Stimpson J. Cat said:
I think that is exactly the key point. If you try to claim that ethical relativism is, itself, a moral system, then you are going to run into contradictions. It is not a moral system. It is a claim about the set of all moral systems.
I disagree, I think it is a moral system in itself. Claims about moral systems I believe are not separate from but laden with moral theories, which derive in part from moral systems.
Not exactly. I am defining A as a sort of meta-system, as you say. I am not defining A to be a trait shared by all the systems within it. The fact that a specific trait is (or is not) common to all systems within A, is a trait of A.
Yes 'A' would in that sense be universal, but hardly enough to describe ethical relativism, imo, which is a statement.
It was never my intention to define x to be a moral system. My point is essentially that x cannot be both a moral statement and a train of A (meaning a statement about all moral systems).
Well then, I might agree. But in that context I think 'x' is obviously a train of 'A'.
It also cannot be both a moral system, and a statement about all moral systems. Both are category errors.
Perhaps not, but it can be part of a moral system as well as a statement about all moral systems, as I believe moral systems make statements about eachother. Hence it is not a categorical error, as the two are not mutually exlcusive.
Of what type? Look at it another way. A moral statement essentially takes the form "x is / is not moral". The statement that there are no such statements which are true for all moral systems, is simply not such a statement.
I would agree with that. IMO, that would be much more clear the the original statement, which is, imo ambiguous.
As the phrase "There are no universally correct moral statements" can mean "You cannot say something is moral for all systems"
or it can mean:
"You cannot say something correct about any moral system."
Or perhaps even:
"All moral systems are fictions/false".
The first would be something I can agree with, though imo, it would be compatible with situationalist and objectivist morality, not just relativist.
In other words, the statement that there are no universal moral statements is not a statement of what is or is not moral. It is not a moral statement. The confusion comes from the fact that while it is not a moral statement, it is a statement about morality. But this does not produce a contradiction, because it does not claim that there are no universal statements about morality.
I would agree with that. Though one can posit of course implicit contradictions. Thing like it implies "All morals are equally good or bad", which would be a universal statement regarding morality, or "all morals are constructs" which would be an extrinsic contradiction. I think relativist systems often commit to these.
In which case, the matter would switch from one of pure logic to one of evidence.
In what sense does it fall into contradictions? The fact that the elements of the set cannot all contain statements which are all true, has no relevance to the logical consistency of the set.
In does in the sense that so many people adhere to different moral systems, and relativism would posit they were all equally true.
Look at it this way. A moral system is a set of moral statements. In order for that moral system to be reasonable, those statements must not contradict each other. Even if they do, though, the set, which is simply a set of statements, is still perfectly self-consistent. It just is not the case that all of the statements which are elements of that set are true statements. There is no reason a set cannot include as elements statements which are false.
But that would make the system I believe, in some way false.
Also, if a system does have different elements which contradict eachother, not just oppose or interfere with but contradict, the system is imo, incoherent.
Last, I don't think moral systems can be reduced to mere moral statements. I think only a descriptive level they can, not necessarily at a prescriptive.
And the set of all moral systems is not even a set of statements. It is a set of sets.
See I disagree. I don't think ethical relativism necessarily contains all systems, it cannot because they contradict. That would not be ethical relativism but the subject of ethics itself.
IMO then, ethical relativism is itself merely a system, one that tries to posit all others are equally true and hence contradicts itself.
The statement then, "there are no correct moral statements" would itself be a meta-statement, but it would not be enough to establish ethical relativism. As an ethical relativist is not saying that in some abstract world, there are no universally correct moral statements, but that nobody can say what's true or false, or better or worse concerning morality.
There is no question that moral norms exist. The questions are "where do they come from?", and "are they universal?". The answer to the second question appears to be "no".
Well I would agree, but I do think we can derive universally ethical principles. And even if moral norms are not strictly universal to all agents, that doesn't mean there aren't some universal (or damn near universal) to humanity.
Not at all. What it does is state that moral systems, much like opinions, are neither true nor false.
I don't see how that can be coherent.
At this point, the relativist wouldn't just be making what I will call the weak claim regarding universal norms, but now a strong claim regarding universal norms, a sort of universal.
