David Hume vs. Sam Harris

[Paul2]

"But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object."

David Hume, from A Treatise on Human Nature

 

[Humes fork]

I think the consensus of this the debate is (or at least should be) that Harris is a fool who doesn't know what the **** he is doing.

See Carroll and Myers on this.

 

[westprog]

I think the consensus of this the debate is (or at least should be) that Harris is a fool who doesn't know what the **** he is doing.

See Carroll and Myers on this.

Those of us who deny that you can derive “ought” from “is” aren’t anti-science; we just want to take science seriously, and not bend its definition beyond all recognition.

I don't wan't to go around the same circles on this, though I expect somebody will. The above expresses it well. Bad science is just as bad when it's making claims that science can't fulfill as when it's trying to get creationism into the classroom.

 

[Wowbagger]

Those who claim you can not derrive an "ought" from an "is" are underestimating the ultimate power Science can, and will, have in the Universe.

I will likely be quite busy defending that statement, in this thread, over the next few days. But, at the moment I do not have time to get into details about it.

 

[Marquis de Carabas]

Those who claim you can not derrive an "ought" from an "is" are underestimating the ultimate power Science can, and will, have in the Universe.

I like it when people use over-the-top hyperbole as a means of satire.

I will likely be quite busy defending that statement, in this thread, over the next few days. But, at the moment I do not have time to get into details about it.

Wait... you're serious?

 

[Humes fork]

Those who claim you can not derrive an "ought" from an "is" are underestimating the ultimate power Science can, and will, have in the Universe.

What scientific experiment can we do to determine which form of well-being that is correct?

I will likely be quite busy defending that statement, in this thread, over the next few days.

Most certainly.

 

[Wowbagger]

Wait... you're serious?

I seriously do think that those who claim you can't derrive an "ought" from an "is" are wrong about that.

I just wanted to get some attention declaring as much.

To save time, I am probably going to copy and paste a lot of what I said in this older thread, a lot:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=209698

Those who are going to engage in debate with me can read that thread, ahead of time, to anticipate some of my answers to your challenges, here.

What scientific experiment can we do to determine which form of well-being that is correct?

Who says only one of them needs to be correct? There could be many valid ways to define different aspects of well-being. We do NOT necessarily need to reduce it all to one, universal all-purpose definition.

And, there could be several empirical ways to measure those aspects. There are the simple, obvious ones like wealth and longevity. But, those alone might be prone to manipulation by themselves. One would also have to measure deeper into such things as environmental sustainability, disaster response effectiveness, violent crime rates, education prospects, etc.

Sam Harris illustrates the stark differences in well-being that are possible in his Moral Landscape book, by describing "The Good Life" and "The Bad Life" early into it.

 

[Wowbagger]

See Carroll and Myers on this.

I will respond to Carroll, now. Maybe I'll do Myers later.

I want to argue that this program is simply not possible. I’m not saying it would be difficult — I’m saying it’s impossible in principle.

None of Carroll's arguments are indicative of this. He shows us ONLY why it would be difficult, NOT why it would be impossible in principle.

1. There’s no single definition of well-being.

As I said in my previous post: There doesn't need to be. This is a complete non-issue. As long as there are one OR MORE reasonable ways to go about it, one can begin to measure well-being.

It might be good to have multiple ways of defining well-being, anyway: That way one will never dominate over the other. A world where accumulation of wealth is the primary measure would probably sacrifice a lot of other stuff to do it.

2. It’s not self-evident that maximizing well-being, however defined, is the proper goal of morality.

No, it is not self-evident. That is why it took so long for us to figure this out. Nothing much in science was ever self-evident to begin with.

What a silly argument!

Does anyone have an alternative proper goal for morality?

3. There’s no simple way to aggregate well-being over different individuals.

No, there is no simple way, that is true. This is going to be a difficult task, but not an impossible one.

As I stated in a previous post, there are several ways we can deeply measure the well-being of a society, and Sam Harris illustrated the scale of differences in his book.

In short, Sean Carroll is reflecting some of the challenges we will face, when science starts to inform us about moral decisions. Challenges which will have answers we can develop, and change, over time. He is not demonstrating that it is fundamentally impossible.

 

[Tony]

What scientific experiment can we do to determine which form of well-being that is correct?

What scientific experiment can we do to determine what items make up the healthiest, most correct diet?

