Can democracy in Iraq survive a US withdrawal?

[WildCat]

Both times. I think he wet himself in fear when the US invaded Afghanistan, and then wet himself with delight when the US promptly got bored in Afghanistan, pulled out most of their troops, and went into Iraq.

I don't think there's ever been more US troops in Afghanistan than there are currently.

 

[seayakin]

I am extremely doubtful that democracy can function in Iraq given current ethnic tensions coinciding with external powers such as Al Qaeda and Iran trying to influence the outcome. We are currently providing some level of security that allows the government to continue to function at some minimal level but it is my personal believe the ethnic divisions are too deep to overcome. I am thinking our military presence probably delays the inevitable. However, I also have little doubt that if we leave tomorrow ethnic cleansing will occur. And, as someone pointed out, Iraqi Arab Shiites will not become bosom buddies with Iran because the ethnic divisions between Arabs and Persians goes deeper than the common religious beliefs.

 

[WildCat]

In hindsight if we had kept out of Iraq and concentrated our forces in Afghanistan and gone after the route cause of the problem (Al Qaeda and to a lesser extent the Taliban) in force it would have been a "cake walk" (so to speak) compared to the problems we are now facing in Iraq.

A significant portion of the Afghanistan population didn't want Taliban rule and welcomed the invasion and help offered by the coalition. Also you can't even begin to compare the technological and military might of the coalition as it is today with that of the former Soviet Union in the 80s.

The people who claim the military doesn't learn from mistakes seem to forget that the strategy of flooding Afghanistan with hundreds of thousands of troops was tried once before by the Soviets, and was a dismal failure. And the Soviets weren't concerned at all about trying to minimize collateral damage, they were as ruthless as any WWII army was. I think this was the main reason that huge numbers of troops wasn't considered for Afghanistan. The strategy instead was to try to work with the local tribesmen and warlords (with whom we had developed ties to during the Soiviet war). And this worked extremely well in driving the Taliban from power very quickly. Of course, the problem is they fled to the tribal areas of Pakistan where we couldn't follow and the Pakistani government is powerless to do anything.

The chances are that we'd have also captured (or killed) Osama Bin Laden because I think the general consensus is that he was indeed present during the Battle of Tora Bora (early on in the campaign), but a lack of troops on the ground allowed him to slip the net and head for the Pakistan border.

I still haven't heard anyone explain how we could have established a large force in that area of Afghanistan so early on in the war. It took months to get forces to Iraq, despite a friendly government in Kuwait offering full use of their ports and airports with which to do so. I just don't see how it would have been possible to get a large number of properly equiped troops to a remote area of Afghanistan with no port facilities and no airport to speak of, and no neighboring countries helping out.

Sometimes, you have to play the hand that's dealt to you for better or for worse.

 

[WildCat]

I am extremely doubtful that democracy can function in Iraq given current ethnic tensions coinciding with external powers such as Al Qaeda and Iran trying to influence the outcome. We are currently providing some level of security that allows the government to continue to function at some minimal level but it is my personal believe the ethnic divisions are too deep to overcome. I am thinking our military presence probably delays the inevitable. However, I also have little doubt that if we leave tomorrow ethnic cleansing will occur. And, as someone pointed out, Iraqi Arab Shiites will not become bosom buddies with Iran because the ethnic divisions between Arabs and Persians goes deeper than the common religious beliefs.

I've often wondered if it is really in the best interests of the US and the west in general to allow Iraq to fall into chaos and civil war. Al Qaeda wasn't able to use Afghanistan as an effective base with which to attack the west until the Taliban gained strong control of most of the country. I don't think any one side would be able to gain control of Iraq for them to be able to turn their attention westward. And as a bonus, Iran might well find itself playing the role the US does now of the hapless peacekeeper.

 

[Soapy Sam]

By "survive a US withdrawal", are you suggesting Iraq has democracy now?

 

[Ziggurat]

We are currently providing some level of security that allows the government to continue to function at some minimal level but it is my personal believe the ethnic divisions are too deep to overcome. I am thinking our military presence probably delays the inevitable. However, I also have little doubt that if we leave tomorrow ethnic cleansing will occur.

