to create a Game of Life world inhabited by conscious beings, since such a world would be without borders, and too complicated to simulate with current technology anyway. Nevertheless, we can discuss the properties of such a world.

The rules of the Game of Life combined with the starting conditions is a model of a world. Some of these possible worlds are simple enough that we are able to create them. Of course, if we create them, they are contained in our own world. It is (again, per definition) impossible to create them outside our world. But we can imagine that they exist outside our world.

We can only ever assume things about the "outside world". Sure, the programs could find a sign that says "Intel Inside", but it won't mean anything. They might assume, based on this information, that they are inside a giant universe called "Pentium", or they might not. Even if they (correctly) assume that they are inside a computer simulation, since they have no way of verifying this, I would argue that this information is about as useless as ID.

Our knowledge about the history of our world is, as the name says it, historical. We can't test our theories about, say, the formation of the first star or about the origin of life with experiments. Nevertheless, those things are subject of theories. There are also theories that deal with the origin of our world, like certain flavors of the inflation model. Those theories may predict testable consequences.

If, in our example, the inhabitants of our VR find certain information, it might help them develop a theory about their world and its origin that leads to predictions about phenomenon inside their own world, that is, predictions that can be tested.

Now I understand you're 'model'. However, I argue that these models are not, in fact, true models of a different universe. They are simply extrapolations of what their own universe could be. You seem to confuse a different configuration of our universe as a different universe. I do believe it to be so.

I take it for granted that your "universe" is my "world". How is the Game of Life just "a different configuration" of our world?

I do not think so, but even if I grant you this point, it makes no difference. The topic at hand is to answer the question given by yourself. Imagining does not help us answer this question, as it gives us no grounds for formulating an answer other then what we think is ouside the universe.

First, the topic at hand is not just the question of the opening post. You claimed you have answered that question. It now seems as if you are changing your position, and now claim that the question can't be answered, due to certain restraints.

Second, I am afraid that I don't understand your last sentence. How can you answer any question without imagine different solutions? And what do you know about the things inside our world, besides what you merely think to be true?

Ok, I agree that in this example they could infer that they are, too, inside a VR world. This does not equal knowledge (in my opinion). Scientific method allows for inferance only if it can be backed up. The argument "all the other ones are like this, so we must be too" does not hold much water for me. Us, as the observers of all this, know that their assumption is only partially correct. Their universe is a VR, but the next is not (we are assuming god like knowledge here). Our argument really is a difference in opinion over what we call knowledge, as this demonstrates.

I agree that they got it wrong. They did the best that is possible. But how is that different from the usual situation that science faces? Assume that there is a substance called "phlogiston" that is present in every flammable matter, that is set free when something is burnt. Unfortunately, there is absolutely no way to detect this phlogiston, since it has no causal consequences at all (phlogiston is supervenient and, from our, mortal, point of view, metaphysical). Now we boldly declare that phlogiston doesn't exist. And we are wrong.

Would you say that you know that phlogiston doesn't exist? Or are you agnostic with regard to phlogiston? How about the tooth fairy?

It is, of course, possible to be agnostic with regard to phlogiston. But I think this is a course to travel that makes realism impossible. For example, it would be impossible to say that electrons carry a negative charge. We would have to say that electrons appear to carry a negative charge, but we don't know for certain, since, after all, maybe it's just the tooth fairy that makes electrons appear as if they had negative charge. And so on.

Making the inferance that their world is a VR, but the upper one, is still making an assumption.

And what kind of knowledge is not an assumption?

Their only correct assumption that they could make based on the evidence is that their world is not a VR world.

But unfortunately, there is no scientific way to reach this objectively correct assumption. Like there is no way to reach the objectively correct assumption that phlogiston exists.

No, we cannot imagine any different laws. I put forward that to be different, they are not simply a reworking of existing laws, but are actually different. I also put forward that it is impossible to try to imagine this, because all our knowledge, and thus our imagination, is based on the laws of this universe. Sinking ice is not a different law, but just a reworking of an existing law. I do not consider this difference arbitrary.

