Define Consiousness

[Mr. E]

Dennett...

That citation was not apparently written by Dennett, thus my question mark.

whom, apparently, you didn't read.

You cited Dennett re QuiningQualia?

Yes, and invisible unicorns are pink, whether they exist or not.

What was you admonishment recently to Ian... something about seriousness ... "obviously disingenuous" was it?

I expanded "neural correlates" to "physical correlates" since qualia are so ill-defined.

It is qualia which are so ill-defined, or by contrast 'qualia' which is ill-defined, to you?

As I said, it was utter pseudomathematical nonsense. I want you to describe a way to falsify "qualia."

Please make up your mind what you want, Bill. One day you talk about falisfying some notion of "qualia", now you have dropped 'notion' from your repertoire. Merely declaring something to be nonsense could be a sign of innallecshul bigotry, Bill, hardly a demo of critical thinking or a serious approach to the topic.


ME

 

[Mr. E]

Qualia is somewhat of an ambigious term.
[also from Ian's post]
Originally posted by davidsmith73
But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia.
E
Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.
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Thanks, Ian, but "mentalese (thought)" was more the target of my sentence. Yes, there are ambiguities in language. It also seems that for some or all human beings, some qualia are more definite than are others. When looking at a Japanese flag, the red part is clearly distinct from the white part. When directing one's gaze to the same material object in very dim lighting, that distinction is hardly as clear and vanishes at some point into something like a fog. But it's clear that these are or can be referred to as objective qualia, and most people who consider it would acknowledge that they are formed up by some kind of brain activity in concert with retinal outputs. The question of the qualia of mentalese is a bit more diffuse, at least for me, to say the least. For instance: Are they objective in the same sense of the terms as visual qualia are objective? Is 'mentalese' a handy fictional term to decribe ignorance or is it more a pointer to a deep insight into duality?


ME

 

[Mr. E]

Further followup to Ian's post:

"Galen Strawson has recently claimed (1994) that there are such things as the experience of understanding a sentence, the experience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenly remembering something, and so on. Moreover, in his view, experiences of these sorts are not reducible to associated sensory experiences and/or images. Strawson's position here seems to be that thought-experience is a distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for example: "Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities" (p. 196). On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia".

If a moment of sudden understanding is a thought, fine. But that's not existence, it's occurrence. It's "Aha!" or "Eureka!" and the like when expressed in common language, responses to a perhaps emotional component of thought-reorganization.

ME

 

[Mr. E]

In curiousity, is this how you go about refuting narrow-minded materialisms?
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Huh??

So your method is to say, "Huh??". Okay.


ME

Reference final section: http://www.randi.org/vbulletin/show...0617811&highlight=materialisms#post1870617811

 

[Atlas]

This notion of qualia still escapes me. For me, a thought experience is made of thought (and emotion). Qualia seems to be more a distraction. They cannot be proved, disproved or studied. They can be defined and conjectured on. So can soul.

They do seem like soul in that they are ineffable and immaterial. They are just the apprehended rather than the apprehender. They seem a perfect conjecture for an already assumed conclusion.

Regarding the the real world light reflection of redness, there is no doubt that it is apprehended. Do we need to postulate an intermediate state of redness that is the qualia of it or is it more prosperous to continue exploring the mechanism of the senses. These pay huge dividends. We can fix some defective apprehensions with corrective lenses or surgeries. Qualia hold no such promise. They offer the same value as "soul". Something supernatural that can be talked about, perhaps felt, but as private as thought and manipulated physically with drugs like LSD.

And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world but with LSD even redness is more than redness. So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. It seems as though a drug like LSD has an affect on the organism that modifies the apprehension mechanism. Either that or LSD modifies the qualia being apprehended. Which is more likely?

 

[Dancing David]

Hi, I am back to the forum, and it would appear that I have a lot of reading to do . I am thrilled to see that the thread has run to thirteen pages. I think I left off around page six and so i will be doing a lot of catching up.

In the mean time I think that I have thought about and clarified my own point in the OP, consiousness may or may not exist but does it exist outside of the processes which occur in the brain. that most likely would have been a better approach. I still hold to my reductionist view that it is merely a series of sub events lumped under a rubric.

i see we are back to the ineffable qualia. And while they are like quarks, at least we can determine the properties of quarks.

Where exists a qualia without an organic frame work? Qualia are learned they do not stand alone!

 

[Mr. E]

Hi, I am back to the forum,

Welcome back.

