Do brains really exist?

[Robin]

There's nothing I disagree with in what you quoted once we accept that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon.

*I* don't of course believe it's an emergent phenomenon. [/B]

In other words you do disagree with what I quoted. Why didn't you just say that?

It is significant that you never responded to my point about reductivist science, yet you are still using the term. Science deals with what is, not what it thinks should be.

Sperry also states that inner experience is within the domain of science. Is there nothing you disagree with about that?

 

[Interesting Ian]

But fair's fair, some of us answered, now it is your turn. According to your immaterialism what would happen?

And also I assume that your immaterialist ideas predict that severing the corpus callosum would not affect memory in any way - right ?

Whilst operating through the brain the self is subject to the constraints of the brain. Severing the corpus callosum might well have deleterious effects on memory retrieval.

What would happen? If my left brain was hooked up to someones right brain then those aspects of my mind shaped by the right brain would be effected. But I would still be 100% completely the same self. Remember that I say I'm the same self whether I'm 5 years old, 35 years old, 70 years old; whether sober or drunk; or whatever. My mind states change throughout my life; they will do so if half of my brain is exchanged for someone else's half brain. I might experience different emotions, but there again I do so after a few drinks of lager. So I would remain absolutely the same self.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I don't give a flying pig stinky about what you think "materialism" would say, or what you think would be the case "if materialism were true."

What do you think?

I don't believe that a single stream of consciousness splits into 2 streams of consciousness. Due to the fact I believe in selves, that would mean that one self becomes 2. This is inconsistent with my metaphysic.

At the very least the 2 selves must already be there prior to the operation. I suppose one could argue there is at least an apparent other self as indicated by tourette's syndrome, automatic writing, and so on. Personally I don't think there is another self operating through our bodies, but there again I have not given sufficient thought and research to these type of phenomena.

And BTW, there's no need to be rude. I haven't been rude to you.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Whilst operating through the brain the self is subject to the constraints of the brain. Severing the corpus callosum might well have deleterious effects on memory retrieval.

What would happen? If my left brain was hooked up to someones right brain then those aspects of my mind shaped by the right brain would be effected. But I would still be 100% completely the same self. Remember that I say I'm the same self whether I'm 5 years old, 35 years old, 70 years old; whether sober or drunk; or whatever. My mind states change throughout my life; they will do so if half of my brain is exchanged for someone else's half brain. I might experience different emotions, but there again I do so after a few drinks of lager. So I would remain absolutely the same self.

Just to clarify here. My post operation self would contain nothing of the self of the other person whose half brain I receive. Just thought I'd add that just in case it wasn't completely obvious.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
What would happen? If my left brain was hooked up to someones right brain then those aspects of my mind shaped by the right brain would be effected. But I would still be 100% completely the same self. Remember that I say I'm the same self whether I'm 5 years old, 35 years old, 70 years old; whether sober or drunk; or whatever. My mind states change throughout my life; they will do so if half of my brain is exchanged for someone else's half brain. I might experience different emotions, but there again I do so after a few drinks of lager. So I would remain absolutely the same self.

As would the other person, presumably. What happens if you keep only 1/4 of your brain and share the other 3/4 with someone else? Does your mind stay with the 1/4 brain or go dormant with the 3/4 of your brain that you're not using? How do it decide?

Now, what aspects of your self would not be affected by creating this brain chimera?

~~ Paul

 

[Interesting Ian]

In other words you do disagree with what I quoted. Why didn't you just say that?

I might disagree with the notion that consciousness is emergent, but it's vastly more sensible than materialism.

Sperry also states that inner experience is within the domain of science. Is there nothing you disagree with about that? [/B]

If consciousness is an emergent phenomenon? I've already said. It wouldn't be part of reductivist science by definition. Also you would have an existent which could only be known by introspection. So whether such an emergent consciousness would be within the domain of science entirely depends on how you define science.

 

[Interesting Ian]

As would the other person, presumably. What happens if you keep only 1/4 of your brain and share the other 3/4 with someone else? Does your mind stay with the 1/4 brain or go dormant with the 3/4 of your brain that you're not using? How do it decide?