As I said above, the rules of the Game of Life are not, like the rules of Lummerland (the place where we find the perpetual motion machine called "Emma"), a reworking of the rules we observe, but built from scratch. Conceded, the concept of passing time within the Game of Life has some familiarity. But of course this is just to be able to show a world in which inhabitants are possible that are a bit like us, so that it is meaningful to talk about what it would be like to live in such a world.

A world without time is not more difficult to model, but there are no inhabitants in it which are like us.

But they [the theories of Aristotle and Newton] were still based on our own observations (i.e laws) of this universe. This may just come down to personal beliefs, but I do not consider these two things the same. You may label the difference arbitrary, but I do not.

I would say that this objection is particularly weak. It is obvious that the alternative worlds accidentally modeled by Aristotle and Newton are based on the observations of our world, since they tried to model our world, not an alternative world with an alternative set of rules. On the other hand, Lummerland is deliberately not modeled in complete accordance with our observations (Michael Ende of course knew that you can't built such a perpetuum mobile as he suggested).

Once again, what is the difference between the Game of Life and a world with "significant different" rules ("significant different" from the rules that govern our world)?





Your next post was not addressed to me, but I'll answer anyway.

a) To know why something exists, we must be able to make a comparison between its existance and its non-existance.
b) We can never leave our universe, as we are both inside and a part of the 'system'.
c) To know the universes state of 'non-existance', we must observe something that is outside our universe (as, by definition, our universe exists until its boundry)
Therefore d) We can never know why the universe exists.

b) sounds convincing. d) seems to be a valid conclusion of a), b) and c).

I have troubles with a) and c).

Furthermore, your initial claim was that more ambitious, that is, it was that we know why the universe exists, not just that we can't know. But perhaps I misunderstood you.

 

[jan]

Originally posted by CplFerro
Quantum mechanics are simply half-baked. Chaos cannot be controlled, by definition. A truly random, chaotic, irrational particle would have, by definition, no rules governing its size, trajectory, composition, sphere of influence, velocity, reproductive ability, or anything else.

Thanks for making my point. Humphreys and I accused you to discard any in-between (without a reason, I might add). Quantum mechanics is, indeed, far away from the complete chaos, the absence of any law that you describe. That's just why I mentioned it. What you still have to show is that the world either has to work like you would like to have it, or be the complete chaos you describe. It's not sufficient just to claim that Quantum physicists are simply fools.

(I have to admit that I'm a bit late with this; Humphreys and Taffer have dealt with it, and I don't have much to add).

"Everything Possible Exists" comes from Parmenides, who held it as the only rational model of the universe. By possible he also meant conceivable.

This is quite a stretch of the concept of "Everything Possible Exists" as I presented it. Not only requires Parmenides that it has to be conceivable (how do you justify such a restriction?), he puts also very severe restrictions on his concept of what is and what isn't conceivable. If I understand him correctly (and I highly doubt that anybody does), then, similar to your theory, only those things are conceivable that are reasonable. But in the chain of equations possibleconceivablereasonable, I doubt both equation signs.

As I understand the concept of "Everything Possible Exists", a world consisting of a Game of Life, inhabited by nothing except the breeder depicted in my post above, is a possible world and therefore must actually exist. If we don't subscribe to this concept, it is still a possible world. It is, within itself, not conceivable, since it is uninhabited. As a consequence, it can't be "reasonable". And it's arbitrary: both the initial values are arbitrary, and the laws that govern it are arbitrary (since there are other cellular automaton rules). That is, both the initial conditions and the rules are not completely specified by reason. But surely this world is far from chaotic. Quite contrary, it is perfectly deterministic.

On "a more ambitious absence," I would have to agree with Parmenides, that logical and physical laws that exist are all necessary, whether or not we can work out their logical necessity on the blackboard.

You don't have to work out their logical necessity in detail, that is, I don't require you to show that it is necessary, for example, that the continent west of the Atlantis is named after an Italian merchant, or that the cloud I just saw looks like a dog or that the rook in chess is called "rook". But it would be nice if you could show in principle why the specific physical laws we observe exist with necessity, and why the same applies to the initial conditions for our world.

In that I must break with Leibniz, and with free will doctrines in general.