 

[Marquis de Carabas]

As I said in my previous post: There doesn't need to be. This is a complete non-issue. As long as there are one OR MORE reasonable ways to go about it, one can begin to measure well-being.

No, this is a huge issue. Because you are going to have to make trade-offs between those "aspects" you mentioned in your previous posts. When two or more of these measures are in conflict, which wins out?

No, it is not self-evident. That is why it took so long for us to figure this out. Nothing much in science was ever self-evident to begin with.

What a silly argument!

Does anyone have an alternative proper goal for morality?

Did you actually read the whole thing?

There are certainly non-consequentialist ways of approaching morality; in deontological theories, the moral good inheres in actions themselves, not in their ultimate consequences. Now, you may think that you have good arguments in favor of consequentialism. But are those truly empirical arguments? You’re going to get bored of me asking this, but: what is the experiment I could do that would distinguish which was true, consequentialism or deontological ethics?

No, there is no simple way, that is true. This is going to be a difficult task, but not an impossible one.

Yes, it is impossible.

John Allen Paulos devised a nifty little hypothetical Democratic primary back in 1992. In it, the delegates ranked their choices from first to fifth. He then presented arguments that each candidate could put forward to demonstrate that they won the primary - that they were the top choice of the voters.

Now, this is not a moral issue, perhaps, but it perfectly illustrates the problem with trying to extrapolate from individuals to a group of individuals. In his example, we have perfect knowledge of what each voter prefers, but it is still impossible to definitively state what the group as a whole prefers. The arguments put forward in favor of some of the candidates are convoluted, to be sure, but none of them are demonstrably wrong. Ultimately, which candidate wins will be based upon the voting system selected, which is a reflection of the values of those selecting it.

And values are inescapably subjective. Moral choices are also based on values, and will run into the same problems.

In short, Sean Carroll is reflecting some of the challenges we will face, when science starts to inform us about moral decisions. Challenges which will have answers we can develop, and change, over time. He is not demonstrating that it is fundamentally impossible.

All you have done is side-stepped his arguments by denying them. You have not shown a single one of them to be in error.

 

[Drachasor]

John Allen Paulos devised a nifty little hypothetical Democratic primary back in 1992. In it, the delegates ranked their choices from first to fifth. He then presented arguments that each candidate could put forward to demonstrate that they won the primary - that they were the top choice of the voters.

In principle it is not outside the realm of science to answer this question. With a decent way to measure satisfaction, you could setup a study to examine which method maximizes satisfaction and then implement that voting system.

So if we're talking about maximizing group satisfaction and happiness, that IS measurable and within the realm of science. It might be difficult, but it is doable.

 

[Marquis de Carabas]

In principle it is not outside the realm of science to answer this question. With a decent way to measure satisfaction, you could setup a study to examine which method maximizes satisfaction and then implement that voting system.

Once you define what you mean by maximum satisfaction of a group, perhaps, but that definition is going to be based on... values.

Let's just assume you've got two groups of ten people and we have your decent way of measuring satisfaction, on a scale of 1-10 say. So we measure each group, and we get this...

Group A
1 1 1 1 4 4 10 10 10 10

Group B
1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

So, which group is more satisfied? Group A has the higher average, and four people who could not be any happier, but over half the group is on the bottom half of our satisfaction scale, with four of them being as dissatisfied as they possibly could be.

Group B has a lower average, but fewer people who are horrendously dissatisfied. The vast majority of them in the upper half of our scale, too. No-one's all that thrilled, though.

Of course, this is really nothing more than a simplified version of Paulos's hypothetical. Again, the problem is extrapolating from individuals to groups. To do it, you have to make some value judgments.

 

[Earthborn]

No, it is not self-evident. That is why it took so long for us to figure this out. Nothing much in science was ever self-evident to begin with.

I don't think Sam Harris ever argued that "well-being is the proper goal of morality" is a scientifically discovered fact. He argues that we must take it as self-evident.

Does anyone have an alternative proper goal for morality?

Sure, there have been alternatives proposals for the goal of morality. None of them have had any basis in science, just like Harris's.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Does anyone have an alternative proper goal for morality?

Other than maximizing well-being? Sure.

Good character. Duty. Etc.


Maximizing well-being is a utilitarian goal. That is simply one of the 'morality modules' we have in our brains. Nothing makes it 'right' in any ultimate sense.