It is now trying to leap from the claim "No norms hold true for all systems" to "there is no moral claim that is true or false for all systems".
The first was very reasonable imo, the second is somewhat harder to support.
Take for example the statement "Green plants,
My problem with the second statement is it relies on ambiguity and posits in a sense a universal.
On the one hand, it can simply mean that moral claims, to be properly evaluated need an appropriate context, and that the truths concerning specific norms can vary with the situation.
On the other hand, it can mean that any prescriptive or descriptive statements regarding moral norms can never be true or false. In other words it can mean something like "x is neither moral nor immoral" which would be universal in scope.
This is very incoherent imo, because it first off contradicts the original premise concerning all moral systems, but positing a sort of norm. Now I imagine one may object saying "No it is describing norms, not positing an actual norm" but I think it is positing a norm implicitly, as a norm merely means "x is moral" or "x is immoral" and the statement is saying "x is both" advocating both in a sense, making it in that sense a norm.
Secondly, as a descriptive statement it suffers as well. We already admit moral norms exist, so in what sense can they be neither true nor false?
In a weak sense it can mean they vary, or to make sense you need a context.
For example "Murder is wrong". Strictly speaking, that is neither true nor false, as there is no context.
But lets go into "Moral is wrong for all possible creatures." That is clearly false.
Or even more specific "Murder is wrong for almost all humans". That is true.
Hence we can make true and false assertions depending on context.
In regards to the original statement "Murder is wrong" the context is assumed, usually "for humans." Just like the statement "Vegitables are healthy". That's true.
Now it's also true that vegitables are not healthy for tigers. But that was presumed to be outside of what was meant, hence why we can say the original assertion is true.
All statements about existing entities have to, at some level, be true or false in a given context.
This is where the strong version of the "morals cannot be true or false" comes in. It is saying these claims are not just lacking truth/falsehood due to context, but just in general. It is at the same time saying these norms exist. What sense can the claim make then?
How can norms exist, as real actual things, yet statements concerning these actual norms have no truth value?
That would be like saying, health exists, but statements concerning health have no truth value.
If ethical relativism implied that all moral systems were true, you would be correct. But it does not. It implies only there are no moral statements which are true in all moral systems.
No, it is not merely limited to such modest proposals.
Ethical relativism, as you said above says that moral statements cannot be true or false. And ethical relativism, were it really a set of sets, and not simply a set, would have to include all other moral systems. That would mean, if ethical relativism were true, and it existed, as did all its parts, all the parts would be "true" as well. This of course, make a system, or even a meta-ethical system full of contradictions. Unless the relativist were willing to declare all the systems within false, or only a select true.
The relativist could not at this point declare a statement about any specific norms, nor limit itself to describing their nature, as that would then be the domain of a system (set) not the meta-system.
The problem is that while saying "No Norm holds true for all systems" may be correct, it is not enough to refute those systems, as all those systems bring with them both descriptive and prescriptive elements, not just prescriptive elements.
Of course there is an objective element. The objective element lies in the reasons why people and societies develop moral systems, and how they go about doing so.
or why moral tendencies evolved among human beings.
Once again, I agree. I don't think this contradicts moral relativism at all.
I'm glad we agree.
I can see what you're saying here. And with that I would agree. Moral norms cannot be said to be true or false based on purely logical or cognitive premises. It's not like math or physics in that it is often agent dependent in whether its true or false (but given we specify the agent, it can be true or false).
And moral norms do vary. What's true then according to one system (with specific norms) may not be true for another.
The problem is that such a broad meaning of relativism isn't what most people mean by it. What most people mean is that moral claims are equal and inventions. That you cannot say anything is good nor bad, right nor wrong. That's why postmodernists for example don't think that a culture which liberates women is any better then one that enslaves them.
I think the same thing could be said for all so-called "beliefs and inventions". Nobody is claiming that moral systems are random, or invented on a whim. There most definitely are trends and similarities which are indicative of some underlying mechanism. That does not in any way contradict moral relativism.
Again, I could very much agree with such a relativism.
The problem is most self styled relativists, including postmodernists and extreme advocates of multiculturalism or some sort of nihilism won't.
They use the word in the stronger sense of the term, and such a sense if what I come to associate with relativism. Basically right and wrong is what you decide is right or wrong, and none are better or worse. None are true or false even when you specify the agent in question.
