Define Consiousness

[davidsmith73]

Mister E:
briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

I don't quite understand the relevance of this point. Firstly, I acknowledge that you are coming from a materialist viewpoint so I shall jump along side you for a moment even thought I don't agree with this standpoint. So, if a neural network is exposed to a stimulus for a period of time and various connections are strengthened etc, (which constitutes the physical side of learning) then there still must be a point when out of this growing network comes the first cruical pattern of activity that corresponds to first injection into conscious experience of the qualia. So, in terms of an explanation as to how a particular pattern of activity corresponds to a particular experience, the preceeding strengthening of connections is irrelavent. It only says something about how the particular pattern of connections is organised in the first place.

 

[davidsmith73]

Nope. Sure can't.

Ian?

So what did you mean by your post?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

So what did you mean by your post?

I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. Thanks for playing.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Causal schmausal. You could just about do that with Lego Mindstorms.

"Combine sensors to create robots that respond to their environments. "

They're just machines, mechanical contrations. We floor the accelerator apparently because of the actual experience of greenness.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Nope. Sure can't.

Ian?

Dymanic is talking about "sensation" as in the functional aspect of sensation i.e the appropriate processes in the brain. The same goes for when materialists use the word consciousness. They tend to define consciousness by what it does rather than what it is. They've redefined words to reflect their belief system. Of course this unfortunatly causes no end of confusion and talking at cross-purposes.

 

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian
If this is truly so, and other people are wondering whether they exist, then it must be me who cannot be understanding what they are. I thought it was just raw experiences; especially those from the 5 senses. They simply replace sense data because of the duality that implies i.e in looking at a horse, there is a real physical horse and in addition there is an image of a horse which only exists in your mind. Qualia just tries to eliminate this apparent absurdity. First, I want to say, thanks for meeting me half way on this. I realy don't know much about qualia. Thirty years ago in a college philosophy class, I was presented with notions of Heidegger's sense data. I did not at that time understand any concept of or need for qualia. It seemed to me back then that there were real world objects that had qualities and that we were apprehending aspects of those objects through the qualites and reflected energies (light and heat) directly as perceptions which were incorporated often unconsciously. He had a concept of Dasein that was a little beyond me but it was very much real world stuff. I have been confusing notions of qualia and sense data... some sources have contributed to my confusion using the terms somewhat interchangably.

In this comment you mention the image of the real horse. I don't know how many qualia that would imply. The raw experience, is it one or many qualia. Are we experiencing nose, eyes, ears, face, mane, neck, shoulder, leg, body, back, tail, brown and white - or are we experiencing horse?

But, as I say, given that people keep saying they probably do not exist, and they are mysterious, then one of us is not understanding what they are. I'm willing to concede that it might well be me. So what am I not understanding? I mean you surely cannot be denying that people experience greenness??

I don't understand how they can be defined. This is the whole purpose of the knowledge argument isn't it? You know, the one about Mary, the brilliant scientist who knows everything there is possible to know about color, but who has lived in a room with only black and white things in it (and shades in between) all her life. The one day she goes outside and gets to know what the experience of seeing green is actually like. Thus it is clear that only the experience of greenness can convey what it is like. Thus no definition is possible. Perhaps the individual qualia cannot be defined but the notion can be or we wouldn't be talking about it. In this thread we are supposed to define consciousness... another experience that escapes easy definition.

I believe the bodies of plants and animals evolved to detect and appreciate real world phenomena. The amoeba knows when he is in the proximity of salt and recoils to escape. Up through evolution this same apprehension and appreciation of the real world in combination with an organism's survival impulse and it's natural discrimination of pleasure and pain combine to break the world's sensory offerings like a prism breaks light. Our body is the prism's glass and the brain is the prism's angle precisely edged to project real world inputs into interiorly stored appreciations. (edit: I know this is a metaphor - that it is not true - I offer it not for argument but more to approximate my position for discussion.)

Does the experience of a glorious sunset over an ocean really not effect you? Is it not the characteristic feel conveyed by your raw experience which is effecting you? Absolutely. But that is an emotional by product. It is not input from the sunset. It is actually an output derived when the sunset is appreciated in association with "the best things in life". We actually have to be ready for it or there is little effect. A whistling teapot demands our attention in a way that a beautiful sunset does not.

LSD effects the brain. Both the brain and self as well as external reality all have roles in determining the characteristics of our qualia. OK. I can't argue with that. I think when we delve into our definitions of self we find disagreement.