What does free will have to do with it? I guess you mean that since everything must be as it is, there is no possibility for anyone to have acted different, which would exclude a certain concept of libertarian free will.

There appears to be one possible universe.

There is, per definition, only one universe, and this universe is of course possible. I don't know if the universe could be different (for example, the "Everything Possible Exists" theory claims that, indeed, the universe can't be different, while the theory of Peirce seems to allow such a possibility).

This doesn't tell us much about the world we are living in. Is it the only one? Could it have been different? I don't know. And I doubt that you know.





As with Taffer, I take me the liberty to answer post you addressed to other people.

No strange phenomenon is proof of randomness, only of ignorance.

If you want to, you may believe in hidden variables, even if it can be shown that there is no way to ever detect those hidden variables. But that, too, seems to be an argument from ignorance. "I can always assume that there are some hidden variables, even if they are metaphysical, so nothing can stop me from pretending that there is no randomness". But how do you know that there is no randomness?

Furthermore, you are missing the point. The point is that a world containing some randomness is still conceivable. You claimed that it can not be. Our example shows that this is not true, even if it should happen that our world is strictly deterministic, due to some metaphysical hidden variables.

 

[jan]

Originally posted by Humphreys
I'm sorry lacchus, but I can't make sense of most of your post. You'll have to be more literal or something.

But what if he answers with questions? And smileys?

 

[Iacchus]

Assuming that Taffer's "universe" = jan's "universe": there can't be anything outside the universe per definition. We know that, because it's an analytic truth.

Which Universe are you referring to here? The physical Universe? Obviously, you must not have heard of the Big Bang ...

 

[jan]

You're introducing enigmatic sandwich appearances with the explicit assumption that they are "irrational". I say prove it, or I won't consider them any different than any other phenomenon. Science is based on the assumption that everything is rational and subject to exploration.

I'm quite content with Humphreys answer to this post, but I would like to take the opportunity to explain why I think that this is an inaccurate characterization of science.

I don't think that science is based on any dogmas, and "everything is rational and subject to exploration" would be one. For me, science is nothing but the honest attempt to search the truth. Everything else, including the whole methodology of science, is just a consequence. And, more important, an empirical consequence.

For example, it is not immediately obvious that medicine must be tested in double-blind studies. Contrariwise, this is the result of our experience with the placebo effect, not some a prioric methodological truth.

It is not immediately obvious that falsifiable theories should be preferred, compared with unfalsifiable theories. I think it is far more obvious the other way round, and it requires some experience to see that it works this way.

Similar, some people might claim that science requires some "fundamental principles" to be able to work. Like, that scientific laws always stay the same and are not subject to change. Or that everything has a cause. Or that the world is completely rational. But I think all we should use as our basic dogma should be the honest wish to investigate the truth. Should this investigation lead us to the point where we doubt that everything has a cause, then away with the principle that everything needs a cause. I don't see the need for any such holy cow.

And, indeed, much of what once was written about the "fundamental, indispensable principles of science" is no longer repeated since the advent of quantum mechanics.

 

[jan]

Assuming that Taffer's "universe" = jan's "universe": there can't be anything outside the universe per definition. We know that, because it's an analytic truth.

Which Universe are you referring to here? The physical Universe? Obviously, you must not have heard of the Big Bang ...

Sometimes I doubt you have even the most basic reading skills. I made an attempt to define what the term "universe" means if I use this term. I explained why, according to this definition, there can be only one universe (and why this universe has to exist).

Now you start talking about the "physical universe" and the "Big Bang". I guess you mean what I called a "world". It's not that I have hidden this second term. In fact, I continue with

Assuming that Taffer's "universe" = jan's "world": ...

Now this should give a clue to even those readers who can only put one post into memory each time that my "universe" is not necessarily what others call "universe", and that I made some previous attempts to clarify this.

I hope this answers your question to which universe I am referring (Hint: it's not the "physical universe" and has not much to do with the Big Bang).





Edited to delete: a superfluous "to".

 

[CplFerro]

Taffer is right that this discussion is pointless. It is, so long as you refuse to think sufficiently about the metaphysical implications of pure chaos.