The only thing you can argue with this is that science can investigate what works best given a framework that one decides upon ahead of time -- such as maximizing well-being, or the greatest good for the greatest number, however you want to express it. Scientific investigation can very nicely work out what works in such a situation.

We could also investigate what works best from a deontological perspective. Or from the perspective of character ethics.

We could even 'run the experiment' for seeing who seems to function best in the real world -- folks with character ethics frameworks, deonotogical frameworks or utilitarian frameworks. But by deciding up front 'who seems to function best' we have already set a framework for evaluation. Why that framework? Why not 'who does it with more style', or countless other options.

We can investigate all those things with science (so science and morality or science and religion, etc. are not separable, not entirely different magisteria), but making the decision of what framework to employ is not, properly speaking, a scientific decision. It is just a decision. Science comes into play in other ways.

Sam Harris' problem is that he thinks he knows what is self-evident. Nietzsche would likely argue with him that no, he doesn't. There are simply too many different cultural influences that determine what we each think is self-evident.

 

[Wowbagger]

No, this is a huge issue. Because you are going to have to make trade-offs between those "aspects" you mentioned in your previous posts.

No doubt there will be trade-offs! There are trade-offs in any moral system you propose! Unless you can name one without any, what-so-ever.

Science may have a different set of trade-offs to consider, than other moral systems. (A trade-off of trade-offs) But, the mere presence of trade-offs should not be a detractive factor in using it. Nor is the presence of such trade-offs indicative that such an exercise is impossible in principle.

When two or more of these measures are in conflict, which wins out?

THAT is a good question! One we may even face someday.

Obviously, the specifics will be dependent on the circumstances. But, in general, they can be resolved in ways science generally resolves its controversies.

For example: Let us say there is one study showing us that kidney dialysis machines are best left only to the wealthiest of society, and another shows us that they are should be assigned to every patient who needs one, in the order of when they got on the list for getting one.

We could resolve this by going with both solutions, in two different areas. In the long run, one might be proven to be better for society than the other, in ways the previous studies did not measure.

There are certainly non-consequentialist ways of approaching morality; in deontological theories, the moral good inheres in actions themselves, not in their ultimate consequences.

The competition-prone nature of our evolutionary heritage makes these non-consequentialist approaches unrealistic. Such ideals, though well intentioned, would likely leave ALMOST ALL of society's population open to the parasitic exploitation of a few who choose to think differently.

John Allen Paulos devised a nifty little hypothetical Democratic primary back in 1992. In it, the delegates ranked their choices from first to fifth. He then presented arguments that each candidate could put forward to demonstrate that they won the primary - that they were the top choice of the voters.

A pickle, to be sure, but not a completely insurmountable problem.

As Drachasor posted: You could implement each of those voting methods in different places. Over the long run, some would yield more satisfied voters than others.

Though, I would also add that much of that outcome can already be predicted by studying real-world examples of some of those methods. We can measure how satisfied constituents are with the general way results are handled.

I would predict that those results that are more straight-forward to measure, AND tend (on average) to show the greatest difference between the candidates, would be more satisfying. And, those where the margin of winning tends (on average) to be small, would be less satisfying. But, I could be wrong about that. I am willing to hear of studies that show otherwise.

And values are inescapably subjective. Moral choices are also based on values, and will run into the same problems.

Answering moral questions with science does NOT need to imply "First Mile Science". I think even Sam Harris agrees that it has to start with a value judgment to use science. But, that is no excuse not to use science to answer moral questions.

I once went into a bit of a rabbit hole trying to explain how even "First Mile Science" could be implemented. But, for now, I am going to skip that exercise. I will see if I can find the thread for those who are interested in enduring it.

All you have done is side-stepped his arguments by denying them. You have not shown a single one of them to be in error.

I am trying to outline frameworks for which questions can be answered, as they crop up in society. If it sounds like I am side-stepping, it is only because I do not know the details under which they will crop up, yet.

My point is to show that they CAN, in principle, be answered by science. NOT that I have all of the answers for all of them, yet. Just because I do not possess all of the answers does NOT mean Science will never be able to address and answer these conundrums you put before me.

 

[Wowbagger]

Of course, this is really nothing more than a simplified version of Paulos's hypothetical. Again, the problem is extrapolating from individuals to groups.