In the mean time I think that I have thought about and clarified my own point in the OP, consiousness may or may not exist but does it exist outside of the processes which occur in the brain. that most likely would have been a better approach. I still hold to my reductionist view that it is merely a series of sub events lumped under a rubric.

That's two things at once! One point of Synthetic Consciousness is to lay the groundwork for consciousness other than that produced by a human brain.

But directly to your text: "does it exist outside of the processes" is multiply ambiguous.

If it exists now, could it ever exist "outside" in the future?
Does it exist at all, now or ever?
Does it rather "exist" IN the processes...?
Does it exist causally or only as a useless by-product of the processes...?
What processes?

Evidently 'exist' is a big player in this, so a definition of the term might be a good start if not a good end.

Qualia are learned they do not stand alone!

Maybe. Do you mean they are learned, as in acculturation? I think few would argue that children learn how to name their experiences, but you seem to be suggesting something more subtle.

ME

 

[Mr. E]

This notion of qualia still escapes me. For me, a thought experience is made of thought (and emotion). Qualia seems to be more a distraction. They cannot be proved, disproved or studied.

Sure they can. I posted a link re the Chesire Cat experiment as a starting point for studying human visual experience. "Proved" generally means "tested" - since you admit the term can be defined (right?) that to which the term refers might be testable or not. It depends on what test you'd do.

They are just the apprehended rather than the apprehender.

Aren't they both, sometimes? Are you trying to make 'qualia' cover too much territory?

Regarding the the real world light reflection of redness, there is no doubt that it is apprehended. Do we need to postulate an intermediate state of redness that is the qualia of it or is it more prosperous to continue exploring the mechanism of the senses.

Or manipulated otherwise. There might be interesting "intermediate states" in the process of forming up an "image", both prior to and subsequent to the formation of the image itself.

And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world

That's only one view. If qualia are necessary (or even useful) for well-informed action in the world, then surely they can be said to affect the physical world of bricks and mortar.

So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same.

"and the same"?

ME

 

[Atlas]

Originally posted by Mr. E
Sure they can. I posted a link re the Chesire Cat experiment as a starting point for studying human visual experience. "Proved" generally means "tested" - since you admit the term can be defined (right?) that to which the term refers might be testable or not. It depends on what test you'd do.
I think I remember the post but don't know where to look. Can you post the link again.

Aren't they both, sometimes? You tell me... I don't see it.

Are you trying to make 'qualia' cover too much territory? Nope... No territory at all... They don't exist any more than fairies - that's my position until I hear a convincing argument.

Or manipulated otherwise. There might be interesting "intermediate states" in the process of forming up an "image", both prior to and subsequent to the formation of the image itself. That's only one view. If qualia are necessary (or even useful) for well-informed action in the world, then surely they can be said to affect the physical world of bricks and mortar.
"and the same"? I'd prefer if you provided examples or links so that I could understand where you are coming from. I know it's one view, but please provide an example of qualia affecting the world. The definitions I've seen say they are completely private phenomena.

 

[Mr. E]

I think I remember the post but don't know where to look. Can you post the link again.

Sorry, the post seems to have been removed from the forum. Maybe it was on page 4 when a paranormal event occured in the forum in early September. Here is another link: http://www.campusi.com/isbn_0471115169.htm

[qualia] don't exist any more than fairies - that's my position until I hear a convincing argument.

Can you explain this from a post of yours: "Visual qualia... I wasn't thinking of that but to me the brain pumps thought and I would put visual qualia as one of the things on the input side of that pump. "?

They don't exist but they play a notable role, right?

please provide an example of qualia affecting the world. The definitions I've seen say they are completely private phenomena.

Here is an example of how qualia can play a role: You see a green light, so you look both ways and you step on the gas pedal. If you don't see the green light etc. you wait or else you kill the pedestrian in the crosswalk and probably spend a lot of real time dealing with the legal system. That seems like a real world consequence of some note.


ME

 

[Dancing David]

Mister E:
briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

 

[Interesting Ian]

This notion of qualia still escapes me.

If this is truly so, and other people are wondering whether they exist, then it must be me who cannot be understanding what they are. I thought it was just raw experiences; especially those from the 5 senses. They simply replace sense data because of the duality that implies i.e in looking at a horse, there is a real physical horse and in addition there is an image of a horse which only exists in your mind. Qualia just tries to eliminate this apparent absurdity.

{shrugs}

But, as I say, given that people keep saying they probably do not exist, and they are mysterious, then one of us is not understanding what they are. I'm willing to concede that it might well be me. So what am I not understanding? I mean you surely cannot be denying that people experience greenness??

