Did Godel disprove the idea of artificial intelligence?

[69dodge]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I agree with you that there is no such thing as "the greatest possible mind". Let's just say that a mind needs to be great enough that it apprehends all mathematical truths. Now of course the AI enthusiasts will maintain, indeed must maintain, that no matter how great a mind is there will always be some mathematical truth that it is unable to see/derive. This must be so if any mind is nothing more than the execution of some algorithm. But then of course we come full circle.

Yes.

It seems that we can recognise some truths that are not arrived at by an algorithmic process. We can see something is true even though a computer cannot i.e. Goedelian sentences.

No. We can recognize some truth that was not arrived at by a particular algorithmic process; we can see something is true even though a particular computer cannot. We may have arrived at that truth by a different algorithmic process---namely, one running in our brains---even though we don't know exactly which algorithmic process that is.

Or consider how mathematicians sometimes discover new mathematical truths. They often declare that it is a moment of insight. They suddenly know, beyond doubt, its truth -- only afterwards do they produce the proof of that which they already know.

I don't know. That doesn't sound right to me. Sometimes I'll be pretty sure of something even though I haven't proved it yet, although I wouldn't say I know it. So then I try to prove it. If I can, I say to myself, "See? I was right! I knew it all along." And if I end up disproving it, I say, "See? In the back of my mind, I knew something was wrong. That's why I felt the need to check it."

But, anyway, this doesn't prove anything one way or the other. No one says that people are aware of the algorithm that's running in their heads, just that some algorithm is in fact running. So, the mathematician's lack of awareness of how he arrived at his insight doesn't mean that it wasn't arrived at algorithmically; it just means that he doesn't know what algorithm his brain used.

You mean the execution of more than one algorithm at once? That obviously does nothing to defeat the argument. 2 algorithms are no more capable of producing a miracle than one algorithm.

Correct. A single Turing machine can simulate multiple other Turing machines running in parallel. Actual parallelism buys you nothing but speed.

 

[Correa Neto]

No, I was referring to anomalous cognition. This mean psi.

Still, I say it would be a potentially ineffective criteria.

Lets suppose psi is true (and leave the discussion if it really is or not for another time/thread).

Wouldn´t you consider the possibility that a human being would not be able to, using psi, recognize self-counsience in a mind that is radically different from those from his/hers species?

So, I think that the artificial having by itself managed to reach a conclusion such as "I think that I exist and I am composed by the following parts, stored data, have the following skills, etc..." would be the best criteria.

As for the "They suddenly know, beyond doubt, its truth -- only afterwards do they produce the proof of that which they already know." argument, on 69dodge´s line, what actually happens (not only with mathematicians, but also with professionals from all branches) is that after this brief moment of inspiration, comes a lot of work, that in most cases, shows that the wonderfull inspiration moment pointed to the wrong path. So, that´s not a valid criteria neither a truth.

 

[Interesting Ian]

69dodge,

You deny then that for any algorithm we dream up, a person (or at least an idealised and immortal version of that person) will always be able to understand something which the algorithm cannot derive?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Still, I say it would be a potentially ineffective criteria.

Lets suppose psi is true (and leave the discussion if it really is or not for another time/thread).

Wouldn´t you consider the possibility that a human being would not be able to, using psi, recognize self-counsience in a mind that is radically different from those from his/hers species?

So, I think that the artificial having by itself managed to reach a conclusion such as "I think that I exist and I am composed by the following parts, stored data, have the following skills, etc..." would be the best criteria.

As for the "They suddenly know, beyond doubt, its truth -- only afterwards do they produce the proof of that which they already know." argument, on 69dodge´s line, what actually happens (not only with mathematicians, but also with professionals from all branches) is that after this brief moment of inspiration, comes a lot of work, that in most cases, shows that the wonderfull inspiration moment pointed to the wrong path. So, that´s not a valid criteria neither a truth.

Correa,

It is my hypothesis that if you gaze into a android's eyes, it will seem that there is nothing inside there, there would seem to be a strange sort of emptiness. Now obviously I do not know this.

As for mathematicians suddenly seeing something is true, I've read that there is an inner conviction, that they know, that the proof is simply proving that which they already know. Now I don't know if this actually does occur, I'm only going by what I've read. But I must admit it seems very plausible to me. I don't suppose it's fruitful to pursue this anyway.

