Ethical Relativism

[Upchurch]

So, I'm taking this class on Computer Ethics and as part of the introduction to the subject were reviewing several different philosophical ethics. The first one being Ethical Relativism, which is a fairly familiar one to this board.

Both the prof and the text book pretty much discounted ethical relativism as wrong, but neither provided a really convincing argument. The argument went something like this.

Ethical relativism comes down to two points:
1. There are no universal accepted moral statements/There are no universally correct moral statements.
2. An individual's moral standards are relative their social norms.

The text book's take was that relativism was inconsistant because "There are no universally correct moral statements" is, in fact, a univeral moral statement which relativism puts forth as correct. The prof discounted this by simply dropping that first point from the argument saying that only the second point was necessary to relativism.

On the other hand, he took issue with the second point in that the evidence for ethical relativism does not support the premise that there can be no moral standard common to all societies. In class, we took a bit to try to come up with one that could be applied universally. In the end, however, we had to come to the point where we had to pretend that one of our possibilities were universally applicable so that we could go on with class. I realize there we had a limited time period in which to work, but it seemed like a cop out to me.

So, I'd like to continue that discussion here. Is there a way that we could prove or disprove ethical relativism? Here are, in brief, the claims that support ethical relativism, according to my text book:

Computer Ethics, by Deborah G. Johnson, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, 2001

1. There is and always has been a good deal of diversity of belief about right and wrong.
2. Moral beliefs change over time within a given society.
3. Social environment plays an important role in shaping the moral ideas you have.

 

[Yahweh]

I would support Ethical Relativism, it seems reasonable that non-uniform cultural backgrounds and beliefs would warrant sound reasoning to assume many moral judgements cannot be applied universally across the whole of humanity.

However, many people make an unwise error in judgement, they will use the concept of Ethical Relativism and take it to its unrealistic extremes. This results in a form of "moral anarchy" in that it would be very easy to say any action immoral in one culture such as spousal abuse may be condoned and accepted in another culture. If anyone actually accepted those extremes as an accurate description of what Ethical Relativism really means, it seems remarkable you could travel to another region without finding yourself killed at all...

 

[Krandal2]

Though 'An individual's moral standards are relative their social norms.' may be a truism, this does not mean that common ground
among ethical systems cannot be found once the values upon which the differing moral standards are based are compared.

To give a very general example, I imagine that although the moral laws and rules of every society may differ, a major justification, principle or "theme" shared by those laws may be the preservation or advancement of each society in turn, for if not, then that society will become self destructive and eventually cease to exist.

I suspect more specific examples could be found.

 

[Upchurch]

To give a very general example, I imagine that although the moral laws and rules of every society may differ, a major justification, principle or "theme" shared by those laws may be the preservation or advancement of each society in turn, for if not, then that society will become self destructive and eventually cease to exist.

Right. The facts that support ethical relativism aren't proof positive that there are no universally accepted moral statements.

When trying to come up with one, our attempts centered around activities that effect the survival of the human race, since that is one thing thing all cultures seem to agree on. Of course, as varied as those cultures are, we had to keep adding modifiers onto our original statement of "killing is wrong". We eventually came up with "killing real babies for the sole purpose of one's own entertainment is wrong." We stopped there so we could go on with the lecture and that sounds pretty good, but maybe there is some street gang culture out there who would not consider that to be true? Or, if we are truly talking "universal", maybe there is an alien race in the cosmos that wouldn't believe this?

*sigh* I miss ancient greek philosophy.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Upchurch,

Ethical relativism comes down to two points:
1. There are no universal accepted moral statements/There are no universally correct moral statements.
2. An individual's moral standards are relative their social norms.

The text book's take was that relativism was inconsistent because "There are no universally correct moral statements" is, in fact, a univeral moral statement which relativism puts forth as correct. The prof discounted this by simply dropping that first point from the argument saying that only the second point was necessary to relativism.

This is actually a very common logical mistake. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a universal moral statement.