Now, what aspects of your self would not be affected by creating this brain chimera?

~~ Paul

Paul,

The brain doesn't determine the self! I can't answer your question because I do not know what the process is whereby a self operates through a particular brain. I just assumed if you put someones half brain in my body, that my self would still operate through my body.

 

[jmercer]

Paul,

The brain doesn't determine the self! I can't answer your question because I do not know what the process is whereby a self operates through a particular brain. I just assumed if you put someones half brain in my body, that my self would still operate through my body.

Care to demonstrate?

 

[Robin]

Whilst operating through the brain the self is subject to the constraints of the brain. Severing the corpus callosum might well have deleterious effects on memory retrieval.

Why would that be? Does memory reside in the physical brain? If so then

Just to clarify here. My post operation self would contain nothing of the self of the other person whose half brain I receive. Just thought I'd add that just in case it wasn't completely obvious.

could not be true. On the other hand are you suggesting that immaterial memories cannot be directly accessed by the immaterial consciousness but have to be shipped back to the physical brain and forwarded on to the immaterial consciousness? If so then your above statement would still not be true, for how could you be sure that the altered physical brain would forward the correct memories to the correct consciousness?

If memories are immaterial and can be directly accessed by the immaterial consciousness then immaterialism would predict that severing the corpus callosum would have no effect whatsoever on memory.

 

[Z]

And what if my left brain was connected to a woman's right brain?? Would "I" develop an interest in talking about carpets, curtains, the royal family etc??

I'll give Ian the benefit of the doubt here, and assume that this was somehow a mis-quote.

Otherwise, Ian ought to be banned from any meaningful conversations until he can turn his bigoted, sexist attitudes off during discussions.

If he weren't already on my Ignore list, he'd be there for such prejudiced, 19th century comments.

...

What in the name of Bob does femininity have to do with carpets, curtains, or the Royal Family? For that matter, what does any of that have to do with homosexuality?

You are offensive, Ian. Offensive, ignorant, bigoted, hate-filled, prejudiced, sexist, and I'll not be surprised if racist as well.

Goodbye, Ian. I will no longer even comment on things others quote that you say. You are beneath contempt. You are a worm, unworthy of even the energy required to scorn you.

I hope you enjoy your next life, and I hope you learn in that life the lessons needed to move back up to the level of 'human'.

 

[Robin]

I might disagree with the notion that consciousness is emergent, but it's vastly more sensible than materialism.

Obviously you are using another definition of emergence than I am, as far as I know emergence and materialism are not contradictory.

If consciousness is an emergent phenomenon? I've already said. It wouldn't be part of reductivist science by definition.

You are carefully ignoring my questions about what you mean by reductivist science, and yet you keep on repeating this furphy. Every definition of science I have ever heard since I was old enough to understand the word is the opposite to what you seem to think science is. Can you give me some quote or reference by which I can understand what you are talking about?

As far as I know science attempts to understand the world as it is, and not as it thinks it should be according to some pre-existing template. They taught me that in school and college, every book or article that I have ever read about science says that.

And yet you have this odd definition of science that tries to shoehorn observations into some pre-defined formula. No I have never heard of this type of science, I have only heard of the type of science that says "if the observation definitely contradicts the theory then the theory is wrong (or incomplete)". Science only reduces phenomena to existing models when they really can be reduced to existing models. If not they create new models (for example relativity, quantum physics, string theory).

Consciousness may or may not be explicable from existing models, I cannot determine that.

So whether such an emergent consciousness would be within the domain of science entirely depends on how you define science.

Your definition of science is "the attempt to categorize all observable phenomena to a fixed and pre-defined template" I cannot think of any definition of science which gels with the definition you have of it.

I suppose the definition of science that I am working from is the systematic approach to building models or theories that predict or partially predict observable (including indirectly observable) phenomena.

