Define Consiousness

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian re BillHoyt

Thought you must have me on ignore.

How disappointing . . . [/B]

In curiousity, is this how you go about refuting narrow-minded materialisms?

ME

 

[Mr. E]

Dynamic,

Keep in mind you are debating with Ian, one of the few people with the sheer audacity to quote an author and immediately follow the quote with an outright distortion.

Is that a dualistic demo of the cliche "It takes one to know one"?

ME

 

[Mr. E]

Real? What does he mean by real? Exists perhaps? Why should everything that exists have properties?

Why bother with Dennett at all?

What meaning might conscious experiences have in abstraction from qualia?

A lot, if there is any meaning at all.

Let's try to imagine we experience a bright summers day, but with no felt like qualities (ie qualia). I submit this is meaningless.

Why pose something so meaningless?

What properties? What properties does my experience of the taste of chocolate have?

Neglecting Dennett, I'd answer "Chocolate flavor" for starters if you are a normal human being.

I don't think they are properties at all. What are they properties of??

My guess:

Experience of a property vs.
Property of an experience

Just a hunch about subject-object disorientation...

Qualia most definitely exist. Of this we can be more certain than anything. Even more certain than the existence of the self.

That's your assumption. Isn't that exactly what BillHoyt might be asking some posters to challenge, their starting assumptions (in one way or another)?

There is lots of "A implies B" floating around. But does A exist and is it falsifiable? So to speak... Anyway, until Ian defines 'exist' meaningfully, is Ian saying anything particulary meaningful at all?

ME

 

[davidsmith73]

This strikes me as a mistake. Blind people might not have ordinary visual qualia but still be able to pose questions, even about questions of sight. Posing a question is an act of will, not a matter of passive sense perception the usual ground of qualia. Without qualia the question might tend to be less coherent or more indefinite, but it could still be posed, even if by a poseur.

ME

But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia. Any experience is qualia. With regards to the question being an act of will, that may or may not be the case. A materialist would surely disagree with you. Either way, I don't think the subject of will has to be relavant here.

 

[Mr. E]

Originally posted by BillHoyt in re nobody
Okay, now that the dialogue is finally building about the qualia question, I'm going to make the question clearer. Here is Dennett on the qualia problem:... "Quining Qualia

Dennet?

So when I ask for a falisifcation of "qualia," it is this definition for which I want one of the dualists to tell us - now - how we would ever be able to muster evidence against the notion.

You want someone to defend the Louis Armstrong definition of qualia? Why?

Maybe you could distinguish the differences among: subjective, personal, private. As far as I'm concerned qualia are objective and private, whether they exist or not.

If they can offer a better definition of "qualia" so that the test for physical correlates can, in principle, be devised, then we've got a concept with which to work.

I've heard of "neural correlates of consciousness" but what would "physical correlates of qualia" amount to?

But we've seen, so far, the quality of qualia answers, haven't we? I'm still waiting for something better than Ian's feint.

My redoubled response to your inquiry stands, despite your apparent ignorance of it. Maybe it's not at all what you were looking for.

ME

 

[Mr. E]

But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia.

Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.

Any experience is qualia.

Is? Not all thought is experienced directly as ordinary qualia.

With regards to the question being an act of will, that may or may not be the case. A materialist would surely disagree with you. Either way, I don't think the subject of will has to be relavant here.

Which materialist is your client here? Feel free to not think here, but this is a critical thinking forum. I don't get how will is entirely irrelevant to the question of consciousness and qualia. Maybe you could show me.

ME

 

[davidsmith73]

Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.

A thought has to feel like something doesn't it? To limit the notion of qualia to sensory experiences seems illogical to me.

Is? Not all thought is experienced directly as ordinary qualia.

I don't understand how an experience can be void of its qualia. To be so would mean the experience does not exist. To me, qualia are what experiences are made of. I assme you agree that mentalese are included in the category of an experience?

Which materialist is your client here? Feel free to not think here, but this is a critical thinking forum. I don't get how will is entirely irrelevant to the question of consciousness and qualia. Maybe you could show me.