To see why, consider the set of all systems of morality 'A'. A universally correct moral statement is a statement about a moral system 'x' which is true for all 'x' which are elements of 'A'. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a statement about a system of morality, but rather a statement about the set of all moral systems. I believe this is referred to as a category error.

So, I'd like to continue that discussion here. Is there a way that we could prove or disprove ethical relativism?

I doubt it. To prove it true you would have to show that no universally true moral statements exist, and to prove it false you would have to show that for some moral statement, there is not some moral system in which the statement is false. Both tasks sound impossible to do in practice.


Dr. Stupid

 

[Some Friggin Guy]

We eventually came up with "killing real babies for the sole purpose of one's own entertainment is wrong."

As reprehesible as it is to us in the US (and various other places in the world right now), this statement is still not a moral concrete.

Take the book Night, for example. In it, the author details an event where Nazi soldiers at the camp he was interred at used infants for targets in a rather morbid version of trap-shooting. This was done for the soldiers personal enjoyment and it was not seen as wrong by the society in power at the time, since their view was that the children, being Jewish, were sub-human.

 

[EternalUniverse]

Upchurch,



This is actually a very common logical mistake. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a universal moral statement.

To see why, consider the set of all systems of morality 'A'. A universally correct moral statement is a statement about a moral system 'x' which is true for all 'x' which are elements of 'A'. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a statement about a system of morality, but rather a statement about the set of all moral systems. I believe this is referred to as a category error.

Dr. Stupid

Please enlighten me. Why can't the statement "there are no universally correct moral statements" comprise an element (X) in the universe of moral systems (A) ? Presumably, some moral systems will contain the idea "there are no universally correct moral statements" (i.e. the moral system that advocates ethical relativism). Or, is that not allowed?

 

[EternalUniverse]

So, I'm taking this class on Computer Ethics and as part of the introduction to the subject were reviewing several different philosophical ethics. The first one being Ethical Relativism, which is a fairly familiar one to this board.

Both the prof and the text book pretty much discounted ethical relativism as wrong, but neither provided a really convincing argument. The argument went something like this.

Ethical relativism comes down to two points:
1. There are no universal accepted moral statements/There are no universally correct moral statements.
2. An individual's moral standards are relative their social norms.

The text book's take was that relativism was inconsistant because "There are no universally correct moral statements" is, in fact, a univeral moral statement which relativism puts forth as correct. The prof discounted this by simply dropping that first point from the argument saying that only the second point was necessary to relativism.

On the other hand, he took issue with the second point in that the evidence for ethical relativism does not support the premise that there can be no moral standard common to all societies. In class, we took a bit to try to come up with one that could be applied universally. In the end, however, we had to come to the point where we had to pretend that one of our possibilities were universally applicable so that we could go on with class. I realize there we had a limited time period in which to work, but it seemed like a cop out to me.

So, I'd like to continue that discussion here. Is there a way that we could prove or disprove ethical relativism? Here are, in brief, the claims that support ethical relativism, according to my text book:

This is definitely a difficult subject! I think there are three points to consider.

1) (a methodological concern). Even if we are able to discern universally accepted principles by comparing the moral system of every society, these principles do not necessarily point to an absolute standard to abide by. Consider the hypothetical situation where every society believes in eating its individual members when they turn 50. Some would say here that, if there are absolute standards, they would naturally show themselves, but this is debatable.

2) when talking about the beliefs of a "society", the term is vague. What comprises a "society"? Take the US. Surely it is comprised of different subgroups (for example differentiated by "culture", with different beliefs.

3) If ethical relativism is true, then any change in the beliefs of a society can not be shown to be morally inferior or superior.

 

[Suggestologist]

Upchurch,

This is actually a very common logical mistake. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a universal moral statement.

To see why, consider the set of all systems of morality 'A'. A universally correct moral statement is a statement about a moral system 'x' which is true for all 'x' which are elements of 'A'. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a statement about a system of morality, but rather a statement about the set of all moral systems. I believe this is referred to as a category error.