In conclusion, that some causes may be forever concealed from us, is disturbing, but not irrational. That cause itself can go, that is simply madness.

The only conceivable universe is one that is fully rational, and thus ordered by a single supreme principle that ends the infinite regress by necessarily existing. Plato called this the Good, Cusa called this the Trinity, Chu Hsi called it "Li" or "Great Ultimate."

And, from this absolute rationality comes the problem of lack of choice, either for Li or for me. Without chaos, whence comes option? Thus until convinced otherwise, I am a block-universe determinist: There is only one universe, which must exist as it does, and nothing had, has, or will ever have any choice in the matter. I find this disturbing, but see no escape.

Thanks for the discussion.

 

[Z]

I don't want to prolong this discussion - which has been rather fascinating - but why does everyone seem bothered by the idea of infinite causal regress? Just because it removes parts of our history from ever being absolutely knowable? Or is it just normal human nature to be bothered by infinity?

 

[Taffer]

Welcome back Jan. I see you have had some trouble with my arguments (and after reading what I wrote again, I'll be the first to admit that I might not have put forward an entirely coherent argument). Instead of going step by step through your posts, allow me to try and generalise an answer that will hopefully be sufficient to explain my position.

First, some definitions (as I think I might need to explain what I mean by universe, etc):
"Our universe" I admit is a bit ambiguous. It refers both to the universe as a 'shell', that contains everything 'within the universe', but also is everything within the universe. The universe stops at its 'edge' (if we imagine a circular universe).
"Outside the universe" refers to everything (or nothing) that is 'outside' the 'edge' of the universe. There may not be anything at all, there might be another universe that this one is inside, it doesn't matter. Anything 'outside' our universe is considered no in our universe (I know this logically follows, but I thought I'd say it anyway).

I'll also restate my arguement in a more correct way.

a) To know state of something, we must compare two different states of that thing for comparison. For example, to know that the day can be both fine and raining we must compare a rainy day to a fine day. If it always was fine, we wouldn't know that a day could be any different.
b) Anything observed inside our universe is, in fact, not in a different state to any other part of the universe. I.e. everywhere in our universe exists. We must go, or observe, outside our unvierse to find something that doesn't exist. This is because, by definition, anything outside our universe does not exist in our universe.
c) We can never leave our universe. We are both within and a part of the 'system' (our universe). To exist, we must be within our universe (this might not be true, but I'm not going to be the first person to leave the universe to find out ). Anything we make cannot exist outside our universe (this is almost by definition, as if it left our universe, it would no longer exist within our universe).
d) Therefore we cannot ever know any different state for our universe other then existance.

So we can never know, find out, or observe, a thing from our universe that does not exist. Thus we can never know why our universe does exist, because all we can know is that it does exist. The answer to the OP question would simply be "it exists because it exists", or something along those lines.

Now we move to creating new physical laws. Any VR world created within our universe (i.e. generated on a computer that exists in our universe), is by definition, bound by the same physical laws. Even if we choose for the program to have gravity 'push' instead of 'pull', this is just a simpulated physical law, not a real one. Their universe (being the VR universe) is still bound by the laws of our universe because it is inside our universe. It may
seem like their gravity works differently, but it is only an illusion, so to speak.

Similarly, even if we were to grant that their gravity is a new physical law, it is still a reworking of old ones, not a new one. I'll explain.

Any physical law we can imagine is, in some way, influenced by the laws of our universe. Even if we imagine a world where gravity pushes, we did not formulate this idea through a new law. We simply 'imagined away' current laws. When I say a "new law", I am talking about all new laws, not reworked current laws.

 

[Taffer]

I don't want to prolong this discussion - which has been rather fascinating - but why does everyone seem bothered by the idea of infinite causal regress? Just because it removes parts of our history from ever being absolutely knowable? Or is it just normal human nature to be bothered by infinity?

Because we are talking about truely knowing something, which cannot happen with an infinite regress. Personally, I've got no problem with it, but then I don't think anything is truely knowable either.