I want to cover some other thoughts in this post. I missed Mr. E's request for expansion on a throwaway thought about "redness being the same". I merely meant that, even internally, we have no objective measure for what we mean and I used LSD as a change agent to show that the same red object one time is electric red in another. That is, qualia are not continuous in consciousness. They are fluid, meaning one thing here, something else there, and in the end I do not see them as distinguishable from thought. I also mentioned though that I saw them as on the input side of the thought pump I called the brain. I was at that time thinking of qualia as sensation as well as association which is the mechanism by which the brain creates thought images and logic, desire and will. Even here I'm being overly succinct as this is very much at the heart of this long thread.

Strangly I find myself an idealistic physicalist. I believe consciousness is shortchanged by analyzing it into it's constituent parts. I believe it to be more than the sum of it's parts. But I also believe it is a natural expression of matter.

That probably sounds strange and I don't know exactly how I feel about it in the big picture. I feel like the force of gravity is an expression of matter's attraction for itself. Life and consciousness evolve as forces of redistribution of matter. What gravity assembles life and consciousness disassemble and reassemble. We eat and procreate, a bizarre transformation of the materials of the world into our very selves. Likewise the power of idea and communication transforms the earth into a skyscraper or bridge. But the forces are as much shaped by as shape the natural physical world.

As for Mr E's traffic signal, in shorthand we say green means go. But there is alot of other information being processed. There may be a siren wailing, or children in the crosswalk. It is not greenness that affects the physical world. It is our appreciation of all the associations we make with the moment. We may be a pedestrian. We may be waiting for someone. Some people sometimes go on red. That green traffic signal may predict the flow of traffic but the internalized perceived qualia of greenness is a cork on the sea - alone it has no affect.

So for me, the assembly of stimuli, concepts, and memories with the power of emotions is what drives consciousness. Qualia are not real like thoughts are real. Qualia is a word like deja vu. It has meaning because it feels like something. But in reality the light of mind is a real world effect like electric current hitting a tungsten filament.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

They're just machines, mechanical contraptions.

They're cool though, aren't they? My kid's getting one for Christmas whether he wants it or not.

We floor the accelerator apparently because of the actual experience of greenness.

Why bother making the qualia causal at all? You could as easily say that we respond mechanically, while at the same time experiencing the sensations -- isn't that what you would say if I mentioned reflexive reactions?

Dymanic is talking about "sensation" as in the functional aspect of sensation i.e the appropriate processes in the brain.

Actually, it started with my response to DD's post, where he proposed a functionalist definition for qualia. I was simply pointing out the contradiction in attempting to do that. I'm still curious about this 'raw' business.

 

[davidsmith73]

It is a parallel. The claim is that the soul is immaterial, and therefore, not falsifiable. The claim is that the soul is responsible for animating you. The claim is that you would not be able to reply to this post except for the existence of the soul that animates you.

My claim is that the question exists as an experience. I cannot see you disagreeing with this since the alternative is to suppose that it exists objectively. You say yourself that you do not deny that experiences exist (which I am curious for you to explain why given your current stance). The experience of a question is different to the experience of redness, so we can say their qualia (the way they feel) are different. So here, we would be trying to falsify the existence of a thing while at the same time acknowledging that the falsification process requires that the thing exists. Where your soul parallel breaks down is where you cannot explain why the soul is responsible for the experience of a question. You have evoked a separate entity to account for the ability to pose a question. I am saying that the actual question is the entity that needs to be falsified. When you realise this, the paradox becomes clear and there is no empty assertion.

"I share Dennett's exacerbation with "qualia." I also share Dennett's postion that I do not deny the existence of experience.

Why do you not deny the existence of experience?

I am simply amazed at the claim that "qualia" are special. I also share with Dennett the perception that "qualia" are elusive, and perhaps, deliberately so."

Dennet mentioned that his critics accused him of creating straw man arguments. I agree with his critics with particular reference to the above. What does “special” mean in this context?

 

[Mr. E]

Causal schmausal. You could just about do that with Lego Mindstorms.

That reads as a confession that one could not do it. I suppose everyone here knows that behaviors can be faked to *some* extent - humans do it a lot... as I pointed out earlier re empathy and re running emulations on a computer-like machine, and I recall someone mentioning Turing, too.

Rhetorical question: Is this thread merely a latter-day Turing Test, an empty AI word game, or is it also a discussion of consciousness presented on a message board in a critical thinking forum?


