Diebold voting systems critically flawed

[Kaylee]

The logistics of implementing an all-computerized voting system are not difficult because of the computers. They are difficult because managing 150 million people

Bingo. The problem is not strictly technical -- the true problem is one of politics and honesty. There have always been people willing to steal elections.

The older system is open (in that everyone knows how it works and there are no secrets) and auditable. It is subject to fraud, but there are systems in place to help keep the fraud in check -- as long as the political will exhists to use them.

The Diebold systems are not auditable and publicly accountable, so there is no way to keep the fraud in check with their machines regardless of political will.

--

 

[rocketdodger]

To be fair, this exploit has nothing to do with the openness of the software - it is a hardware security issue.

To be even fairer, this exploit is precisely that -- an exploit. From what I know, the systems were designed in ignorance of the fact that there are people out there who will try to be malicious any way they can.

As a CS major and veteran programmer it boggles my brain that people make this mistake over and over and over and over and over and over and over.

 

[Cleon]

To be fair, this exploit has nothing to do with the openness of the software - it is a hardware security issue.

The thing is, these are designed, manufactured, sold, and maintained as appliances--the hardware and software are all one bundled unit. The hardware is just as much under wraps as the software.

From a security standpoint, whether it's a "hardware" or "software" vulnerability is irrelevant; the key point is that there's a security vulnerability that can be exploited.

 

[davefoc]

...

As long as the voting machine companies are allowed to use secret software, this will be a never ending problem. We'll always have to wonder if the party in control of the state has some special relationship with the vendor they're paying big bucks to each year.

I agree with this completely. Unfortunately, the voting machine companies have been dealing with unsophisticated (or perhaps corrupt) purchasing agents unaware of the potential for security problems in computer implemented devices.

I would have also added that a human readable paper output is probably also an essential requirement for voting machine security.

 

[gnome]

As a matter of fact, I imagine if you'd taken a vote on the issue before the electronic machines were implemented, it would overwhelmingly be in favor of having a paper backup.

So how, in a nominally democratic country, did this fail to happen?

 

[davefoc]

Bingo. The problem is not strictly technical -- the true problem is one of politics and honesty. There have always been people willing to steal elections.

The older system is open (in that everyone knows how it works and there are no secrets) and auditable. It is subject to fraud, but there are systems in place to help keep the fraud in check -- as long as the political will exhists to use them.

The Diebold systems are not auditable and publicly accountable, so there is no way to keep the fraud in check with their machines regardless of political will.

--

This is exactly right. The problem might have been that the priorities of new voting equipment were misplaced as a result of the Florida problems.

It is reasonable that reducing voter error should be a goal of a voting system using electronic voting systems, but the most important goal, IMHO, is for the new voting system to be at least as secure as the system being replaced.

Voter error in the overall scheme of things is a small problem. It tends to be random and it is generally too small to affect the outcome of an election and if an election is so close that voter error is a factor it might not be all that important who gets elected anyway.

But security problems are different. They have the potential to undermine the entire electoral system and the democracy itself. Reducing voter error is an insignificant issue compared to the importance of election security but the first attempts at electronic voting have stood this idea on its head. Voting systems have been introduced that almost eliminate voter errors while making the entire election subject to non-random manipulation.

 

[BobK]

I agree with this completely. Unfortunately, the voting machine companies have been dealing with unsophisticated (or perhaps corrupt) purchasing agents unaware of the potential for security problems in computer implemented devices.

I would have also added that a human readable paper output is probably also an essential requirement for voting machine security.

I agree with having each voter get proof on paper of their votes. I think that alone would be insufficient without also having a unique ID number on the paper, so that it could be referenced against a particular vote held in the computer if fraud is suspected. With paper counted if discrepancies are found.

Any voting system can be compromised. But geez! These guys aren't even trying. Secret source code hides flaws that would otherwise be noticed. I'd rather have the eyes of the public looking for flaws, than just the eyes of a select few, and having them say "trust me".

Why would the company want their system to be totally secure? Seems to me, they'd only want it to be secure enough so no one notices. If they were to leave no way around the security, a possible future revenue stream will be lost.

If it's possible to game to system, someone is going to try it. To think otherwise is naive.

 

[CFLarsen]

Why not just use a paper ballot?