 

[Correa Neto]

Correa,

It is my hypothesis that if you gaze into a android's eyes, it will seem that there is nothing inside there, there would seem to be a strange sort of emptiness. Now obviously I do not know this.

Then you are not sure you would be able, using this method, to recognize a self-counscient being that is not a Homo Sapiens, regardless it being an android or an alien octopus.

Now, do you agree that a being that reached by itself a conclusion similar to "I think therefore I am" can be labelled self-counsious?

As for mathematicians suddenly seeing something is true, I've read that there is an inner conviction, that they know, that the proof is simply proving that which they already know. Now I don't know if this actually does occur, I'm only going by what I've read. But I must admit it seems very plausible to me. I don't suppose it's fruitful to pursue this anyway.

Please allow me to disagree. As raised, the argument applies only to the "1% inspiration plus 99% transpiration", leaving aside the times when the inspiration was later proved wrong - after more transpiration. My personal experience (OK, its anedoctal evidence) is that in most cases the intuition later proves to be a dead end. We all have countless "inner convictions" through our lives, and many if not most of them are later shown to be wrong. Sticking to the cases where the intution proved right is to introduce a bias to your analysis.

It was raised as an argument that this "intution" is an attribute of human mind that could not be recreated. However, its not an attribute of human mind, since the whole reasoning regarding its existence is flawed. So it does not matter if it can be replicated or not. And it also can not be used as theoreticall or technicall evidence that a human-like mid will never be artificially created. So, in this sense, I have to agree that its it's not fruitful to pursue this anyway.

 

[MESchlum]

I agree with you that there is no such thing as "the greatest possible mind". Let's just say that a mind needs to be great enough that it apprehends all mathematical truths.

You write this, and you are aware of Godel? How odd. Godel showed that if you take a system (as you are), and the system is complex enough ("all mathematics" is more complex than arithmetic) and is consistent (I'd hope that truths are), you will have statements that cannot be proven.

Statements that are neither truths (correct) nor untruths (false) so to say.

So your not-quite greatest mind is still beyond the realms of feasibility.

And what is more, some of the meta-statements ("I'm not provable" and variations) will lead to different mathematics depending on whether they are set as being true or not. And according to the postulates, you can get staments that contradict each other, and are true. See my post on square circles (you can get cupic spheres by using 8 points on the sphere, by the way) for an example.

So the domain of mathematical truths is a) infinite (not just the way integers are - where you can always find another, but more so: for any set of truths (even infinite) you can always find a larger set) and b) extremely context dependent (see squares and circles). Which makes any mind capable of apprehending all of them (if feasible, which seems unlikely) something I would not view as human.

As for mathematicians suddenly seeing something is true, I've read that there is an inner conviction, that they know, that the proof is simply proving that which they already know. Now I don't know if this actually does occur, I'm only going by what I've read. But I must admit it seems very plausible to me. I don't suppose it's fruitful to pursue this anyway.

Aaargh (horrible beast of ). Socratic claptrap. Sorry, I don't mean to disparge Socrates (much), but his "proof" that everyone knows everything, demonstrated via one of the earliest instances of directed cold reading I know of, is not a good foundation.

Do not pursue. Please. Or explain why the romans did not use 0 and advanced number theory, since they should "already know" about them, and had plenty of people with leisure time to ponder math. If you don't like the romans (Latin is a pain), ask similar questions of any early mathematicians, even the great ones. They were great mathematicians. Why didn't they know everything?

Please, no.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Then you are not sure you would be able, using this method, to recognize a self-counscient being that is not a Homo Sapiens, regardless it being an android or an alien octopus.

Now, do you agree that a being that reached by itself a conclusion similar to "I think therefore I am" can be labelled self-counsious?

I don't understand this. Is this being conscious or not?

Please allow me to disagree. As raised, the argument applies only to the "1% inspiration plus 99% transpiration", leaving aside the times when the inspiration was later proved wrong - after more transpiration. My personal experience (OK, its anedoctal evidence) is that in most cases the intuition later proves to be a dead end. We all have countless "inner convictions" through our lives, and many if not most of them are later shown to be wrong. Sticking to the cases where the intution proved right is to introduce a bias to your analysis.