EDIT to avoid triple posting: To answer Jan's comment that all scientific knowledge is based on assumption, I would argue that some knowledge is based on direct observation. Sure, we can assume that outside the universe is nothing, but it does not help us solve the problem of why there is something in this universe. Further more, though we can make this assumption, we do not know the nature of the 'nothing' outside the universe, which is important in telling us why our universe is 'something'.

 

[Iacchus]

Taffer is right that this discussion is pointless. It is, so long as you refuse to think sufficiently about the metaphysical implications of pure chaos.

In conclusion, that some causes may be forever concealed from us, is disturbing, but not irrational. That cause itself can go, that is simply madness.

The only conceivable universe is one that is fully rational, and thus ordered by a single supreme principle that ends the infinite regress by necessarily existing. Plato called this the Good, Cusa called this the Trinity, Chu Hsi called it "Li" or "Great Ultimate."

And, from this absolute rationality comes the problem of lack of choice, either for Li or for me. Without chaos, whence comes option? Thus until convinced otherwise, I am a block-universe determinist: There is only one universe, which must exist as it does, and nothing had, has, or will ever have any choice in the matter. I find this disturbing, but see no escape.

Thanks for the discussion.

Yes, but how is it possible to know anything, without the ability not to know it? That has to be provided for in the answer as well. In fact, where is the evil, without the ignorance of the Good? Hence the Yin and Yang states duality exists "within" a singularity. The singularity itself is not evil however, since God is all-knowing and fully aware of Himself.

 

[jan]

Taffer is right that this discussion is pointless. It is, so long as you refuse to think sufficiently about the metaphysical implications of pure chaos.

I'm sorry you feel that way, especially since your viewpoint seemed to be the most exotic, hence the most valuable.

In conclusion, that some causes may be forever concealed from us, is disturbing, but not irrational. That cause itself can go, that is simply madness.

I and others have tried to persuade you that there are several scenarios imaginable how the world could be only partly rational. Unfortunately, if, as Mercutio conjectured, your mind is set that this is impossible, the discussion might indeed be pointless.

 

[jan]

I don't want to prolong this discussion - which has been rather fascinating - but why does everyone seem bothered by the idea of infinite causal regress? Just because it removes parts of our history from ever being absolutely knowable? Or is it just normal human nature to be bothered by infinity?

Not everybody is bothered. I allow myself to quote myself:

But, of course, that still doesn't show that there are things without a cause. The chains of causes depicted above may be absurd, but that doesn't mean that it is impossible.

Note that I am not talking about an infinite regress (that is, that what is caused by "cause ω"), but the whole hierarchy — even if it may sound absurd, that only makes it paradox, not inconsistent, and many scientific theories started sounding quite paradox.

Originally posted by Taffer
Because we are talking about truely knowing something, which cannot happen with an infinite regress.

If the infinite regress shows a repetitive pattern, I doubt that it is true: if "cause n+2 causes cause n+1" works exactly the same as "cause n+1 causes cause n", then the infinite regress may be not very complex and, after all, manageable. Of course, such an infinite regress would not cure our curiosity; as I mentioned, we would then start to ask "and what's the cause (or the reason) for this infinite chain?". Which is perhaps what you mean — in which case I agree that our curiosity would not be satisfied by any kind of an infinite regress.

 

[jan]

First, some definitions (as I think I might need to explain what I mean by universe, etc)

I hate to argue about definitions, but I am afraid that I am no longer certain that I understand what you mean when you are talking about "existence". If we agree that we can't know anything about worlds besides the one we are a part of (which is, depending on the definition of world, debatable, but let's ignore that for the sake of the argument), then we could claim that everything inhabiting those other worlds does not "exist", since it is part of strictly metaphysical worlds, and Occam's razor renders all those metaphysical things nonexistent. It is also possible, and quite harmless, to say that those things don't "exist within our world". Of course not! So does "existence" mean "as part of our world", or do you use a more relaxed meaning?

b) Anything observed inside our universe is, in fact, not in a different state to any other part of the universe. I.e. everywhere in our universe exists. We must go, or observe, outside our unvierse to find something that doesn't exist. This is because, by definition, anything outside our universe does not exist in our universe.