ME

Free will is irrelevant to the issue of whether mentalese has qualia if you regard free will as an independent quale in itself. If you regard free will as being intrinsic to the mentalese then this is a semantic issue and free will has the same quale as the thought.

 

[Mr. E]

A thought has to feel like something doesn't it?

Why?

To limit the notion of qualia to sensory experiences seems illogical to me.

To extend the notion of qualia to include everything seems meaningless to me.

I don't understand how an experience can be void of its qualia.

"its qualia"? What is the limit as quale-content goes to zero?

To be so would mean the experience does not exist.

Does all cognition have qualia-existence? Why?

To me, qualia are what experiences are made of. I assme you agree that mentalese are included in the category of an experience?

I have no reason to believe that mentalese is more than a handy fiction, whether qualia exist or not.

Free will is irrelevant to the issue of whether mentalese has qualia if you regard free will as an independent quale in itself. If you regard free will as being intrinsic to the mentalese then this is a semantic issue and free will has the same quale as the thought.

I don't recall mentioning "free will".


ME

 

[BillHoyt]

Have been unable to post messages of the last few days for some reason. Anyway, I'll try to answer to your question -

I think to ask how qualia can be falsified is a statement with no meaning. It is by virtue of qualia that you are able to ask the question in the first place. If there were no qualia then you would not be asking the question and I would not be able to read it or answer it. So a prediction of the lack of existence of qualia would be a lack of consciousness. This is clearly not the case since consciousness is required in order to pose the falsifiability question. A bit of a paradox indeed. I think therefore I am.

Still reading the Dennet link

This is nothing more than a bald assertion, then. You have a soul. It is obvious; the soul is what animates you. You wouldn't be able to ask the question if you didn't have a soul.

Would you like to try to address the question, or do you wnat to stick with this non-starter bald assertion?

 

[BillHoyt]

Dennet?

Dennett...

You want someone to defend the Louis Armstrong definition of qualia? Why?

whom, apparently, you didn't read.

Maybe you could distinguish the differences among: subjective, personal, private. As far as I'm concerned qualia are objective and private, whether they exist or not.

Yes, and invisible unicorns are pink, whether they exist or not.

I've heard of "neural correlates of consciousness" but what would "physical correlates of qualia" amount to?

I expanded "neural correlates" to "physical correlates" since qualia are so ill-defined.

My redoubled response to your inquiry stands, despite your apparent ignorance of it. Maybe it's not at all what you were looking for.

As I said, it was utter pseudomathematical nonsense. I want you to describe a way to falsify "qualia."

 

[Interesting Ian]

I can see how you might be confused, and am willing to give the benefit of the doubt by assuming that you actually are confused, rather than being deliberately disingenuous.

Let's look again at what he actually said:

"...I grant that conscious experience has properties."

[but]

"...experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special."

In other words, he does not see consciousness as having any special properties such as qualia.

Dymanic, I have already addressed what Dennett has said. What is wrong with the response I have already provided?

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian re BillHoyt

Thought you must have me on ignore.

How disappointing . . .

In curiousity, is this how you go about refuting narrow-minded materialisms?

Huh??

 

[davidsmith73]

This is nothing more than a bald assertion, then. You have a soul. It is obvious; the soul is what animates you. You wouldn't be able to ask the question if you didn't have a soul.

I can give you practically endless examples of qualia by way of ostensive definition. When you ask a question, beit by word of mouth, written or mentalese, each form of expression is experienced. Therefore each form of expression has a qualia by definition. To falsify the existence of qualia would be to falsify the existence of experience. However, in order to falsify something you must have engaged in the process of analytical thought, which is by way of conscious experience is it not?

Your definition of the "soul" - it is what animates you. How does this relate to the experience of asking a question ?

I have explained why asking for falsification of qualia is an illogical statement because the existence of the whole process of falsification needs to be experienced. You haven't explained why the non-existence of the "soul" would mean experiences (of a question) don't exist.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Originally posted by davidsmith73
But even a question that is in the form of mentalese (thought) is qualia.

E
Oh? Source please? You seem to make the term so broad that it loses specific meaning.