This was alluded to even by you when you said morals are "like opinions neither true nor false".
This can like I said mean two different things. The first, something very agreeable, the second, something absurd.
Thing is though even opinions must be true or false when agency and context are specified.
For example "Chocolate is good". Not true or false strictly. But "Chocolate tastes good to most people", that can be true.
But most relativists don't recognize this, and believe when they say "Ethics are relative" that there can be no right or wrong in ethics. Much of this depends, ironically enough, on what relativist you talk to. I imagine you will get different definitions of ethical relativism from each.
IMO though strong relativism is obviously wrong as it depends on two premises: moral norms/practices are abritrarily made by individuals, or moral norms/practices are arbitrarily invented by cultures. And that there is no context then to judge actions as right or wrong. Cultural practices as good or bad. Or character as better or worse.
In other words they equate morality with practices concerning morality, and beliefs concerning it. This of course removes objectivity altogether, as there is no purely cogntive basis for morality. In other words, what is considered moral or ethical is moral or ethical.
Some examples of this kind of relativism:
Ethical relativism is the theory that holds that morality is relative to the norms of one's culture. That is, whether an action is right or wrong depends on the moral norms of the society in which it is practiced. The same action may be morally right in one society but be morally wrong in another. For the ethical relativist, there are no universal moral standards -- standards that can be universally applied to all peoples at all times. The only moral standards against which a society's practices can be judged are its own. If ethical relativism is correct, there can be no common framework for resolving moral disputes or for reaching agreement on ethical matters among members of different societies.
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/ethicalrelativism.html
Normative (ethical) Relativism
The normative relativist goes BEYOND any sociological facts.
(a) Normative Claim: "What is considered right in Society x at time t IS right for that Society."
(b) Theoretical (metaethical) Claim: Morality Itself is Relative.
Note that ethical relativism does not logically follow from any truths uncovered by descriptive relativism. Note also that the ethical relativist has a hard time explaining how radical moral change can occur within a certain society (as with slavery or women's suffrage in the United States).
http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/80130/part2/sect6.html
Moral relativism is the viewpoint that moral standards are not absolute, but instead emerge from social customs and other sources. The philosophical stance can be traced back at least as far as the Greek scholar Protagoras , who stated that "Man is the measure of all things;" a modern interpretation of this statement might be that things exist only in the context of the people who observe them.
Moral relativism stands in contrast to moral absolutism, which sees morals as fixed by an absolute human nature (John Rawls), or external sources such as deities (many religions) or the universe itself (as in Objectivism ). Those who believe in moral absolutes often are highly critical of moral relativism; some have been known to equate it with outright immorality or amorality.
(snip)
One consequence of this viewpoint, also known as cultural relativism, is the principle that any judgment of society as a whole is invalid: individuals are judged against the standards of their society; societies themselves have no larger context in which judgement is even meaningful. This is a source of conflict between moral relativists and moral absolutists, since a moral absolutist would argue that society as a whole can be judged for its acceptance of "immoral" practices, such as slavery. Such judgments are inconsistent with relativism, although in practice relativists often make such judgments anyway (for example, a relativist is unlikely to defend slave-owners on relativistic principles).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_relativism
My own viewpoint, given those above descriptions would neither be moral relativism, nor moral absolutism. This is because I think that while morals depend on character (thus making them vary and not absolute), the character of human beings are similiar enough for us to make certain "universal i.e. very general" norms by which to declare actions right or wrong. Secondly, I think that even if morals are determined by character, and character varies, it is still apropriate to judge one person or culture by standards that one does not share. For example, I can still condemn a sociopath for murdering someone, even if for him murdering is by no means unethical or immoral. Third, I think that even if better or worse is relative (agent dependent), that one can always see a better or worse for that person. This may of course vary with what agents we talk about, hence why it is in a sense relative. Fourth, I think at least one universal claim can be made and that is, to do what serves the most norms for any given agent. And last, I think what is moral or immoral, ethical or unethical depends on our emotional mechanisms, not cogntive. So we cannot in that sense "decide" something is moral, because it is not our decision. It is an emotional matter, that like other such matters, is determined by our character (genes and environment).