I doubt it. To prove it true you would have to show that no universally true moral statements exist, and to prove it false you would have to show that for some moral statement, there is not some moral system in which the statement is false. Both tasks sound impossible to do in practice.

Dr. Stupid

I call it an error of logical types (or: logical levels). As in Russel's theory of types. No class can be a member of itself.

 

[Upchurch]

This is actually a very common logical mistake. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a universal moral statement.

See, that's what I thought. Or at the very least, it was more of a meta-ethical statement.

I doubt it. To prove it true you would have to show that no universally true moral statements exist, and to prove it false you would have to show that for some moral statement, there is not some moral system in which the statement is false. Both tasks sound impossible to do in practice.

The prof tried to explain that the "you can't prove a negative" thing was a myth, but his explination was kinda weak and I think he actuall ended up contradicting himself.

I'm going to find this class very frustrating, I'm afraid.

 

[epepke]

Please enlighten me. Why can't the statement "there are no universally correct moral statements" comprise an element (X) in the universe of moral systems (A) ? Presumably, some moral systems will contain the idea "there are no universally correct moral statements" (i.e. the moral system that advocates ethical relativism). Or, is that not allowed?

It all goes back to Bertrand Russel. Consider the following example. All words, it seems, can be classified as "self-descriptive" or "not-self-descriptive." We'll allow hyphenated words. The word "short," for example, is self-descriptive (assuming that five letters is short). The word "long" is not-self-descriptive. The word "polysyllabic" is self-descriptive. The word "monosyllabic" is not. The word "potato" is not self-decriptive, because it isn't a potato; it's a word.

To what set does the word "non-self-descriptive" belong? It can't belong to either, because if it's self-descrptive, it isn't, and if it isn't, it is. The question of what set the word "self-descriptive" belongs is undecidable.

The normal dodge is to disallow descriptions of a set to be members of that set. This is a sufficient but not necessary way to avoid problems. A weaker statement is that when a member of a set describes the set, Aristotelian logic is no longer reliable.

 

[Suggestologist]

It all goes back to Bertrand Russel. Consider the following example. All words, it seems, can be classified as "self-descriptive" or "not-self-descriptive." We'll allow hyphenated words. The word "short," for example, is self-descriptive (assuming that five letters is short). The word "long" is not-self-descriptive. The word "polysyllabic" is self-descriptive. The word "monosyllabic" is not. The word "potato" is not self-decriptive, because it isn't a potato; it's a word.

To what set does the word "non-self-descriptive" belong? It can't belong to either, because if it's self-descrptive, it isn't, and if it isn't, it is. The question of what set the word "self-descriptive" belongs is undecidable.

The normal dodge is to disallow descriptions of a set to be members of that set. This is a sufficient but not necessary way to avoid problems. A weaker statement is that when a member of a set describes the set, Aristotelian logic is no longer reliable.

Part of the problem is that logical/mathematical statements are thought of as occuring simultaneously; without a time component. But nothing in the real world can occur instantaneously in time.

Alternatively, one can think of "non-self-descriptive" as self-descriptive at time1; non-self-descriptive at time2; self-descriptive at time3; etc. Each time step leads to reevaluation in the next. So it flip-flops between the two. One could then place it in the nontemporal category of being a "flip-flopping" member of two opposite categories.

 

[DialecticMaterialist]

So, I'm taking this class on Computer Ethics and as part of the introduction to the subject were reviewing several different philosophical ethics. The first one being Ethical Relativism, which is a fairly familiar one to this board.

Both the prof and the text book pretty much discounted ethical relativism as wrong, but neither provided a really convincing argument. The argument went something like this.

Ethical relativism comes down to two points:
1. There are no universal accepted moral statements/There are no universally correct moral statements.
2. An individual's moral standards are relative their social norms.