I would also like to add that this applies to almost all moral value systems*, it is not a unique problem for science. How would Christian Morality solve this? How would Anarchists (assuming they even hold an election) resolve this? Each one can develop answers, but none of those answers would be obvious, at first. Science is just another option we can put on the table, to answer these sorts of things, if we must.

(* The only exceptions I think of being those that explicitly value one mathematical system over another. Though, I suspect such a group would not likely emerge in reality.)

I don't think Sam Harris ever argued that "well-being is the proper goal of morality" is a scientifically discovered fact. He argues that we must take it as self-evident.

Well, "must" is a strong word. It would be nice if we could take it as self-evident.

But, I think Well-Being can defend itself as a good goal for morality, even against those who don't think it is all so evident, yet.

Sure, there have been alternatives proposals for the goal of morality.

Name a few that you think are defendable.

None of them have had any basis in science, just like Harris's.

What part of Harris's arguments are not based on science? Are you refering to the "first mile" thing? That it takes a value judgement to use science? Fine. I can accept that bit. But, unless you think I am mistaken, his arguments all seem to be science, science, science, from that point forward. And, that is what is most relevent.

My own opinion is that science could even bridge that "first mile". Its provisional nature allows it to change with the world, and yet its empirical nature keeps its findings grounded in reality, and thus more reliable in spite of its fluidity. That, in the long run, makes it a compelling to "initially value". A "value" that was only discovered through science, itself.

 

[Wowbagger]

If we get back to the CORE of the argument, It is NOT about weather science should answer moral questions, but about if it actually can answer moral questions. So far, I have focused too much on debating the potential quality of answers. I might not have addressed the actual "can" part, yet.

The best way to answer that is with some examples. I copied these from the other thread:

The "apocalypse": Science is not indicating that the world is going to end any time soon. It is morally unjust to ask people to give up their worldly possessions in anticipation that it will. Religious views on this matter are, in fact, wrong... and demonstrably so.

An example Sam Harris uses is the Burqa: Certain theocracies require women to wear them in public. But, if we can demonstrate scientifically that it degrades their well-being, how would they be anything less than morally reprehensible. (Even though this is a superficial aspect of a much larger problem of disrespect for half the population.)

When kidney dialysis machines were rare, science was able to develop a workable solution to the problem of who should be allowed access to them; when all other directions of thought on the manner become either a confusing mess or a controversial outrage. Those same insights are being used for organ donation waiting lists.

Though, as science changes, so does the strategy: Should people be allowed to bypass the list, if someone volunteers to sell them an organ? I think science will have more insights into this than any other form of thinking.

Science gives us profound insight into all sorts of biological issues: cloning, stem cells, abortion, etc. When they could be appropriate or not. Other "more morally prone" frameworks tend not to address them properly.

I have now answered the question "Can science answer moral questions?" with the word "Yes".

Even if you do not like my answers, they are still answers provided by science.


Perhaps you can think of some moral problems you believe science could not answer?

I think science is up to such an onslaught of challenges. But, let us now assume it is not. Let us assume some clever kid comes up with an actual moral question that science cannot provide an answer to:
Such a scenario would modify my "Yes" answer to something like "Yes, most but not all of them." But, that would still be a long way off from "NO! It is impossible in principle!!!" I have shown it is already being done, in practice.

 

[Drachasor]

Once you define what you mean by maximum satisfaction of a group, perhaps, but that definition is going to be based on... values.

Let's just assume you've got two groups of ten people and we have your decent way of measuring satisfaction, on a scale of 1-10 say. So we measure each group, and we get this...

Group A
1 1 1 1 4 4 10 10 10 10

Group B
1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6

So, which group is more satisfied? Group A has the higher average, and four people who could not be any happier, but over half the group is on the bottom half of our satisfaction scale, with four of them being as dissatisfied as they possibly could be.

B, most likely would be better, though it is a matter of scientific inquiry. You act like "are you happy with this result" is the sole measure of satisfaction and health. That's decidedly NOT the case. Group A is going to have more disaffected people, more polarization, and I think this would very likely produce more problems on many levels. So I would rather expect B would be shown to be objectively superior as far as the health and well-being of society are concerned.

Now, I suppose the health and well-being of society might be "values" to you, but I don't really see how this is the case anymore than the health and well-being of an individual is a "value." And yeah, this IS a value, but it is one that's rather inherent to being a human (who is a social creature).