I think this experience is supposed to be akin to a mystical experience where you simply understand what reality is. In the case of maths maybe your mind makes contact with the world of platonic forms. Now I am somewhat sceptical about your claim that those who do have such an insight, are more often wrong than right. I suspect we're not talking about the same thing. You seem to be talking about some vague intuition.

It was raised as an argument that this "intution" is an attribute of human mind that could not be recreated. However, its not an attribute of human mind, since the whole reasoning regarding its existence is flawed.

What reasoning? People simply say it exists.

So it does not matter if it can be replicated or not. And it also can not be used as theoreticall or technicall evidence that a human-like mid will never be artificially created. So, in this sense, I have to agree that its it's not fruitful to pursue this anyway.

Well the existence of this ability would entail we are not a mere machine; at least not an algorithmic one.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
I agree with you that there is no such thing as "the greatest possible mind". Let's just say that a mind needs to be great enough that it apprehends all mathematical truths.


MESchlum
You write this, and you are aware of Godel? How odd. Godel showed that if you take a system (as you are), and the system is complex enough ("all mathematics" is more complex than arithmetic) and is consistent (I'd hope that truths are), you will have statements that cannot be proven.

Statements that are neither truths (correct) nor untruths (false) so to say.

So your not-quite greatest mind is still beyond the realms of feasibility.

Huh?? You're simply presupposing that people are mere algorithmic machines here! But we know they're not because we can always understand some Godelian sentance which cannot be derived from any given specific algorithm, no matter how complex. This is apart from the sheer absurdity that an execution of an algorithm can somehow mysteriously generate consciousness. It's just rule following. Let's consider a chess computer. Place a rook into an empty file unless certain conditions pertain blah blah blah. There is not the remotest hint or suggestion that any consciousness, and hence mind is involved. Do you seriously suggest that a chess computer is conscious? If not then neither would an android be conscious or have a mind. It would only appear to have consciousness.

And what is more, some of the meta-statements ("I'm not provable" and variations) will lead to different mathematics depending on whether they are set as being true or not. And according to the postulates, you can get staments that contradict each other, and are true. See my post on square circles (you can get cupic spheres by using 8 points on the sphere, by the way) for an example.

There is no such existent as a square circle. An object cannot simultaneously being a circle/sphere and square/cube. This is by virtue of what these terms mean.

 

[Interesting Ian]

You write this, and you are aware of Godel? How odd. Godel showed that if you take a system (as you are),

I am not a system, I am a self.

 

[Robin]

Is homo sap a machine?

What other machine has been proposed that cannot be 'simulated' by a (theoretical) Turing machine, real-time considerations aside?

It is an interesting question but irrelevant since 'simulated' does not mean 'is'. The relevant point is that even if you have an algorithm that provides a very high resolution simulation of some physical process it does not follow that any statement about the algorithm also applies to the physical process.

Also if a physical system can be described using mathematics it does not follow that any statement about the metamathematics also applies to the physical system (as Lucas appears to be suggesting).

 

[Robin]

1inChrist?

- posted 24 hours
- posts contain no intelligence

1inC was one of the posters I was considering. The other possibility with 1inChrist is that he was a committee which could achieve the same effect.

 

[Robin]

Interesting Ian
Randomness? You mean intrinsic randomness as described by QM?

No I just mean randomness, whatever shop you bought it from. To be more precise, there may be some difference between randomness produced by some sub-atomic event or randomness produced by shaking a bunch of numbered marbles round in a barrel. But as an effect you could not tell the difference.

I don't know what you mean by parallelism.

Nothing very profound, just independent, unsynchronised, simultaneous processes.

But sure, a non-turing machine, meaning something that operates by physical processes, some of which cannot be expressed algorithmically, would be immune to such criticisms. But something like randomness could be built into a computer couldn't it?

Yes, and you can have parallelism. I believe that Stephen Wolfram even contends that you can implement true randomness in an algorithm which, if true, would knock out my first point.
Still I think that there is plenty wrong with Lucas's argument even leaving aside the TM question.

 

[Correa Neto]

I don't understand this. Is this being conscious or not?

If you consider as self-counsient an entity that, by logical reasoning, reaches by itself (its not a programmed result), the conclusion of its own existence, than it is.