That may well be true. Except that if we delay the "inevitable" long enough, it may not be inevitable any more. We stayed in South Korea for decades, delaying the inevitable return of a conflict between the communist north and the autocratic south. And a funny thing happened: the south became democratic, the north became weak, and the biggest worry now isn't an invasion of the North Korean army, but an invasion of North Korean refugees fleeing an imploding regime. Of course, Korea isn't the same as Iraq, but the point is that things change over time. What's inevitable today may not be 20 or 30 years from now, and we are capable of staying for decades, if we choose to. Sunni memories of privilege under Saddam will eventually fade, and so will Shia and Kurd resentment for past oppression.

I think the more pressing question is to what extent we'll be able to scale down our presence while still providing the necessary stabilizing role. If we need to maintain 150,000 troops for decades, I think the public will eventually decide it's not worth it anymore, but long-term deployments of, say, 50,000 troops might be doable. The success of the surge suggests to me that this sort of draw-down may be possible long-term. And if it works, we will have gained a LOT from doing so.

 

[skeptical]

I've often wondered if it is really in the best interests of the US and the west in general to allow Iraq to fall into chaos and civil war. Al Qaeda wasn't able to use Afghanistan as an effective base with which to attack the west until the Taliban gained strong control of most of the country. I don't think any one side would be able to gain control of Iraq for them to be able to turn their attention westward. And as a bonus, Iran might well find itself playing the role the US does now of the hapless peacekeeper.

This exact reasoning has been put forward by a lot of proponents of a withdrawal. There have been some great presentations from CATO and others to the effect that none of the regional powers in the Middle East has any skin in the game to keep Iraq from growing out of control as long as the US keeps high levels of troops there. I think there is a lot to be said of this view.

Since everyone acknowledges that a military solution is not the answer, we must force a political solution. Iran and Syria, despite their bluster, desire an unstable Iraq only so long as the US has large numbers of troops in the country. When those troops begin leaving, they will have much more incentive to keep the violence from growing and spilling into their own backyards.

 

[Spins]

The people who claim the military doesn't learn from mistakes seem to forget that the strategy of flooding Afghanistan with hundreds of thousands of troops was tried once before by the Soviets, and was a dismal failure. And the Soviets weren't concerned at all about trying to minimize collateral damage, they were as ruthless as any WWII army was. I think this was the main reason that huge numbers of troops wasn't considered for Afghanistan. The strategy instead was to try to work with the local tribesmen and warlords (with whom we had developed ties to during the Soiviet war). And this worked extremely well in driving the Taliban from power very quickly. Of course, the problem is they fled to the tribal areas of Pakistan where we couldn't follow and the Pakistani government is powerless to do anything.

I wasn't particularly referring to flooding Afghanistan with hundreds of thousands of troops, just a more focused effort on tracking down senior members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This would have required more troops (in the initial stages) but not necessarily hundreds of thousands. The strategy would have still been (as you say) to work with the local tribesmen and warlords and provide much needed support for the Afghan Northern Alliance.

I still haven't heard anyone explain how we could have established a large force in that area of Afghanistan so early on in the war. It took months to get forces to Iraq, despite a friendly government in Kuwait offering full use of their ports and airports with which to do so. I just don't see how it would have been possible to get a large number of properly equiped troops to a remote area of Afghanistan with no port facilities and no airport to speak of, and no neighboring countries helping out.

Sometimes, you have to play the hand that's dealt to you for better or for worse.

Good point, TBH I'd forgot Afghanistan was landlocked and it's now pretty obvious why the military planners were forced to go the airpower and special forces route, especially early on. Did the coalition have control of Kabul (and it's airport) before the Battle of Tora Bora?

The points you made are well reasoned and it's obvious you've looked into this in some detail so I'll defer to you on the subject.

 

[Crossbow]

Ummm,

since Iraq is not a democracy, I think a better question to ask is:

Can the current government of Iraq survive a USA pullout?

At present, and for at least the next year, I would have to say that the answer is a decided 'No! The current Iraqi government is so fragile that it will not be able to survive a USA pullout for any appreciable amount of time.'.

 

[WildCat]

Good point, TBH I'd forgot Afghanistan was landlocked and it's now pretty obvious why the military planners were forced to go the airpower and special forces route, especially early on. Did the coalition have control of Kabul (and it's airport) before the Battle of Tora Bora?

IIRC, the airports at Kabul and Baghram were unusable early on, and had to be repaired before large planes could land there.