This is the point that made me wonder. I'm not certain whether it's important, since I think my main issues are with this one:

a) To know state of something, we must compare two different states of that thing for comparison. For example, to know that the day can be both fine and raining we must compare a rainy day to a fine day. If it always was fine, we wouldn't know that a day could be any different.

I know a thing that doesn't exist: the Invisible Pink Unicorn. I don't know it because I have ever met it, but because I thought about it. It is possible to know about something without meeting it face to face. I have never seen a black hole, and I am unable to see infrared light, like bees can, but that doesn't stop me from knowing them. Now you might argue that there is a huge difference between infrared light and black holes on the one side and the Invisible Pink Unicorn on the other side: for some things, we have empirical evidence, the other is something we only know from speculation. But that doesn't preclude us to know important things about the Invisible Pink Unicorn, like that it can't exist in any possible world, since the notion of being both invisible and pink is inconsistent*.

Now we move to creating new physical laws. Any VR world created within our universe (i.e. generated on a computer that exists in our universe), is by definition, bound by the same physical laws. Even if we choose for the program to have gravity 'push' instead of 'pull', this is just a simpulated physical law, not a real one.

I disagree. And we can easily test who is right. Ask one inhabitant of the simulated world to drop an apple, and the inhabitant will tell you that the apple moves away from the surface of the earth.

It may seem like their gravity works differently, but it is only an illusion, so to speak.

That's just chauvinism. You call their whole world "simulated", because their world supervenes on our world. But why should we call their world less real than our world?

Imagine once again the infinite chain of simulated worlds. Would you say that going down the chain of those worlds, each world is "less and less real" than the previous one?

Now try to imagine an even more bizarre scenario: not an infinite chain of worlds, but a circle, in which the simulation run within the lowest of all worlds is identical with the uppermost world. Which world is "real", and which one is "just simulated"?

Any physical law we can imagine is, in some way, influenced by the laws of our universe. Even if we imagine a world where gravity pushes, we did not formulate this idea through a new law. We simply 'imagined away' current laws. When I say a "new law", I am talking about all new laws, not reworked current laws.

Could you please apply this train of thought to the Game of Life, instead of applying it to your Inverse Gravity World, where it is obviously true?

To answer Jan's comment that all scientific knowledge is based on assumption, I would argue that some knowledge is based on direct observation.

A once prominent view, now mostly abandoned. I would argue that there is no direct observation, and no observation is ever possible without some kind of theory. If it is not relevant for your argument, we might make this the topic of another thread.

Sure, we can assume that outside the universe is nothing, but it does not help us solve the problem of why there is something in this universe.

I have trouble following you here. There are several questions mixed, I think: why is there at least one world? Are there more than one world? Why is our world not empty? Answering one of those questions might not help us answering one of the others. And perhaps none of them can be answered (not too unlikely, I would say).

Further more, though we can make this assumption, we do not know the nature of the 'nothing' outside the universe, which is important in telling us why our universe is 'something'.

I agree that we do not know the nature of different kinds of nothingness. But I don't know that we can't know.






*For all those fervent defenders of the Invisible Pink Unicorn who believe that the notion of the Invisible Pink Unicorn is not at all inconsistent: I use the Invisible Pink Unicorn just as a placeholder for an arbitrary inconsistent concept; please replace it with another inconsistent concept more to your liking.

 

[jan]

...to avoid triple posting...

No surprise your post count is lower.

 

[jan]

Yes, but how is it possible to know anything, without the ability not to know it? That has to be provided for in the answer as well. In fact, where is the evil, without the ignorance of the Good? Hence the Yin and Yang states duality exists "within" a singularity. The singularity itself is not evil however, since God is all-knowing and fully aware of Himself.

You mean, evil exists to allow us the possibility not to know some things?

 

[jan]

This is my sixth post in a row, and also my 600^th post.

 

[Taffer]

No surprise your post count is lower.

I always just considered it good manners, although I'm not sure if it is or not.