The text book's take was that relativism was inconsistant because "There are no universally correct moral statements" is, in fact, a univeral moral statement which relativism puts forth as correct. The prof discounted this by simply dropping that first point from the argument saying that only the second point was necessary to relativism.

On the other hand, he took issue with the second point in that the evidence for ethical relativism does not support the premise that there can be no moral standard common to all societies. In class, we took a bit to try to come up with one that could be applied universally. In the end, however, we had to come to the point where we had to pretend that one of our possibilities were universally applicable so that we could go on with class. I realize there we had a limited time period in which to work, but it seemed like a cop out to me.

So, I'd like to continue that discussion here. Is there a way that we could prove or disprove ethical relativism? Here are, in brief, the claims that support ethical relativism, according to my text book:

Computer Ethics, by Deborah G. Johnson, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, 2001

1. There is and always has been a good deal of diversity of belief about right and wrong.
2. Moral beliefs change over time within a given society.
3. Social environment plays an important role in shaping the moral ideas you have.

My main problem with ethical relativism is that I don't believe morals are based on beliefs, I think they are based on emotions.

Hence it can be argued that emotional reactions may vary, but I think there are some constants. I also think it can be well argued that certain actions are more emotionally satisfying then others for the average human being, especially in the long run.

I still agree that the first objection holds. Saying that there are no universally moral statements, is I believe a universally moral statement.


A better expression would be there are no universally moral codes, or norms. That would avoid the contradiction.

I would agree with that, though I think there is a universally moral rule. Basically to do what best serves the set moral standards of a moral system i.e. satisfies the most norms to the highest degree.


To illustrate, imagine we have any specific moral system 'A', and it's normative elements 'b'. In certain cases 'A' can simply have one 'b' as a trait, i.e. 'A'='b' in some cases. Now at any given time, whatever satisfies the most 'b's in any given 'A' must be the right choice for that 'A'. Regardless of whether or not 'A's can vary in other areas, that truth would apply to every single one.


As for number 2, it's incoherent. First off, it would constitute a universal moral statement.

Second, if morals are beliefs, there is no reason why they must be based on social norms. Other then it is believed they do by an individual, which can be contradicted by another individual.


Third, what if the social norm is universal in scope? How can it be wrong?

Fourth, it would lead us to conclusions that violate common moral sense. Ideas like the Nazi genocide were ok (since the Nazi society allowed for it) or that sexism and racism were at one time "moral". That to my opinion, is a poor hypothesis for the phenomenon for morality, and the moral observations inherent in the subject.

Fifth, it gives us no way to solve moral dillemmas in our own society. Abortion for example is an issue we are divided on almost 50/50. Moral relativism really can say nothing constructive on this, unless we are to degenerate into majoritarianism. It is not self-correcting.

Last, there is nothing to stop societie's from just making things up.




Even with computer ethics I take exception. Mainly because I think morals and ethics are ultimately grounded in emotion, not belief (cognition). Second, because I think it is not just a matter of social environment, but personal environment, family and other environment factors, as well as biology to a very large degree.

 

[DialecticMaterialist]

This is actually a very common logical mistake. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a universal moral statement.

To see why, consider the set of all systems of morality 'A'. A universally correct moral statement is a statement about a moral system 'x' which is true for all 'x' which are elements of 'A'. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a statement about a system of morality, but rather a statement about the set of all moral systems. I believe this is referred to as a category error.

I think 'x' is described in two ways, as a universal moral statement, and as a specific system. The latter would be an object, and the former a trait that would be applicable to 'A'.

Remember the claim wasn't just a declaration of category, that moral systems are contained in a larger category. That would be 'A'. The statement is also descriptive of the moral systems themselves, making 'A', contain 'x', as the trait.

Hence the first claim is not an 'A' but an 'x' in the former sense, i.e. as a universal trait.

The claim as I see it then is that 'x' is that there is no 'x'. A clear contradiction.