 

[Zep]

Here's an idea - use computers to track the voters, to tick them off the "big list" as they come to vote. That way, you minimise the most obvious ways of vote-rigging, i.e. voting "often".

Then use a paper ballot process, which has already proven itself as a cost-effective and reliable mechanism for conducting votes. It is still prefered in many places to computerised methods. Although not without possible problems re fraud, at least it is its own paper trail.

Personally, I would have thought that a "computerised" method would be a punch-card based system, which I understand is used in a number of places. All the obvious reasons accrue - a hard archive of the votes is made, and it can be processed both quickly and repeatedly. The well-publicised issues to do with dimpled or hanging chads, etc, could be dealt with by simply improving the mechanical punching method (I used IBM 026 card punches in my youth, and they NEVER hanged or dimpled chads! So it can be done...).

 

[davefoc]

Why not just use a paper ballot?

Two reasons, I think.

1. Reduce voter error. States that have initiatives on the ballot have fairly complicated ballots that computer screens can make somewhat clearer. In addition, computer voting eliminates ambiguous voter actions like a partially removed chad or an unclear mark.

2. Improve security. The possibility of having a paper trail coupled with vote totalling done automatically for audit purposes offer the possibility of a voter system which is more secure than a paper only system.

The main problem, up to now, is that people have focused on issue one without giving any priority to issue 2. And, IMHO, issue 1 isn't really that important in the overall scheme of things compared to issue 2.

 

[Cylinder]

Because in this case, you can't prove the positive, either. Therein lies the problem; the system is not publicly accountable. It's faith-based voting.

No - you are making a faith-based argument. Name a single state that uses any form electronic voting that is not publically accountable. Any one will do.

 

[a_unique_person]

Because in this case, you can't prove the positive, either. Therein lies the problem; the system is not publicly accountable. It's faith-based voting.

The onus is on them to demonstrate it is a safe system.

 

[varwoche]

It is reasonable that reducing voter error should be a goal of a voting system using electronic voting systems, but the most important goal, IMHO, is for the new voting system to be at least as secure as the system being replaced.

Voter error in the overall scheme of things is a small problem. It tends to be random and it is generally too small to affect the outcome of an election and if an election is so close that voter error is a factor it might not be all that important who gets elected anyway.

But security problems are different. They have the potential to undermine the entire electoral system and the democracy itself. Reducing voter error is an insignificant issue compared to the importance of election security but the first attempts at electronic voting have stood this idea on its head. Voting systems have been introduced that almost eliminate voter errors while making the entire election subject to non-random manipulation.

Spot on davefoc, per usual.

 

[Kaylee]

As a matter of fact, I imagine if you'd taken a vote on the issue before the electronic machines were implemented, it would overwhelmingly be in favor of having a paper backup.

So how, in a nominally democratic country, did this fail to happen?

My guess is a complacent and lazy electorate and a combination of ignorant and/or corrupt decision makers and purchasing agents.

The money to replace the election machines at stake is high and I've heard the lobbying is very intense.

 

[Cleon]

No - you are making a faith-based argument.

Ah, yes, argument by "nuh-uh!" Very persuasive. I shall reconsider my stance immediately.

Name a single state that uses any form electronic voting that is not publically accountable. Any one will do.

Any state that uses proprietary systems in which the mechanism of tabulation, reporting, and input is proprietary and not available for public scrutiny. Diebold is the largest producer of such systems, but not the only one. If you want a list of states that use them, try using a magnificent tool known as "Google." Failing that, read the OP.

 

[Kaylee]

No - you are making a faith-based argument. Name a single state that uses any form electronic voting that is not publically accountable. Any one will do.

I agree with AUP that the onus is on the govt and the providers of the election voting machines to prove that it is a safe system, and not on the voters to prove that it is corrupt.

Given the current status that the vendors involved refuse to disclose the code or how their system works, how can anyone say their systems are publically accountable? With no transparency there can be no accountability.

Anyone that wants to find out more only has to read the links posted on this thread and follow the links made available on those web sites. But what the heck -- here's one current lawsuit at random:

Lehto and Wells v. Sequoia and Snohomish County
See: http://www.votersunite.org/info/lehtolawsuit.asp

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This case arises out a dispute concerning a contract between defendants Snohomish County and Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. for the purchase of Sequoia touch-screen voting computers employed in the 2004 elections (hereinafter “the Contract”). The Contract is appended hereto as Appendix ‘A.’ Plaintiffs make claims under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act [RCW 7.24.010 et seq.] for specific declarations respecting the Contract and its provisions and for such other and further relief as may be necessary or proper.