 

[skeptical]

Ummm,

since Iraq is not a democracy, I think a better question to ask is:

Can the current government of Iraq survive a USA pullout?

At present, and for at least the next year, I would have to say that the answer is a decided 'No! The current Iraqi government is so fragile that it will not be able to survive a USA pullout for any appreciable amount of time.'.

And the even better question is: SHOULD it survive if it cannot stand on its own feet?

If we are serious about self determination of the people of Iraq, it would seem that the question of what government should be in Iraq is completely the province of Iraqis. A govt which cannot command the respect of its own citizens cannot govern them, with or without the US military.

 

[Soapy Sam]

If we are serious, we should be asking whether "Iraq" as a concept is meaningful.
(It's largely a foreign office concept dating from about 1922- as are several other "nations" in them parts.)

Having decided that, just maybe we should ask the indigenes what THEY want?

 

[Undesired Walrus]

And the even better question is: SHOULD it survive if it cannot stand on its own feet?

If we are serious about self determination of the people of Iraq, it would seem that the question of what government should be in Iraq is completely the province of Iraqis. A govt which cannot command the respect of its own citizens cannot govern them, with or without the US military.

Yea but the problem is those who destabalise the country are coming from the surrounding countries, not just in Iraq.

 

[Ziggurat]

And the even better question is: SHOULD it survive if it cannot stand on its own feet?

If we are serious about self determination of the people of Iraq, it would seem that the question of what government should be in Iraq is completely the province of Iraqis. A govt which cannot command the respect of its own citizens cannot govern them, with or without the US military.

That's true in the long run. But it need not be true in the short run. South Korea was hardly a bastion of democracy when we defended it against North Korea, but it's turned out pretty well. It took a very long time of continuous military presence to get to that point, but it did, and I think it was worth it.

And quite frankly, the question is not simply whether or not the current government should survive, it's whether or not the alternatives to its survival are preferable. And the alternatives, at this point, don't even vaguely resemble the will of the people. If it were cost-free to us, then the obvious answer MUST be that the Iraqi government should survive. The only real debate should be over whether the cost is worth it to us. I believe it is, I suspect you feel otherwise, and that disagreement is fine. But to suggest that the iraqi government should fall to insurgents, terrorists, and sectarian militias because it's insufficiently democratic and still weak is... well, I can't quite find the appropriate word for it. But it isn't a worthy argument.

 

[skeptical]

Yea but the problem is those who destabalise the country are coming from the surrounding countries, not just in Iraq.

I am far from convinced that those elements comprise any significant portion of the problem. The evidence I have seen is the foreign fighters comprise only a small fraction of the "insurgency".

And, even if it is a bigger portion than I suspect, then that just means the Iraqis need to step up and defend their own country. If they don't want to control their own destiny, take charge of their own security, and build a consensus government of their own, we can't force it down their throats.

 

[skeptical]

And quite frankly, the question is not simply whether or not the current government should survive, it's whether or not the alternatives to its survival are preferable. And the alternatives, at this point, don't even vaguely resemble the will of the people. If it were cost-free to us, then the obvious answer MUST be that the Iraqi government should survive. The only real debate should be over whether the cost is worth it to us. I believe it is, I suspect you feel otherwise, and that disagreement is fine. But to suggest that the iraqi government should fall to insurgents, terrorists, and sectarian militias because it's insufficiently democratic and still weak is... well, I can't quite find the appropriate word for it. But it isn't a worthy argument.

Actually, my point was that if the current Iraqi government cannot obtain the support of its own populace, I fail to see why propping it up indefinitely is going solve anything. They have had nearly 2 years to consolidate popular support, backed by the most powerful military in the world, and it does not seem that they have done so.

I am not saying that the govt should be allowed to be hijacked by terrorists, but I AM saying that if the govt does not have the popular support of the Iraqi populace, we should not continue to prop it up if we are serious about having Iraq controlled by Iraqis.

My point was that the ultimate arbiter of what government is in Iraq should be determined by the people who live there, and not whatever government the US or anyone else wants. (assuming we are serious about self determination)

 

[Darth Rotor]

If we are serious, we should be asking whether "Iraq" as a concept is meaningful.
(It's largely a foreign office concept dating from about 1922- as are several other "nations" in them parts.)

Having decided that, just maybe we should ask the indigenes what THEY want?