The way I see it, the sole (OK, I´ll be prudent and write main) requisite to labell a being as self-counsient is that it´s aware of its existence, (at least parts of) what compose it, its memories, its limits, and its begining (better keep the issue regarding the end of a sentient being aside in this thread).

I think this experience is supposed to be akin to a mystical experience where you simply understand what reality is. In the case of maths maybe your mind makes contact with the world of platonic forms. Now I am somewhat sceptical about your claim that those who do have such an insight, are more often wrong than right. I suspect we're not talking about the same thing. You seem to be talking about some vague intuition.

You should be. It´s a healthy attitude when it comes to anedoctal evidence. I´ll try to make it a bit more clear. Quite often, when one deals with problems (as varied as the validity of a theorem, the behavior of a species, if there is or not ore in a certain place, the feasibility of a certain project, a theological issue, etc.), a possible solution "pops up" in our minds. That´s the inspiration, the revelation of the truth, and I don´t see why the mathematicians´ experiences (and the mechanisms behind it)should be radically different from that from the other people.

Now, after this revelation, that indeed sometimes can be compared to mystical revelations, comes the times to test it. And, basing on my personal experience (this involves my own "eureka moments" and those of many people I know, from a number of academic and industry occupations, as well as what I read about it - sorry, I can´t remember any sources right now), most of times the revelation turns out on a dead end. Then it´s time to start again with the whole proccess and search for a new possible solution.

And here´s why I do like your analogy with mystical experiences, since they can be very different from each other, specially when one looks at diferent cuktures (sure, there may be points in common, like the feeling of being one wih the universe).

What reasoning? People simply say it exists.

I don´t object their existence. I disagree on their efficiency when it comes to reveal the truth.

Well the existence of this ability would entail we are not a mere machine; at least not an algorithmic one.

Perhaps, but my point is regarding the eficiency of the mechanism. I suspect the hits may be quite close to what expected from random cases. I really would like to see a statistical study on this.

I am not a system, I am a self.

But the self may be the product of a system composed by body, brain and environment...

 

[Interesting Ian]

Still I think that there is plenty wrong with Lucas's argument even leaving aside the TM question. [/B]

But no-one's actually pointed out what's wrong with his argument yet

Looks ok from my, admittedly, superficial appraisal.

 

[Robin]

But no-one's actually pointed out what's wrong with his argument yet

Looks ok from my, admittedly, superficial appraisal.

I am tapping away at it this very moment.

But I did put an initial objection:

I totally fail to see what Godel's theorems have to do with the case. The human mind is not a system of logic.

And jzs put it fairly succinctly:

As far as I am aware, the human brain does not work like + and * with the numbers {0,1,2,...}, so I too fail to see where Godel's theorem comes in.

 

[MESchlum]

Huh?? You're simply presupposing that people are mere algorithmic machines here!


No. I'm asserting that absolute knowledge of all "truths" in mathematics is beyond the realms of feasibility.


But we know they're not because we can always understand some Godelian sentance which cannot be derived from any given specific algorithm, no matter how complex.


No. There is no magical "Godel Sentence" that NO algorithm can derive. For a SPECIFIC algorithm, it is possible to CREATE a sentence that the algorithm will not derive. Change the algorithm, the sentence changes.

And since there is a method (Godel) for constructing these sentences, we could program an algorithm to write some, then derive the mathematics that follow. And I'm fairly sure that we (as human beings) would find it extremely difficult to understand the sentences, and their implications, after a few degrees of iteration.


This is apart from the sheer absurdity that an execution of an algorithm can somehow mysteriously generate consciousness. It's just rule following. Let's consider a chess computer. Place a rook into an empty file unless certain conditions pertain blah blah blah. There is not the remotest hint or suggestion that any consciousness, and hence mind is involved. Do you seriously suggest that a chess computer is conscious? If not then neither would an android be conscious or have a mind. It would only appear to have consciousness.

How does this relate to what I was saying? I stated that (due to Godel among others) a "being that knows all mathematical truths" is not possible.

The impossibility is, I will grant, my opinion. Even if such a thing exists, I am quite certain that it would not be anything close to human (probably a lot more like a machine, with infinite memory, and the dogged persistance to run down each and every implication of each and every outcome).


