Charles Stross on the Singularity.....

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Where it starts to get murky is when we add the downloading issue into the mix and end up with copies. At the instant the download is complete and the "new you" is turned on, you are no longer a single minded entity. What then? Can we say we are still in essence a single entity but with two minds ... a "multiprocessor unit" with independent sensory inputs capable of simultaneous autonomous operation? Would many of such copies take on the persona similar to that of a "corporate entity", where all the "yous" are partly responsible for the actions of the collective? Or would the new "yous" be considered nothing more than advanced desktop computers and be considered property you could switch off at will?
I'm a little confused at what you're saying here. After a second reading, it appears you mean each mind controlling its own body (or robot simulation of a body or whatever). I at first thought you might mean several copies of the mind controlling one body.

I don't see such things being anything like a single entity. It's true they share the same exact knowledge until the copies were made, but from there they would communicate with one another the same way they communicate with other people. They'd of course have all the skills of the original, and of the original could dance like Michael Jackson, they could all put on a heck of a show, but I don't see where they would be like a "corporate" or "hive" mind.

As far as the copies being "property" one could switch off at any time, I think they might pretty quickly achieve legal status as persons. For one thing, they should certainly pass the Turing Test or any variation of it as well as any flesh-and-blood human.
Whether we like it or not, if we keep progressing the way we are, these are the kinds of issues we're facing. It's exciting and frightening at the same time. We live in amazing times.

j.r.
Things have been this way for a while now. Gutenberg made one of the most disruptive technologies ever (imagine a book reproduced at a rate many times that of hand copying!), and we're living the ramifications of that. Such new technologies are showing up more and more frequently, and the more it happens, more people notice the change not just in technology, but that such changes have effects on human culture.

Science Fiction has been around for a century or so and part of its reason for existence (besides the main reason of it being entertaining) is to explore the ramifications of scientific and technological change. Notable is the book "The Mind's I" (have I mentioned it yet?) that has at least one short story and discussion on the ramifications of exactly this technology (mind uploading/body duplication/transportation).
 
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I'm a little confused at what you're saying here. After a second reading, it appears you mean each mind controlling its own body (or robot simulation of a body or whatever). I at first thought you might mean several copies of the mind controlling one body.

I don't see where they would be like a "corporate" or "hive" mind.


All good responses there. Thanks.

About the idea of a "corporate entity", I don't mean a "hive mind", I mean like a normal corporate entity we have today where corporations are legally considered to be a separate entity, but they are still operated by groups of individuals ... boards of directors and so on. Something analagous to that where all your "yous" would be considerd to be a part of this corporate entity, part of the board ... so to speak, legally considered like other corporations to be a single entity.

j.r.
 
I'm not sure why Stross believes that the ability to upload consciousness will prove the non-existence of the soul.

Then again, I've been arguing for years that conscious AI may have souls.
 
For me the objection is that I don't want to die, which is what happens in the "make a copy and destroy the original" scenarios.

Hm, what would you consider to be the difference between the following scenario's?

1) You move from point A to point B in during time t
2) You get disintegrated at point A and recreated at point B during time t

From what I understand of physics, there is no actual difference in the two situations at time +t. All of the atoms in the universe (or probability distributions, either way) are positioned in exactly the same way. As such, a materialist couldn't possibly claim that there is a difference in the end result; that would require the positing of something non-material. So if you're going to claim a physical difference in the two situations, it would have to be that during time t, you aren't at any of the points between A and B... but that seems entirely arbitrary. The only alternative that I can see is that you say that it "feels" different intuitively, which seems to be the real issue at hand. That seems fair enough: I don't want to eat slugs even if they tasted great, since the thought just 'feels' icky. But that line of argument wouldn't at all imply that the person at point B is 'not really you' in any material sense.


ps: Please don't answer that the difference is that you die at point A in situation B, since the whole point of this post is to try and find out what you mean by that. :p
 
Hm, what would you consider to be the difference between the following scenario's?

1) You move from point A to point B in during time t
2) You get disintegrated at point A and recreated at point B during time t

...snip...

As far as I understand it you've defined the scenario so there can't be a difference?
 
As far as I understand it you've defined the scenario so there can't be a difference?

Well, as far as I can see, there couldn't possibly be a difference. But you seemed to indicate with your earlier posts that you thought there was. Bear in mind that there is no difference between the statement "You get disintegrated at point A and recreated at point B during time t" and "You get disintegrated at point A and a perfect clone of yours is created at point B during time t", since both statements describe the exact same process of building an exact copy of you atom for atom.

If you agree that there is no actual difference between the two, then you must agree that there is no meaningful difference between you and your clone in the original scenario (the fact that you take up different positions is irrelevant, as you don't become a different person by moving from point A to point B). It is not clear to me then, what you mean by "the objection is that I will die". Would you find it preferable if it were your clone that died? Because if you agree that there is no difference, then that preference would seem arbitrary. If not, why the emphasis on "I"? And if you agree that there is no difference between walking from point A to B and being disintegrated and recreated at point B, why would you not agree to being 'teleported' in this manner?
 
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Our wee brains evolved on the assumption that our brain's substrate is all we've got.

We really can't deal rationally with cases where we can alter or replace the substrate. We still think there is a ghost in the machine.
 
...snip... (the fact that you take up different positions is irrelevant, as you don't become a different person by moving from point A to point B). ...snip...

Er yes you do become a different person when you move, it is probably the most obvious way in which this meatsack interacts with the rest of the environment! I'm not sure of what point of mine you think you are arguing? My comments in this thread were about when we have two people existing at the same time i.e. DaratOriginal and DaratCopy. I can assure you with 100% certainty that DaratOriginal will not look at DaratCopy and say "Oh I'll just kill myself as it makes no difference since you now exist."
 
Our wee brains evolved on the assumption that our brain's substrate is all we've got.

We really can't deal rationally with cases where we can alter or replace the substrate. We still think there is a ghost in the machine.

I don't think there is anything at all difficult with dealing with the idea of parts being replaced. People seem to cope very well with having a heart replaced, and now even hand and face transplants. As I said earlier I can't see anything in principle that couldn't be replaced as long as function is duplicated.
 
Er yes you do become a different person when you move, it is probably the most obvious way in which this meatsack interacts with the rest of the environment! I'm not sure of what point of mine you think you are arguing? My comments in this thread were about when we have two people existing at the same time i.e. DaratOriginal and DaratCopy. I can assure you with 100% certainty that DaratOriginal will not look at DaratCopy and say "Oh I'll just kill myself as it makes no difference since you now exist."

Well yes, you can say that during the time that has passed in moving you have become slightly different. But you don't stop being Darat just because you take a step to the left. That should be obvious, but I have heard some argue that a clone is not the real thing because its location is different, which I think is trivial.

Anyway, if all you're saying is that you would not want to kill an existing copy of yourself under the motto of "there'll still be one of me left", then that's fair enough. It just seemed as if you were saying that your clone would somehow not really be you upon creation: as if killing you would somehow be worse than killing your clone. Or that being disintegrated and replaced with a perfect copy would still result in your permanent death.
 
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I don't think there is anything at all difficult with dealing with the idea of parts being replaced. People seem to cope very well with having a heart replaced, and now even hand and face transplants. As I said earlier I can't see anything in principle that couldn't be replaced as long as function is duplicated.
Yes, but I did not say "parts being replaced", I said "replace the [brain's] substrate". Entirely different things.
 

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