Agreed. As with Yugoslavia, so with Iraq when the US pulls out. The fun meter starts to peg as the Saudis and others make their play to counter Iran, with US support from Kuwait and afloat in the Gulf.

Being a war correspondent never looked so good, in terms of continued employment.

DR

 

[Ziggurat]

Actually, my point was that if the current Iraqi government cannot obtain the support of its own populace, I fail to see why propping it up indefinitely is going solve anything. They have had nearly 2 years to consolidate popular support, backed by the most powerful military in the world, and it does not seem that they have done so.

Honestly, that's not a lot of time for a democracy. It takes time for politicians to create track records of either success or failure, and for the electorate to start voting based upon such records. Given the complete lack of any such institutions under Saddam, the whole system was essentially starting from zero. It's an iterative process, and we're still at the beginning of it.

I am not saying that the govt should be allowed to be hijacked by terrorists, but I AM saying that if the govt does not have the popular support of the Iraqi populace, we should not continue to prop it up if we are serious about having Iraq controlled by Iraqis.

If they keep having open and fair elections at regular intervals, why not? It's one thing if we're supporting politicians who not only don't do what the people want them to do, but hold on to power against the will of those people. It's quite another if the politicians just aren't performing as well as desired, but are still the preferred officeholders as determined by fair elections. Keep in mind also what happens in the US: people often have very low opinions about Congress as a whole, but approval ratings for individual congressmen and senators among their constituents consistently come out much higher. Nobody likes other people's congressmen, but everybody likes their own congressman (overgeneralizing, I know, but I think you get the point).

My point was that the ultimate arbiter of what government is in Iraq should be determined by the people who live there,

Which is why we should never let them cancel elections. But that sort of problem doesn't appear to be an issue in Iraq as far as I can tell.

 

[gumboot]

I still haven't heard anyone explain how we could have established a large force in that area of Afghanistan so early on in the war. It took months to get forces to Iraq, despite a friendly government in Kuwait offering full use of their ports and airports with which to do so. I just don't see how it would have been possible to get a large number of properly equiped troops to a remote area of Afghanistan with no port facilities and no airport to speak of, and no neighboring countries helping out.

The 15th MEU were in Afghanistan very early on, establishing Camp Rhino and securing Kandahar International Airport before the battle at Tora Bora. In fact they were supposed to be in the battle of Tora Bora and were very unhappy that they were pulled off the operation at the last moment. Here's what one of the 15th MEU officers had to say about it:

The next morning I was called to the COC for a brief. Our mission to Tora Bora was canceled. No American forces would take part in the operation. Instead, our Afghan allies would do the job. There were already rumblings about most of the assembled fighters slipping away across the border into the wilds of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Colonel Waldhauser said that fear of casualties had prompted the cancellation at the highest levels of the U.S. government.
Back in the tower, Jim kicked the wall when I told him the news. "Goddamn chicken**** decision. Casualties? What the **** do they think happened on 9/11? This is our chance to get those bastards."
I agreed with him, and so did Staff Sergeant Marine. He heard us yelling in the tower and came up to see what was happening. "Afghan allies? We don't have any Afghan allies. We got Afghans who'll do what we say if it helps them and if we pay them to do it. Bin Lade will trade 'em a goat and escape."
With that mission went our dream of laying our hands on America's most wanted man. But we felt relief, too. A winter fight in the high mountains against hardened mujahideen would have been ugly. They'd fought the Soviets on that ground for ten years. It was a measure of the mission's significance that the Marines knew all the dangers and still wished we'd gone.

Fick, N. One Bullet Away, Pg.138

 

[gumboot]

If we are serious, we should be asking whether "Iraq" as a concept is meaningful.
(It's largely a foreign office concept dating from about 1922- as are several other "nations" in them parts.)

That's a fairly dishonest claim, at least in the context it is normally used. The argument is usually that these are separate peoples who have only coexisted recently under the force of ignorant western map making.

This is not true at all - in fact Iraq has been unified under one central government or another for virtually its entire history, beginning with Sumer and continuing through the Akkadian Empire, Babylonia and Assyria into Persia, Macedonia, back to Persian, then the Caliphate, a brief stint under the Mongols and then the Ottoman Empire.

The term "Iraq" is a geographic term dating back to the middle ages, and "Irak" was a province of the Caliphate.