Last, I doubt an 'A' is even possible, especially if we just speak of moral beliefs/theory's and not simply actual moral systems, as there would be too many contradictions. Deontological and utilitarian morals would both have to be in 'A', for example and would both have to be true for 'A' to exist as a whole. Thus 'A' can never be an actual existing thing, just something concieved.

 

[calladus]

Upchurch, I went into my upper division Philosophy class believing that there was no universal "Moral Statement" and came out of the class persuaded that there WAS such an animal.

However, the logic that our professor led us through to get there is long forgotten. (And I won't dig through my notes on it!)

What I found amusing is that my professor easily admitted that Philosophy had not actually found WHAT this moral statement was. She said that this was a questions that philosophers were researching, in an attempt to discover.

Being scientifically minded, I immediatly took 'research' to be 'experimental research' and had wonderful images of Philosophers in white coats, in a lab, saying something like, "Okay, Dr. Jones, now let's run the test to see if eating babies is morally wrong in all cultures."

 

[Cain]

Upchurch- you may wish to supplement your reading with the slim (but excellent) introduction to ethics by James Rachels titled _The Elements of Moral Philosophy_.

If I remember correctly, Rachels attacks the issue on several fronts starting with the extent of disagreement between cultures. He cites a famous story of an enlightened king who brought two cultures together, the Greeks and (I believe) the Callatians.

The Callatians ate the bodies of their dead ancestors (as a thread in the politics forum reminds me). The Greeks listened to this custom in wide-eyed horror. The Callatians were similarly terrified to learn that the Greeks incincerated the bodies of their dead fathers. The underlying principle -- what the two cultures share in common -- is a deep respect for their ancestors, though expressed in different ways (rituals vary, purpose remains the same).

I never really understood how cultural relativism was supposed to be persuasive. Living in society A, it's illegal, punishable by death, to carry out pre-meditated murder of an innocent named X. Society B, under identical conditions, is perfectly fine with such a murder. How would the beliefs of others affect the rightness or wrongness of such an action?

In an older issue of _Skeptic_ (the one with Spinoza on the cover), an article tells us that there are fewer ethical relativists in philosophy departments than creationists in biology departments (it may have been a percentage comparison).


___________________________
DM:

My main problem with ethical relativism is that I don't believe morals are based on beliefs, I think they are based on emotions.

I take it this statement is intended as descriptive rather normative...?
Because most people have intensely negative emotional reactions to the idea of two men engaging in anal sex, or a brother and sister engaging in sexual intercourse. This mirrors the other thread: I see nothing morally wrong with those actions, however.

 

[epepke]

Alternatively, one can think of "non-self-descriptive" as self-descriptive at time1; non-self-descriptive at time2; self-descriptive at time3; etc. Each time step leads to reevaluation in the next. So it flip-flops between the two. One could then place it in the nontemporal category of being a "flip-flopping" member of two opposite categories.

That's fine, but it pretty much require a computational solution to every problem. It's nice to be able to get analytic solutions whenever possible, because they're easier to deal with.

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

EternalUniverse,

This is actually a very common logical mistake. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a universal moral statement.

To see why, consider the set of all systems of morality 'A'. A universally correct moral statement is a statement about a moral system 'x' which is true for all 'x' which are elements of 'A'. The statement "There are no universally correct moral statements" is not a statement about a system of morality, but rather a statement about the set of all moral systems. I believe this is referred to as a category error.

Dr. Stupid
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Please enlighten me. Why can't the statement "there are no universally correct moral statements" comprise an element (X) in the universe of moral systems (A)?

Because the symbol 'x' represents moral systems, within which any given moral statement may be true or false. A moral statement cannot be equivalent to a moral system, nor can a moral statement be equivalent to a statement about all moral systems.

Presumably, some moral systems will contain the idea "there are no universally correct moral statements" (i.e. the moral system that advocates ethical relativism). Or, is that not allowed?

Strictly speaking, no. A philosophical system may contain the belief that there are no universally correct moral statements, but that is not, itself, a moral statement. Nor is it really a statement about that philosophical systems moral system. It is a statement about all moral systems.