For me, a thought experience is made of thought (and emotion). Qualia seems to be more a distraction. They cannot be proved, disproved or studied. They can be defined and conjectured on. So can soul.

I don't understand how they can be defined. This is the whole purpose of the knowledge argument isn't it? You know, the one about Mary, the brilliant scientist who knows everything there is possible to know about color, but who has lived in a room with only black and white things in it (and shades in between) all her life. The one day she goes outside and gets to know what the experience of seeing green is actually like. Thus it is clear that only the experience of greenness can convey what it is like. Thus no definition is possible.

They do seem like soul in that they are ineffable and immaterial.

Quick correction; not the soul, but self. Or substantial self if you like.

They are just the apprehended rather than the apprehender. They seem a perfect conjecture for an already assumed conclusion.

Regarding the the real world light reflection of redness, there is no doubt that it is apprehended. Do we need to postulate an intermediate state of redness that is the qualia of it or is it more prosperous to continue exploring the mechanism of the senses. These pay huge dividends. We can fix some defective apprehensions with corrective lenses or surgeries. Qualia hold no such promise. They offer the same value as "soul". Something supernatural that can be talked about, perhaps felt, but as private as thought and manipulated physically with drugs like LSD.

And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world

Does the experience of a glorious sunset over an ocean really not effect you? Is it not the characteristic feel conveyed by your raw experience which is effecting you?

but with LSD even redness is more than redness. So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. It seems as though a drug like LSD has an affect on the organism that modifies the apprehension mechanism. Either that or LSD modifies the qualia being apprehended. Which is more likely? [/B]

LSD effects the brain. Both the brain and self as well as external reality all have roles in determining the characteristics of our qualia.

 

[Interesting Ian]

i see we are back to the ineffable qualia. And while they are like quarks, at least we can determine the properties of quarks.

[/B]

That's all a quark is, its properties. It is not an existent which has properties.

 

[Interesting Ian]

E
Are you trying to make 'qualia' cover too much territory?

Atlas
Nope... No territory at all... They don't exist any more than fairies - that's my position until I hear a convincing argument.

Can we take a specific example to make sure we're all talking about the same thing? Are you actually denying that you have the qualitative experience of greenness when you see a green object?? Or am I understanding something different to everyone else by the term "qualia"??

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Dancing David

briefly Qualia are learned in that a baby must be exposed to visual and other stimuli to have the perceptive experience of qualia. The neurological networks must learn to percieve the sensations and perceptions referred to as qualia. Without exposure and stimulation there is point beyond which the system will never learn to percieve certain stimuli.

Well, hold on. The whole deal with qualia is that they lie outside what can be captured by that sort of functional explanation. Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Well, hold on. The whole deal with qualia is that they lie outside what can be captured by that sort of functional explanation. Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

But qualia do play a function. To take E's example, what about flooring the accelerator on seeing a green light at traffic lights? So the raw experience of greenness does play a causal role. Only under epiphenomenalism does one deny this.

Edited to add: And come to think of it, materialists deny this too??

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

But qualia do play a function. To take E's example, what about flooring the accelerator on seeing a green light at traffic lights? So the raw experience of greenness does play a causal role.

Causal schmausal. You could just about do that with Lego Mindstorms.

"Combine sensors to create robots that respond to their environments. "

 

[davidsmith73]

And that goes to the heart of my problem with qualia. They cannot affect the physical world

Only if you assume the physical world has an objective reality. If one adopts a mental monist philosophy and the physical world is indeed "made" of qualia, then the whole range of physical interactions we usually associate with an objective reality could be viewed as really occuring within the experiential realm.

but with LSD even redness is more than redness. So there does not seem to be a qualia of redness that is objective and the same. It seems as though a drug like LSD has an affect on the organism that modifies the apprehension mechanism. Either that or LSD modifies the qualia being apprehended. Which is more likely?

Interesting point. Either way, one can still identify some kind of qualia - what redness feels like under LSD. I suppose it is exactly the same thing as asking whether viewing redness in dim light as opposed to bright light changes the apprehension mechanism or the qualia. I do not think it makes a difference to the issue. Dim redness still has its immediate phenomenology.

 

[davidsmith73]

Qualia are not simply sensations and perceptions (of the sort every p-zombie has) but the experience (the 'raw experience') of those sensations and perceptions.

I see no difference between a "sensation" and a "raw sensation". They are the same thing. Can you explain why they aren't?

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by davidsmith73

I see no difference between a "sensation" and a "raw sensation". They are the same thing. Can you explain why they aren't?

Nope. Sure can't.

Ian?