Can randomness exist?

[Rusty_the_boy_robot]

Ok, I finished your paper. In section 3, Errors in Logic Exposed, you made many errors in your logic. Such as:

You say determinism rests on empirical evidence. You then say that:

evidence for cause and effect is bounded in such a way as to including only supporting examples

You then conclude that this means:

the evidence is no evidence at all.

Rather this means that their evidence for cause and effect only includes evidence for cause and effect. If the evidence concluded that it was not cause and effect then it would not be included in the evidence for cause and effect.

Then you say:

Huem's argument can be turned arounda nd applied equally well to the theory that the laws of nature are indeterministic

For proof you say that we see chance events in the world. You have misunderstood deterministic. Chance does not imply cause or non-cause, it implies an unknown variable.

You then assert that "Numerous events transpire which are outside of our causal control". I don't know where you read that determinism somehow requires "our causal control".

You then try to bring in the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by statine that "we cannot be held responsible since we didn't "cause" the event" in reference to being hit by a drunk driver. No one would say we would hold the victim responsible! What would be said is that (if we believe the PAP) then we are not justified in holding the drunk driver responsible because his actions were necessitated by prior states of the world.

You then state "numerous laws of nature exist which appear to be tied to probabilities rather than cause-and-effect." A law of nature can not, analytically, be dependant on probabilities. If it is then it is not a law of nature. That is like my saying that I saw something that looked like a horse but it had wings, hence horses now have wings.

You then talk about how we cannot in principle possibly reduce something as complex as weather to cause and effect. Wrong again. We are trying to do it all the time with supercomputers. You are continually displaying that you do not understand the determinists argument.

Again in the same paragraph you state, "What caused you to arrive at work this morning at a specific time? Nothing did; yet your arrival may be statistically correlated to "office hours""

A determinist would never agree with you. They would say that the prior states of the world necessitated you to arrive at the time that you did. Here is an example:

Rusty arrived for work at 1100. Rusty arrived at this time because the state of the world was such that Rusty believed to keep his job he must arrive at that time. To keep his cleints he must arrive at that time. To get his work done he must arrive at that time. etc.. etc..

I don't have enough time for this. I've only gone through one page. You need to read more about the argument you 'think' you are arguing against. Go get some of Peter Van Inwagen's and Peter Strawson's work on determinism and some of Daniel Dennet's papers on mechanism (determinism with a funny hat).

 

[DrChinese]

1.1) The definition of TLOP is such that, analytically, there can be no statistical laws. I would assert that there are underlying TLOP in control of QP, hence your statistical laws are not laws, only statistics.

Also you assert that if we continue to assert "unknown" variables we can create an unfalsifiable theory. I assert that in principle you are absolutely incorrect. It is possible, in principle, to render everything into an observable state and observe it. Hence it is possible, in principle, to discover the falsisity in any theory.

3) I would assert that all things you list (time, mass, space, energy) are all ultimately physical so all causal relations are independant and it is possible, in principle, to render the physical relations to an observable state and hence discover an independant variable. By simply stating that it has not been done yet it does not validly follow that it cannot be done.

I am stating that all physical occurances must analytically have cause and effect. And if something lacks one or both then it is not physical, analytically.

What hypothesis? The definition of physical? That is not my hypothesis. I started this thread because I wanted to know if anyone had any proof that anything random could occur.

Ultimately I would *like* to see proof that randomness could occur.

I have no argument against randomness! I am saying that by definition an uncaused occurance is not physical. That is part of the definition of physical!

It's like me saying that a healthy horse has four legs. It's analytically correct.

Whoa! (that's a take on the horse analogy, just a little joke.) I have extracted your comments to allow me to focus on a couple of things. I got lost in your distinctions about "analytically physical" so maybe you can help out with some more examples.