I hate to argue about definitions, but I am afraid that I am no longer certain that I understand what you mean when you are talking about "existence". If we agree that we can't know anything about worlds besides the one we are a part of (which is, depending on the definition of world, debatable, but let's ignore that for the sake of the argument), then we could claim that everything inhabiting those other worlds does not "exist", since it is part of strictly metaphysical worlds, and Occam's razor renders all those metaphysical things nonexistent. It is also possible, and quite harmless, to say that those things don't "exist within our world". Of course not! So does "existence" mean "as part of our world", or do you use a more relaxed meaning?

It doesn't matter. Your point that we could claim everything does not "exist" is correct, but again, it doesn't matter. I assume that 'outside' our universe there is something different, that we probably wouldn't recognize. I tend to use 'existance' meaning 'exists in our universe', thus anything outside the universe does not exist. This is, in my view, the only way to use the term 'existance', as any other term assumes things in our universe exist, and other things do not, which might not be the case, or it might be the case for all observers, both within and without the universe.

This is the point that made me wonder.

My how I can write gibberish . Let me explain b). We are asking why our universe exists. However, as 'existance' is a state of something (it can exist, or not exist), we must really ask "why does our universe exist compared to a universe that doesn't exist". Herein lies the problem. On this 'state', we cannot compare anything inside our universe to another thing inside our universe to get this comparison, as everything inside our universe exists. Therefore we must compare something inside the universe to something outside the universe to have the required comparison to answer the question.

I know a thing that doesn't exist: the Invisible Pink Unicorn. I don't know it because I have ever met it, but because I thought about it. It is possible to know about something without meeting it face to face. I have never seen a black hole, and I am unable to see infrared light, like bees can, but that doesn't stop me from knowing them. Now you might argue that there is a huge difference between infrared light and black holes on the one side and the Invisible Pink Unicorn on the other side: for some things, we have empirical evidence, the other is something we only know from speculation. But that doesn't preclude us to know important things about the Invisible Pink Unicorn, like that it can't exist in any possible world, since the notion of being both invisible and pink is inconsistent*.

This is not the same. You can hive an idea of an Invisible Pink Unicorn, but the said mythical beast does not actually exist. A thought of it does, but the thing itself (which is claimed to not exist) still doesn't exist. The thing you state you know about the Invisible Pink Unicorn is, in fact, an Analytic Truth, i.e. true by virtue of meaning. Black Holes are true by said imperical evidence. You are still only knowing the idea of an IPU.

I disagree. And we can easily test who is right. Ask one inhabitant of the simulated world to drop an apple, and the inhabitant will tell you that the apple moves away from the surface of the earth.

He is only right in so far as he thinks that his world isn't simulated. I'll come back to this.

That's just chauvinism. You call their whole world "simulated", because their world supervenes on our world. But why should we call their world less real than our world?

Imagine once again the infinite chain of simulated worlds. Would you say that going down the chain of those worlds, each world is "less and less real" than the previous one?

Now try to imagine an even more bizarre scenario: not an infinite chain of worlds, but a circle, in which the simulation run within the lowest of all worlds is identical with the uppermost world. Which world is "real", and which one is "just simulated"?

Perhaps it is Chauvinistic, but it is still correct. True, our world might be another simulation, but we know, by definition, that any simulated world in this universe is controlled by our physical laws. This doesn't stop us being another simulated universe, as for all we know our physical laws were made up by the people in the 'next' universe, but are bound by their physical laws.

Could you please apply this train of thought to the Game of Life, instead of applying it to your Inverse Gravity World, where it is obviously true?

Although I'm not sure how a board game comes into this (or perhaps I'm missing the point), I argue that it will still apply to any situation. Any 'new' law we can think of will be, in one way or another, influenced by our own laws, and is thus not entirely new.

I agree that we do not know the nature of different kinds of nothingness. But I don't know that we can't know.

Because we can never observe, interact with, or measure this 'nothing' because we cannot leave the universe. We are 'of' the universe, and can never leave it as a computer program can leave the computer universe.

A once prominent view, now mostly abandoned. I would argue that there is no direct observation, and no observation is ever possible without some kind of theory. If it is not relevant for your argument, we might make this the topic of another thread.

Although I too don't want to dwell on this issue, I'd like to point out that my point of view is a Skeptics point of view, and I fail to see how it's "mostly abandoned". Everything we know, in one way or another, comes about from observation of the world. If you can name a single thing that isn't from observation, I'll concede the point.