There is no such existent as a square circle. An object cannot simultaneously being a circle/sphere and square/cube. This is by virtue of what these terms mean.

Square: 4 sides, each of equal length, the angle at each corner is the same. Yes?

Circle: set of points on a plane such that all points are the same distance from a given center. Yes?

Great diameter of a sphere with center C.

Circle? Yes.

Square? Consider 4 equidistant points on the diamter. The arcs linking them are the same length (first constraint for a square). The angle at the corners are the same (second constraint for a square) (since the angle is tangentially zero, or the curvature of the sphere if you're picky). Yes.


If you rephrase your statement to "there is no circle that is also a square in Euclidian geometry", I'll let it pass (technically, it's more complex than that, but mentionning Euclidian geometry at least shows you know where the obvious problems are).

And that just goes to show how "obvious" things don't work as soon as you get slightly complex. In my geometry, a square is a circle. It's a mathematical truth (outlined above). Or, if I change geometries, it isn't. Another truth.

I can create (using an algorithm) any number of totally warped geometries where everything you think you know about space is patently false. That's another truth.

And so back to my earlier point - thanks for putting them together! Any thing that can "know" "all" "mathematical truths" is going to be so far from human (and from possibility) that it isn't worth using as a reference.

 

[Robin]

The OP, as all will agree, is a mess. There is the 'bait-and-switch' poll question. The messy bit of cut and paste. Lucas is quoted but unattributed. Stephen Hawking is incorrectly credited as sharing Penrose's view on artificial intelligence.

In hindsight the whole thing should have been ignored. But credit to Interesting Ian to provide a reference to John Lucas' original article (here is is again http://users.ox.ac.uk/~jrlucas/Godel/mmg.html) which forms the basis of the argument.

Now Lucas is a good deal smarter than me so it seems presumptious to take issue, but I will anyway.

I should probably also quote Godel's paper (http://home.ddc.net/ygg/etext/godel/godel3.htm) and I think that Proposition XI is the one that all the fuss is about.

The short form of my objection is that Godel is just not applicable. Naturally there have been thousands of philosophical speculations using poor old Godel but we should probably not dismiss out of hand the view of such a respected figure as Lucas.

OK, here is my first objection to Lucas that he has not met:

Gödel's theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system.

As John McCarthy points out there is no reason why a machine should instantiate just one formal system. It might use any number of formal systems. I would add that it might not use any formal system of axioms at all.

We now construct a Gödelian formula in this formal system. This formula cannot be proved-in-the- system. Therefore the machine cannot produce the corresponding formula as being true. But we can see that the Gödelian formula is true: any rational being could follow Gödel's argument, and convince himself that the Gödelian formula, although unprovable-in-the-system, was nonetheless----in fact, for that very reason---true

For the moment let's leave aside Lucas' rather hopeful "... any rational being could follow Godel's argument ..." and ask how do we know that it is true? Not intuition certainly, intuition can be wrong (Aristotle intuited that the natural state of a body was at rest) so you can't by definition know anything through intuition.

Clearly what Lucas has in mind is that we know it through some logically valid process. If we can do this, why can't a machine follow Godel using the same logical process? It is not necessary that a computer has all possible logical processes pre-programmed in, there is no reason presented here why a machine should not be able to understand and even construct any logical system that a human can.

One result of Lucas' argument is that he seems to be suggest - indirectly - that a computer program is of the type of system that Godel has under consideration. Despite similarities they are not the same. A computer program is just a set of instructions and is not subject to Godel's result - ie provable and non-provable have no meaning within an algorithm.

Basically Lucas' argument is a slightly more sophisticated version of the old science fiction cliche that if you give a paradox to a computer then smoke will start to pour out of it. Lemme Caution may be able to destroy the evil computer in Alphaville by feeding it poetry but a real AI system might well appreciate the thought.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I wish people would use the quote function!

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
Huh?? You're simply presupposing that people are mere algorithmic machines here!

MESchlum
No. I'm asserting that absolute knowledge of all "truths" in mathematics is beyond the realms of feasibility.

You might assert that, but you cannot prove it. Goedel's proof only applies to algorithms, it does not preclude a mind just seeing some mathematical truth. I am not interested in your unsubstantiated assertions.