 

[Robin]

Paul,

The brain doesn't determine the self! I can't answer your question because I do not know what the process is whereby a self operates through a particular brain. I just assumed if you put someones half brain in my body, that my self would still operate through my body.

So presumably you are saying that if you put someone else's whole brain in your body your self would operate through the same body?

 

[Atlas]

So presumably you are saying that if you put someone else's whole brain in your body your self would operate through the same body?

That's what I took away. And it made me wonder. If a rat was taught a maze and his brain swapped out, that rat would still run the maze with perfect memory - according to Ian.

It might actually be something science will be able to answer.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Ian said:
The brain doesn't determine the self! I can't answer your question because I do not know what the process is whereby a self operates through a particular brain. I just assumed if you put someones half brain in my body, that my self would still operate through my body.

However the self operates through my brain, if I bust my brain into two pieces, there's gonna be hell to pay. Forget the other person's brain. Suppose I divide my brain and put part of it in a spare body. What's up with my consciousness now?

~~ Paul

 

[Robin]

That's what I took away. And it made me wonder. If a rat was taught a maze and his brain swapped out, that rat would still run the maze with perfect memory - according to Ian.

It might actually be something science will be able to answer.

Yes that would seem to be the logical conclusion. I wonder what percentage of body parts from the other rat would have to be transplanted into the first rat before it became the other rat and would forget how to run the maze.

 

[Z]

That's an odd thing, Atlas - seems that, according to what you're saying, if we replace a person's brain, they're still the same self. If we replace their body, they're still the same self.

So with regards to the teletrans or cloning experiments, whereby the original is vaporized and a duplicate made, this matters not - it's just 100% replacement, and the self remains the same.

Curious - this is what Ian claims that materialists should believe, isn't it? That the cloning and teletrans don't matter, because the self is the same self regardless of a 100% replacement?

In fact, a person could, according to this, be replaced with machines - with hardware - and the self would remain unchanged, as well. Cool - then human evolution has a bold, wonderful path to the future to follow. Hail, the machine age!

Of course, this isn't what Ian wants to claim. Half of the brain could be replaced, but not all. Probably he'll have to come up with some model of the brain by which a key piece contains the receiver - maybe one of the clusters of cells which never changes over the course of human life?

Logically, if you move enough of the brain from person A to person B's body, eventually you'll have person A peering out from inside person B's body. But which pieces are needed? How much, and what parts, have to be moved? Otherwise, you have neither A nor B, but a thing that - assuming full compatibility - would have a mishmash of A and B in various proportions.

 

[Atlas]

Yes that would seem to be the logical conclusion. I wonder what percentage of body parts from the other rat would have to be transplanted into the first rat before it became the other rat and would forget how to run the maze.

I think the head would be enough. Cut off Ian's head, say, and mount it on a chick's body. I think he's saying he would wake up expressing chickisms.

Likewise, in a cruel irony, his body received the head of a dumb blond. The dumb blond head would wake up just as smart as Ian and immediately start to fight.

 

[Robin]

I think the head would be enough. Cut off Ian's head, say, and mount it on a chick's body. I think he's saying he would wake up expressing chickisms.

Likewise, in a cruel irony, his body received the head of a dumb blond. The dumb blond head would wake up just as smart as Ian and immediately start to fight.

I think we need to get Ian's view of this.

What I get from it is if you were to entirely transplant Ian's head onto Brittany Spears then the Ian headed Brittany would be completely Brittany and the Brittany headed Ian would be completely Ian.

 

[Atlas]

... Of course, this isn't what Ian wants to claim. Half of the brain could be replaced, but not all. Probably he'll have to come up with some model of the brain by which a key piece contains the receiver - maybe one of the clusters of cells which never changes over the course of human life? ...

I think we need more clarification. It sounded like the self is more tied to the body than the brain for Ian.

I think the personality would follow the head in a whole head transplant operation but Ian made it sound like the self is not in the head but the body in his reply to Paul.

 

[Z]

I...

But he...

...


Oh, forget it. I'm gonna go astral-project into the ladies' locker room in a gym in Japan now.