TLOP = QM. That is the theory. QM is statistical, and states that there are no underlying causes for observable effects. Let's take a specific example, the observation of the polarity of an emitted photon. According to QM, the likelihood of an up polarization is equal to a side (90 degree perpendicular) polarization, and will occur randomly. There is no cause.

This can be observed in nature. Does this meet your criteria for analytically physical?

Also, you state that you would like to see a proof that anything random can occur. Can you demonstrate that anything deterministic occurs? Why do you assume that everything you see represents examples of determinism? For example, take human behavior. I would challenge anyone to demonstrate that human behavior is deterministic.

In other words, determinism is in the eye of the beholder. Hume saw determinism at work all around, but could not demonstrate that it should exist. So he assumed it. That horse doesn't fly (sorry, I got carried away).

When you say: "I am stating that all physical occurances must analytically have cause and effect." aren't you excluding random events by your definition? That would be the circular reasoning (or circular definition) I am referring to.

 

[DrChinese]

1. For proof you say that we see chance events in the world. You have misunderstood deterministic. Chance does not imply cause or non-cause, it implies an unknown variable.

2. You then state "numerous laws of nature exist which appear to be tied to probabilities rather than cause-and-effect." A law of nature can not, analytically, be dependant on probabilities. If it is then it is not a law of nature. That is like my saying that I saw something that looked like a horse but it had wings, hence horses now have wings.

3. You then talk about how we cannot in principle possibly reduce something as complex as weather to cause and effect. Wrong again. We are trying to do it all the time with supercomputers. You are continually displaying that you do not understand the determinists argument.

I am not trying to support my paper in this thread. No need to dissect it unless you consider it relevant. (I, of course, would be happy to defend it ad nauseum.) I added the numbers for clarity of comment and response.

1. When you say chance implies an unknown variable, you are falling into a famous trap. Einstein said the same thing in a well known 1935 paper. He argued for the existence of the hidden variables which would explain the otherwise random behavior of the photons I described in my previous post above. He argued that QM was not complete because a greater specification of the system must be possible.

Anyway, fast forward to today and that concept has been thoroughly discredited. If you are not familiar with the proof I can provide it. Bell 1964/5, Aspect 1981/2, etc.

2. "A law of nature cannot be dependent on probabilities..." Sure it can, that's what QM is. You are assuming that which you seek to prove. Of course, if you define all observations as being ultimately caused by something, you will prove that there is no random behavior. But that would be inconsistent with actual experimental evidence, I'm afraid.

3. As to weather, you are miles off track. The best supercomputers aren't even close. Hypothesizing that the weather will one day be predictable adds up to a lack of proof, not a proof.

 

[Agammamon]

Radioactive decay is an example of a random physical phenomenon. At their core most QM phenomenon are random. Being random does not imply being uncaused.

 

[DrChinese]

Radioactive decay is an example of a random physical phenomenon. At their core most QM phenomenon are random. Being random does not imply being uncaused.

I agree the decay is random. General viewpoint of QM is that the decay is not caused by anything. Not sure if you are saying that there is in fact an underlying cause.

 

[Knightmare6]

I would like to think randomness can exist, even in the most stable of things.

 

[DrChinese]

I would like to think randomness can exist, even in the most stable of things.

My view is that causality and chance are relative concepts. It is dependent on the observer. If Heisenberg's constant were 0, then all observers in a reference frame would clearly see causes preceding the effects. Determinism would be total, all things would be predetermined, and there would be no element of chance in atomic reactions.

But h>0, so that explains why we see a mixture of causality and chance. The future influences the past to a certain extent, as accorded the value of h. If h were higher, the past would have even less influence on the future. As h increases, there would be progressively greater disassociation between what we do and the results that derive.

Just a concept... So I think randomness is an essential element of our universe, which still exhibits plenty of stability because h is relatively low. (Although I guess 'low' is still subjective.)

 

[Stimpson J. Cat]

Rusty,

But as a physicalist you cannot believe that anything was not caused. If it wasn't caused then it wasn't physical. Philosophically physical things must have two traits:

1) 'it' is a cause.
2) 'it' is an effect.

