Eleatic Stranger said:
And arguments, of course, can (and are) often challenged, disproven, or what have you. Positions - along the above lines - are far less likely to be disproven, of course, but that's not in their nature anyway.
Actually, you've more or less just proven my point in two independent ways, as I read it.
First, although arguments are often "challenged," they're extremely rarely "disproven" in the sense that a scientist or mathematician would use. One philosopher will "challenge" another by offering a counterargument that he holds is more logical, convincing, or consistent with common sense, and the onlookers get to pick whom they find the more convincing. But because there's so little uniformity of opinion about the nature of logic or common sense, you will (relatively) rarely see a uniformity of opinion that the first argument has been "disproven."
Basically, evidence gets treated differently. You can see that for yourself by simply asking Popper's question "what would falsify your theory?" Most scientists have no problem describing a fact or experimental finding that would entirely destroy their current theory and invalidate their current experiment. Such facts are usually fairly straightforward and data-driven. When such a fact comes along, it's usually obvious to all involved, including the people who just got their theory destroyed. (The experiment with neutrino mass are a good example of this.)
On the other hand, it's usually difficult for a philosopher to articulate what it would take to invalidate "realism about such and such" or "utilitarianism" or "prescriptivism." Usually they would be convinced by a more persuasive argument -- but the idea of persuasive isn't well-defined and reasonable people can disagree on this.
But this, of course, is exactly what you said, and this gets to my second point. "Positions - along the above lines - are far less likely to be disproven, of course, but that's not in their nature anyway." Contrary to your claim, this
is a substantive difference between philosophy and science; science deals for the most part with the empirically testable. More than that, science deals seriously with the notion of "predictive." If a scientific theory is not predictive, it's arguably (in the opinions of most scientists and most philosophers of science) not science at all -- this is one of main complaints leveled at both Intelligent Design
and at the Theory of Evolution. If a (scientific) theory makes a prediction [as it must] and the prediction fails, the theory is falsified and must be modified or abandoned. Philosophical positions, on the other hand, are rarely predictive.
It's not a hard and fast division; many scientists will deal with questions that are not easily testable, and some philosophers will take questions of validation and disproof extremely seriously. But there's still a strong distributional difference between the two fields.
It's perhaps illustrative that one of the strongest complaints that can be leveled by practicing scientists against a line of reasoning is "that's philosophy, not science!" (Google it for yourself.) What's meant by this? What is usually meant is that the theory being proposed has no observable or testable consequences.
I submit that most of the traditional philosophical fields, questions, and "positions" are in exactly that situation. Having no testable consequences, they cannot be falsified. If they cannot be falsified, they cannot be "disproven."