Qualia is somewhat of an ambigious term. So here it states that

"qualia most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them".

I don't agree with this definition as I think qualia are sensory experiences themselves, not their properties.

BTW, as an aside the word properties as used in philosophy means:

"The word property, in philosophy and logic, refers to an attribute of an object; thus a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties. Properties are therefore subject to the Russell's_Paradox. It differs from the logical concept of class by not having any concept of extensionality, and from the philosophical concept of class in that a property is considered to be distinct from the objects which possess it".
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Property_(philosophy)

I agree that an object can have the property of redness (redness as experienced i.e the quale) but the conscious experience of redness does not have the property of redness. Rather the conscious experience of redness is redness.

As regards your dispute with David Smith over the definition of qualia this link might be helpful.

It states:

"Galen Strawson has recently claimed (1994) that there are such things as the experience of understanding a sentence, the experience of suddenly thinking of something, of suddenly remembering something, and so on. Moreover, in his view, experiences of these sorts are not reducible to associated sensory experiences and/or images. Strawson's position here seems to be that thought-experience is a distinctive experience in its own right. He says, for example: "Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities" (p. 196). On Strawson's view, then, some thoughts have qualia".

But then goes on to say that "this view is controversial".

 

[davidsmith73]

Thanks for those links Ian. Personally, I can't understand why "thoughts" are to be exempt from qualia. It seems inconsistent to declare so. It would be analogous to saying that certain physical processes are exempt from an objective existence.

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian

Dymanic, I have already addressed what Dennett has said. What is wrong with the response I have already provided?

What is wrong with it is that it indicates that you have not understood -- much less 'addressed' -- what Dennett has said. This is consistent with your continued refusal to actually read his books.

Originally posted by davidsmith73

Have been unable to post messages of the last few days for some reason.

So it wasn't just me after all!

 

[Interesting Ian]

What is wrong with it is that it indicates that you have not understood -- much less 'addressed' -- what Dennett has said. This is consistent with your continued refusal to actually read his books.

If I have not understood it then Dennett should explain himself better. It seems to me that I do not agree with his premises. Are you asserting that I am in error in this, and that I actually do agree with such premises?

 

[BillHoyt]

Your definition of the "soul" - it is what animates you. How does this relate to the experience of asking a question ?

It is a parallel. The claim is that the soul is immaterial, and therefore, not falsifiable. The claim is that the soul is responsible for animating you. The claim is that you would not be able to reply to this post except for the existence of the soul that animates you.

Do you not see that this is a) parallel to your claims about "qualia" and b) simply a bald assertion?

I think you may have missed my refinement of the question, posted earlier:

"I share Dennett's exacerbation with "qualia." I also share Dennett's postion that I do not deny the existence of experience. I am simply amazed at the claim that "qualia" are special. I also share with Dennett the perception that "qualia" are elusive, and perhaps, deliberately so."

So, please, at long, long last, explain how we falisify "qualia."

 

[Dymanic]

Originally posted by Interesting Ian


If I have not understood it then Dennett should explain himself better.

Or maybe he should just have simpler ideas.

If some of Dennett's arguments are not easily understood, it is due in large part to their running contrary to some of our most deeply entrenched notions about consciousness. Despite this, I think he does an excellent job of explaining them. I don't think you do agree with his premises, but by relying only on second-hand versions, you place yourself at a disadvantage in attempting to refute them. You are like a blindfolded swordsman, vigorously thrusting here and there, but missing your opponent entirely.

 

[Interesting Ian]

Or maybe he should just have simpler ideas.

If some of Dennett's arguments are not easily understood, it is due in large part to their running contrary to some of our most deeply entrenched notions about consciousness. Despite this, I think he does an excellent job of explaining them. I don't think you do agree with his premises, but by relying only on second-hand versions, you place yourself at a disadvantage in attempting to refute them. You are like a blindfolded swordsman, vigorously thrusting here and there, but missing your opponent entirely.

I was not relying on second hand sources. It was a direct quote from Dennett himself from that link. Of which I have read before, and also the first third again yesterday.