I have trouble following you here.

We know that outside our universe nothing exists (by my definition of existance), and we know that inside our universe everything exists (again by my definition). By we don't know why. Although this is true by definition of the word "existance" this is not quite what I mean. Or, rather, I am asking why there can be anything outside the universe at all (things outside the universe won't exist, by the definition).

 

[jan]

I always just considered it good manners, although I'm not sure if it is or not.

I'm currently having a (unfortunately slow) discussion with Bri over there, and DavoMan complained that the posts are too long. So it's difficult to tell what it polite and what is impolite.

This is not the same. You can hive an idea of an Invisible Pink Unicorn, but the said mythical beast does not actually exist. A thought of it does, but the thing itself (which is claimed to not exist) still doesn't exist.

It would be foolish to except to meet anything outside our world face to face (it wouldn't be outside our world, if that would be possible; if a god interacts with our world, or if there is an afterlife (not that I'm expecting one), it would, according to my definition, be part of our world). But if you concede that I am actually able to know something about the IPU, that seems to be sufficient. Yes, it's an analytical truth. So what we are looking for might be some kind of analytical argument.

Max Tegmark has developed a theory around my solution No.3, that is, "Everything Possible Exists". In this essay, he tries to defend the view that it is possible to corroborate his theory empirically. Unfortunately, I don't think that his arguments are sound; but maybe it's possible to enhance them so that they become sound.

Perhaps it is Chauvinistic, but it is still correct. True, our world might be another simulation, but we know, by definition, that any simulated world in this universe is controlled by our physical laws. This doesn't stop us being another simulated universe, as for all we know our physical laws were made up by the people in the 'next' universe, but are bound by their physical laws.

If we run such a simulation, and forget to pay the bill for the powerhouse, then puff — goodbye simulated universe with all your alternative laws, in our world, there are no free energy devices.

But besides that, why and in what way does the simulated world follow our laws? In your example, no matter how often an apple falls down in our world, never ever will a simulated apple ever fall down in the simulated world.

Although I'm not sure how a board game comes into this (or perhaps I'm missing the point), I argue that it will still apply to any situation. Any 'new' law we can think of will be, in one way or another, influenced by our own laws, and is thus not entirely new.

I wouldn't call it a "board game". How is the rule 2/23 influenced by our laws? Maybe you are indeed missing the point; should that be the case, I suggest you return to my longer post and re-read the text below the second picture.

Although I too don't want to dwell on this issue, I'd like to point out that my point of view is a Skeptics point of view, and I fail to see how it's "mostly abandoned". Everything we know, in one way or another, comes about from observation of the world. If you can name a single thing that isn't from observation, I'll concede the point.

Shifting the claim again a bit, are we? You posted, if I may remind you:

To answer Jan's comment that all scientific knowledge is based on assumption, I would argue that some knowledge is based on direct observation.

I read this as: "pure observation, without theory". And that's what my reply addresses.

If you want to defend the claim that no knowledge would be possible without some kind of observation: I doubt this too (since I think we couldn't start without some innate knowledge), but that's another topic.

To explain my remark:

There once where people who thought they could base their scientific knowledge on protocol sentences. They would try to avoid saying things like "I met an unicorn today", since this would contain hidden assumptions and wouldn't be purely observational; instead, they would say: "I had the perception of an unicorn today", allowing the possibility of a hallucination, a trick, a hologram, or whatever. As far as I can see, this project this pretty dead among philosophers. I am aware that this is just an argument from majority or authority, and it isn't even backed up with quotes, but I am willing to discuss it: you can't have observations without theory.

To distinguish our positions, I suggest we call your position "naïve skepticism", and my position "critical skepticism".

We know that outside our universe nothing exists (by my definition of existance), and we know that inside our universe everything exists (again by my definition). By we don't know why. Although this is true by definition of the word "existance" this is not quite what I mean. Or, rather, I am asking why there can be anything outside the universe at all (things outside the universe won't exist, by the definition).

If I understand you, you allow for the possibility that something is, but doesn't exist. Right?