ME

 

[Mr. E]

Mister E:
briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

Maybe I attempt to reword your statement?

We say that Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to sense stimuli to be able to have perceptive experience, to develop a fuller ability to process stimuli. The neurological networks must "learn" to perc[ei]ve the sensations and perceptions lumped together under 'qualia'. Without exposure and stimulation there is [a] point beyond which the system will never learn to perc[ei]ve certain stimuli.

Does that mean the same thing you intended to convey by your words?

I think one confusion about qualia is shown in the discussion of the difference between an overall experience and a raw sensation. An overall experience such as that of a beautiful sunset might include quasi-reflexive components in addition to a myriad of specific visual forms and values (particular evoked quales). We generally refer to the part of the experience which is consequent as the emotional aspect of the experience. This can be considered a quale in its own right for those who do have the particular consequent component.

So Ian is quite accurate to suggest that the viewing of the sunset *effects* the "you" in one - it causes one to have an additional experience.

The ambiguity would seem to lie in two common attempts to define 'qualia': What it is like to... (eg. Mary) VS. The feel of.... (eg., falling in love at sunset).

Resolving this apparently simple linguistic ambiguity formally can avoid unnecessary confusions and lead to deeper probes.

I hope that helps address the challenge of the OP.

ME

 

[Mr. E]

I'm going to jump into Atlas' reply to Ian in very small part where Atlas references a post of mine:

As for Mr E's traffic signal, in shorthand we say green means go. But there is alot of other information being processed. There may be a siren wailing, or children in the crosswalk. It is not greenness that affects the physical world. It is our appreciation of all the associations we make with the moment. We may be a pedestrian. We may be waiting for someone. Some people sometimes go on red. That green traffic signal may predict the flow of traffic but the internalized perceived qualia of greenness is a cork on the sea - alone it has no affect.

None of that denies the point of the example, that without seeing the green we would either wait forever or kill people with our cars. Except perhaps for the epiphenomenalists, having something to recognize (whether the greenness or the lack of targets in the crosswalk etc.) plays a causal role in determining actions in the material world whether will is free or not. The greenness by itself of course does not force the foot onto the accelerator in a normal conscious test subject.

Qualia are not real like thoughts are real

That would be more throwaway bunk from you, right, Atlas?


ME

 

[Mr. E]

I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. Thanks for playing.

It doesn't seem that your post succeeded. Care to play again?

ME

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Mr. E

Rhetorical question: Is this thread merely a latter-day Turing Test, an empty AI word game, or is it also a discussion of consciousness presented on a message board in a critical thinking forum?

I think that is something that can be answered only subjectively. Your contributions so far suggest that for you it is somewhat more of the former than the latter.

Except perhaps for the epiphenomenalists, having something to recognize (whether the greenness or the lack of targets in the crosswalk etc.) plays a causal role in determining actions in the material world whether will is free or not.

Bzzzt! It is obvious that you have entirely missed the point as to what is meant by 'qualia'. My advice: read more, post less.

I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. Thanks for playing.
------------------------
It doesn't seem that your post succeeded. Care to play again?

Until someone offers something by way of clarification as to what is added by the use of the term 'raw', I will assume that it is nothing more than a rather trivial rhetorical device. If you'd like to take a shot at it, knock yourself out.

 

[hammegk]

I don't know which answer to your question obliterates dualism as a logical alternative to monism.

None. Or all.

What don't you understand about my previous response to your question?

One way to think about it is: Assume 'physical' exists; then, whatever effects or affects the 'physical', must also be physical -- or one is a dualist. Ditto if 'not-physical' is the assumption.

See the problem?

 

[Atlas]

...I thought it was just raw experiences; especially those from the 5 senses. They simply replace sense data because of the duality that implies i.e in looking at a horse, there is a real physical horse and in addition there is an image of a horse which only exists in your mind. Qualia just tries to eliminate this apparent absurdity. ...

Ian,

The apparent absurdity is dualism, is it not? But what then is a raw experience? Is it not an experience of the physical world. Is there no referent for your beautiful sunset qualia?

I don't know what qualia are if they are not thought. What are they made of. Are they really rehashed Platonic Ideals that are available to the human mind to compare against reality's accidental differences.