Let's look at the group as a giant being.

You have person A:
He has 40% of his body in perfect health. His legs and arm, however, are in extremely poor shape due to burns, broken bones, and other damage (40%). This is putting some significant strain on some parts of his body as he tries to heal (the 4's).

Person B:
This guy has a major problem with one of his legs and perhaps a hip. Everything else about him is doing pretty well, though not perfect.

Who is healthier? Seems pretty clear it is person B. Anyone who looked at Person A and said "yeah, you might lose your legs and arm, but man, you look GREAT otherwise! Don't worry! At least you aren't like that poor schlub B, eh?"

This is, admittedly, a thought experiment. I'm not saying it is definitely the case. I am saying science can determine if this analogy is valid and if not what is a good way to look at it. Science can do this by examining the consequences of different voting methods.


Now, perhaps scientific inquiry would show two or more systems have no difference in the short and long-term satisfaction and well-being of society. If that's the case, then it doesn't matter which one you go with...they are equivalently good.


I don't think you can get "ought" from "is", on the other hand, the fact we are human inherently implies a number of oughts about out condition.

 

[Earthborn]

Those who claim you can not derrive an "ought" from an "is" are underestimating the ultimate power Science can, and will, have in the Universe.

One can acknowledge the power of science while still understanding that science has some limitations; it is under no obligation to deliver us things that are meaningless, illogical, nonsensical, or unscientific.

I would also like to add that this applies to almost all moral value systems*, it is not a unique problem for science. How would Christian Morality solve this? How would Anarchists (assuming they even hold an election) resolve this?

That has an easy answer: no one has solved this. No one ever will. It is ultimately unsolvable.

Saying that it is not a unique problem for a scientifically based morality is not much of a defence for such a morality. Sam Harris' "Moral Landscape" idea suffers from all the same philosophical problems that all the other moralities have suffered from. Nobody is saying its problems are unique, the criticism of the idea is that its problems are exactly the same!

Well, "must" is a strong word. It would be nice if we could take it as self-evident.

No, he has been pretty clear on numerous occasions that he thinks we must because without it we would not be able to speak meaningfully about morality.

Name a few that you think are defendable.

Why should I? Have I claimed that there any that are defendable?

What part of Harris's arguments are not based on science?

Which part of his arguments are?

Are you refering to the "first mile" thing? That it takes a value judgement to use science?

There's that. There is also the fact that it takes a value judgement to use "well being" is the basis for morality, a value judgement on what constitutes "well being", a value judgement to use "conscious creatures" as the entities on which it applies, a value judgement of what constitutes "conscious" ... that's a whole bunch of value judgements even before any of this "scientific morality" can begin.

But my objection to his concept runs deeper: I think science is the wrong tool to answer moral questions. Science ought not to deal with questions of "ought" and only of what "is"; its power comes from getting rid of such teleological thinking. Trying to cram it back in will only result in a hideously bad science and repugnant morality.

But, unless you think I am mistaken, his arguments all seem to be science, science, science, from that point forward.

I think you are horribly mistaken.

My own opinion is that science could even bridge that "first mile". Its provisional nature allows it to change with the world, and yet its empirical nature keeps its findings grounded in reality, and thus more reliable in spite of its fluidity.

There already is a view of morality that is provisional and that is allowed to change with the world. It is called "moral relativism" and it is the thing Sam Harris wants to get rid of.

 

[westprog]

I seriously do think that those who claim you can't derrive an "ought" from an "is" are wrong about that.

I just wanted to get some attention declaring as much.

To save time, I am probably going to copy and paste a lot of what I said in this older thread, a lot:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=209698

Those who are going to engage in debate with me can read that thread, ahead of time, to anticipate some of my answers to your challenges, here.


Who says only one of them needs to be correct? There could be many valid ways to define different aspects of well-being. We do NOT necessarily need to reduce it all to one, universal all-purpose definition.

And, there could be several empirical ways to measure those aspects. There are the simple, obvious ones like wealth and longevity. But, those alone might be prone to manipulation by themselves. One would also have to measure deeper into such things as environmental sustainability, disaster response effectiveness, violent crime rates, education prospects, etc.

Sam Harris illustrates the stark differences in well-being that are possible in his Moral Landscape book, by describing "The Good Life" and "The Bad Life" early into it.

You can, of course, derive an "ought" from an "is" and an "ought".