There is no one "philosophical definition" of physical. There are many. The definition you have given is one. The definition I have given is another. The one I have given is the definition used by science. It is also the definition used by the philosophy of physicalism. If you insist on applying a different definition, then of course none of the statements made about physicalism using its definition are going to make any sense to you. Likewise, an accurate description of physicalism using your definition of physicalism, isn't going to sound very "physicalistic".

I have no interest in such semantic trivialities. If you want to understand the physicalist position, then you should try to learn the terms it uses, and not let yourself by tied down to specific definitions that may not have any relevance to it. likewise, if you want to understand science, you will have to learn its terminology.

So a non-caused event would not be an effect, hence it would not be physical. It would, in fact, fit the philosophical definition of random.

Not necessarily. Once again, which definition? The most common definition of "random" I know of, philosophical or otherwise, is "not deterministic". And as I already pointed out, non-causal does not imply non-deterministic.

It appears that perhaps the word random is carrying too many connotations. In science random appears to mean highly unpredictable. In philosophy it means not an effect of anything.

I have no idea what it means philosophically.I suspect that, like everything else, it means very different things to different philosophers. Scientifically, it means non-deterministic. Nothing more, and nothing less.

So QP does appear to demonstrate things that are philosophically random?

It demonstrates things that are acausal, and describes them with a (scientifically) random model. There are many different philosophical interpretations of this.

But if I'm reading everything correctly there are disagreements about whether that is just an appearance or that is correct.

There is philosophical disagreement about the metaphysical implications of it. This has nothing to do with science, though.

If it does, then I believe I can work QP into an argument suggesting that the "agent" does exist. All I need is any non-caused occurance to suggest that the "agent" is possible.

Don't reinvent the wheel. Just about every dualistic and idealistic theory out there has had somebody try to work QM into their argument. Such a task is pointless, though. QM is a mathematical theory which makes claims and predictions only about observable events. There are no metaphysical connotations to it. All any of the above attempts amount to is taking advantage of the fact that QM is still not completely understood, thereby making intuitive arguments from ignorance seem very compelling.

Dr. Stupid

 

[DrChinese]

Rusty,

There is no one "philosophical definition" of physical. There are many. The definition you have given is one. The definition I have given is another. The one I have given is the definition used by science. It is also the definition used by the philosophy of physicalism. If you insist on applying a different definition, then of course none of the statements made about physicalism using its definition are going to make any sense to you. Likewise, an accurate description of physicalism using your definition of physicalism, isn't going to sound very "physicalistic".

It demonstrates things that are acausal, and describes them with a (scientifically) random model. There are many different philosophical interpretations of this.

There is philosophical disagreement about the metaphysical implications of it. This has nothing to do with science, though.

Don't reinvent the wheel. Just about every dualistic and idealistic theory out there has had somebody try to work QM into their argument. Such a task is pointless, though. QM is a mathematical theory which makes claims and predictions only about observable events. There are no metaphysical connotations to it. All any of the above attempts amount to is taking advantage of the fact that QM is still not completely understood, thereby making intuitive arguments from ignorance seem very compelling.

Dr. Stupid

Very well said, Dr. S. As you point out, there have already been numerous and concerted attacks on the indeterministic side of QM, and this has gone on for at least 70 years. Your point about the wheel is right on.

The current state of theory is as follows: QM provides as complete a specification of the system as is possible (EPR/Bell/Aspect). Local deterministic theories - presumably the type Rusty envisions - are excluded from the realm of the possible. Non-local deterministic interpretations are within the realm of the possible, but they are indistinguishable from traditional indeterministic theories which respect c.

A careful study of the EPR paper, the Bell paper, and subsequent physical experiments by Aspect et al is critical to avoid going down a road that has been traveled extensively. These 3 papers are considered definitive.