If I stand in the sun, I get a warm and bright feeling. I don't need qualia to explain that. The physical body knows it's pleasures. Likewise, the colors. Or perhaps I should say that, like space and time, the human has built in, a priori, appreciations of reality. I just get the feeling that qualia are being advocated to deny physical reality. If not, they validate dualism - don't they?

 

[Dancing David]

Well, hold on. The whole deal with qualia is that they lie outside what can be captured by that sort of functional explanation. Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

Ah, yes the bizzare definition of qualia.

However they are learnt, a child that is never exposed to color will loose the ability to percieve color.

The deal that is usualy presented is that that they are unique and therefore not objective, if I recall the argument correctly.

 

[hammegk]

I just get the feeling that qualia are being advocated to deny physical reality. If not, they validate dualism - don't they?

Hmm. I'd say qualia are not "advocated"; they are the only known existent for any of us.

And of course they are either "physical" and part & parcel of "physical reality", or ... given that interactive dualism is a rediculous concept ... part & parcel of the obverse "~physical reality"; name it thought, spirit, life, consciousness, sentience, awareness, or what you will.

BTW, "will" -- mentioned earlier -- imho is a very key part of this discussion.

 

[Mr. E]

Until someone offers something by way of clarification as to what is added by the use of the term 'raw', I will assume that it is nothing more than a rather trivial rhetorical device.

I suppose that works for some.

"I meant to expose the meaninglessness of the distinction -- 'raw' versus whatever. "

Okay. Let's look at this as stated:

a) You, Dymanic, are chicken.

b) When raw, you are likely toxic, coated with the likes of salmonella just waiting to infest and destroy a conscious human being.

c) When cooked, you might be cooked in any of 6 senses --

poached
sauteed
deep-fried
roasted
baked
broiled

c') -- and done from rare (dangerously unrecognizable as food) to charred beyond recognition (tasteless, to say the least).

Empty word game, important nearly exact metaphor for the student of consciousness, or what?


Raw sensations would be the edge of consciousness forming up as/by subconscious impressions teasing say the visual cortex into an excited state and generating proto-qualia and qualia. Clear-cut sensations would be well-defined by contrast with/by other proximally located qualia -- like the red spot on the white backrground already mentioned. They would persist over time, subject to attention deficit disorder and the like.

Of course, you, Dymanic, are not chicken, that was only a rather trivial rhetorical device.


ME

PS - In case it's not clear, there is no personal attack in this post.

edit - PPS - As noted earlier all posts by "ME" Copyright 2004, Fair Use rights allowed.

 

[Mr. E]

The deal that is usualy presented is that that they are unique and therefore not objective, if I recall the argument correctly. [/B]

Never mind Dymanics text and "usual (mis)presentations", I've stated the position that they can be private and objective, whether "exist" is the correct term for them or not. Do you hold a similar position?

ME

 

[Atlas]

Hmm. I'd say qualia are not "advocated"; they are the only known existent for any of us.

And of course they are either "physical" and part & parcel of "physical reality", or ... given that interactive dualism is a rediculous concept ... part & parcel of the obverse "~physical reality"; name it thought, spirit, life, consciousness, sentience, awareness, or what you will.

BTW, "will" -- mentioned earlier -- imho is a very key part of this discussion.

The only known existent for any of us...

I could deal with that - as long as the existents are referents of a physical world reality. Take the sunshine on my skin - that warmth I feel is one of the qualia of the experience. To me it can be explained by physical reality. The world seems tuned to matter energy exchanges... water does not need qualia to "know" when it is time to freeze, nor ice to melt. We too know warm from not warm. If we know that because of physical qualia manifestations like chemical/electrical reactions acting as nerve impulse on pleasure centers of the brain (if we have those) then I have no problem with the concept of qualia as a medium of exchange between the body and it's consciousness.

I know whether I feel warm so whatever word or words best illustrate the mechanism by which I know that I know that, I'm on board.

I must say again that I am caught by this problem. The physical world is undoubtedly real. So too is the force of consciousness. You mentioned will - I think that it is central to the issue of consciousness although I'm not sure how qualia fit exactly.

I'm thinking of consciousness on the model of a breathing human being. We breathe in, and consciousness intakes stimuli from many senses. We breathe out and consciousness, using will, assembles it's goal and acts on the world around it, getting a drink of water or building a skyscraper.

OK, I apologize for my own metaphoritus. It's an affliction. If you guys pick on me beware, all you'll do is force me into different ones. Maybe someone will explain to me the qualia of my experience that drives me to metaphors instead of describing the qualia of the experience itself.