II
But we know they're not because we can always understand some Godelian sentance which cannot be derived from any given specific algorithm, no matter how complex.

MESchlum
No.

then you need to read up on Goedel's proof.

There is no magical "Godel Sentence" that NO algorithm can derive.

Indeed, although I do not recall anybody denying this; certainly it has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with my paragraph that you are responding to.

For a SPECIFIC algorithm, it is possible to CREATE a sentence that the algorithm will not derive. Change the algorithm, the sentence changes.

We all know this, why don't you address the argument that the execution of an algorithm cannot simulate a mind??

This is apart from the sheer absurdity that an execution of an algorithm can somehow mysteriously generate consciousness. It's just rule following. Let's consider a chess computer. Place a rook into an empty file unless certain conditions pertain blah blah blah. There is not the remotest hint or suggestion that any consciousness, and hence mind is involved. Do you seriously suggest that a chess computer is conscious? If not then neither would an android be conscious or have a mind. It would only appear to have consciousness.

MESchlum
How does this relate to what I was saying?

you insinuated that consciousness is no more than the execution of algorithms.

I stated that (due to Godel among others) a "being that knows all mathematical truths" is not possible.

And I'm still waiting for you to substantiate this statement.

II
There is no such existent as a square circle. An object cannot simultaneously being a circle/sphere and square/cube. This is by virtue of what these terms mean.


MESchlum
Square: 4 sides, each of equal length, the angle at each corner is the same. Yes?

Circle: set of points on a plane such that all points are the same distance from a given center. Yes?

Great diameter of a sphere with center C.

Circle? Yes.

Square? Consider 4 equidistant points on the diamter.

A square does not have a diameter.

The arcs linking them are the same length (first constraint for a square). The angle at the corners are the same (second constraint for a square) (since the angle is tangentially zero, or the curvature of the sphere if you're picky). Yes.


If you rephrase your statement to "there is no circle that is also a square in Euclidian geometry", I'll let it pass (technically, it's more complex than that, but mentionning Euclidian geometry at least shows you know where the obvious problems are).

And that just goes to show how "obvious" things don't work as soon as you get slightly complex. In my geometry, a square is a circle. It's a mathematical truth (outlined above). Or, if I change geometries, it isn't. Another truth.

Nothing that you have said implies in the remotest that a square and a circle can be and one the same thing. It is logically impossible by virtue of what we mean by circle and square i.e a certain characteristic visual appearance. I believe I understand what you mean though; we just need to draw a square on some sphere to see what you're getting at. But as I said, it's not relevant. To understand this forget your mathematical definitions of squares and circles, and think in terms of qualia.

I can create (using an algorithm) any number of totally warped geometries where everything you think you know about space is patently false. That's another truth.

It certainly is not another truth as I don't think anything about space; I have no (or little) physical knowledge of space. Sure, we can check if we live in Euclidean space by drawing a huge triangle in space to see if the angles are less or greater than 180 degrees. But this has nothing to do with a circle or square drawn on paper.

And so back to my earlier point - thanks for putting them together! Any thing that can "know" "all" "mathematical truths" is going to be so far from human (and from possibility) that it isn't worth using as a reference.

The fact that it is a human mind or not a human mind is not relevant. It is implausible to say that one mind is simply an execution of of an algorithm, but that another mind is of quite a differing nature. I've already said this earlier on in the thread.

 

[Interesting Ian]

But I did put an initial objection:

quote:I totally fail to see what Godel's theorems have to do with the case. The human mind is not a system of logic.

Huh?? but here you are denying that the human mind is simply the execution of algorithms! If the human mind amounts to no more than the execution of algorithms, then it proceeds via logic. So how come you are saying the human mind is not a system of logic?

And jzs put it fairly succinctly:

quote:As far as I am aware, the human brain does not work like + and * with the numbers {0,1,2,...}, so I too fail to see where Godel's theorem comes in.

I think we need to ask those people who maintain that consciousness is just the execution of algorithms.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Clearly what Lucas has in mind is that we know it through some logically valid process.

I've read 2 of his articles. He explicitly states he does not mean this. After all, if it were a process, then an algorithm could simulate it. Which indeed you proceed to point out. Do you really think that Lucas is so dim as to not understand this?

I agree about the poll question. I voted incorrectly.