1.2 Plaintiffs Wells and Lehto, as citizens and voters, object to provisions of the contract between Snohomish County and Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. attempting to shield from public view and verification the means by which votes are recorded, counted, tabulated, and reported on the grounds that they contain “trade secret,” “confidential,” or “proprietary” materials. Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that provisions of the contract ought properly to be set aside based upon contractual, statutory, Constitutional and public policy grounds.

1.3 This case implicates questions concerning the proper balance to be struck between a free people and their government, recognizing the inherent tension between appropriate delegation of regulatory and administrative functions respecting the conduct of elections by the people to the agencies of their government, on the one hand, and the danger that lack of transparent, accurate, and verifiable elections could undermine accountability and lead to rule by self-perpetuating incumbents with the resulting damage to our democracy, on the other.

1.4 Access to Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc. information is essential to insure the transparency and verifiability of elections at the precise nexus of the exercise of the voting franchise (vote counting) and the essential legitimacy of government (i.e. election results). Accordingly, the court must apply strict scrutiny to all acts or contracts tending to impair the right of the people to supervise and review their elections in order that public confidence is sustained respecting the accuracy, integrity, transparency, and verifiability of voting systems. Such scrutiny supports the public policy of Washington State, as stated in RCW 42.30.010: The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created.

1.5 This action seeks to vindicate the proposition that no contract, public or private, shall be permitted to undermine Article I, Section 1 of the Washington Constitution: “all political power is inherent in the people”. Plaintiffs seek relief herein based upon past damages sustained and the threat of future injury.

...

Here's a random cut and paste from one of the plaintiff's legal documents available on line.

http://www.votersunite.org/info/SnohomishElectionFraudInvestigation.pdf

[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Bold]EVIDENCE OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES IN

​

[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Bold]

SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASHINGTON​

GENERAL ELECTION, 2004
[/FONT]

[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Bold]1[/FONT]​

[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Bold]
[/FONT]

[FONT=TimesNewRoman,Bold]

By Paul R. Lehto, J.D., Attorney at Law​

[/FONT][FONT=TimesNewRoman,Bold]

paul@lehtopenfield.com

Dr. Jeffrey Hoffman, Ph.D.
jehoffma@nmu.edu​

...​

[/FONT]

While we have been advised in writing that under "no circumstances" may we perform any tests on Sequoia voting machines without the permission of Sequoia, we remain hopeful that Sequoia will completely open up its proprietary operating system andhardware to inspection so that a full security evaluation and investigation can take place. Only then will the data anomalies be solved. As it currently stands, there are at least 45 polling locations in which the number of voters does not equal the number of electronic votes, and in some cases "phantom votes" appear, where vote totals greater than the machines recorded on election day are reported in the precinct results.​

[/FONT]

12 However, it isunlikely that any serious investigation will ensue simply because no one is rewarded for finding problems, and the media no longer takes its role as watchdog seriously.

...​

​

​

 

[Kaylee]

I see Cleon beat me to it!

 

[Cylinder]

Any state that uses proprietary systems in which the mechanism of tabulation, reporting, and input is proprietary and not available for public scrutiny.

Name a state then. Which one? You made a claim. I cannot reasonable expect the author of the article cited in the OP to defend his or her claim here. I can, however, expect the same from you.

Once again, which state uses electronic voting not subject to public scrutiny or accountability?

 

[Cleon]

Name a state then. Which one? You made a claim. I cannot reasonable expect the author of the article cited in the OP to defend his or her claim here. I can, however, expect the same from you.

Once again, which state uses electronic voting not subject to public scrutiny or accountability?

You're purposely being difficult. If you're not going to bother reading this thread, I'm not going to waste my time entertaining you. Troll someone else.

 

[Cylinder]

You're purposely being difficult. If you're not going to bother reading this thread, I'm not going to waste my time entertaining you. Troll someone else.

Sorry if I challenged your faith. I was just looking for a specific claim that could be tested.

You do agree that election rules are codified by the various states, right?