DialecticMaterialis,

I think 'x' is described in two ways, as a universal moral statement, and as a specific system. The latter would be an object, and the former a trait that would be applicable to 'A'.

As is often the case, things come down to a question of definitions. I maintain that the apparent contradiction involved in moral relativism derives from sloppy definitions. What you have just said seems to support this. Either it is a moral statement, in which case it could possibly be a universal moral statement, or it is a system of morality, in which case it is not a moral statement at all, or it is neither. It cannot be both. Not if both concepts are defined in a coherent way.

Remember the claim wasn't just a declaration of category, that moral systems are contained in a larger category. That would be 'A'. The statement is also descriptive of the moral systems themselves, making 'A', contain 'x', as the trait.

A universal moral statement would not be a trait of A. The fact that the statement is (or is not) universal is a trait of A.

Hence the first claim is not an 'A' but an 'x' in the former sense, i.e. as a universal trait.

The claim as I see it then is that 'x' is that there is no 'x'. A clear contradiction.

If you define x to be both a moral statement, and a statement about the set of all moral statements, then yes, there is a contradiction. The contradiction is simply that a statement cannot be both a moral statement (which is a statement that is defined in the context of a single moral system), and a statement about the set of all moral systems (which is a statement that is defined in the context of the set of all moral systems).

To put it another way, any statement which is meaningful outside of the framework of a moral system, is not a moral statement. But any statement about the set of all moral systems, cannot possibly be meaningful without being taken in the context of the set of all moral systems, which is outside of any single moral system. These two types of statements are each only meaningful in different contexts. A single statement can therefore not be of both types.

Last, I doubt an 'A' is even possible, especially if we just speak of moral beliefs/theory's and not simply actual moral systems, as there would be too many contradictions. Deontological and utilitarian morals would both have to be in 'A', for example and would both have to be true for 'A' to exist as a whole. Thus 'A' can never be an actual existing thing, just something concieved.

I don't follow you. I agree that the statement "All moral systems within set A are true" is definitely false, but so what? Sets are abstract. I have no idea what it would even mean to say that A is an actual existing thing. Sets are not actual existing things.

That said, the fact that different moral systems contradict each other does not in any way render set A logically inconsistent.


Dr. Stupid

 

[DialecticMaterialist]

DM:


I take it this statement is intended as descriptive rather normative...?
Because most people have intensely negative emotional reactions to the idea of two men engaging in anal sex, or a brother and sister engaging in sexual intercourse. This mirrors the other thread: I see nothing morally wrong with those actions, however.

Both, actually.

In regards to the above, which is a good point, I would object to the homophobia on other grounds.

One being that I think the emotional reaction is not based on anything intrinsic, but false beliefs.

Second, that what bad reaction is present is more akin to disgust arising from taste, and only confused with morality. Studies actually show that humans confuse issues of percieved cleanliness with morality quite a bit.

For example in tests where people are shown pictures, most people give people that look more "dirty", a lower rating then people that look more "clean" in terms of moral standing. It's simply an attribution error.

Another is how moral vegans will not eat a bowel where meat has been eaten out of, unless it has been thoroughly cleaned. This is different then health vegans which are usually ok with just removing meat. In other words, I don't think homophobes are having a moral reaction, but a "bad taste" reaction. The two are merel confused for many reasons.

Most homophobes I know may find it displeasing and not to their tastes, but many if not most I met will not argue it's immoral simply for that reason. For that they usually appeal to God.

This imo, is different then rape or murder, which I think can be argued is intrinsically unpleasant.

Further evidence for this imo, stems from rape and murder having taboos against it in almost every society (for those in the group, when unprovoked) whereas homophobia does not.

Last, I would appeal to other values which I believe have emotional appeal. Those like tolerance, freedom, empathy and justice.

 

[Martin]

Another is how moral vegans will not eat a bowel where meat has been eaten out of, unless it has been thoroughly cleaned

No sh!t, Sherlock.